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This study set out to answer one critical question, namely, what is the most parsimonious theory
that explains Uganda's interventionist foreign policy behaviour in three of its neighbouring states
of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC during 1986-2006. Drawing on four theoretical approaches,
viz. Constructivism, Poliheurism, Liberalism and the Security Dilemma theory, which is a variant
of Realism, this study examines how the interventions manifested in each state. It is argued that,
the Security Dilemma theory is the most parsimonious theoretical perspective because it explains
multiple exercises of Uganda's interventions in its western neighbouring states. Where the
Security Dilemma is unable to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, it requires other
theories to complement it to explain all the interventions conclusively. The alternative theories
drawn upon to complement the Security Dilemma are Constructivism, Poliheurism and the
Utilitarian Liberal position. The study argues that although the use of a single theoretical
approach may indeed be able to explain a specific intervention at a given time, it may not be
sufficiently comprehensive to encapsulate Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in all three
states thus the application of multiple theories. The rationale of using multiple theories lies in
their ability to interpret different types of interventions and to complement each other in
explaining interventions.
Using a theoretical comparison, the study consisted of two phases. The first phase covered the
desktop research, which provided background information on the case as well as historical
documentary sources. In the second phase, qualitative and quantitative methods of data
collection and analysis were used to study the different ways in which Uganda's interventions
manifested in the region. More specifically, interviews were conducted with relevant political
actors in the region, and quantitative analysis of the censuses were carried out to obtain people's
opinions on respective foreign policy actions, thus providing the study with an in-depth
perspective on the processes that led up to the different interventions in each state.
Drawing on the Security Dilemma theory, the study established that Uganda intervened in its
western neighbours firstly, to stop insurgency and incursions into its territory by rebels that
exploited the strategic offensive advantage of the neighbouring states to wage war and carry out
terrorist attacks on Uganda. Secondly, Uganda wanted to stop the spill-over effects of the
neighbouring states' ethnic violence and struggle for power that affected Uganda's security.











regional conflicts to intervene as a means of containing these conflicts, which would have been
disastrous not only for Uganda but also for the states where the conflicts were happening.
Another argument that is advanced is that the interventions were motivated by the
misperceptions and mistrust amongst the regional leaders of each other's actions. Shifts in
alliance patterns, a breakdown in relations and differences of opinion regarding the security
matters of states and the regions greatly influenced Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.
It is argued from the Constructivist perspective that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was
a result of the norms, culture and identity that has been ascribed to Uganda primarily by itself as
well as by other actors in the international community, which compelled it to intervene in states
such as Burundi. From the Poliheuristic perspective, it is argued that Uganda intervened because
its leaders supported interventionism. It is also affirmed that the Utilitarian Liberal perspective
explains Uganda's interventions as motivated by its 'legitimate' economic interests in the region.
The central argument of this study is that the Security Dilemma is the best theory that explains
Uganda's interventions but that it is not a comprehensive theory. Other alternative theories need












Citizenship crisis: Adapted from Mahmood Mamdani, the term is used to refer to
the violent eruption of multiple ethnic based conflicts that
occurred at the same time in the neighbouring states of Rwanda,
Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the Great
Lakes Region of Africa.
Hardware: Military capability of a state that includes both tangible, i.e.
weaponry and force structure, and intangible characteristics, e.g.
military doctrine and the values that the military holds dear.
Hot pursuit When troops of one country pursue their enemies and ensure that
the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory being
protected does not offer any strategic advantage to the enemy for
future threat.
Military stature: The rating of a state's military force and capability is given in
relation to the rest of the military forces in a region.
National security: National security refers to the total capacity of the state to
provide the state and its citizens with a secure environment and
protection from threats, both real and imagined, from the external
environment.
Preclusive defence: The ability of a state to defend its borders against external attacks.
Regime security: Term used to describe leaders' behaviours and strategies aimed at
securing that they remain in power.
Security sector: Collective term used to refer to the components of the
agencies/groups in a state that provide safety and security, and
how these are managed for effective delivery of safety for all
citizens of a country.
Strategic depth: A state's capacity to prevent attacks from other states because of
its geographic area coverage.
Strategic level: A description of the combined geographic and hardware













AAC Anti Aircraft Weapons
ACRE African Crisis Response Force
ACRI African Crisis Response Initiative
ACSS African Centre for Strategic Studies
ADF Allied Democratic Front
ADFL Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
ANC African National Congress
APC Armoured Personnel Caniers
APM And-Personnel Mine
MEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
ATM Anti-Tank Mine
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CID Central Investigations Department
CMI Central Military Intelligence
CNDD/FDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy/ Front for the Defence of
Democracy
CNN Cable News Network
COMESA Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa
DCS Direct Commercial Sales
DISO District Internal Security Officer
DMS Direct Military Sales
DOD United States Department of Defence
DP Democratic Party
DPC District Police Commander
EAC East African Community
EASBRIG Eastern African Standby Brigade
ECA Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPDRF Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPLF Eritrean People's Liberation Front
ESI Economic Sustainability Index
ESO External Security Organisations (ESO)











EX-FAZ Forces Armées Zaire
FAPC Forces of Armed Congolese
FAZ Forces Armées Zairoises
FEDEMU Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FNI Integrationist National Front
FNL National Liberation Front
FNL-Icanzo National Liberation Forces-Icanzo
FRODEBU Front for Democracy in Burundi
FROLINA National Liberation Front
FUNA Former Uganda National Army
GLR Great Lakes Region of Africa
GPMG General Purpose Machine Gun
MEP Hydroelectric Power
HSM Holy Spirit Movement
ICD Inter Congolese Dialogue
ICG Intemational Crisis Group
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDP Internally Displaced Peoples
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL International Humanitarian Law
IMET International Military Education Training
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Indian National Congress
ISO Internal Security Organisations
JCET Joint Combined Exchange Training
KAP Kalangala Action Plan
LDU Local Defence Unit
LMG Light Machine Gun
LRA Lord's Resistance Army
MAD Mutual Assistance in Defence
MFPED Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development










MISAB Mission interafricaine de surveillance des Accords de Bangui (Inter-African
Mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements) (Central
African Republic (CAR)
MLC Congolese Liberation Movement
MMG Medium Machine Guns
MOD Ministry of Defence
MONUC Mission des Nations Unies en Republique Démocratique du Congo (United
Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo)
MRC Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens
MSP-Inkinzo Movement Socialist Panafricanist-Inkinzo
NALU National Army for the Liberation of Uganda
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDA National Democratic Alliance
NDU National Defence University
NIF National Islamic Front
NRA National Resistance Army
NRAC National Resistance Army Council
NRM National Resistance Movement
NSC National Security Council
OAS Organisation of American States
PAC Pan African Congress
PARENA Party of National Recovery
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PKM Russian-make machine gun
PP Progressive Party
PRA People's Redemption Army
PTA Preferential Trade Area
RADESH Rally for Democracy, Economic and Social Development
RCD Rally for a Democratic Congo
RCD-ANC Rally for a Democratic Congo-Armee  Nationale Congolaise
RCD-ML Rally for a Democratic Congo-Liberation Movement
RDC Resident District Commissioner
RPA Rwandan People's Army
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenades










SADC Southern African Development Community
SADC-NAM Southern African Development Community-Non Aligned Movement
SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons
SAM Surface to Air Missile
SAPS Structural Adjustment Programs
SPG Self Propelled Gun
SPLA Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SPLM Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
TPDF Tanzanian People's Defence Force
TPLF Tigrean People's Liberation Front
UBOS Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UFM Uganda Freedom Movement
UN United Nations
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNC Uganda National Congress
UNLA Uganda National Liberation Army
UNLF Uganda National Liberation Front
UNRF I Uganda National Rescue Front I
UNRF II Uganda National Rescue Front II
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UPC Uganda People's Congress
UPDF Uganda People's Defence Forces
UPM Uganda People's Movement
UPRONA Union for National Progress
URA Uganda Revenue Authority
US United States of America
USIS United States Investigation Services
WB World Bank
WNBF West Nile Bank Front
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INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
1.0 Introduction and Motivation of the Study
This study examines Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its western neighbours of
Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all of which are located in
the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. The central question of this study is to establish the
most comprehensive theoretical explanation of Uganda's interventions in the GLR states
during the Museveni administration of 1986 to 2006. The study is a timely one. Uganda's
intervention in the GLR has not only coincided with the international use of force by the US in
its military interventions in Iraq in 1991 and again in 2006-7, in Somalia both in 1992 and now
in 2007, and in Haiti during 1993-1994, as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's
(NATO)'s intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999. It also comes at a time in the post-Cold War era
when there has been a significant increase in military interventions generally by states.
Particularly in African states, intervention in conflicts is becoming very common.' The
legitimacy of intervention in states by other states poses a serious challenge in international
politics. Apart from the debate on whether intervention is justifiable or not, there is also a
serious debate on who should be allowed to use military force in intervention and when,
especially if such interventions are undertaken outside the legal framework of the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and if they are in contravention of international law.
The post-Cold War em has been replete with many interventions by individual states as well as
regional groups, for example in Liberia (1990-1998), Iraq (1991 and 2003), Burundi (1993-
2006), Rwanda (1994), East Timor (1996-2000), the DRC (1996 to 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-
1999), Afghanistan (1998), Guinea Bissau (1998) and Lesotho (1998). The causes of these
interventions have been observed, measured and described in many investigations and
researches carried out on the initiative of many actors - international, regional and national - as
well as organisations.' This study will explore what motivates states to intervene in other states.
G. Mills quoting Kofi Annan argues that interventions, particularly that of the US in Iraq and its interventions in
other African countries have set a precedent, which has led to a proliferation of unilateral and lawless use of force.
See G. Mills, "How to Intervene in Africa's Wars: Crimes of War Project", http://www.crimes of warorg/Africa-
mag/afr_03_mills_printirtml, accessed on 18 April 2006.











It will analyse the theories that have been applied to the study of intervention, specifically those
that are peculiar to Africa. Using the Ugandan case, the study will examine the motives of its
interventions by approaching them at a theoretical level. The aim of this study is thus to
establish the most parsimonious theory that can help to explain Uganda's intervention in its
neighbouring states of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.
Intervention is one of the many aspects of international politics that faces serious challenges.
At the international level, the UN Charter Articles 2(3) and 2(4) prohibit intervention in other
states and very explicitly states that "no state shall organise, assist, foment, fmance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the
regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife of another state"? This prohibition is also
contained in the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States, which was later reaffirmed in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International law? The UN Charter stipulates that states should settle disputes among
themselves by peaceful means instead of using force, and refrain from the use of force in their
international relations with each other?
At the regional level, interventions were prohibited in Africa by the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) charter. In its Selected Resolutions of the thirtieth regular session in 1976, in
Resolution CM/RES. 641 POGO), the OAU declared that peace and security of African states
was contingent upon strict adherence to tfre principles of people's political rights and national
sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-use of force
in territorial acquisition. It recommended that differences between states were to be settled by
peaceful means and within an African context. No justification whatsoever could be used to
intervene in another state. In clause 6, the African leaders reiterated their condemnation of the
tendency of certain non-African states and otfrer non-state actors to use mercenaries against the
security, independence and sovereignty of African states with a view to maintaining their neo-
colonial domination on the continent. In clause 7, the members also reaffirmed their will to
work towards the elimination of foreign military bases and to oppose all power blocs and
"lust Wars": Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004) p.223.













diversionist policies that characterised the international system at that time.' More specifically
in the OAU Article 3(2) member states affirmed their adherence to the principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of each other's states. The United Nations Charter, Article 2
paragraph 7, stipulates that states should not intervene in matters, which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of another state. If intervention is to be carried out, it should be
mandated by the UN and overseen by the UNSC. This is to prohibit states from unilaterally
intervening without close supervision. However, this has been disregarded on many occasions,
and states have unilaterally intervened in other states in contravention of the UN and OAU
chatters.
In the Cold War era, there were interventions and use of force in some parts of Africa, for
example, in Nigeria (1966), Western Sahara (1976-1977), Chad (1977), and Benin (1977). The
only advantage the intervenors and those who were invaded had at that time, was the easy
scapegoat of 'foreign influence' being used as the main underlying cause. Most interventions
were blamed on the former colonial masters' collusion with African opponents or dissidents. In
1961, an over intervention took place in Southern Zaire when the United Nations, the US,
using the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the French and the Belgians intervened to solve
the political crisis that had been caused by the south's attempt to secede. These interventions
occurred at a time when there were growing nationalist uprisings and demands for
independence, so they were simply seen as an anti-colonial process and a mainly foreign issue.
In spite of these interventionist wars, there was relative peace in the first and second decade of
independence of the African states, save for the coups and rebel activities that took place in the
region. This peace, it could be argued, was because states conformed to the regional regulations
and the tacit policy amongst leaders that what happened in a neighbouring state was not
important to you and you therefore had no right to intervene. Intervention was still seen as a
neo-colonial tool to retain control of former colonies.
The intervention that seems to have set the precedent on how future inter-state interventions
would be was Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978. 7 Ironically, this happened a year after the
6 C. Zdenek and C. Legum, "The OAU in 1980: Focus on Economic Problems and Human Rights" in Legum, C
(ed) African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey  and Document (London: African Contemporary Record,
1980) pp A64-A79
7 Interventions were initially not aimed at overthrowing an 'illegitimate' government but were carried out on
humanitarian grounds or to stop an impending secession. However, the fact that Tanzania fought against and











OAU had passed the resolution of non-interference in the affairs of other states. An
examination of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda has laid the blame on Uganda's earlier
incursion into the Kagera region in order to place it under Uganda's jurisdiction.' Others have
advanced three different reasons to explain this intervention. Firstly, it was suggested that it
was caused by tfre feuds between Amin and Nyerere? and that Nyerere was tired of the
increasing threats that Amin had made to him. Secondly, Tanzania wanted to protect its
territory against foreign invasion and to punish the aggressor. Lastly, it was argued that
Tanzania wanted to overthrow a dictatorial regime and replace it with a democratically elected
government.' However, the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda was clearly a violation of tfre OAU
charter. The failure of the OAU to reprimand Tanzania for this intervention meant that
Tanzania got away with this invasion; however, its demands for reparations from Uganda were
never upheld. During the Cold War, it could be argued that interventions were kept in check by
the ideological differences between states, as no state would risk intervening in the other for
fear of incurring the wrath of the former colonial master or the broader ideological camp,
especially after what had happened in Zaire-Congo."
In the post-Cold War era, African states continued to face challenges of intervention, albeit this
time not from the foreign powers directly (Europe or the US) but from fellow African states. A
new willingness has emerged among African armies to engage in conflicts beyond their borders,
and this threatens to make armed insurrection, with the help of neighbours, the preferred
means of political change in states in Africa.' In this study, an in-depth examination is done of
Uganda's interventions in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Drawing on the four
theories of foreign policy, viz. Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and Poliheurism, and
current debates on intervention, the study examines Uganda's interventions in Burundi,
state, it could easily organise an invasion to remove that president from power. This is what has subsequently
happened in the GLR and in postcolonial Uganda.
8 An indepth analysis of this intervention has been done by 0. Purley and R. May, "Tanzania's Military
Intervention in Uganda" in African Interventionist States, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001) pp. 69-92.
9 The personal feud between the two leaders lay in Tanzania's refusal to recognise Amin as the legitimate ruler of
Uganda and Nyerere's harbouring of Ugandan dissidents, among whom was Obote whom Amin had overthrown.
11 P. Mutibwa, U since Independence: A Story of UnfulfilledH pes(London: Hurts and Company, 1992)
pp. 125-147.
" The convoluted intervention in Zaire-Congo had resulted in the death of Patrice Lumumba and in that of Dag
Hammerskjold, the UN Secretary General at the time, and led to an intense struggle between the West and the
East over who wielded influence in the political arena. From then onwards, Africa stares saw intervention as an
exclusive preserve of the superpowers.
11 M. McNuky, "From Intervened to Intervenor. Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC" in Purley, 0.











Rwanda and the DRC. The aim of the study is to establish the theory that best explains
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR between 1986 and 2006.
Earlier studies that have explained intervention using the theories of Liberalism and Realism
and their variants have broadly attributed military and other types of interventions in tfre world
to the anarchic nature of inter-state relations, the insatiable desire for political and regional
power, ideological, economic interest and national interests." The Constructivists have argued
to the contrary, namely, that interventions are a new behaviour that states have acquired in
their socialisation with each other. They further hold that, in the post-Cold War era, states are
intervening because they consider it a norm that is characteristic of the current international
system. The military interventions of the United States (US) in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq" are
prime examples of this.' Unlike the above, the poliheurists attribute intervention to the leaders'
foreign policy decisions or their reaction to domestic conditions that threaten their legitimacy
and regime.
While all theoretical debates acknowledge the security concerns of states, the humanitarian
crises that result when wars spill over from one state to another, and the need to establish good
governance as the proximate causes of interventions, the question that remains is: What is the
the most parsimonious theory that can be used to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign
policy in her western neighbours? This study is salient because it comes at a time when there
are renewed theoretical debates on what motivates intervention, and whether intervention and
use of force in what is claimed to be 'undemocratic' states in Africa, is in fact restoring
democracy and peace, as its proponents argue.
11 The motives of intervention in general are similar whether they take place in Europe, Africa or Asia, the
underlying causes are the same and the motives only vary in magnitude. A detailed analysis of the motives behind
interventions in different regions is provided by K. Booth, "Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence in
Freedman, L. (ed), Military Intervention in European Conflicts,  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 56-75;
E. Holoboff, "Russian Views on Military Intervention: Benevolent Peacekeeping, Monroe Doctrine or Neo-
Imperialism?" in Freedman, L. (ed) Military Intervention in European Conflicts,  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1994), pp 154-174; IN. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society,  (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000); and N. Wheeler and T. Dunne, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian
Interventionism", International Affairs, Vol 77, No 4 (2001), pp. 805-822)
Constructivists argue that norms are values acquired by states through socialization with other states. In this
case, interventions are taking place because states perceive them as a norm within international politics.
15 M. Finnermore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in Katzenstein, P. (ed) The Culture of
National Security Norms and Identity in World Politic (Columbia University Press: New York, 1996), pp. 153-
185; F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, (West View Press: Oxford, 1998); F. Teson, Humanitarian
Intervention: An Ins into Law and Mo . , (2nd Ed) (Transnational Publishers, New York, 1996) and













There is consensus about the definition of intervention as a range of actions used by one state
to seek to influence the politics of another state. Such actions may include providing a rebel
group, another group or a state witfr any form of military or economic support on the pretext
that it is restoring order or implementing political and economic order to such state.' Although
this definition does not differentiate between a solicited and unsolicited intervention, it
acknowledges the role played by non-state actors as conduits through which the intervenor can
influence change in the intervenee." Another set of scholars define intervention, less charitably,
as the dictatorial interference by a state in the sphere of jurisdiction of anotfrer sovereign state."
These forms of interventions may be done covertly, or through deployment of troops, or
simply by means of cross border incursions. Although this is a harsh definition , it adequately
defines intervention; it is limited, though, because not all interventions can be considered
dictatorial. For example, an intervention that seeks to stop genocide or mass murders would be
a justifiable intervention according to the OAU and the UN, albeit on condition that it is
approved by the OAU (now the AU) or the UN. Teson's definition of "humanitarian
intervention" as "forcible trans-boundary action undertaken for the purpose of protecting the
rights of individuals against violations by their own governments" is a good example of a
definition that allows such intervention.' Of course, Teson's version raises serious concerns
about the rights of states to decide for themselves what is good or bad. This is exacerbated
16 T. G. Carpenter, "Direct Military Intervention" in Schraeder, P. (ed) Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign
Polly in the Third World. (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 155; P. Schraeder, "Studying US Intervention in the
Third World° in Schraeder, P. (ed) Intervention into the 1990s: US Foreign Policy in the Third World.  p.2,3. Nye,
Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory History  (New York Harper Collins, 1993),
p. 132; C. Crocker, "Introduction" in Crocker, C, Hampson, F. and Aall, P. (eds) Herding Cats: Multiparty
Mediation in a Complex World, (Washington DE: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999) and M.
Finnemore, The P se of Intervention: Clin t theUse  of Force (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 2003).
17 The term intervene' has been used in this thesis to refer to the state that has been intervened in, either
unilaterally or multilaterally.
111 K. von Hippel , "The Non Interventionary Norm Prevails: An Analysis of the Western Sahara" in The journal of
Modem African Studio, Vol 33, No 1 (1995), pp. 67-81; J. Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa
Incrementalism, Crisis and Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 8; H. It Ransom, Coven
Intervention" in Schraeder, P., Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign Policy in the Third World,  (London: Lynne
Rienner, 1992) pp. 113 and 117; B. Hedley, "Introduction" in Medley, B. (ed) Intervention in the Third World,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 1; B. Healey, "Intervention in the Third World" in Medley, B. (ed)
Intervention in the Third World, pp. 136-137; and C. Kegley and J. Herman, "Putting Military Intervention into
the Democratic Peace: A Research Note" in Comparative Political Studies, Vol 30, No 1 (1997), p.87.
F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law,  p.62; and F. Teson, "The Liberal Case of Humanitarian
Intervention" in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, It, Humanitarian In ention: Ethical Le al and Political











when states feel that International Law protects them, because states are not permitted to
interfere with the internal affairs of other states. Teson vehemently opposes this position and
argues that states should not take the advantage of sovereignty to abuse the rights of their
citizens because the International Law protects them. In this study, I define intervention as
interference by one state (the intervenor) in the internal affairs of another state (the intervenee
or target state), whether diplomatically, militarily or by other means, with the express aim of
protecting the intervenor and ensuring that the intervenee pays allegiance to the intervenor. It
is this allegiance that the intervenor presumes will partly guarantee his safety from external
threats, particularly from enemies that may choose to use the target state as a base to destabilize
the intervenor. The target state would be a client state in subsequent economic relations and
would provide the intervenor with a strategic geopolitical advantage over its adversaries.
1.2 Causes of Intervention
Briefly, interventions have inexhaustible causes that include but are not limited to security
causes, economic interests or humanitarian concerns. Historically, interventions have been a
common feature of international relations since time immemorial. Finnemore positions
interventionist foreign policies of states in the fifteenth century. During this time, the aims of
interventions were mainly aimed to protect people in territorial and religious wars or to collect
debts owed to their nationals by other states!' In the twentieth century, interventions were
linked to the decolonization process, in which colonial states were fighting against the mandate
system of the League of Nations (LON) and against the trusteeship system of the United
Nations (UN) to gain independence. In the twenty-first century, there have been many forms
of intervention, the most prominent of these being humanitarian interventions, direct military
interventions or indirect logistical and economic support either to the government in power or
to the dissidents of a particular govemment with the ultimate aim of causing a change in the
social setup in the intervenee.
Interventions have evolved over time from being restricted to religions wars, as Finnemore
points out, to interventions that change entire regimes of other states. In contrast to
Finnemore, however, Schroeder argues that interventions have not changed over time but that











they have always served the same purpose" He does argue, though that the difference between
past and present intervention lies in the sophistication with which they are now being carried
out? Interventions in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, have increased and are
motivated by different reasons. The most common explanation is that they are aimed at serving
the political objectives of one or more of the great powers," as well as to maintain secure
borders and sovereign control of policy, which has remained a constant concern within the
Third World." It is necessary to examine the different types of intervention to analyse the
theoretical approaches that are relevant to studying them. The rationale for this that it is clear,
from the previous section that certain theories are more suited for explaining interventions of a
specific type. The theories themselves further frave variants and revisions that give different
interpretations of what causes interventions. A good example is the liberal theory, which has a
neoliberal variant. On the one hand, for example, neo-Liberalism favours a state-centric
explanation but it also traces intervention to the character of the regime in power. On the other
hand, utilitarian Liberalism, which also interprets intervention from a state-centric perspective,
puts emphasis on the economic interests of the state. Types of interventions are discussed in
the following section.
1.3 Types of Interventions
Military intervention
Military intervention is defined as the direct engagement of soldiers of one state in another
state with the intent of either overthrowing a regime or ensuring that the intervenor's interests
are met. In the past, military intervention was often for ulterior motives or for genuine motives,
if it had been instigated by international law (UNSC action). In the post-Cold War era,
however, it has expanded its role to that of humanitarian assistance in cases of severe
environmental disaster or man-made disasters such as genocides or attacks by rebels, or at the
request of a falling government. Many scholars have preferred to dissociate military
Schraeder, "Studying US intervention in the Third World", in Schraeder, J. (ed) Intervention into the 1990: US
Foreign Policy in the Third World,  p. 3
12 Ibid.
21 M. Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflia and the International
System (London: Lynne Wenner, 1995).
14 S. Wright, "The Changing Context of African Foreign Policy", in Wright, S. (ed) African Foreign Policies .











intervention from invasions and argue that invasion is unsolicited and aims to punish the victim
state for an action that it has carried out, with the purpose of forcing it to conform to a certain
standard. Instead, they argue that intervention is often preceded by a life-threatening event that
cannot be ignored, for example genocide, natural disaster, advanced warfare and threats to use
nuclear warfare. Finnemore and Hauss, however, challenge the whole notion of military
intervention being different from declaring war on states. They both argue that military
interventions in states are aimed at changing the political authority of the target state, and that
such intervention requires massive deployment of military forces, an aspect that is not different
from a declaration of war."
Military intervention has attracted much research and debate, with overwhelming reference to
the US interventionist foreign policy in the Third World and the motivations driving it."
However, with many states joining the intervention business, military intervention has now
extended to all aspects of international relations. Military interventions in the post-Cold War
period have taken on multiple forms, such as unilateral action by the UN or by individual
governments, as for example, France in Rwanda and tfre US and NATO in Kosovo and
Somalia. Multi-lateral use of military force to deliver relief or for humanitarian put poses at the
request of non-governmental organisations or civil society groups' demands has also become a
common feature, particularly in intractable conflicts or complex emergencies such as Somalia,
Kosovo, Sudan and Iraq, which were rare in the past." What remains unexplainable is wfry
military force was not used in the Rwanda genocide even when there were similar appeals made
by non-governmental organisations and tfre international community at large.' This has raised
the question: when and where should military interventions take place?
25 C Hauss, "Military Intervention", http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/military_intervention.jsp,  accessed
on 24 February 2005 and M. Finnemore, The ose of Intervention: Changing  Beliefs About the Use of Force,
P. 8 .
16 L. Calhoun , "Killing, letting die and the alleged necessity of military intervention", in Peace and Conflict Studies,
Vol 8, No 2 (2003), hap://www.gmu.edu/acadernie/pcs/Cal82PCS.htm,  accessed 30 June 2005; F. Weissman,
"Sierra Leone: Peace at ey Price" in Weisman, F. (ed) In the Shadow of "Just Wars": Violence, Politics and
Humanitarian Action, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); D. Rieff, 'Kosovo: The End of an Era" in
Weissman, F. (ed) In the Shadow of "Just Wars": Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action, D. Rieff, A Bed for
the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York Simon and Schuster, 2002) and M. Rupiya, °The DRC: A
Humanitarian Catastrophe Ignored?" in Sidiropolous, E, (ed) A Continent Apart? Kosovo, Africa and
Humanitarian Intervention, Johannesburg: SAIL, 2001), pp144-145
"M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force, p.20.
28 Innumerable authors and scholars have discussed the Rwandan case  and questioned why Rwanda was not
treated like other cases that needed help See, for example, L. Melvern , A People Betrayed : The Role of the West in
Rwanda's Genocide, (London: Zed Books, 2000); L. Melvem, Conspiracy  to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide 
(London: Verso, 2004); P. Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families:












Humanitarian intervention is defined as an intervention that addresses an emergency resulting
from man-made or natural disasters. It involves the quick removal of people from terrible
situations, such as genocides, wars or armed conflict. In the words of a UK Permanent
representative to the UNSC, humanitarian interventions are "an exceptional measure on
grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.' In broader terms, it has been defined as
"proportionate trans-boundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to
individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who would be
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government".'
Humanitarian intervention is currently given the biggest coverage and authorship, arguably
because of the gruesome murders and human suffering that are portrayed by the mass media
and the accounts of such events released in the public sphere by international non-
governmental organisations. It is generally agreed by a range of scholars that, irrespective of the
impact humanitarian intervention has on the people, it is a form of intervention that can be
justified as long as it is undertaken within tfre framework of international law and the UNSC
requirements. However, if these mandates cannot be issued, humanitarian intervention must
nonetheless take place.' Humanitarian intervention has thus become common. Kofi Annan,
former UNSC General Secretary, has described it as a new international norm in favour of
Collective Memory, (Washington DO Howard University Press, 1999); G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of
a Genocide, New York Columbia University Press, 1995); and R. Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil
Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 74.
29 P. Muggleton, citing the British UNSC representative in his "The Doctrine of Humanitarian intervention and
the NATO strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" in Coady, T. and O'Keefe, M. (eds) Righteous
Violence: The Ethics and Politics of Military Intervention,  (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005), p. 102.
40 Ibid.
31 See, for example, F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality,  (3rd Ed) (Ardsley :
Transational Publishers, 2005); M. Finnemore "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in
Katzenstein, P. (ed) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics;  p. 180; A. Tanga, TIM
Intervention (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003); J. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian
Intervention Debate" in Holzgrefe, J. and Keohane, IL (eds), Humanitarian Intervention, Ethical.
Political Dilemmas, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 15-52 (2003); F. Teson, "The Liberal
Case for Humanitarian Intervention" in Holzgrefe, J. and Keohane, It (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,
Ike al and Political Dilemmas, pp. 93-129; T. Coady and M. O'Keefe (eds), Righteous Violence: The Ethics and
Politics  (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2005); and J. Stromseth, "Rethinking
Humanitarian Intervention: The case for incremental change" in Holzgrefe, J. and Keohane, It (eds)










intervening to protect civilians and an emerging pattern in post-Cold War international
politics."
Critiques of humanitarian intervention are often concerned not about the use of the military,
but the way in which humanitarian intervention manifests itself. In some cases where a military
force has undertaken intervention, the military often gets involved in a wide range of other
non-military components, involving reconstruction of the collapsing state, addressing
inadequate social services or even involving themselves in over-hauling war-torn societies and
remaking them in accordance with the normatively preferred liberal democratic model. A good
example of this is the case of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda in 1979P As a result of the
military's extension into post-war reconstruction activities, they became entangled in other
activities too, for example, engaging in economic activities, and becoming involved in the
politics of the intervenee, which compels them to take sides or arguably to protect the ethnic
communities that are targeted by their fellow ethnic communities. The consequences of
humanitarian intervention often discredit the intervention; in other words, although the initial
intervention may have happened for very noble reasons, it may end up discredited and there
may be a loss of faith in it by the communities concerned or the international community in
general. Examples of such humanitarian interventions include Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-
Bissau (1998), Kosovo (1998) and Liberia (1990). The principal aims of these interventions
were to save people from war and intra-state ethnic strife, or saving people from massacre and
abusive regimes that violated their citizen's human rights and yet people were killed in the
process."
31 See N. Wheeler and T. Dunne, "East Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism" in International
Affair  Vol 77, No 4 (2001) p. 805.
33 M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention °, p. 139 cites the Tanzanian case. The
inclusion of the Tanzanian invasion as an example here is a little problematic because there is a difference between
a state that unilaterally intervenes in another country and remains there after the intervention to reconstruct the
intervenee, and a state that is authorised by the UNSC to intervene as part of a peacekeeping force to stay and
help in the reconstruction of that intervenee.
34 See D. Rieff, At the Point of the Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention; D. Rieff, "Kosovo: The
End of an Era° in Weissman, F. (ed) In the Shadow of "Just Ware': Violence Politics and Humanitarian Action,
p. 290-291; J. Herbst, "Self Determination and the Future of the African State" in Sidiropolous, E. (ed) A
Continent A ? Kosovo, Africa and Humanitarian Intervention, Johannesburg : SAILA, 2001), pp. 197-210; J.
Kurth, "Models of Humanitarian Intervention: Assessing the Past and Discerning the Future" in Orbis  Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Vol 9, No 6 (2001) and S. Samkange, "African Perspectives on Intervention and State
Sovereignty" in African Security Review, Vol 11, No. 1 (2002), p.73-












Ransom defines covert intervention as a foreign policy instrument based upon secrecy and
deception?' Often used by the major powers in their relations with the Third World, covert
intervention involves multiple actions by one state against another, aiming at exacting a specific
reaction or relationship. This intervention may include secret propaganda, manipulation of
foreign electoral processes, overthrowing  governments, secret financial assistance, paramilitary
operations or assassination of political leaders. 36 Covert intervention, by its nature, is impossible
to qualify or prove, but it remains an ominous and sometimes lethal way of dealing with an
enemy state or a state, while pretending to be a friendly state. At a regional level, neighbouring
states can easily employ coven interventions in support of their neighbours' dissidents, by
manipulating a section of the population to rebel against the existing government, or even
ensuring that the policies of neighbouring states are sabotaged.
Covert intervention in the Cold War era occurred along the ideological lines, with communist
and capitalists supporting different groups of leaders within a state. In the post-Cold War era,
coven operations have become even more common, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, it is
no longer necessarily foreign powers that undertake such covert operations, but it may be
African leaders acting against their fellow leaders. Covert interventions stand in direct
contravention of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law and the subsequent
UN Resolution 1373 of 2001 and UN Resolution 1506 of 2004, which prohibit states from
aiding or allowing armed bands of other states from committing terrorist acts against their
states.' International law stipulates that a state that covertly provides active support to armed
bands of another state to enable them carry out incursions in another state's territory is an
accomplice of unlawful use of force."
35 For a detailed examination of coven intervention, see H. Ransom, "Covert Intervention° in Schroeder, J.P.,
Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign Policy in the Third World,  (London: Lynne Renner, 1992) p. 113.
36 Ibid.













Schraeder defines paramilitary intervention as economic and military aid designed to foster an
armed insurgency against a foreign government, usually with the intent of overthrowing said
government." Paramilitary intervention often employs the services of insurgent groups based
sometimes in another state or in the state itself.' It is characterised by covert operations and
indirect military interventions. It may include the provision of military weaponry or financial
assistance, and in Africa, it sometimes includes the loaning of military troops by one state to
another with the express aim of achieving a short-term objective, such as a coup or removing a
rebel group from a specific territory."
Diplomatic Intervention
Brecher and Wilkenfeld outline two main types of interventions, i.e. diplomatic interventions
and third party interventions!' Examples of diplomatic intervention include the periodic
negotiations in domestic conflicts, e.g. the US in Cyprus and the US mediation in the Middle
East. Others include mediation between leaders e.g. the US mediation between the leaders of
Uganda and Rwanda and currently the just concluded South African mediation of Thabo
Mbeki between the warring factions in Ivory Coast, in which they signed a peace agreement as
well as pledging to hold elections in April (2005). Brecher and Wilkenfeld further perceive third
party intervention as "any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the crisis, that is
designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and
therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself"." They limit "Third party
interventions" to those by superpowers or multi-lateral organisations, yet there is a significant
role played by middle powers like Australia in the Pacific Island and East Timor and an
increased role of regional organisations in the Third World. The post-Cold War era has also
witnessed the interventions of African states in other African states.
3' P. Schrader, "Paramilitary Intervention" in Schraeder, JP., Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign Policy in the
Third World, p. 131.
40 Ibid.
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In all these variants of intervention, it is evident that they can take place for multiple reasons.
Irrespective of what type of intervention is undertaken, it is important to note that international
law is very specific about when intervention is allowed. Intervention in general is prohibited,
and if it must happen, it must be under specific jurisdiction and in specific circumstances.
Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that all members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Even under the customary law, sovereign states are protected by the rule of non-interference or
non-intervention; the law specifies that states must refrain from interfering in the domestic
affairs of other states. In spite of this, interventions have become even more common and, as
Kofi Arian observes, military interventions even more than all other forms of intervention have
become an international character of international relations." As the debate continues in the
UNSC with regard to when intervention should take place and what best option or type of
intervention should be used, the question of who should intervene remains a salient issue in the
intervention debate. Should it be an immediate neighbour or any state that has the capacity to
intervene? In the following subsection, who should intervene and when is briefly discussed.
1.4 Who should intervene and when?
Whereas there is a consensus that intervention should take place under the auspices of the
UNSC to contain intrastate wars, abuses of human rights, ethnic violence, and violent political
power struggles in states, in cases of environmental disasters there are divergent views as to
who should intervene. When states should intervene and how the intervention should be
carried out. The UNSC remains the indisputable intervenor and the main actor in the
intervention business. In terms of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the UNSC is
mandated eitfrer to intervene expressly by sending a peace mission or to delegate a state to
intervene on its behalf, or it may sometimes ask states to contribute troops or logistical
support. Examples of such UNSC interventions are numerous but good examples are the
recent cases where the US was asked to help in Somalia and Haiti, or France to help in in44
 Kofi Annan, cited by G. Mills, "How to Intervene in Africa's Wars: Crimes of War Project," http://www.crimes











Senegal and Rwanda." In addition, the UNSC is the only international body that authorises
states or regional groups to intervene, although regional actors could sometimes intervene on
their own initiative if the situation in a particular state in the region is compromising the
stability and security of other states. Nonetheless, it is required that even in such situations,
where regional organisations have decided unilaterally to intervene in a specific situation it must
be done with the full knowledge of the UNSC and preferably only after the UN has mandated
the regional organisation to take action. The UN Charter Article 52 stipulates tfrat states have a
right to make regional arrangements to deal with matters of international peace and security
and urges them to make "every effort" to settle local disputes peacefully and within the
framework of the purposes and principles of the UN. Such intervention by regional groups
should not amount to "enforcement actions" unless this has been authorised by the UNSC and
is done with regular accounts, giving feedback on such an intervention to the UNSC. Article 52
stipulates.%
Amide 520)
Nothing in S present duster precludes the existence  of regional arrangements  or agencies  for
dealing with such matters as relating to the maintenance  of international  peace and security as are
appropriate for *anal action, provided that such arrangements  or agencies and Sir activities are
consistent withthe Purposeand Pri ciples tithe United Nations.—
However, given the shortcomings of both the UNSC and regional organisations in addressing
crises by delaying interventions or not intervening at all, unilateral intervention by a group of
states or a state acting on its own initiative has become a common feature in international
politics. While international law placed the responsibility of authorising and legitimating
interventions on the UN and on regional security groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS), the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (and lately, the Association of South East
Asian Nations [ASEAN]), there are circles that argue that states have the right to invite other
states to intervene to help them sort out conflicts. They also argue that when states are
violating the rights of their citizens to an unacceptable degree, then neighbouring states have
the right to intervene and stop this."
45 I. Williams, "Sudan, To Intervene or not to Intervene?" http://www.una-uk.org/africa/africaconts.html,
accessed on 25 May 2005.
46 It Wallace, International Law p. 291-292.
45 F. Teson is a proponent of this view. See his F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and











In some regional groupings, for example in the Organisation of American States (OAS), North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), SADC and ECOWAS, procedural requirements of
interventions are well laid out to ensure that they are legitimate. In the African Union, for
example, intervention is considered a legitimate alternative, provided it is undertaken within a
holistic framework that addresses the root causes and conditions of conflict, and provided it is
aimed at building peace and stability." In the UN, similarly, intervention should follow the legal
framework and be mandated by the UNSC under Chapter VII. This states that action of the
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace, is
permitted. The UNSC can furthermore authoriz intervention under UNSC Article 42. Article
42 specifically provides that the Security Council may authorize intervention by armed forces to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Articles 55 and 56 imply an affirmative
obligation on member states to take joint and/or separate action to promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. It should be noted,
though, that all these procedural requirements of intervention ignore the urgency with which a
bad situation may become worse. As demonstrated by the Rwandan case of 1994 or currently
the Darfur case in Sudan, prompt action may be required. As Museveni argues, there is a need
to encourage "bureaucratic and political structures to measure the known price of sticking their
necks out and doing something against the less tangible and measurable costs associated with
having to pick up the pieces later, human casualties, loss of political prestige, famine and
refugee relief, economic reconstruction and peace-keeping"." Furthermore, the UN requires
interventions undertaken by the UNSC and its regional counterparts to be in a manner that is
commensurate with the needs of the time; they must also attempt to be as impartial as possible
to prevent an already bad situation from deteriorating into war.'
(West View Press: Oxford, 1998).
48 M. Locke, "African Perspectives on Intervention and Internal War" in African Security  Review, Vol 11, No 1
(2002) p.87.
49 Y. Museveni, Parliamentary address on the security situation of Uganda°, 21 November, Parliamentary
Hansard (2002), p. 21. Museveni subscribes to the philosophy that, when a neighbour's house catches fire, you
have to go out and check or help, or else the fire can easily extend to your own house. Secondly, he argues that a
neighbouring state cannot wait until a nation is wiped out in genocide, just because it has to wait for permission
from the UN or help from outside.
50 g. Olufemi, "Regionalism and African Foreign Policies" in Wright, S. (1999) African Foreign Policies, (Oxford:











The literature on who should intervene and when is dominated by the legitimacy of the UNSC
and of regional security groups, thereby excluding independent states from interventions. In my
opinion this is an error, in that, whatever the conflict, these international organisations should
work with the states in and around the regions in question. Without their involvement, little
can be achieved by way of pacifying waning groups or stopping an ethnic conflict of the
magnitude of Kosovo, Rwanda and the DRC.
1.5 When to intervene: Challenges of Intervention
The timing of the intervention is also controversial because, depending on tfre conflict, the
intervenors and their purposes, the timing of the interventions undertaken is dependent upon
the character of the conflict, the type of intervention to be undertaken, the parties involved in
the conflict and the ripeness of the conflict. If conflicting parties are not amenable to peace and
are in the middle of fighting and a regional group intervenes, it is extremely unlikely that it will
solve the conflict; the Israel and Palestine case is instructive here.' Similarly, if the parties to a
conflict are determined to annihilate each other, then the timing of the intervention is
particularly crucial, because it will have to prevent genocide. A delayed intervention results in
the situations such as those in Rwanda and Kosovo in which thousands of lives were claimed.
It is assumed that interventions that are requested by a state from their regional organisations
or by another state face the least challenges (such as the SADC intervention in Lesotho at the
request of Prime Minister Mosisili52  and MISAB intervention in Central African Republic).
However, evidence suggests that, no matter whether the state requested to intervene or
whether the UNSC or regional groups authorized it, the outcome of interventions sometimes
compromises the very peace that the intervention seeks, particularly if it is undertaken at the
wrong time'. The Rwandan case again is a good example of this.
The UNSC and regional group structures often, have strict procedural requirements that affect
the timing of the intervention. The bureaucratic nature of the decision-making process, the
5t M. Finnemore and K. Siklonk , "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change" in International
Vol 52, No 4 (1998), pp. 887-917; M. Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs
eout the Use of Force, and J. Fox, "Religious Causes of International Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts"
International Politics, 38 (2001), pp. 515-532.
52 J. Lewin, "African Interventionist States and International Law", in Furley , 0. and May, R. (eds)











nature of states' foreign policies ('states' here refers to the countries that provide the
peacekeeping troops) and the legal requirements of these peacekeeping contributors (as
stipulated in those states' constitutions) greatly influence the timing of an intervention." Even
when a situation is particularly serious, such as a genocide, the timing of past interventions has
demonstrated that delays in making decisions to intervene or the legal hurdles before sucfr
actions can be taken have often failed to prevent genocides or serious humanitarian crises."
In some cases, the constitution of a state spells out a particular foreign policy, yet that state may
face challenges that force it to revisit its foreign policy. When tfris happens, it is most likely that
states will ignore the legislature and instead evoke clauses within their constitution that favour a
particular action. The US interventions, for example, in the three cases of Panama (1989),
Grenada (1983) and Cuba (1962) were carried out without congressional approval." Similarly in
Africa, states sometimes intervene without full permission from their legislature and executive,
based on the justification that the situations at hand was so serious that quick decisions had to
be taken and shortcuts had to be found within their constitutions?'
The nature of the existing leadership in the state contemplating an intervention also poses a
challenge in deciding when the intervention should take place. Leaders of neighbouring states
may be reluctant to commit their troops because they are trying to obey international law,
which prohibits the deployment of troops in another state without the mandate of the UNSC.
However, leaders and states may also focus on ensuring good neighbourliness, and conditions
in the neighbouring state may warrant intervention by virtue of its geographical proximity. In
the DRC interventions, for example, no leader had obtained permission from either their
executive or the legislative anus of government, while some leaders used their constitutional
prerogatives to intervene militarily and inform their governments later."
53 M. Bamett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda  (New York Cornell University Press,
2003).
50 C. Brown, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Political Theory" in Moseley, A and Norman, It (eds),
Human Rights and (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 153-169.
55 J. A. Rosati, "The Domestic Environment in Schroeder, 3. P. (ed), Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign
Policy in the Third World, pp. 175-191.
56 B. Baker, "Going to War Democratically: the Cow of the Second Congo War 1998-2000", in Contemporary
Politics, Vol 6, No 3 (2000), pp. 263-282.
57 W. D. Baker "The Dog that won't Wag: Presidential Use of force and the diversionary theory of war" in
ts, Vol 111, No 5 (2004), Centre for Contemporary Conflict,











The use of military force in 'humanitarian intervention' poses new and unanswered questions
for the intervening nations, especially considering that the intervenors are not direct parties to
the dispute that is allegedly justifying recourse to war." Why would states use force in a
humanitarian intervention? Why is military force used in some cases and not in others? If
NATO was concerned with the pligfrt of the people of Kosovo, then why were areas that were
densely populated with civilians bombed? Why did ground troops not directly confront the
enemy soldiers whose actions the campaign was supposedly intended to stop? These questions
posed by Calhoun are vital to any inquiry into the use of force for humanitarian intervention.
She questions the rationale of killing in the name of self-defence, particularly when the mission
of the intervention is to save lives. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (MONUC) in the DRC recently killed the Congolese to reciprocate for the death of
their colleagues." The argument they used to justify their action was that "they shot because
they were shot at". Although this is a plausible argument, it also ultimately creates distrust in
intervenors. Clearly, intervention is a complex issue and its outcomes, though sometimes
predictable, are often underestimated. Ebrahim summaries it well when he argues that
... intervention is a controversial  issue. No matter who intervenes, there will
always be different opinions asto whether it was right t o intervene  or not
Nevertheless , states or the international  commie* should k mixing
towards a situation where, ever without authorization fern multilateral
bodes, intervention can take place Saran provisions do haze to le met,
though: there must be the political Tall and a dear understanding of how theintervention
 should b e done and it must be aimed  at preventing
humanitarian  disaster , whether caused by military behaviour orenvironmental
 issues.'
In the light of this debate of who, why and when states should intervene, the aim of this study
is to develop a theoretical explanation for Uganda's interventionist behaviour that is as
comprehensive as possible. The study, as has been pointed out before, thus focuses on
58 L. Calhoun, 'tilling, letting die and the alleged necessity of military intervention", in Peace and Conflict Studies,
Vol 8, No 2 (2003), hnp://www.gmu.edu/academic/pcs/Ca182PCS.htm,  accessed 30 June 2005.
58 In March of 2005 MONUC peacekeepers were lolled by one of the military factions in the DRC avenging the
MONUC peacekeepers' rape of the Congolese women. In retaliation, MONUC invaded a whole village and lolled
people whom they alleged were leaders of the factions and arrested the others on grounds that they had refused to
surrender and disarm.
88 E. Ebrahim, "Seminal Discussions", in Kadima, D. and Kabemba, C. (eds), Whither al Peace and












Uganda's intervention in three of its western neighbours, namely Burundi, Rwanda and the
DRC.
1.6 The Problem
Interventionism in Africa has coincided with the onset of the post-Cold War era. Interventions
during the Cold War were simply attributed to the 'Cold War'. Tfrey were portrayed as proxy
wars sponsored by the superpowers the interventions in the Congo-Zaire and in Nigeria during
the sixties and in the Western Sahara, Chad and Benin during the seventies. In the post-Cold
War era, African interventions have come to be attributed to multiple factors. On the one
hand, they are portrayed as a continuation of the struggle of the superpowers for hegemonic
control over Africa, particularly as a struggle between the Anglo-Saxons versus the
Francophone axis", using African states as proxies. On the other hand, they are portrayed as
motivated by a whole range of factors that are peculiar to Africa. These factors include (but are
not limited to) economic interests, humanitarian considerations, political power struggles in
intervening states, and geo-strategic security concerns." All of these factors have been
advanced to explain many of the interventions in Africa in general, and some of them are
mentioned in interpretations of Uganda's interventions in the GLR.
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR has been attributed to three main factors.
The rust is Uganda's economic interests in specific states and its general interest in exploiting
the economic advantages of the region as a whole. The second is Uganda's hegemonic
ambitions and imperialist attempt to create a Hima-Tutsi empire. The third is that Ugandan's
motive was to spread its revolutionary framework, its so-called 'movement' brand of
democracy to its neighbours. Consequently, the regime changes in the states of Rwanda and
Burundi in the GLR have been attributed to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. Some of
61 Proponents of this Anglo-Saxon-Francophone view are many, but most prominently are 0. Ogenga, "Uganda
as a Regional Actor in the Zarin) War", in Adelman, H. and Rao, G. C. (eds), War and Peace in Zaire/Congo
Analyzing and Evaluating Intervention 1996-1997, (Trent: African World Press, 2004), pp. 54-57 and p. 78; A.
Wallis, Silent Accom slice: The Untold . Story of France isRole in the Rwandan Genocide(London: LB Tauris,
2006), p. 64; and John Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo Wan. Uganda's Vietnam° Clark, J (ed) The
African Stakes of the Co vo War, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002b), p. 147. Also see J. Clark, "Explaining
Ugandan Intervention in Congo: A Thick Description", in Kabweru  Mukwaya, A. (ed) Uganda  Riding the Political
Tiger: Security and Wars in the Great Lakes Reg*, (Kampala: Makerere University Printery, 2004), p. 67 and
J. P. Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa : Two Thousand Years of History, (New York Zone Books, 2003).
62 A wide range of literature exists on the interventions in Africa and Uganda's interventions in particular; a
critique of this literature on Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is done in Chapter Three and for purposes of











these motivations have been widely contested by both scholars and the state, both of which
provide alternative explanations of its behaviour. Other motives such as Uganda's humanitarian
considerations and its national security concerns have been ignored by many scholars, because
it was felt that they were used as pretext to conceal its economic and hegemonic ambitions."
An interpretation that has been subsumed in other factors, has been brought to the fore, and
has since characterised the debate on motives of interventions. It is the "Crisis in Citizenship"
and the spillover argument." Mahmood Mamdani is the proponent of this ethnic conflict
model, to which he attributes the trend of interventions in the GLR region. He argues that
postcolonial governments used ethnic affiliation to access positions of power and to legitimise
themselves. Their governments expelled competing ethnic categories and effectively tried to
annihilate them. These victim ethnic categories fled to neighbouring states, where they were
further marginalized and not recognised as victims of their repressive governments but rather
as intruders seeking to benefit from their asylum states. The struggle for survival in these
repressive asylum states and their inability to return to their own states resulted in a struggle to
return nonetheless. Mobilizing themselves on ethnic levels, they launched military attacks on
their home states and demanded to be treated as natives of these states and recognised as
ethnic categories that are entitled to citizenship, access to political power and other services
that other citizens in that country were accessing. This history of the ethnic struggle amongst
ethnic categories and how it played out in several states (with emphasis on Uganda), as well as
its impact on the GLR, Mamdani argues, must be understood if the interventions of African
states in the GLR region in general need to be comprehensively explained.'
It is against this background that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the GLR,
particularly during the Museveni administration from 1986 to 2006 is examined. It is critical to
63 For purposes of brevity, the factors that have been advanced to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy
are only dealt with superficially  here. A detailed literature review of intervention is done in Chapter Three of this
thesis.
64 M. Mamdani uses "Crisis in Citizenship" as a term to identify the complex nature of the ethnic struggle for
citizenship in the GLR.
65 e exhaustive review of Mamdani's works on the GLR is impossible here, but this section focuses on four of
his related works: M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001a); M. Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAFES
Trust, 2001b); M. Mamdani, "Democratic Theory and Democracy Struggles in Africa" in Okwudiba Nnoli (ed),
Government and Politics in Africa: A Reader, (Harare: AAPs Books, 2000), pp. 220-239; M. Mamdani "Rwanda-
Uganda Intervention in the Congo", in Mandaza Ibbo (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, (SARIPS Series, 1999), pp. 33-34 and M. Mamdani, "Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis", Talk
delivered to the workshop on Reflections on the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 23 September











understand whether the available theories are sufficient to explain Uganda's interventions. This
study thus proposes to examine Uganda's intervention using four theories, the Realist variant
known as the Security Dilemma, Construaivism, Poliheurism and Liberalism. The justification
for this multi-theoretical approach lies in the inability of each theory to address Uganda's
interventions comprehensively on its own.
As Clark notes, Uganda like other interventionist states such as the US grossly underestimates
the high risks of interventions and will therefore most likely become entangled in many of its
interventions." He further argues that Uganda's intervention in the DRC, for example, is
analogous to the US' intervention in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s which had serious
consequences? This makes Uganda an interesting case. Internationally, Uganda's military
interventions contravene Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in
other states, as well as related international conventions and protocols. Those of Uganda's
interventions that have been motivated by altruism equally contravene the 1965 Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of the State. This declaration prohibits
states from intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other state it explictly states that, "... no state shall organise, assist, foment,
fmance, incite or tolerate subversive terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of the regime of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state"? Uganda's
interventions further contravene the OAU charter and other regional agreements e.g. the Addis
Agreement', which Uganda has ratified
In this period, from 1986 to 2006, Uganda's foreign relations with its western neighbours have
been characterised by unstable relations, inter-state wars, intra-state wan and civil strife both in
the neighbouring states and in Uganda itself. Some GLR states are wary of any dealings with
Uganda and the country has in fact been sued at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Uganda has intervened in GLR states militarily, diplomatically and covertly to mitigate
humanitarian disasters caused by intra-state conflicts. These interventions have been contested
66 See J. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War: Uganda's Vietnam?" in Clark, J. (ed) The African Stakes
of the Congo War , pp. 145 -165.°
Clark notes that the US intervention in Vietnam caused a loss of colossal sums of money and claimed many US
military officers and men, to the extent that the US wondered whether intervention in Vietnam had been
worthwhile. See J. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo Wan. Uganda's Vietnam?" in Clark, J. (ed) The
African Stakes of the Congo War,  pp. 145 -165.
69 R. Wallace, International Law, p. 286.











and Uganda's interventionist foreign policy has been challenged. Uganda that has become a
central player in African foreign relations has been the focus of debates, conferences, and peace
talks that continue to seek solutions to the GLR conflicts. In view of tfris, it is a particularly
relevant to examine the best theoretical explanations of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy
with a view to contribute to African international relations literature.
1.7 Justification of the Study
Interventions and the reasons why they take place have been analyzed and studied in various
disciplines, for example in law, politics and international relations; this study aims to explore
the interventions of African states from a theoretical perspective. This study will contribute to
the literature on African international relations as well as to arrive at a better understanding of
Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. Uganda has been named as a major actor in the GLR
conflicts and its interventionist foreign policy has come under attack from its neighbours, the
international community and the citizens of the country themselves. The focus of Uganda's
interventionist foreign policy fras been on the DRC, it is envisaged that the findings of this
research will create a greater understanding of Uganda's foreign policy in general. It will not be
limited to isolated incidents, such as the DRC intervention, but will also cover the entire
interventionist foreign policy of the Museveni administration.
1.8 Scope of the Study
The study focuses on Uganda's foreign policy of the Museveni administration covering the
period from 1986 up to 2006, when Uganda lost a court case at the International Court of
Justice. 1986 is an important starting point because of the regime change that brought
Museveni into power following the overthrow of Tito Okello Lutwa who in turn frad
overthrown a democratically elected' dictatorial regime.' The regime change that ushered
Museveni into power also marked the end of the domination of political power by the North'
and the shift of political power to the 'South?' His ascension to power was partly aided by
Museveni's justifications for waging protracted guerrilla warfare were the rigging of elections and the dictatorial
reign of Obote II's reign, which he sought to ready. Although in reality he overthrew Tao Okello Lutwa, who
had overthrown Obote, Museveni continues to argue that he overthrew Obote's regime and that of its proteges.
71 The terms North and South are widely used to refer to the regional political division within Uganda. The North











Tutsi refugee soldiers from Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, as well as by Ugandan peasants
whom he used in his war." The success of his guerrilla warfare and subsequent capture of
political power marked the beginning of an era of the use of force to change regimes not by
'outsiders' but 'insiders'."
What is crucial about the use of force in the GLR was the reciprocity aspect with which
interventions were carried out.' The period is also important because Museveni's successful
accession to power led to a spiral of guerrilla warfare, marked the decline of the dictatorial
regimes of the western neighbours and the accession to power of leaden supported by Uganda
in some of the GLR component states. This study, however, only covers the four expisodes of
Uganda's interventions in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. It explains the interventions in the
light of how events in these states affected Uganda's western border districts and the state as a
whole. (A map of Uganda on page 230 of this thesis shows the rebel affected areas and has
arrows indicating the districts that were included in this study.) The reason for such an
extensive study of three states is to ensure that Uganda's foreign relations are understood in
their totality. Studying an isolated intervention case would limit good theoretical analysis or
theory building.
1.9 Theoretical Framework
This study draws on four theories that have been used to explain intervention in international
relations. The traditional theories of Liberalism and Realism have been extensively used, but
subsequent developments in world politics such as the emergence of aspects such as identity,
ideas and norms, and how these have influenced the foreign policy behaviour of states have
compromised the theories' ability to explain fully tfre foreign behaviour of states. These
are in the Northern Districts of Uganda.
12 The Ugandan peasants had suffered on account of the dictatorial regime, and because war was in their regions,
they had two options, either join Obote II to fight the rebels, or to join the rebels to fight Obote II. They chose
the latter.
73 The term "outsider" here refers to the role played by foreign powers in the regime changes in African states,
while "insider? refers to intrastate groups mobilizing themselves to overthrow their regimes.
74 I am using the concept of reciprocity because each leader who received assistance from a military group or from
a neighbouring state was expected to render similar assistance to the leader who had given him help. This set up a
whole spiral of reciprocity that partly accounts for the conflicts in the GLR region, because every faction that had












traditional theories still account for some aspects of international behaviour but have
limitations that alternative theories have attempted to address. These alternative theories that
have emerged within international relations, e.g. Constructivism and Poliheurism have not thus
far been used to examine African states' behaviour, nor have they been used to analyse
Uganda's foreign policy, whicfr is the aim of this study.
This study uses an eclectic approach to examine motives of intervention. This approach is
premised on the limitation of either theory (viz. Constructivism or Poliheurism) to address the
research question adequately on its own. In addition, as Gent observes, there is a paucity of
formal-theoretic work on intervention, which makes such a study of theoretical explanations of
intervention extremely important."
The study will be organised as follows: The theories will be reviewed at the beginning of every
chapter, highlighting the tenets of the theories. This will be followed by a description of events
and, lastly, an evaluation of the theory. The merit of this approach is that, by the end of the
discussions, it will be evident which of the theories is most comprehensive and applicable to
the Ugandan situation.
1.10 Research Methodology: The Comparative Theoretical Case Study
This study utilised the comparative theory case study design. The selection of this design was
premised on the fact that it was most suitable for studying the emerging phenomenon of
African states' interventionist behaviour in the post-Cold War era. The information obtained
was used to illustrate the four competing theories with an aim of establishing the most
parsimonious theory that explains Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. The dependent
variable was Uganda's interventions from 1996 to 2006. Uganda was selected because, of all
the African states that intervened in others, Uganda has the highest number of unilateral
interventions in the region from 1986 to 2006, which makes it a good case to study. Four
theories were selected for scrutiny, namely, Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism and
Poliheurism. The tenets of these theories, which were discussed in Chapter 2, form the












framework on which the study is based. The study was conducted in eight border districts, two
central districts and in Uganda's western neighbours of Rwanda, Burtundi  and the DRC.
The advantages of using comparative theory are numerous. Firstly, use of many theories allows
evidence to be interpreted in multiple ways, which in turn enables the researcher to use the
evidence to either confirm a specific theoretical alternative or counter the explanation being
advanced by that theory." Secondly, as each theory is analysed and applied to study a specific
event, factual depth and comprehensive information is obtained on the case. Thirdly, using
multiple theories helps in establishing the validity and reliability of the study results, because
both qualitative and statistical data are triangulated to establish whether the qualitative results
are consistent with the relevant statistical data or, in the case of international relations, if state
actors explain and justify actions in similar ways in different settings. Fourthly, using Uganda as
a case study not only illustrates the strength of theories but also helps in refining theories and
addressing their limitations."
Lastly, it is suited for in-depth analysis and for following leads into new areas or new
constructions of theory." In this study, for example, the Security Dilemma theory as a variant
of Realism emphasised state actors and looked specifically at how their actions influence each
other. This perspective leads to refining the existing theory or developing one would emerge
from a question such as, Bow do the leaders perceive themselves?' This would be vital
because, as states' perceptions or misperceptions of each other are discussed, it establishes frow
their leaders perceive each other and how this influences the nature of bilateral relations
between the states. What emerges from such an analysis is the new alternative or theoretical
perspective that focuses on individuals and how this informs their foreign policy behaviour!'
76 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink , "Taking Stock The Construtivist  Research Program in International
Relations and Comparative Politics" Annual Review Political Science,  Vol 4 (2001) p. 396.
7 A. Du Toit and A. Seegers, "An Introduction to the Study of Politics", Departmental monograph
(Department of Political Studies: University of Cape Town, 1997), see also E. Babbie and J. Mouton,
The Practice of Social Research (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 280 and R. Yin, Case Study
Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Method Series, Vol 5 (London: Sage, 1994), p.
8 and p. 21.
J. Hartley, "Case Studies in Organisational Research", in Symons, C. and Cassel, C. (eds), Oualitative
Methods in Organisational Rese. h: A Practical Guide, (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 208-229.













The research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, desktop research and analyses of
national, regional, and international documentary sources were carried out at the relevant
institutions both in country and international.' As I was cautious of the limitations of
documentary sources, I triangulated these with other sources of information to ensure optimal
results. The second phase involved field research in the selected central and border districts of
Kampala, Ntungamo, Rukungiri, Kanungu, Kasese, Hoima, Kabale, Kisoro, Bundibugyo and
Ntoroko. These districts share borders with the states in which Uganda intervened. Interviews
were conducted with key informants, security forces, selected members from the communities
and government officials working in the study districts in Uganda and the DRC and communes
in Rwanda. In Burundi, in-depth interviews were held with critical actors in the peace process,
political party leaders and former rebel leaders turned government officials" Appendix 2
provides a full list of the interviewees and their respective organisations. The period of study
was replete with inter-state security border meetings, regional and international conferences and
seminars on security and good governance, some of which I attended. These conferences and
seminars provided first-hand experience of the security situations in the region as well as view
points of the protagonists of the conflicts present at these conferences. Aware of the
limitations of such fora as sources of information, follow-up interviews were freld?
Data Collation Methods and Mammas
Qualitative data collection and qualitative data analysis were used in this study because they
have the advantage of being flexible, economical and enable the coverage of sufficient
ground." They are effective in investigations into foreign policy, which is primarily a
communicative subject, and are appropriate when used for uncovering and understanding what
lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known." Three qualitative data collection
80 
Appendix 10 has detailed list of these organisations were research was conducted.
et it 
should be noted that the interviewees in Burundi and the DRC held different posts at different times. The
former rebels interviewed were serving in the current government in different capacities.
82 See F. H. Wolcott, Transforming Qualitative  Data: Description, Analysis and Interpretation,  (Thousands
Oaks: Sage, 1994); T. Wengraf, Qualitative Research Interviewing, (London: Sage, 2001) p. 168 and R. Yin,
Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Applied Social Research Method Series,  Vol 5 (London: Sage,
1994), pp. 34-37.
83 
For a detailed discussion on the advantages of qualitative methods, see D. Silverman, Doing Qualitative
Research: A Practical Handbook, (London: Sage Publications, 2000); and D. Silverman,
Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk Text and Interaction, (London: Sage, 1993).
84 
Strauss and Corbin reckon that those who have used qualitative research have obtained satisfactory results











methods were used, namely, in-depth interviews," group methods" and meetings." I also
carried out follow-up interviews to clarify some issues that were not clearly understood."
Four instruments were used in the study. Interview guides and interview schedules were
administered to the in-depth interviewees. Appendix 6 provides a sample of the interview
schedule). The questions in the interview schedule were modified into interview guides that
were used in interviews with the focus groups. In addition, a questionnaire was administered to
the border communities and refugees of Kisoro, Hoima and Ntungamo to solicit information
from those who were unable to express themselves adequately in English (see Appendix 4 for
the questionnaire).
Qualitative  Data Analysis
Data collected using key informants and focus group discussions was analysed using qualitative
methods, which included free listing, tabulations, chronicling of events and classification of the
information into specific categories." Spradely's data analysis model was used in the final data
analysis. In this model, the information obtained from the interviews was presented in three
levels, namely, the theory questions (TQs) in the first column, the interview questions (I(?) in
Basics of Qualitative  Research, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990).
85 For further explanations on the advantages of oral interviews and how they should be carried out
effectively, see N. King, "The Qualitative Research Interview", in Symons, C. and Cassel, C. (eds),
Qualitative Methods in Qrganisational Research: A Practical Guide, (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp.
14-36.
86 Five groups were formed, in the districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo, Kisoro and Ntungamo and Hoima. In these
groups, a questionnaire was used to discuss the salient issues of security. Those who were unable to fill in the
questionnaire were assisted. A conference group organised at the Dar-es Salaam Declaration of 2004 enabled me
hold discussions with technocrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of foreign policy malong.
87 I am aware of the limitations of oral interviews, and I thus corroborated information obtained from
interviews (this information was transcribed) with information from the contact summary sheet (see
Appendix 5 for the contact summary sheet) and media reports to cross check some of the information provided
by the interviewees. I attended Cross-border security meetings between Rwanda's Ruhengeri Prefecture and
Uganda's Kisoro district on 23 August 2005 and A GLR meeting between the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda
convened in Kab ale on 28 August 2005. Minutes of these meetings are available on request.
88 Dey and Dentin argue that annotating data and follow-up interviews are critical because they raise
questions that were earlier ignored or not aptly answered. See I. Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis: A User-
Friendly Guide for Social Scientists  (London: Routledge, 1993) and Dentin, N. K., The Research Act, (New
York: Mc Grawhill, 1987).
89 The data was managed with the guidance of the following works: See I. Dey, Qualitative Data Analysis: A
User-Friendly Guide for Social Scientists, p. 40; N. King, "Template Analysis", in Symons, C. and Cassel, C.












the second column, and the views from earlier documentary sources in the last column
(interventions) (see Appendix 5 for the data analysis sheet).%
Quantitate Data Collation and Analysis
Quantitative data collection was used to collect data amongst border communities. There were
many participants in the focus group discussions and key informants who wanted to
participate, but who had limited time for interviews or preferred unrecorded interviews. A
questionnaire was also given to informants with a view to establishing their ranking and to
enable a comparison of the primacy of causal factors of the intervention that have been
advanced to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy (see Appendix 3 for this
questionnaire, with a mark up sheet at the end). The information from the questionnaires and
interview schedules were coded and analysed by simple statistical methods, such as means and
percentages to establish the rankings of the causal factors of intervention."
Sampling Criteria and San* Design
Given the wide range of interviewees that were available to select from, I deliberately selected
the key informants based on their involvement in the peace negotiations, their roles as key
actors (as former rebels or opposition in parliament) and govemment administrators engaged in
foreign policy issues. These categories were purposively selected based on their experience and
long service in the ministries departments responsible for foreign policy formulations and
implementations in different regimes. These often also recommended other informative
people who I followed up." A detailed break down of the interviewees is provided in appendix
2. It does not disaggregate between non state actors and state actors but they are all inclusive.
90 Wengraf argues that this is the best data analysis tool for handling large amounts of data90.  A total of 110
questionnaires and transcripts from the in-depth interviews were analysed using Spradely's data analysis model.
For a detailed explanation of data analysis see T. Wengraf., Qualitative Research Interviewing,  pp. 318-319.
91 King warns that there is a danger in working out the frequencies because one can assume that differences in
frequencies automatically correspond to meaningful differences within or between transcripts, which is not
necessarily the case.91 Consequently, whilst frequencies were calculated, additional explanations were
provided to justify them and their limitations in the analysis of the data see N. King, "Template Analysis", p.
130.
92 Purposive sampling furthermore provided me with the opportunity to select a high quality of key
informants. Identification of other respondents by key informants is called snowballing. Miles and
Huberman provide tips on how to select key informants, see M. Miles and M. Huberman,  Qualitative Data
Analysis, (Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications 1994) and R. Kumar, E. Babbie and J. Mouton also provides
in-depth analysis of snowballing and how it should be selectively used, see R. Kumar, Research Methodology :












Because the study dealt with particularly relevant but very complex security matters, the
interviewees viewed the research as an evaluation of Uganda's security related concerns and
were a little cautious to participate. I emphasised that the study was for purely academic
purposes and that it was not in any way affecting state security." To this effect, I assured those
interviewees who preferred anonymity that their information was going to be treated with the
confidentiality they deserved. Those that did not want to be recorded were provided with a
questionnaire on which to fill in their responses, wfrile the discussions were hand written. I
assured them that it was important that a Ugandan wrote about issues on Uganda's foreign
policy. For ethical purposes, the views that these informants provided have not been attributed
to them by name; where their views must appear, titles and numbers have been assigned to
them.
Problems Encountered
Research in security matters sometimes is misconstrued as an exclusive preserve of the military,
the police or other security organs. A considerable amount of red tape was involved in
obtaining permission to carry out interviews. The clearances of the Uganda National Council of
Science and Technology came in handy and, together with the district criteria of clearance, tfre
ADCs often made the work easier by endorsing the relevant letters and providing transport and
guides to enable me locate the district personnel selected for interview.
I recorded and transcribed the information, which I would make available to the informants on
request. Because many respondents refused to be recorded, some of the information was lost in
the discussions and interviews. A few informants were optimistic that I would include their
views in my thesis because they hoped that foreigners who read the thesis would know the
truth (particularly of the challenges of the peace processes in the GLR states)! I did
acknowledge their views and promised to present them as best as I could. I cautioned them,
though, that since their information was not recorded I had no way of proving my claims; they
The Practice of Social Research p. 167.
93 R. Mitchell., Secrecy and Field work Qualitative Research Methods Series  29 (London: Sage, 1993) and
F. Erickson, "Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching" in Wittrock, M. (ed), Handbook of Research on











accepted this, but nonetheless remained curious to know how their views would be made
available to the world if I did not include them.
I solved the problem of recording in three ways: I took as many notes as possible during the
interviews, which I later reconstructed and reviewed against the contact summary sheets.
Secondly, I carried out follow-up interviews in which respondents would kindly allow me to
revisit certain issues. Thirdly, some of the informants who declined to be recorded were given
questionnaires to fill in and the discussions were written out with the help of research assistants
as rapporteurs.
Chapter Outline
The thesis as a whole consists of nine chapters. The first chapter, the current one, has given a
general background of intervention in the international system. It has briefly discussed the
interpretations that have been advanced to explain interventions in general and in Africa more
particularly, and it has laid out the theoretical framework drawn on by this study as well as the
research metfrodology. A theoretical literature review in Chapter Two is followed by a review
of literature on African interventions and Uganda's interventions in the third cfrapter. In the
Chapter Four presents a history of Uganda starting with the colonial regime up to the current
government. It highlights the role of the army in the national security framework as well as the
external threats faced by the state. Chapters Five to Eight analyse Uganda's interventions from
a theoretical perspective, using four main theories in its analytical framework In the concluding












THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERVENTION
2.0 Introduction
This chapter explores four dominant theoretical approaches that explain intervention by one
state in another one's territory. The traditional theories of Realism and Liberalism, which have
dominated the study of international relations and in world politics, are discussed alongside the
more recent theories of Constructivism and Poliheurism, which gained wide use in the 1990s.
In this chapter, all four theories are discussed with the intention of developing a framework
that can be used later to examine Uganda's interventions in the GLR and particularly its
intervention in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC during 1986-2006. This chapter is divided into
two sections. In the first section, the central tenets and limitations of the theories are discussed.
The second section is a discussion of how they will be used as a framework to explain Uganda's
interventions in the GLR. Tfre main conclusion drawn by this discussion is that all these
theories need to be used to complement each other's theoretical flaws and limitations when
explaining Uganda's interventions.
2.1 Realism
Realism has been the dominant theory in the analysis of international relations between states,
as well as in understanding state behaviour. Similarly, in the realm of intemational politics,
Realism has had supremacy over other theories for a long time. Starting with Morgenthau who
tried to develop a comprehensive theory of power politics on realist principles of human nature
and the role of ethics in foreign policy, Realism slowly gained ground in its use in the analysis
of foreign policy." Essentially, the theory takes cognizance of the central role that states play in
the international system and holds that, because the world is anarchic, states have to ensure that
they maximize their security from attacks that would otherwise have compromised their
position and security at both the domestic  and international  lad The theory also acknowledges that
states have an insatiable desire to dominate others, and that morality and reason are
94 M. Griffiths, "Morgenthau", in Griffiths, M. Key  Thinkers in International Relations, (New York:











subordinate virtues in politics and mere instruments for attaining and justifying power."
Realism comes in many variants and new dimensions of it include, among others, the
neorealist, neoclassical, defensive and offensive realists. A discussion of all these variants is not
possible; however, one variant, the Security Dilemma theory, will be examined. This particular
theory has been used to explain inter-state and violent ethnic conflict to study why states
intervene in others and to understand why in some cases states cannot cooperate to secure
themselves.
The Security Dilemma
The Security Dilemma theory is a branch of the Realist school that focuses on the precarious
situation states find themselves in when they try to establish security within their own borders,
and in the process prompt other states to do so as well. The Security Dilemma theory was
initially used by Butterfield and Herz to describe a situation where a state is uncertain about the
intentions of another state's actions in world politics!' Butterfield describes a security dilemma
as follows:
[the uncertainty  that decision makers fox in trying to determine  rails other' intentions ... fear
that you have of the other party but you cannot enter S other man's counter fear,  or eon.
understand   why he should be particularly nervous . For you yourselfkn w that you mean him no
barn; and that you mint nothing fan him sate guarantees  for )air oun safety; and it is never
possible for you to realise or remember  fluty that site he cannot see S inside of your mind  he
am never have the same assurances of your intentions that you haze..."
Similarly, Hem used the Security Dilemma as a basic framework to illustrate the history of
international relations, by arguing that it was a key factor in these. His basic argument was a
psychological one, namely that, if an individual fears that other individuals may be seeking his
destruction, it would create a need for self-defence, which in turn would make others feel
insecure!' Herz extended this sense of insecurity of the individual to groups, subjecting these
to a similar analysis!' The Security Dilemma analysis has since been expanded to explain how
"Ibid.
96 R Roe, "Misperceptions and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania's Societal Security Dilemma", Review of
International Studies, Vol 28 (2002), pp. 57-74.
97 Ibid98
 J. Herz., "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma" in World Politics, Vol 2 No 2 (1949), pp. 157-180.
For a detailed expose of Herz's works and a history of the security dilemma he propounds, see M. Griffiths, Fifty
Key Thinkers in International Relations, pp. 17-21.











the efforts of states to secure themselves make it impossible for them to draw accurate
inferences about other states' intentions. This results in a cycle of suspicion, which could in
turn lead to war! Furtfrermore, the theory posits that, because the international system is
anarchic and security is scarce, states try to secure themselves by maximizing their relative
advantage over other states.'"
Posen and Roe have employed the Security Dilemma theory to explain a historiography of
intra-state ethnic conflicts and their resurgence in the post-Cold War era. More recently,
scholars like Jervis, Rose, Glaser, Van Evera, Kaufmann, Booth and Wheeler have variously
used it to account for major wars, inter-state conflictual relations and increasing insecurity in
the world. As a result, the theory has gained wide use as a framework of analysis in the areas of
security, strategic and international studies. It has been used as an analytical tool to explain the
two world wars, military interventions and inter-state relations in regions like East Asia and the
Gulf (see Moller'"), in Israel (see Romirowsky103)  and in Asian relations between China and
the US (see Siddall).
The Security Dilemma theory has three central tenets: the inability to distinguish offence from
defence, the superiority of offence over defence action, and the window of vulnerability and
opportunity.'" The first tenet, i.e. the inability to distinguish offence from defence , presupposes that the
military preparations of one state will create an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another
as to whether the preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security) or
whether they are for offensive purposes106  When, for example, state A alms itself, it becomes100
 R. Jervis, Perceptions Misperceptions in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1976); J. N. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society,  (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 63.
101 G. Rose, °Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", in World Politics, Vol 51 (1998), pp. 144-172.
B. Moller, "Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region", in Emirates Occasional Pa 	(1997), hap://
www.eessrac.aetieriodicals/03uae.eso9intro.htm,  accessed 26)I) September 2003103
 A. Romirowsky, "Israel's Military Dilemma", E-Notes, May 2002,
www.fpri.oreenotes/middleeastafrica20020510.romirowskylsraelmilitarydilemmaltml accessed on 25
November 2003
1C4 A. Siddell, "The Misapplication of defensive realism: the security dilemma and rising powers in East Asia",
(2000) http://apsa.2000.anu.edu.au/confpapersisiddellatf,  accessed on 26 September 2003. Most recently, Boaz
has used it to examine interventions in states sharing borders. See A_ Boaz, "When good fences make bad
neighbours: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict" in International Security, Vol 31, No 3
(Winter 2006/07), pp. 139-173.
105These  central tenets have been drawn from B. Posen's "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" in Brown,
M. (ed) Ethnic Conflict and International Security,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) pp. 105-111.106
 N. Wheeler and K. Booth, "The Security Dilemma" in Baylis, J. and Ranger, N. (eds) Dilemmas of World











apparent to the neighbour or adversary state B that this may be in preparation for a war or
another sort of engagement. In fact, state B is not sure whether this arming is being done for
defensive or offensive purposes or whether the first state's increase in its military capability may
just be routine."' Most actions by states to protect themselves simultaneously have a menacing
effect on others!' The drive for security produces aggressive actions if the other state either
has a strong sense of insecurity or feels menaced by the very presence of the other, stronger
state."' The relative insecurity of states, in other words, is caused by a general feeling of
uncertainty about the course of events in each other's states and a lack of capacity to control
them, all of which produces a pervasive sense of fear."'
The inability to distinguish offence from defence may be a result of states' failure to evaluate
each other's incremental increases in military capabilities due to inaccurate evaluations or
misperceptions of states' actions due to misinformation.'" This misinformation is in turn
attributed to the role played by interest groups (such as non-state actors, individuals and,
sometimes, international non-government organisations) in escalating security dilemmas: these
may have an ulterior motive of benefiting from the security seeking states that procure military
equipment to improve their capabilities.'" Glaser further argues that,
Interests groups that would benefit fan large Averments  A military capabilities and/or
expansion am often A control of US state's policy; dry then advance  self-serving  strategic
arguments that exaggerate the state's insecurity  and the benefits Of expansion.113
Such misinformation is perhaps responsible for the misperception that Jervis and Wheeler
describe. They argue that states fmd it difficult to draw inferences about other states' intentions
based on their military posture and capabilities. As a result, a cycle of mutual suspicion is set in
motion, which Jervis calls the spiral!' This spiral model emerges from the simultaneous
increase in the (usually military) capabilities of states. This escalates confrontation to higher and
107 C Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited" in World Politics, Vol 50 (1997), pp. 171-201.
Mg R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 64.
Ibid, p. 63-64. See also Xin Benjian, "Security Dilemma: Balance of power versus US Policy towards China in
the Post-Cold War era" in Contemporary International Relations (September, 2001).
"0 J. Erikson, "Introduction" in Erikson, J. (ed), Threat ew Perscectices on Security Risk and CrisisManageme t
, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001) p. 6.
1 "C Glaser, The Security Dilemma Revisited" in World Politics, Vol 50 (1997), pp. 171-201.
117 C Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence
Models", World Politics, Vol 44, No 1 (1992), p. 498-510.
113 Ibid.
114 R. Jervis, Perceptions ons in International Politics, p. 64 and N. Wheeler and K. Booth, °The











higher levels of hostility and, if states feel that their own security is threatened, they may be
compelled to intervene in other states that they believe to be compromising their security with
the express aim of protecting themselves.'"
The second tenet, the superiority of offensive  over defensive  action, is a salient aspect of the Security
Dilemma theory.'" In terms of this, states that choose the offensive, if they wish to survive,
may engage in pre-emptive wars against their adversaries."7  Van Even expounds this tenet
further by saying that, when conquest seems easy, the 'more aggressive' state may attempt to
control the 'less aggressive' state'!" In reaction, however, the less aggressive' state will resist
the expansions of the strong, aggressive state more fiercely.'" This often results in an even
more intense security dilemma and in the likelihood of war because five additional causal
phenomena are implicit in this situation. He enumerates these as follows: (1) states adopt fair
accompli  diplomatic tactics in their political relations; (2) there is much blame shifting because it
is not clear which state is responsible for violent clashes in intense security dilemmas; (3) states
negotiate less and so fewer agreements can be reached in attempting to resolve a conflict; (4)
alliances among ethnic groups in collapsing states tend to form more often, and they become
even tighter and unconditional, which makes ethnic civil war more likely; and, (5) states
husband information that may suggest offensive capabilities and motives, including their
grievances, demands, and political military plans." ° These additional causal factors are key to
defining the security dilemma in states or in inter-state or inter-ethnic state behaviour and form
the basis of analysis of a conflict when classifying it as a security dilemma. In a security
dilemma as Howard observes, the capacity to deter one's adversary by having available the
capacity to inflict on frim inescapable and unacceptable damage in return is paramount!'
R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p.63.
116 B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", pp. 103-124.
112 Ibid.
118 The term 'less aggressive state' is used here to refer to states that may not be necessarily weak but, given the
prevailing situation, are unable to project a strong military posture. These situations may be intrastate wars, ethnic
violence within their states, or civil wars and other problems.
112 S. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the causes of War° in International Security, Vol 22, No 4, pp. 5-43
(1998), p. 10.
122 Ibid. If Van Evera's steps are critically analysed vis-a-vis the GLR conflict, it is very clear that a security
dilemma existed in the region to warrant interventions and counter interventions. More significant is the formation
of alliances between ethnic groups. Within the GLR region, there are ethnic groups that created alliances to either
resist the wrath of others or to attack them.











The Security Dilemma theory highlights geography and technology as the two characteristics
determining the superiority of offence over defence in inter-state, intra-ethnic or inter-ethnic
conflicts. The theory posits that political geography will frequently create an 'offence-dominant
world' when empires collapse.' From the ruins of the empire will emerge groups that have
greater offensive capability because they will effectively surround some or all of the other
groups, thereby prompting / forcing the vulnerable groups to seek offensive strategies to
contain the offensive from the much stronger group.' In a grimmer situation, Posen holds
that
Where one territorially  concentrated group has 'islands' of sediment of its members distributed
across the nominal territory of another group , the protection  if these islands in the  event of hostile
action can seem : extremely difficult These islands may not he able to help one  another; they may be
.submit to blockade and siege, and by virtue of their numbers Maive to S surrounding population
and brain? of topography , they may be militarily indefensible . Thus the Mahon of the strand&
group may an to Mine that only rapid *size military action can savethir irredentaIo ahorrible fate
Posen highlights that in such situations as the above, if one side has an advantage that will not
be present later, and if security can be achieved by offensive military action, then leaders will be
more inclined to attack during this 'window of opportunity' when the defendant is
indefensible.'" In this study, one further aspect of analysis is added to the ethnic dimension of
the security dilemma, and that is the 'spill over effect' (which the Security Dilemma theory does
not take into consideration) of ethnic conflict, which in turn sets off the spiral of insecurity (in
the words of Jervis). As one ethnic group garners support to fight for its state, it sparks off
similar struggles elsewhere in the region, and in an effort to stop these conflicts, states create
insecurity for each other and a security dilemma emerges. By extrapolating from this example,
this study examines how the geo-politics of the GLR represent a security dilemma and how the
foreign policy behaviour of the states in this area, and particularly intervention, can be
explained by using similar dimensions.
The geo-political location of states in a security dilemma is important, if the offence-defence
aspect of the security dilemma is to make sense. States, whose geographic character provides
122 B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", p. 108.
123 Ibid, p. 108.
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them with security, will take advantage of this location to engage in offensive wars.' Likewise,
states that lack preclusive defence capabilities' because of their geographical location are likely
to carry out defensive wars to protect themselves. Alternatively, if states that lack preclusive
defence capabilities have weak and war-riddled states as their neigfrbours, they will still be
compelled to intervene in these neighbouring states to defend themselves from the spill-over
effects of the neighbouring states' wars and conflicts."' Romirowsky argues from a military
perspective that if a country lacking territorial depth is attacked, it must quickly transfer the
battleground to the enemy's land for a better strategic advantage!' What this confirms is that
the geographical location of states plays an instrumental role in heightening a security dilemma,
which in turn often leads to more wars and military engagements across the world.
Another factor that determines the superiority of offence over defence is the level of
technology. The Security Dilemma theory posits that states tend to increase their military
capability in a bid to improve their level of security. This they do by acquiring better military
equipment, increasing military personnel, and ensuring that they maintain a strong force!' The
result of this increase in military resources in order to defend themselves is a double-edged
sword. On the one hand, they gain both too much and too little: too much because they gain
the ability to carry out aggression, but too little because other states tfrat now feel threatened,
while on the other they also increase their own arms and so reduce the relative security of the
first state."' The arms build-up thus expands into an arms race, as states compete for better
and more advanced military hardware, which may deteriorate into a standoff between the
competing states. The arms race results in the proliferation of sophisticated weapons, which
not only increase the destructiveness of war when it does break out, but also compels states to
become increasingly involved in each others' affairs because they believe they have the means
to do so."' Krause adds another dimension to the technological factors that influence tfre
126 Ibid.
127 Preclusive defence refers to the ability of a state to defend its borders from external attacks; in this case it is
applied to explain how a lack of geographic features could prevent a state from preventing attacks from other
stronger states; similarly, having particular geographic features, such as mountains, forests or rift valleys could
increase a state's offensive behaviour.
128 Ibid.
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nature of perceptions regarding the intentions of states, which include the nature of military
training that troops undertake and the identity of the trainer. If the trainer is a superpower,
then the neighbouring states will be more alert as to the intentions of such training; similarly, if
there is a massive transfer of training at various levels within the army, this too is cautiously
analysed
Krause observes that the states that receive such military training and weapons develop a
`technological fetish' for expensive, unnecessary, or unusable weapons that diverts resources
from more productive uses , which is a situation that is not peculiar to the GTR states.'" The
arms race turns intervention into an end result, because states feel strong enough to engage
with each other in war, even when there is no outright cause or misunderstanding between
states to warrant this."' Krause continues by arguing that the actions of strong states that
engage in military posturing that resembles that of aggressors, cannot easily be understood by
other states. The latter may be uncertain whether the strong states are preparing for something
more sinister, so they assume the worst and equip themselves in preparation for any
eventuality. This is best described in Jervis's citation of Grey as follows:
Incase in armanents  that are intended in each nation to pa r consiousness  of strength , and a
sense of security  does not produce these*s. On S contrary, it produces a consciousness of the
strength of  nations and a sense of fear.  Fear lets suspicion, distrust, and evil imaginings of
all sorts, until each government feels  it sued be criminal  and a betrayal of its oun country cannot
take every incaution, while government  regards any precaution of every other government  as
evidence ofhostil i tent"'
Further, Waltz argues that, because states are always sensitive to the changing relations of
power among them, they are forced to project themselves in a way that suggests strength."' He
argues, for example, that Japan is made uneasy by the current steady growth of China's military
budget and tfrat this is leading to a prevailing sense of instability in the region." A similar case
B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", p. 108.
133 See A. Walks, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide , pp. 30-39 and
L Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, p. 81.
134 Jervis argues that a war may break out between states as a result of issues of little intrinsic value, such as just
because the states feel they are strong and can engage each other. See It Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in
International Politics,  p.58.
135 Ibid, p. 65.
136 R. Waltz,  Realism after the Cold War° in International Security, Vol 25, No 1 (2000), p.25.











of instability arose in the Gulf region because of the general arms build-up among states and
the collapse of Iraq in the late 1990s, which was the main military threat in the region. The
other states responded by increasing their own strength to fill the gap left by the collapse of
Iraq. As each state endeavoured to increase its military capability, however, the imbalance and
insecurity between the regional states increased too.' Likewise, America's increase in its
military presence in Eastern Asia makes China perceive it to mean that America wants to
maintain its strategic hegemony in the region, to which China is opposed. The US's increase in
arms sales to Taiwan, for example, has been one of the factors that have kept China on its toes.
Equally so, wfren China tries to improve its human and military capability, the US sees China as
a potential threat.' What would offset such a situation, argues Jervis, would be either to clearly
distinguish offensive weapons from defensive ones or to suggest that states cooperate with one
another by sharing information as to why they are arming themselves.'" It is implicit from this
discussion, that accusations regarding the proliferation of arms, the use of such arms and their
generally increased capability are salient in determining the existence and extent of a security
dilemma between states or ethnic groups.
The third tenet of the Security Dilemma theory is the window of vulnerability and opportunity.
It has been argued that states that wish to initiate offensive military actions, but that fear
outside opposition may move quickly if they become aware of such intentions, may try to
choose a moment to act when international organizations and great powers are preoccupied
with other problems."' They thus take the advantage and strnke while the opponent is weak and
unable to access resources or military aid from allies, or at a time when the international
community or international organizations are too busy and preoccupied to attend to them.'"
When this happens, the offensive gains an advantage over the defensive, because the latter is
caught off-guard. Such a scenario will most often result in war.
The application of the Security Dilemma theory to explain inter-state security challenges has
become more prominent and most important ; it has also gained wider use in the analysis of
138 See B. Moller for a detailed discussion of the security dilemma in the Gulf region, in B. Moller, °Resolving the
Security Dilemma in the Gulf Region", Emirates Occasional Papers (1997) hap:// wwwacssnac.ae/periodicals
accessed on 24th October 2003
139 K. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", p.32.
wt. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma", World Politics, Vol 30 (1978), pp. 167-214.












ethnic conflicts in world politics. It has been argued by many scholars (the most outstanding of
whom are Barry Posen and Paul Roe), that many ethnic conflicts are a result of ethnic groups
mobilising based on the misperception that the societal requirements of other rival ethnic
groups will threaten their own identity. These misperceptions on either side will feed into war-
causing situations.'" Sometimes ethnic groups are very strong and threaten states in which they
are or have the potential to operate from neighbouring states; this poses a threat to their own
state, which puts them in a precarious situation.'" Kaufmann argues that,[a]marchy
 am be approximated if ethnic groups *limey challenge the government's  legitimacy
and control Goer its territory. If anarchy tracks the point where the government cannot control its
!errtry effectively  enough to protect its nee, Chile ethnic-based  organizations am, then the
ethnic organisations  hue enough jibe attributes of sovereignty to create a security dilemma.'
The security dilemma caused by the intra-state ethnic conflicts (examined by Roe and Posen) in
both the Hungarian and the Romanian struggles for sovereignty over Transylvania since the
1950s to date, and the conflict between the Croats and Serbs in the 1990s, are instructive here.
In this study, the Security Dilemma theory will be applied to the interventions in the GLR. ,is
used because it can be used to explain a wider range of situations, particularly in regions like the
GLR that have complex security situations. Firstly, it has prescriptive richness. For example, it
posits that states with a geographic disadvantage are likely to intervene in their neighbours'
states to protect themselves. Secondly, when hostile regimes come into power, nearby states are
forced to intervene because such neighbours are harder to defend against. Thirdly, it
acknowledges that states' abilities to improve their military capabilities compel others to do the
same, which inadvertently results in an arms race and ultimately in an outbreak of war.
Although the Security Dilemma theory does not strongly account for the economic
motivations of interventions, it does acknowledge that greedy states can easily create a security
dilemma and subsequently instigate war because of their greed.'" The other limitation of the
lo B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", pp 103-124 and R Roe, "Misperception and Ethnic
Conflict: Transylvania's Societal Security Dilemma", pp. 57-24.
' 44 Posen and Roe in their use of the Security Dilemma to explain "Societal dilemma" or "Ethnic dilemmas" do
not focus on the insecurity that ethnic groups pose for neighbouring states, which in the case of Africa is a
characteristic of the ethnic conflict spill-overs .
145 S. Kaufman, "An 'International' Theory of Inter-Ethnic War", in Review of International Studies, Vol 22, No 2
(1996), p. 151, cited in P. Roe, "Misperceptions and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania's Societal Security Dilemma",
p.
146 Glaser acknowledges that motives that go beyond security, like greed, often exacerbate the security dilemma











Security Dilemma framework is that it does not acknowledge that morality is important in
international relations, which makes the framework flawed; if it were used to complement other
theories, especially Constructivism, though, this limitation would be easy to address.'
The Security Dilemma is salient in analyzing interventions in the GLR because it can be
abstracted to explain the security dilemma in dysfunctional or socio-politically weak states that
lack effective government structures and institutions. The GLR comprises such states that are
often ridden with ethnic conflicts and intra-state instability.
148 
Such states' conflicts and poor
governance has created a spill over effect of their conflicts, affected neighbouring states and
escalated the levels of regional insecurity. As a result the states have increased their military
capabilities to contain spill over effects of their neighbours' insecurity. In some cases, states
have advertently or inadvertently been used by dissidents of other states as launch pads for
their guerrilla warfare. As a result, bilateral relations between states have broken down and
mistrust and misperceptions of each other have characterized states' relations. Politics of
regional patronage have also emerged in which one state supports the dissidents of another as a
pawn to use should the states whose dissidents it assist choose to sponsor the dissidents of the
other. Dissidents become the main currency through which insecurity is traded between states
further aggravating the region's insecurity.  Similarly, states start amassing arms and
ammunitions as well as other military equipment sparking of a spiral of arms acquisition by
other states consequently a security dilemma emerges.
Jervis, "The Spiral of International Insecurity" in Smith M., Little, R. and Shackleton, (eds), Perspectives on World
Politics, (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 83-93.
147 Samuel Barlon argues that classical realist theory and Constructivism  approaches to the study of international
relations are not implacably opposed and that we cannot understand ideals without reference to power nor can we
understand power without reference to ideals. He proposes that Realism and Construaivism be fused so that a
novel international relations perspective emerges. See S. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism  and Realist
Constructivismm" in The Forum (2003), P. 349. Similarly. Patrick T. Jackson and Daniel Nexon argue that
Constructivism and Realism should be merged particularly because, as they argue, what actors do in international
relations, the interests they hold and the structures within which they operate are defined by social norms and
ideas rather than by objective or material conditions. See P. Jackson and D. Nexon, "Constructivist Realism or
Realist Constructivismm?" in International Studies Review, No 6 (2004), p. 338.
148 Rotberg provides a very detailed examination of weak states and particularly those that have fixed borders and
the security challenges they have, See Robert I. Rotberg, ed., "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes
and Indicators," in Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Tune of Tenor,  (Cambridge, Mass.: World












The second theory that has gained wider use in explaining interventionist behaviour is
Liberalism. Liberalism has been propounded by Teson as an alternative framework within
which to analyse state interventions in world politics in the post-Cold War era. There are two
divergent liberal perspectives that explain motivations for interventions: Political Liberalism
and Economic or Utilitarian liberal. Central to the Political Liberal perspective is the argument
that interventions are motivated by the desire to remove 'illegitimate dictatorial governments'
from a legitimate state. According to Teson, an illegitimate government is one that abuses the
rights of its citizens, fails to control the state, encourages conflict, and is generally dictatorial.'"
Continued prevalence of such conditions makes a state illegitimate and therefore susceptible to
replacement or intervention from other democratic states.'" Adopting the political philosophy
of Kant', Teson and Doyle describe an illegitimate state as one characterised by human rights
abuses that are so egregious as to violate the fits cogens norms of international law. They
prescribe tfrat such a state (the illegal state) does not require the right to be free from foreign
intervention because it is not only failing to respect the rights of its citizens but is most likely
unable to respect the political independence of other states.'" In fris argument in favour of
intervention, he contends that:[b]ecause
 the ultimate justifiction  of the existence  gestates is the protection and enforcement  of the
natural rights of the citizens, a government  that engages in substantial violations of human  rights
betrays the purpose for which  it exists and so forfeits  not only its demesne legitimacy , but its
international legitimacy as well Consequently, • .. foreign armies are neurally penist& to help
thins of tyranny, provided  dent the Intervention  is proportionate to the evil which  it is detail to
suppress... intervention  k 'unlearnt actually or ideally by the victims.153
Teson further prescribes that when a government has collapsed and is spiralling into a state of
anarchy, or when a democratic regime has been violently and illegally overthrown against the
149 R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality,  pp 16-17.
159 See F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, P. 21 and F. Teson, "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian
Intervention" in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane, R. (eds) Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political
pp. 93-129.
151 Teson draws on Kant's first definitive article, in which he stipulated that force should never be used to exact
compliance with a state's international obligations. However, force will sometimes have to be used against non-
liberal regimes as a last resort in self-defence or in defence of human rights. Liberal democracies must seek peace
and use all possible alternatives to preserve it. In extreme circumstances, adds Kant, violence may be the only
means to uphold the law and to defend the liberal affiance against outlaw dictators that remain non-members.
152 See M. Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, on his coverage of F. Teson and M. Doyle.











will of its populace, other states must intervene unilaterally to ensure that they safeguard
democracy."' Likewise, intervention should be undertaken if it is to remedy egregious cases of
human rights violations, such as genocide, enslavement, or mass murder, or to put an end to
oppression." He explicitly points out that in cases where the intervention is aimed at
safeguarding democracy, the intervenors must respect and uphold the rights of the citizens.
The intervention, he points out, must be tailored as narrowly as possible to be an action against
the 'illegitimate' government and not its people.'" Of course, as he observes, an intervention
that targets an illegitimate government may unavoidably affect the innocent citizens too. In
such a case, the Doctrine on Double Effect has to be evoked.' This doctrine presupposes that
if there was no specific intent to kill bystanders but they die by accident in an action, such an
intervention is legitimate and the deaths are excusable.
This Political Liberal prespective was used in various studies to justify interventions in the
African context, although the focus was more on international law and its concerns about
intervention. Lewitt's examples of intervention in the post-Cold War era in Africa would fit the
Teson and Doyle model candidate states that qualified for intervention. See the matrix overleaf,
in which four of the interventions (that is Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea Bissau
(1998) and the DRC (1998)) were undertaken against illegitimate governments. They were
aimed at removing dictatorial regimes, which were committing gross abuses of human rights.
154p. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, p. 40; J. Lewitt, "African Interventionist States and International
Lave, in Furley, O. and May, R. (eds), African Interventionist. States, p. 15; P. Gilbert, "Repression, Secession and
Intervention" in Moseley, A. and Norman, R. (eds), Human Rights and Military  Intervention, (Aldershot: Ashgate
2001), pp. 211-227; and C. Hauss, "Military Intervention",
hard/www.beyondintractability.org/m/militaryinterventionlsp, accessed 24 February 2005.
155 F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention An Inauiry in Law and Morality p. 17.
151 F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law, p. 62.





























One criticism levelled against Political Liberalism perspective is that it is not clear who decides
that a government is illegitimate. Of course states' compliance to international conventions such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights and International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other
international conventions on specific aspects of life would be used to measure if a state is
legitimate or non-compliant. However, this too is an insufficient measure, because measuring
compliance also would be dependent on many other factors, which seem uniform in the
international perspective but for some African states may not be the best measure. For example,
Teson argues that foreigners have the right to pass judgements about a state's illegitimacy only if
there is proof of human rights violations; and yet, he seems to contradict himself by insisting that
the illegitimacy of the targeted regime is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the validity
of intervention!' The only legal hurdle to an intervention in such circumstances is that,
regardless of the conditions prevailing in a state (genocide is the exception here), intervention is
prohibited because it contravenes International Law. This is also stipulated in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter, which states that:
All members shall refrain in their intonational relations from  the threat or use offs  against the
territorial integrity or political independence of racy stare or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purpose of the United Nations.
Clearly, intervention in another state to remove an illegal government is prohibited, even if the
clause to intervene to defend nationals is evoked!' This clause would be inappropriate because
the nationals being defended must have either requested the intervention (i.e. assistance from the
intervenor) or they must be of similar nationality as the intervenor, in which case the
intervention would be interpreted as a mission to save a 'a people in danger'!" The 1976 Israeli
invasion of Uganda to save Israelites who had been hijacked by Palestinians is instructive here!'
According to Teson, illegitimate states often prevent interventions against their governments, by
arguing that such interventions are not warranted and by in fact embarking on counter
interventions on the grounds that they have an 'inherent right' to defend themselves, which is
162 See F. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry in Law and Morality,  p.28; he advances a similar argument
in his earlier work, F. Teson, A Philosophy  of International Law, (West View Press: Oxford, 1998).
lo See J. Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective, (3rd Ed), (Lansdowne: Juta and Co Ltd), p. 502
and p. 507.
p.507











recognised by the customary law of anticipatory self-defence. Perhaps this is why interventions in
Africa have often been perceived as illegal, because the illegitimate states are able to evoke
international law to defend themselves against such interventions.'" The other concern that
could also be raised to argue against Teson's prescriptions is that in a region such as Africa,
where states characteristically have a poor record of handling intrastate conflicts, no strong
tradition of handling opposition, and, above all, are authoritarian'", what right would a state have
to intervene in another without examining its own domestic affairs? Besides, in the case of the
GLR, where the various states' politics are extricably tied to each other, it becomes impossible to
justify interventions: this is because what happens in one state is often a result of the actions of
non-state actors that inhibit proximate states. In such a case, it would be impossible to apportion
blame. In spite of its limitations, Neo-liberalism provides a good comparative theoretical
framework because it has been advanced to explain the resurgence of intervention in
international politics of the post-Cold War era, especially in the Kosovo case of 1990s and now
the Iraq case of 2003. In the study it will be used to examine the extent to which Ugandan's
claim that it intervened to remove illegitimate governments from its neighbouring states can be
qualified as a comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.
The other criticism that Political Liberalism has faced comes from its sister theory, the Utilitarian
Liberal position, which positions intervention within the framework of wars over economic
resources, which are prevalent internationally. For the Utilitarian Liberals, as well as for their
counterparts, the International Political Economists, intervention is synonymous with
exploitation of the resources of the intervenee. Their view is that, no matter what the intensity of
the humanitarian situation is, states will intervene with the express aim of benefiting from the
resources of the intervenee during and after the conflict period with the ultimate aim of
developing the intervenor's power and economy!' Gilpin argues that a state will seek to change
the international system through territorial, political and economic expansion until the marginal
costs of further changes are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits!' In other words,
166 A proper analysis of these legal implications of intervention is not possible here, but for an in-depth analysis of
international law and its implication on interventions, see R. Wallace, International Law, (London: Sweet and
Maxwell, 2005).
147 B. Baker, "Going to War Democratically: The Case of the Second Congo War 1998-2000", in Contemporary
Politics, Vol 6, No 3 (2000), pp. 263-282.
168 R. Gilpin, International Political Economy,  (New Jersey: Princeton, 1987) and D. Gibbs, The Political Economy
of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money and U.S Policy in the Congo Crisis,  (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 28-33.











states tend to intervene in others because they have gained more power in a region and because
they want to use this to extend their control over the region economically and politically.
The ultimate aim of states that intervene in others is to become a region's hegemonic power.'"
Gilpin argues that political power is synonymous with economic power and superior economic
competitiveness is accompanied by superior military power." In short, states intervene in others'
affairs to enhance and protect their own economic interests or to pursue economic opportunities
that the target state offers. Gilpin later revises his position in a later book, arguing that national
security and prestige play an equal and frequently an even greater role in motivating the
behaviour of national governments."' He also observes that the concept of national interest is
not limited to individuals who happen to be in power at a particular moment, but that it is based
on the interests of those in power and the citizens of a particular state.'" In short, if states
intervene, it is not only to protect their own economic interests but also national interests, such
as national security.
The most important empirical contributions to this utilitarian liberal debate in Africa is Gibb's
"business conflict model" in which he demonstrates how Belgium, the US and Sweden
intervened to gain access to the wealth of the DRC, using the justification that they were
restoring order in the new state." Interventions by the US in Latin America, in Asia and in the
Arab world have also been attributed to economic interests. For example, Gelb and Betts argue
that the US intervention in Vietnam was the predictable outcome of an American drive to secure
control over the economic resources of the non-communist world with the ultimate aim of
preserving its own position in the world.'" Similarly, the post-Cold War interventions in
Afghanistan (1998), Iraq (1991 and 2003), and the DRC (19978-2003) are collectively being
attributed to economic factors and regarded as efforts by intervenors to wield more power in
these regions.P` For Calhoun and Rieff, economic interests, whether real or potential, motivated
up Ibid.
171 lbid, p. 53.
177 R. Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001), p. 44.
173 Ibid, pp. 44-45.
174 D. Gibbs, The Political Econo of Third World Intervention: Mmes Money and the US Poli in the Como
Crisis  pp. 28-33.
175 L. H. Gelb, and R. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked,  (Washington D.C: The Brookings
Institution, 1989).
176 P. Owens, "Theorizing Military Intervention" in International Affairs, Vol 80, No 2 (2004), p. 355; L. Calhoun,











the US intervention in Iraq. Rieff demonstrates empirically (from the research he conducted in
Iraq) how the US stationed troops only to protect the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, even when there
were other ministries nearby that needed protection too.'"
Whereas the Utilitarian perspective is attractive for explaining interventions, its main limitation is
its inability to explain interventions that have no obvious economic value, particularly in states
riddled by violent warfare, genocide or extreme levels of civilian disobedience; such cases include
Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia and Haiti. Secondly, the theory does not differentiate between state
interventions that are driven by economic interests and interventions by non-state actors which
are also driven by economic interests. A good example of such a difference is the US
intervention in Iraq (state intervention) in comparison to a non state actor intervention such as
the Cotecna Company Oil-for-food Scandal project intervention in Iraq.'" Another is the case of
the Zaire-Congo, where Gibbs using his business conflict model, demonstrated how unilateral
and multilateral interventions in the Congo clearly showed that the intervenors were acting out
to protect personal and family business interests. Similarly, the families of some US leaders and
that of the Swedish UN General Secretary (for example, Dag Hammarskjold had had conflicting
interests in the Congo (specifically in the area of Katanga) that prompted their interventions,
although these were simply categorised as state interests. In the GLR, however, the utilitarian
perspective on interventions has often been used to describe the regions interventions.
Consequently, it is necessary to review this theory and establish the extent to which it could
adequately explain Uganda's interventionist policy. The main reason for the inclusion of the
Utilitarian perspective is that unlike other perspectives, it benefits from much statistical and
quantitative evidence that is used to bolster its use. This reduces the problems that
methodological limitations would pose for the method, when it is compared with other
theoretical frameworks.
°Shaping U.S Policy on Africa: Pillars of a New Strategy" in Strategic  No 210 (2004), pp. 1-7; D. Rieff, At
the Point of the Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention,  (New York Simon and Schuster, 2005);
D. Rieff, "Kosovo: The End of an Era" in Weissman, F. (ed), In the Shadow of lust Wars": Violence, Politics and
Humanitarian Action, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 286-296; and 0. Furley and R. May (eds),
"Introduction", in Furley , 0. and May, R. (eds) African Interventionist States, p. 7.
m D. Rieff, At the Point of the Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention, p. 218.
In The Cotecna Company intervention in Iraq to alleviate food scarcity became controversial because it was
portrayed as a company that had ulterior economic interests. The company had Kofi Kojo (the former UN
Secretary General) as one of its proprietors. For a detailed expose on the case, see "Kofi, Kojo and a lot of shredded











Both Political Liberalism and the Utilitarian Liberal theory have been used extensively in the
literature that has covered interventions in Africa during the post-Cold War era (which will be
discussed in the following chapter). In this study, thus, these two theories are used in comparison
with the constructivist, poliheuristic and realist theories (in the latter case specifically the Security
Dilemma theory), which have not thus far been given sufficient importance in the analysis of
Uganda's interventions in the GLR. However, emphasis has been put on the Utilitarian Liberal
perspective because it has featured prominently in the GLR interventions explanations. In the
following sections, the constructivist and poliheuristic theories are discussed as possible
alternative theories that are salient in explaining the foreign policy behaviours of states.
2.3 Constructivism
Constructivism is a framework that has relevance to the analysis of interventions particularly in
the post-Cold War era. Constructivism focuses on how identity, norms and culture influence
state behaviour within international politics. Having entered the realm of International Relations
in the late 1980s and early 1990s following the changes that were beginning to occur in the
international system, and the challenges faced by Realism and Liberalism in trying to explain
these changes. Constructivism has gained ground in the analysis of international relations
following its development by scholars like Onuf, Wendt and Katzenstein whose works have
come to constitute Constructivism as an international relations analytical tool!" Constnictivism
was originally confined to the US but has since become viewed even by Europeans as an
important framework for understanding international relations and its practice!' To date there
are three outstanding books that provide an indepth analysis of Constructivism and its
importance to the field of foreign policy and international politics: °nut's book, World of Rule-
Orientated Constructivism in the Making,  and his follow-up article "The Politics of
Constructivism", Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics and Katzenstein's edited The
179 K. M. Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", in Fierke, K. M and Jorgensen, K. E. (eds),
Constucting International Rel. ions: The Next Generation,  (London: M E Sharpe, 2001), pp. 115-117;
V. Kubalkova, "Foreign Policy and International Politics, and Constructivism”, Kubalkova, V. (ed)  Foreign Policy
in a Constructed World, (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2001), p. 19 and M. Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in International
Relations, p. 200.
18° K. M. Fierke and K. E. Jorgensen, "Introduction" in Fierke, K. M. and Jorgensen, K. E. Constructing











Culture of National Security are the key books on Constructivism181  More recently, the edited
works of Kubalkova's Foreign Policy in a Constructed World  and Fierke and Jorgensen's
Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation, all provide more grounding on
Constructivism.'" Central to all these books is the argument that Constructivism provides a
useful framework of analysis of international relations, although it is not a theory in itself.'"
Constructivism has come to be associated with an approach that identifies a causal relationship
between ideas and material relations.'" Constructivism like Realism posits that states are the
principal units of analysis of international politics. The difference between the two is that
Realism is opposed to the salience of identities,' or norms in differing state actions in
international politics' s', whereas Constructivism is not. Constructivists focus on how norms,
culture and identity influence national security matters, as well as how ideas change identities of
states and thus their interests and policies."' Norms, they argue, constitute the collective
expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity, which can either define identities (m
which case they are "constitutive") or prescribe behaviours for already constituted identities (in
which they are "regulative").' The norms establish acceptable behaviour, and who the actors are
expected to be in a particular environment. Anything done outside the expected norm is
considered a breach of the norm, and anything done in accordance with the norm is upheld.
181 P. Katzenstein and his group's Constructivism and style have come to be associated with the °new security
studies" branch of international relations. For a commentary on Katzenstein's °Construaivism" see V. Kubalkova,
"Foreign Policy and International Politics, and Constructivism ", p. 3.
181 A critical review of all these books is not possible at this time but they are crucial to an understanding of
Constructivism and its role in world politics, because they all focus on key items, including but not limited to
language, culture, state behaviour and how world politics is structured.
183 See Jorgensen's critique of Constructivism, in K. E. Jorgensen, "Four Levels and a Discipline", in Fierke, K. M.
and Jorgensen, K. E., Constructing  International Relations: The Next Generation,  pp. 36-53.
B4 K. M Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism", p. 121.
185 The exception here is Barry Posen who uses "identity" as an aspect of his analysis of the security dilemma
framework. He uses it exclusively to refer to ethnic security dilemmas but does note that even when states face a
security dilemma, their identities are important too. See B. Posen, °The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict".
rests Griffiths, Fifty Key  Thinkers in International Relations, p. 201.
187 P. Katzenstein provides an in-depth analysis of how culture, identity and norms play a central role in state
behaviour, see P. Katzenstein, "Introduction" in Katzenstein, P. (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and
Identity in World Politics, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1996) and V. Kubalkova, "Foreign Policy and
International Politics, and Constructivism" p. 19.
1715 R. L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. J. Katzenstein , 'Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" in
[Katzenstein, J. P. (ed), The Culture of National Smirks ,: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York











Identity, which is a salient feature of Constructivism, refers to a "mutually constructed and
evolving image of self and other",'" or to "the images of individuality and distinctiveness ... held
and projected by an actor and formed ... through relations with significant bothers'" ." 9 States
project or identify themselves in a distinct way and construct roles that they presume give them
special responsibilities in the international system."' States believe that their actions (as
prescribed by their identity) are publicly understood standards for action that help to address a
particular situation, such as conflict management in a generally agreed upon way."' In this
respect, actors bring meaning to their identities, practices and interactions'", which emerge into
and create a culture. States will thus try to adhere to this culture and learn to behave in a way or
in ways that are mutually acceptable to each other.'"
Constructivism and Intervention
The main claim of constructivists is that the security environment is cultural and institutional,
rather than material. A cultural environment is a product of human beings' relations with their
material environment)" As human beings interact with the material environment, they create a
material culture and a non-material culture."$ While the material culture is tangible, the non-
material culture manifests in ideas, beliefs and philosophies, as well as in a culture of security)"
There are two levels of constructivist analysis: the domestic and the international. At the
domestic level, they argue that states' responses to certain situations depend on the ideas and
identities that characterise these states. For example, some states perceive themselves to be
responsible for the security of others, while other states believe that they have a social role to
ensure that they cooperate with other states to make the world secure.
188 Ibid, p. 8.
189 Ibid, p. 59.
19° 1bid, p. 99. Also see 0. Aluko, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States" in Aluko, 0. (ed),
The Foreign Policies of African States,(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), pp. 1-23; V. Ripberger, °Germany
Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories Meet Reality" in Ripberger, V. and Wagner, W. (eds), Foreign Policy of
the New Germany: Theories and Cue Studies, (Manchester-. Manchester University Press, 2000); D. Copeland, "The
Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism" in International Security,  Vol 25, No 2 (2000), pp. 187-212.
191 P. Katzenstein, "Introduction" in Katzenstein, P. (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics, p. 21.
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At the international level, with the development of International Humanitarian Law RILL states
are expected to abide by certain rules and regulations set out by JELL to protect humanity. States
thus become conscious of humanitarian concerns and of how the political environment affects
humanity, and are consequently forced to intervene for humanitarian reasons.'" This new
responsibility to protect humanity accounts for many interventions in the post-Cold War era, and
constructivists attribute such states' behaviour to extra-national factors like the structure and
expectations of the international system as well as the status of particular states in international
society.'" They argue that the social nature of international politics creates a normative
understanding among actors that they should behave in a certain way at particular times.'" This
normative understanding about social roles or rules assigned to people or actors, place limits on
the range of actions that are available to them. For example, rules could include how far states
can go in terms of intervention, but are not necessarily limited to this example.' In general,
constructivists argue that states may only intervene in the business of other states if they are
compelled by an accepted norm of intervention, such as a humanitarian disaster, in which many
lives would be saved as a result of the intervention. Drawing on Construaivism, Barnett
observes, as follows,
State sovereignty  limits state responsibility. Yet state sovereignty  is not a fixed category. It is a
changing set of practices arrd obligations. States are nested  in  a web of internationalinstitutiorrs th t
place legal and normative  limits on their actions and impose various obligations. The practices
includehow states whim to other states and their citizens. The obligations include&w states can
carryout their humanitarianommitmentsthrough m ltilateraland ilat ral ctions.'
It is true that, over time, states have constructed rules among themselves about why and when
intervention should take place. It is also true that there is a consensus amongst constructivists
that, by virtue of states belonging to the UN, interventions motivated by humanitarian concerns
are well-founded because they are supposed to bring relief to people afflicted in emergences,
r" It L. Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Senility", p.55.
l" S. Walt, "International Relations: One world, many theories", Foreign Policy, (1998)
http✓/www.Findanicles.com, accessed on 5 February 2003; M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian
Intervention" in Katzenstein, P. (ed) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
pp. 153-185 and F. Teson, "The Liberal case for Humanitarian Intervention" in Holzgrefe, J. L. and Keohane,
(eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical,Legal  and Political Dilemmas, pp 93-129; and P. Katzenstein,
"Introduction" in Katzenstein , P (ed) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p.24.
'99 S. Walt, "International Relations: One world, many theories" in Foreign Policy (1998); M. Finnemore,
"Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention" in Katzenstein, P. (ed), The Culture of National Security:
Noms and Identity itic pp 153-185
203 V. Kubalkova, °A constructivists  Primer" in Kubalkova, V(ed) Foreign Policy in a Constructed World, (New
York: M.E Sharpe, 2001) p.65.











such as genocides, intense warfare or natural disasters. What is not clear, though, is why states do
not adhere to the rules and regulations set out by the international law on intervention."'
Another question is who decides on the norms amongst states to act in certain ways? These
questions simply indicate that Constructivism is good in theory but weak in practice, because it is
not explicit on how norms emerge amongst states. If they are accepted norms, why is it that
some states are able to take up challenges to intervene and others do not? One major
characteristic of the constructivist perspective on international obligations, for example, is that
some states seem to have more responsibility by virtue of their position on the
internationalstage . For example, the US is often expected by all other states in the world to play a
central role in any conflict in the world, and to be more noble and altruistic than any other
state 03
Constructivists take cognizance of the role of power and economic interests in explaining
intervention and the fact that sometimes intervenors' interests change during the course of their
interventions. However, they also hold that power and economic interests are immaterial,
especially in interventions where humanitarian emergencies like genocides or gross abuses of
human rights occur. Drawing on the US intervention in Somalia (1991 - 1992), they argue that this
intervention had no geo-strategic or geo-economic advantage and, in fact, that the US used
colossal sums of money to intervene.'
The constructivists dismiss the realist claim that attributes motivations for interventions to the
anarchic nature of the world, which increases spirals of hostility among states and results in war.
On the contrary, they argue that states behave in a particular way, because of their own social
practices, which reproduce egoistic and militaristic mind-sets.' In relation to intervention,
therefore, states will intervene in situations where they perceive themselves to have an obligation
to intervene because the social structure of the international system expects them to do so.
Constructivism provides a good orientating framework in terms of which states' foreign policy
2°2 States often evoke the customary international law to justify interventions when international law does not permit
them. States assume that because it is noble to save people in genocide then they are justified to intervene in states
that try to commit genocide on their citizens.
203 M. Barnett tried to apportion blame in respect to the genocide in Rwanda and argues that the US had a
significant role to play, yet it too had its own limitations following the disastrous attempt to manage the conflict in
Somalia, see M. Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda,  p. 172.
20 ' For a detailed expose on constructivists see M. Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention"
pp. 153-161.
ms For a detailed view on what the constructivists view as a realist's weakness, see D. Copeland, "The Constructivist











behaviour can be analysed, especially considering that it pays attention to important factors that
are often neglected in international relations, such as identity, culture and religion, all of which
are indeed salient in foreign policy behaviour."' In spite of this, it should be noted that
Constructivism has inherent limitations, which compromise its application. Firstly, it would
require interdisciplinary methods, which would be complicated, particularly in the field of
security studies. Secondly, the constructivist definition of culture is very inflexible, which
complicates its analysis. As observed by Seegers and Farrel, studies of culture often lack
intellectual rigour and discipline,' which compromises the nature of information collected in a
study and how it is analysed. This however does not compromise its usefulness for analysing
state behaviour, as these methodological limitations could be dealt with by a careful triangulation
of research methods.
2.4 Poliheurism
A theory that has received little attention in the analysis of international politics is Poliheurism,
also known as the Psychological Reductionist School. This school attributes foreign policy
behaviour and decision making to the particular nature of the leaders of a state. Poliheurism is a
new theory in the realm of analysing foreign policy decision-making, which is slightly older than
a decade but is already making its mark as a respected theory.2©8 Founded by Alex Mintz, the
theory addresses the dynamics of decision making in foreign policy and builds on the works
during the 1960s and 1970s of Allison Graham'', Hilsman210,  and Robert Jervis'" predicating
foreign policy responses of 1976.2" Poliheurism has emerged at a time when foreign decision-
206 In this study Constructivism has been described as a theory, but note that much as it provides a good foundation
for theories of international relations, it is not a theory per se. See K.E. Jorgensen for a detailed genealogical survey
of Constructivism and why it is not considered a theory, in K. M. Fierke and K. E. Jorgensen, "Introduction" in
Fierke, K and K.E. Jorgensen, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation,  (London: M.E Sharpe,
2001) p. 7.207
 I am grateful to A. Seegers who shared with me her critique of Connructivism. See also T. Farrel, "constructivist
Security Studies: Protrait of a Reseach  Program" inInternational Studies Review,V l4,No I (2002), p.57.
2°8 S. B. Redd, "Poliheuristic  Theory of Foreign Policy" in Mintz, A. (ed), Integrating Cognativend Rational
Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), p. 101.
29" A. T. Graham, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: Little Brown and Company,
1971).
210 K Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defence and Foreign Affairs, (New York Harper and Row
Publishers, 1971).
211
R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
212 L. Xinsheng, "The Poliheuristic  Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic Theory of Decision: A Comparative
Examination" in Mintz A., (ed)  Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making,











making analysis has become an important subfield of international relations and an explanatory
framework in national foreign policy behaviour." The theory has been applied to many real
world foreign policy situations in which the decisions taken by leaders and key actors in the
international system are analysed. The poliheuristic theory, which is contained in an edited book
by Mintz, is used to examine renowned poliheuristic foreign policy decisions in international
conflicts in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Kosovo (1991) and the ongoing conflicts in Pakistan, Iraq
and Israel.'"
Poliheurism has followed the earlier theoretical perspectives, like the rational choice
perspective', which has been used in game-theoretic analysis and the cybernetic decision
perspective.216 Cybernetic decision-making attempts to answer the how of foreign policy making
while the rational choice theory explains the why of foreign policy decision making. Poliheurism
addresses both the how and why by examining how leaders, groups or the elite in a given state
make particular foreign policy decisions.'" As Redd observes,[p]oliheurism
 has beet it existence , for a very short while but has made significant Stilt towards
becoming a respected thorny in the field of foreign policy analysis... and is aiming at bridging the gap
between cognitive psychology and rational choice  approaches to the study of Foreign policy decisionmaking
2 18
Poliheurism has focused specifically on the role that leaders play as units within the decision-
making structures of states. As Liu argues, national leaders are assigned a special role within
states to make decisions that translate national interests into discrete objectives, such as power,
prestige, wealth, territory and the like. Leaders' decisions are extremely important and, as
expected by the state, they have to evaluate different policy alternatives, and behave rationally by
213Ibid.
211 See Mintz A., (ed), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Palgrave
Macmillan: New York, 2003), Chapters 2-5. In these the theory has been empirically tested with results that provide
strong support for the theory's relevance in an analysis of international relations and state behaviour.
215 V. Danilovic propounds that in rational choice, decision makers make choices between alternatives with the goal
to maximise their preferences. Their choices become rational if their preferences are connected and transitive. See
V. Danilovic, "The Rational-Cognitive Debate and Poliheuristic Theory", in Mintz, A. (ed), Integrating  re
and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003), p. 128.
216 Lb., provides an in-depth analysis of the Cybernetic theory. In brief, he argues that decision making within the
Cybernetic framework is compromised because decision makers do not consider all alternatives and all possible
outcomes due to cognitive computational limitations, environmental uncertainness and incomplete information. See
X. Liu., "The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic Theory of Decision: A Comparative
Examination", p. 142.












selecting policy options that will maximise their success in achieving their goals." This theory
thus concentrates on leaders and accounts for the ways in which make decisions in foreign
policy. The school thus attributes states' foreign policies in general to big men's idiosyncrasies,
regardless of whether a policy is good or bad.'
Poliheurism has three central tenets. Firstly, the theory posits that the foreign policy decision-
making process follows a non-compensatory two-stage approach, in which the initial stage of
foreign policy decision making, cognitive and political factors are particularly important.'
Danilovic in explaining poliheurism argues that policy makers usually employ multiple heuristics
(cognitive shortcuts, which alludes to the cognitive mechanisms used by decision makers to
simplify complex foreign policy decisions and used by political leader to measure success and
failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards using political units."'
Secondly, the process is guided more by the rules of maximising the utility of the final choice.'
At this stage, decision makers switch their decision making procedures to the selection of
alternatives, to ensure that they do not compromise the outcome of their actions.' Two key
aspects of the two-stage decision-making process emerge from this theory: Firstly, decision
makers ensure that the decisions they make or the alternatives they choose, do not compromise
their welfare nor hurt their individual as well as state political interests and plans.' Secondly,
decision making is a group process, and not necessarily a one man process. The key decision
maker (leader) thus consults a group that provides him with an in-depth review of the
alternatives to enable him to choose the best alternative. A group may comprise the president,
119 A. Mintz "Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Poliheuristic
Perspective", in Mintz, A. (ed), Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theres of ForeignP licy D cisionMaki g
(Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2003) p. 2 and X. Liu, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic
Theory of Decision: A Comparative Examination", p. 139.
22° A. Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and
National Security Decisions", in International Studies Perspective, Vol 6 (2005), pp. 94-98; A. Mintz, "Integrating
Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Malting: A Poliheuristic Perspective", pp. 1-9; and
K. De Rouen, "The Decision Not To Use Force at Dien Bien Phu: A Poliheuristic Perspective", in Mintz A. (ed),
Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making,  pp. 11-28.
22% Liu "The Poliheuristic Theory of Decision and the Cybernetic Theory of Decision: A Comparative
Examination", p. 143.
222 V. Danilovic, "The Rational-Cognitive Debate", pp. 127-137 and p. 133.
223 Ibid.
22• A. Mintz, "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilising Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and
National Security Decisions", p.94 and A. Mintz, N. Geva, S. R. Redd and A. Carnes, "The Effects of Dynamic and
Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform" in American
Political Science Review, Vol 91 (1997), p. 554.











prime ministers, other foreign policy actors, and the president's confidants.' Inherent in such
groups is the fact that members of the 'decision-making group' (like the US President's inner
circle') become central to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. They help the
president to define the nature of the problem and present appropriate options and strategies for
discussion in the complex foreign policy arena Such dependency of presidents on groups or
specific personalities to advise them on the best policy option in specific circumstances is based
on the assumption - whether true or idealistic - that these advisors have done sufficient
background work to be fully informed about the policies and options they propose." Preston
calls this group-based approach to decision making the "broad-based information gathering
network"." This may be done at a formal or informal level. Irrespective of whether it is
informal or formal, the underlying notion of this group's decision-making process is that the
subsequent actions of the state depend on the importance the leader attaches to this group and
the trust placed in their abilities.
The second tenet of Poliheurism holds that decision making in foreign policy is often
multidimensional and non-compensatory.' Mintz argues that decision makers eliminate
alternatives that are below the 'cut off' level on the domestic political dimension, and do not
make tradeoffs across multiple dimensions to compensate for a low score on the domestic
political dimension.231 In other words, if an alternative is good but has inherent limitations, the
decision makers will not only consider the good part of the alternative and choose a matching
positive alternative from another option. Instead, decisions will be made with the ultimate output
226 T. Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs,
(New York Columbia University Press, 2001).
222 The term "Inner Circle" is used by Preston and Garrison to describe a President's Privy Council or selected
confidants on whom he depends when making decisions and formulating policies. For an extensive discussion of
the role of presidents' groups in decision making, see T. Preston, The President and his Inner Circle: Leadership
Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs and J. Garrison, "Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner
Circle : The President, His Advisors, and the Struggle for the Arms  Control Agenda" in Political Psychology, Vol 22
(2001), pp. 775-807.
228 The limitation of such reliance on a group to do all the ground work required in a decision making process is that
sometimes the group of "advisers or technocrats" may not do a proper analysis, which in turn affects the outcome
of the decision taken. This has been demonstrated by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003: US troops invaded Iraq on
the grounds that Iraq had nuclear weapons and yet in reality it did not.
229 See T. Preston for a thorough analysis of the decision-making channels of the US leaders. He demonstrates how
each leader arrived at a set of actions that were taken by the US government. See particularly Eisenhower's
intervention in Dien Bien Phu. Preston presupposes that some leaders make decisions after utilizing the group to
collect a wide variety of information regarding the plausibility or feasibility of the action and the likely consequences
of an action they hope to take (pp. 83-96).
236 A. Mintz, "The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making", in Journal of












level that best matches the interest of the leader or his group. For example, if the decision to
intervene in a conflict is likely to 'benefit' the intervenor in terms of economic resources but may
result in people dying during the military deployments and warfare in the intervene state, the
intervenor will not necessarily decide against the intervention because of its potential impact on
the populace. He is more likely to authorise the intervention, with the consequences being borne
by the actors in the conflict, provided the decision made is likely ultimately to benefit the
decision maker.
The third tenet of Poliheurism takes cognizance of the fact that several factors affect the foreign
decision-making process. The first factor points to the varied way in which decision makers may
present issues in areas about which they must make choices, which may affect the decision
especially when determining the best alternatives.' The second factor that plays an important
role in the decision making itself, in managing tasks and in reaching a final decision are the
cognitive characteristics of the national decision makers. Lastly, they also observe that the
manner in which decision makers cognitively define and represent situations about which they
must make choices leading to national action has important implications for how the same
decision makers process information, how they perceive alternative options, how they apply
decision strategies, and how they make final choices!" It is implicit from this discussion of
poliheurist theory that decision-making in foreign policy is a salient aspect of foreign policy that
requires a thorough analysis into the leaders. It seems to provide good empirical outcomes if
properly utilised. The only limitation that can be discerned from this discussion of the theory is
that it requires good data or documentation that is relevant. Yet within the realm of international
relations access to documents is sometimes limited especially depending on the laws of the state
where such research would be conducted. The available alternatives to such limited access to
documentation would be to rely especially on interviews and newspaper material, which equally
often have their own biases.
152 Cognitive characteristics include computational skill and the holistic information processing capacity required for
rational decision making, so leaders engage in a selective/non-holistic information processing when handling
complicated, multifaceted international crises: they lack the computational skill and the holistic information
processing capacity required for rational decision making so they engage in a selective/non-holistic information
processing when handling complicated, multifaceted international crises.
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Poliheurism provides a useful framework for analysis on how decisions to intervene in states are
made and if these decisions are important as a motivation for the intervention process. This
study draws on poliheurism to examine the cognitive factors that influenced Uganda's foreign
policy decision-making leaders to pursue an interventionist foreign policy in the region.
Poliheurism has been used to analyse the US interventions and what emerged from the studies is
that leaders and their groups are very central to the US interventions in states and in influencing
the nature of foreign policy that US undertook at particular times. A good example of an
intervention that was based on group decision-making is the US foreign policy decision to
intervene in the "Bay of Pigs". Scholars argue that there was group pressure to obtain a
consensus and refusal to accommodate dissenting views.' This interaction made it impossible
for President Kennedy to make sound judgements as to whether it was worthwhile to intervene
or not.' If a President considers it a good option and his group "advisers" are positive about
it, then the leader will easily commit the army to war. Note, though, that sometimes leaders have
a strong view which they impose on their informal group. The action then taken is identified
with this group when, in fact, it was the leader's personal preference.
politicalleaders almost by definition take So account political factorsand consequences while
making inky &Sion& They measure  success and failure at and benefits, gains and loses , and
risks and rewards in political units. They foots on a few, noncompensatory  criteria in simplifying
lowly: policy decision problems prior to employing more  elaborative, analytic processors.236
Redd emphasises further that, when leaders make foreign policy decisions, they will measure
gains and losses, costs and benefits, risks and rewards, success and failure in terms of the political
consequences to their leadership. In other words, leaders are concerned with their level of
support, challenges to their leadership, and prospects of their political survival, which in turn
affects their foreign policy choices in situations of crisis or in an anarchic international system.'
Another dimension that is close to Mintz's poliheuristic theory is that decision makers will
sometimes intervene in other states in order to divert their populaces' attention from internal
J. Garrison, "Framing Foreign Policy Alternatives in the Inner Circle: The President, His Advisors, and the
Struggle for the Arms Control Agenda" pp 775-807.
235 %id,
236 S. B. Redd, "The Poliheuristic Theory of Foreign Policy Decision Making: Experimental Evidence", p. 103.
237 Did, pp. 103-104. A detailed analysis of the diversionary aspect of leaders behaviour is presented in Chiozza











weaknesses and unpopular polices.' Such diversionary military interventions, which are
compelled by failing domestic politics, often manifest in three ways.' Firstly, presidents will use
force to boost their popularity at both the domestic and international levels. Secondly, they will
intervene in other states to divert public attention from internally prevailing poor economic
conditions. Thirdly, presidents will intervene in conflicts with the ulterior motive of bolstering
their public approval rating in an impending election.' Baker, for example, cites the 1998 film
Wag S Dog where a fictional president manufactured a military conflict with a minor state to
divert the public's attention from a sex scandal.' Baker further notes that interventions are
exclusively done by powerful countries and most commonly by the superpowers, although, in
the post-Cold War era, even small states have started to play a major role in interventions in spite
of being small, weak and, above all, authoritarian.
In the West, it is a commonly used strategy of presidents to embark on interventions that seek to
bolster their public approval rating in elections or that seek to divert attention away from bad
internal policies. This is because the populace's level of political participation in the West is high
and their opinions are important. A case in point is the 2006 Congressional elections in the US in
which the Republicans lost to the Democrats because the populace did not perceive the US
intervention in Iraq by the George Bush administration in a positive light.'
Events in Africa and other parts of the Third World paint a very different picture. States will
intervene in others states' internal affairs without fearing that their interventions will make them
unpopular or that they will lose elections to the opposition. Particularly in Africa, ruling
governments will undertake unpopular interventions without fear because they do not depend on
23 See W. a Baker The Dog that won't Wag: Presidential Use of Force and the diversionary theory of war" in
Strategic ts, Vol 111, No 5 (2004), Centre for Contemporary Conflict,
http://www.cce.nps.navy.milisi/2004/may/bakerMay04.pdf,  accessed 5 May 2004, and J. Pickering, and E. F.
Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary
Hypothesis" in International Studies quarterly , Vol 49 (2005), pp. 23-43.
24° Though a proponent of this diversionary theory, Baker is the only one who disputes the fact that the attack on
Iraq (2003) was designed to bolster the president's popularity or to divert the attention from a lacklustre economic
recovery to which many scholars have pointed. See, for example, D. Rieff, At the Point of the Gum Democratic
Dreams and Armed Intervention, p.218 who succinctly demonstrates that the US intervention in Iraq was
economically motivated and aimed at helping Bush gain popularity, which he had lost because of his poor economic
policies.
141 W. D . Baker, "The Dog that won't Wag: Presidential Use of Force and the diversionary theory of war".
242 S. Ruken has argued that in the US, contrary to the expectations, domestic political constraints have become less
important, and that the individual decision maker has emerged as the pre-eminent determinant of American
interventionist behaviour. See S. Ruken, "A Theory of American Intervention Decisions", Ph.D. (University of











the populace to stay in power. The only limitation of the diversionary school, whose proponents
are De Rouen, Baker, Korwa and Ajulu (2002) and Pickering and Kisangani (2002), is that it
seems to concentrate on major powers, which undertake interventions to divert their populace's
attention from unpopular or bad policies!' It is necessary to establish if leaders of African states
also intervene in other states in order to distract their populace from unfair domestic policies.
The Poliheuristic framework is relevant for analysing African interventions because, while
interventions are obviously linked to security, the role of the leader and the influence of domestic
politics in interventions are important variables to examine. In this study, the proximate causes
of Uganda's interventions are discussed against the poliheuristic framework.
The Poliheuristic school is most relevant in analysing the foreign policies of African states post-
independence and in situations where the formulation and implementation of such policies are
an exclusive preserve of the president!" The only limitation of this school is that it assumes that
leaders will carry out a cost benefit analysis of their actions,-and that they will discard those
policies that are likely to count against them politically  or require considerable financial input, yet
the opposite is true in Africa. In most cases, African foreign policies reflect the interests of the
president."' The school further presupposes that presidents are accountable to their citizens, yet
they often do not communicate with their populace and may not even feel obliged to account for
their foreign policies, because they can remain in power even if the populace is disgruntled, In
Africa, it is also implicit that even when citizens use legitimate channels to protest against their
leaders' actions or demand accountability from their leaders, they often do not obtain what they
want because their presidents do not feel obliged to explain their actions. Therefore, if
interventions are undertaken, they are publicized as part of the broader foreign policies of the
state when they actually represent exclusively the interests of the president and his confidants.
A second weakness of the poliheuristic theory is that, while it proposes that states will refrain
from actions that are not likely to benefit them, the reality is that this does not always stop them.
m See J. Pickering and E. F. Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime
Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis" and a A Korwa and R. Ajulu, "Southern African States' Foreign Policy and
Foreign Policy-Making Process: An Introductory Contextualisation" in G. A Korwa and R. Ajulu (eds),
Globalization  andEm in African States Foreign Policy Makin Process: A Comparative Perspectiveof
Southern Africa (Ashgate: Aldersot, 2002), pp. 1-5
144 R. Hllsman, The Politics of Policy Making in  Defence and Foreign Affairs, (New York Harper and Row
Publishers, 1971) and A. Olajide, "The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States in  Olajide, A., (ed),
The Foreign Policies of African States, pp. 1-23.











The US intervention in Somalia and NATO's intervention in Kosovo are very good cases in
point. Although these interventions were allegedly compelled by reports of suffering people and
intolerable human conditions, decisions to intervene were clearly going to cost colossal sums of
money and manpower. According to the poliheuristic theory, alternatives that may have a
negative political effect or that drain economic resources are discarded first and the remaining
alternatives are evaluated based on rational calculations." Clearly, this was not relevant in these
two cases. It is also questionable whether leaders do in fact carry out such effective or detailed
planning with regard to interventions in other states as the poliheuristic theory proposes. If
effective planning does occur, then the interventions should have produced better results.
Unfortunately, they do not. This weakness notwithstanding, the poliheuristic approach does
provide good insight into the role played by leaders in their states' foreign policies, and
specifically with regard to interventions.
The main criticism of Poliheurism is that it assumes that decision are made by means of an
organized process in which detailed discussions are held and decisions are arrived at in the
interest of the state. Other than De Renouen's analysis of the US decision in the Dien Phu case
and Allison Graham's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, where US decision-making process
was carefully studied, attempts to conduct a similar analysis on other cases, especially in Africa,
would be very difficult. Poliheurism has a methodological limitation.
Poliheurism's use as a theory nonetheless provides a unique understanding of the poliheuristic
decision-making model's ability to account not only for simply situations but also for cognitively
demanding and complicated foreign policy decisions that are made in critical areas of world
politics."' These areas, argues Mintz, include world trade, multilateral aid decisions, global
environmental issues, armament and disarmament programs, counter terrorism or the use of
force and war and peace decisions."'
1 A. Mintz "Applied Decision Analysis: Utilizing Poliheuristic Theory to Explain and Predict Foreign Policy and
National Security Decisions ", p. 12 and K. De Rouen, "The Decision Not To Use Force at Dien Bien Phu: A
Poliheuristic Perspective" (2003), p. 12.













2.5 CONCLUSION: A COMPARISON OF THE FOUR THEORIES
In this chapter, I have discussed the theoretical antecedents to this study and their relevance. The
theories discussed in this chapter seem to have one inherent problem that is common to them
all, i.e. they all have methodological limitations of varying degrees. Although these are not
insurmountable, the use of each as an isolated framework of analysis would not yield the desired
results and therefore all of them need to be included to provide a more comprehensive analysis
of the case study.
Of the four theories, the poliheuristic theory has the most limitations when used to explain
African state's interventions: it is likely to yield only partial results because there is limited
documentation available and even if documentation does exist, access to it is likely to be limited.
As will be discussed in Chapter Seven when Poliheurism is used in a theoretical case study that
examines decision making as a process of foreign policy formulation, it would be unable to yield
very good results because it is not yet fully developed!' Yet it cannot be completely ignored
because the motivations and chokes that prompt leaders to make particular decisions, be it at the
domestic or the international level do play a central role in African politics.
In the case of Uganda, the decision-making process is an exclusive preserve of the High
Command and the decisions are tacitly made. Evidence of the decisions made is often reflected
in presidential speeches, which provides a good basis for analysing the role of leaders in foreign
policy behaviour even though it is not sufficient for a detailed analysis: after all, it is possible that
a president may be projecting his state policies in a way that is acceptable to people, although it is
actually doing the converse. Of course, leaders' decision-making processes are important in
determining the foreign policy behaviour of states, particularly in Africa, but the problem with
this theory is that it is difficult to find sufficient relevant material to support its position,
especially in Africa where decisions are made tactily in secret. An analysis to establish if the
leaders have used their cognitive skills to arrive at decisions to intervene in another state or
whether they used the non-compensatory pay-off in selecting a specific foreign policy action
often requires information that is classified and, even if it is available, may be difficult to find.











The constructivists provide a good explanation of intervention and, unlike the utilitarian liberal
position or the Security Dilemma for that matter, Constructivism can explain interventions in
states that are not necessarily endowed with economic wealth as well as in states that do not
necessarily pose security problems for the intervenor. The weakness of the constructivist
approach is only in relation to its methodology. How can norms be measured and on what basis
would a norm be regarded as being embraced by all states, especially when some states cannot
take up similar responsibility to intervene in states. How can norms be differentiated from the
ulterior motives of an individual?
The utilitarian approach does not have any of the problems that Poliheurism and Constructivism
present. It is a strong approach and has the advantage that statistical data can be used to defend
its position. The only limitation of the theory is that the data provided could be used selectively
to augment preconceived positions regarding state foreign behaviour. Data demonstrating
economic benefits that accrue from a specific intervention would greatly depend on who
collected them and for what purpose. This would require an indepth analysis and an appreciation
of the context in which such data was collected, which in turn would influence the evaluation of
the theory and its effectiveness in explaining an intervention that is motivated by economic
interests. In this study, it is pointed out that the utilitarian approach has been used extensively to
account for Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. This study furthermore reviews the position
of the theory in confirming or denying what motivated Uganda in its intervention and in
establishing whether it indeed developed because of its interventionist foreign policy in its
western neighbours.
The Security Dilemma theory overcomes some of the above limitations of all the other theories.
It is able to account for interventions that are not necessarily aimed at economic interests, as well
as interventions aimed at stopping humanitarian disasters in neighbouring states. It can thus
account for the many varied types of interventions that exist. The only drawback of the Security
Dilemma theory is empirical. It is problematic to prove foreign policy actions that are shrouded
in secrecy and particularly ones that are covertly carried out. Other than data released by the
relevant actors, it it difficult, if not impossible, to find data in security matters that are primarily a
classified area of international relations. The theory thus relies on speeches and oral accounts of
the periodic interventions, which are sometimes impossible to corroborate. Nevertheless, they
do provide a starting point for inquiry and they can be used in conjunction with the other











In conclusion, in order to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist
foreign policy, this studywill be using an eclectic approach. The study will examine the theories
that best explain the motivations of Uganda's intervention in the GLR from 1996 to 2006. In
table 2 overleaf, a summary of the theoretical positions is done.
In the next chapter, the existing literature on Uganda's foreign policy behaviour is discussed with
a view to providing a favourable grounding on which the theories will be analysed. This is
followed by a chapter on the study methodology and a chapter on Uganda itself. Thereafter, the
empirical part of the study that draws on the four theories discussed in this chapter is organised








































AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS A LITERATURE SURVEY
3.0 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, a review is done of some of the literature on intervention and Uganda's foreign
interventions in the GLR. The chapter discusses the major scholarly contributions to the
intervention debate and how these contributions have influenced the way in which Uganda's
interventions have been interpreted. By examining studies that have covered several
interventions in Africa, the chapter attempts to work out the theoretical and empirical
importance of these studies to Uganda's interventions. The central aim of this chapter is to
identify, from the wide spectrum of literature available, those theories that can provide a
comprehensive explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its neighbouring states
of Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda.
The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section examines general works on the topic
of intervention, and the second section looks critically at the literature dealing with Uganda's
interventions in particular. The last part is a more general theoretical discussion of the literature,
creating a framework for the subsequent chapters on Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.
3.1 AFRICAN INTERVENTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
Interventions have been a common feature of African international relations and African
politics. There has been enormous coverage of specific events in Africa. Most prominent of
which have been the US intervention in Somalia (1991), genocide in Rwanda (1994), events in
Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1996, current crises in Darfur and Somalia and what has come to be
termed popularly "Africa's First World War", or Africa's deadliest conflict since World War
Two, in the DRC.250 From the North to the South, from the West to the Horn of Africa and to
the GLR, every government has intervened in another country, either covertly or ovenly.251  A
15° literature on intervention in Africa is now replete with several accounts of the DRC war, which has been termed
"Africa's First World War", having claimed up to 600,000 lives, based on Amnesty International statistics.
251 C Clapham, "Ethiopia and Eiitrea. Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn" in Purley, 0. and Roy, M. (eds),
African Interventionist States (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), p. 119 argues that in the Horn of Africa alone, all











proliferation of literature seeks to explain African interventions that have characterised the post-
Cold War era. In particular, the literature addresses intervention as a general trend and examines
whether they have in fact solved problems of African states or worsened the situation. Three
main collective works have addressed interventionism in Africa with specific case studies
covering the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The works focus on theoretical debates that
have been specifically framed to suit the African interventionist context, which provides a good
basis on which intervention in Africa can be understood.
3.2 PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION
African Interventionist States,  edited by Oliver and May, is the first book of its kind to explore
the willingness of African states to use military means to effect changes in neighbouring states
and the challenges involved in doing so. It provides a useful backfround to intervention in
Africa. It points out that the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in 1978 with the aim of
overthrowing the government in power set a precedent for African states' interventions in other
states. The book covers mainly the causes of intervention, and critiques the legal framework in
which they were undertaken. It provides classifications of interventions that are arguably peculiar
to Africa although, if further critically analysed, they are akin to the classifications that Schraeder
and others have provided in their explanation of the US interventionist foreign policy in the
Third World!"
Furley and May give a three-fold classification of interventions. The first classification covers
regime supportive  interventions  that provide military assistance to a threatened regime!" The second
category, regime opposing interventions , seek to overthrow and destabilise a government in power.
Lastly, state supportive interventions are undertaken to ensure that a state survives in the face of
severe internal disruptions or external aggression.'" These classifications are important in
identifying the nature of intervention although when it comes down to it, whether the
intervention is regime supportive or state supportive, the motives will not differ significantly.
The major difference between interventions would therefore be whether the intervention
252 See P. Schraeder, Intervention into the 1990: US Foreign Policy in the Third World,  (London: Lynne Renner,
1992).
253 a Finley and R. May, "Introduction", in Furley, 0. and May, R. (eds), African Interventionist States, (Ashgate:
Aldershot, 2001), p. 2.











undertaken is voluntary or solicited, whether it has been undertaken within the framework of the
UN Charter, and whether it conforms to international law. There is a consensus amongst the
authors that the motives of African interventionist states are common to all intervening states. In
their analysis, six main factors emerge. The first common motive, which is given great
significance, is the economic interests of the intervenors. Of the countless interventions carried
out by African states it could be safely argued that at least 60% of these could be considered
resource wars. The most significant examples indicated in the book are the DRC, Angola, Sierra
Leone and the Republic of Congo. These four examples are analysed in depth, and it is found
that they were primarily about the control of wealth, as the military engagements were implicitly
centred on mining areas or on areas with economic significance."'
The second factor that emerged as a central feature of African interventions is the region's
specific geo-politics. The political upheavals in regions of Africa were greatly catalyzed by the
geographic terrain that provided suitable habitat for insurgencies. The book covers the geo-
political location of states, which, on the one hand, provide offensive advantages to rebel groups,
which forces neighbouring states to intervene to stop such insurgency. On the other hand,
porous borders allow spill over effects of civil war and violent conflict, which also force states to
intervene to control or contain the threat."' The location of natural resources in specific
geographic zones is also highlighted as instrumental in causing interventions. Far-reaching
empirical research by international non-governmental organisations like Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International and International Crisis Group (ICG) are instructive in this context.
The third factor is that leaders whose revolutionary/guerrilla warfare succeeded were compelled
to intervene in other states in support of their fellow guerrilla groups or opposition groups,
which they felt needed to be freed from the subjugation of government.' For example,
Clapham refers to the success of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPDRF) and uses its assistance of the Eritrean People's Liberation Force (EPLF) and of rebels
255 See the ankles by N. McQueen, "Angola, in Finley, 0. and May, FL (eds), African Interventionist States,
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), pp. 93-118; P. Woodward, "Sudan, in Furley, 0. and May, R. (eds), African
Interventionist States,  pp. 139 - 152; M. McNulty , "From Intervened to Intervenor. Rwanda and Military Intervention
in Zaire/DRC, in Furley, 0. and May, R. (eds), African Interventionist States,  pp. 173-191; G. Cleaver and S.
Massey, "DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa, in Finley, 0. and May, R. (eds), African Interventionist Siam, pp.
193-210; and G. Cleaver, °Interventionist Companies: Privatising the Military Option, in Furley, 0. and May, IL
(eds), African Interventionist States, pp. 265-286 .
256 See M. McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervener: Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC, p. 174.











in Djibouti, in Yemeni territory, as examples of how the success of the EPDRF's struggle
influenced other countries and encouraged intervention."' Mel Mc Nulty singled out the success
of Uganda's National Resistance Movement (NRM)259 as a key factor in that country's
interventions in other conflicts, with Uganda's Museveni as the "key adviser"." Museveni after a
successful war provided support to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPCA) of Sudan."'
Rwanda's Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) support to Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), Rally for a Democratic Congo-Goma (RCD-Goma) and its
alleged support to People's Redemption Army (PRA) of Uganda has also been attributed to its
success in gaining power from the late President Habyarimana of Rwanda. All these cases are
instructive here.
The fourth factor that has been advanced by the book as a central feature of African
interventions is the hegemonic ambition that leaders in the region have, which compels them to
intervene in the hope of gaining political power and influence in the region. However, Clapham
observes in the Horn of Africa cases that not all interventions are the result of such hegemonic
motivations. He points out that the interventionist states have inherent problems of their own
that are not compatible with regional hegemony for example, they are all impoverished, their
borders are insecure, and they have internal divisions that not only make the leaders and their
states insecure.' Hegemony, as highlighted by Susan Strange, requires several key structures, i.e.
a knowledge structure, a financial structure, a security structure, and a production structure.' A
regional hegemonic power, in other words, needs to have the power to shape the frameworks
within which states relate to each other; hegemonic states must thus have the power to decide
things and be able to take responsibility on behalf of others which African states are not capable
of doing.
25e
259 The National Resistance Movement was the administrative wing of the National Resistance Army that waged a
guerilla warfare that saw President Yoweri Museveni come to power in 1986.
269 M. McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervenor. Rwanda and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC", pp. 180-181.
26" success of the NRA was in turn followed by its assistance to the RPF, AFDL, Rally for a Democratic Congo
(RCD)-Kisangani, MLC  and other mushrooming groups in the DRC, although much later in the crisis in the DRC.
162 C. Clapham, "Ethiopia and Eritrea Insecurity and Intervention in the Horn", pp. 119-138
26]  Strange, States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy, (London: Pinter, 1988),
pp. 24-25.
26' makes a similar observation to that of Strange. He argues elsewhere that African states are so wealt that
the leaders of these states are preoccupied with legitimising themselves in power and monopolizing the state, and so
their conduct of foreign relations is aimed at strengthening their domestic legitimacy more than becoming regional
hegemonies. Clapham provides a detailed examination of the foreign policies of various postcolonial states; see C.











The fifth factor of African states' interventions in each other's states is that they have primarily
been a result of the decline in the capacity of the UN to manage or resolve the conflicts. This can
be seen, for example, in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and, more prominently, Rwanda.
The failure of the UN has in turn forced African governments to intervene in other's affairs to
solve their own problems."' In addition, powers like America and France and the international
community, have also not only failed but have become loathe to interfere in these conflicts.'
The concept of "African solutions for African problems" has become synonymous with
intervention?' Closely related to the new role played by African states with regard to solving
their own problems, is the interplay between international politics and regional politics, and its
influence on interventions.'
The last factor that has motivated interventions in some states is the ideological factor. Using
Sudan as an example of this, Woodward argues that Sudanese interventions in its neighbouring
states were driven by its interest in spreading Islam, particularly after Hassan al Turabi came to
power.' Al Turabi felt that Sudan had an obligation to ensure that Muslims were linked together
in what he conceived as the "Commonwealth of Muslims; dar al-Islam". As a result, he
supported the liberation struggle of the Eritrean EPLF and the Tigrean People's Liberation
Front (TPLF) financially and militarily. Woodward's discussion demonstrates how Uganda
becomes a victim of the interventionist foreign policy of Sudan and how much the groups
supported and sponsored by the Sudanese army affected Uganda."' It would have been
interesting to compare and contrast the ideological struggle between the Anglo-Saxon and
Francophone states with the debate around the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, but this is
done elsewhere by Otunu, Wallis and Clark?" Three of them in their own studies argue that the
interventions in the GLR such as France's intervention in Rwanda and Uganda's intervention
initially in Rwanda and later in the DRC were indirectly a struggle for influence and power in the
265 Furley, O. and May, R, "Introduction", p. 7.
266 Ibid, p. 7.
262 Ibid.
268 N. McQueen indicates how the cold war influenced developments in Angola a situation that continued and has
now characterised the politics of Angola. See N. McQueen, "Angola, pp. 93-117.
269 P. Woodward, "Sudan" pp. 139-152.
271 0. awn; "Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zairian War, pp. 54-57 and p.78; A. Wallis, Silent Accom 
The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide, p. 64; and J. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the
Congo Wan. Uganda's Vietnam" in Clark, J. (ed), The African Stakes of the Congo War,  (Kampala: Fountain
Publishers, 2002b), p. 147. Also see J. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: A Thick Description" in
Kabweru, M. A., (ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger: Wars in the Great Lakes Reeion, (Kampala;











region between the Francophone and the Anglo-Saxon states. More specifically, the
interventions were perceived as an Anglo-American plot to control the entire GLR. The main
contradiction in this argument is its failure to notice that there was a general disengagement from
African affairs by the Anglo-Americans. In fact, the genocide in Rwanda, the current stalemate in
Somalia, and the crisis in Darfur are all evidence of this disengagement. If strengthening their
influence in the region had been the Anglo-American strategy, then their ways of achieving this
strategy were perhaps not well conceived.
Furley and May's book provides a very interesting perspective on the motivations of
intervention, and although they do not provide a theoretical analysis to explain what motivates
states to intervene in others, their case studies provide a useful template on which subsequent
comparative analysis of states' interventions can be based. Although the book provides a very
informative basis on which one can understand the politics behind the interventions in the
region, and the legal framework and legal implications of the interventions', its focus on
Uganda's intervention is to say the least wanting. Its coverage of the Ugandan case consists
mainly of occasional references to Uganda's role in the rise of Rwandan Tutsi nationalism.'"
Uganda is portrayed as a victim of the Tanzania intervention and as a victim of the Rwandan
political crisis of 1959.
3.3 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERVENTION
The African Stakes of the Congo  War, edited by John Clark, is an excellent survey of one
particularly significant case of intervention, the DRC case. The interventions in the DRC by the
states that intervened are presented as inextricably intertwined with each other; for example, to
understand Uganda's intervention in the DRC, it is also important to understand the Rwandan
intervention in the DRC. Similarly, to understand Rwanda's intervention in the DRC, it is crucial
to understand Uganda's and Angola's intervention in the DRC. Despite these complexities, the
book provides a good basis from which other interventions in Africa in general can be studied.
Clark's thorough review of the DRC conflict in which nine African states intervened militarily,
has analysed the interventions by states at multiple levels. It focuses on the level of states, on the
272 See article by J. Levitt, "African Interventionist States and International Law, pp. 15-50.
273 See G.erry Cleaver and S. Massey, "DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa, pp. 195-196, and P. Woodwar d,











level of non-state actors and, above all, on the level of international organisations. The authors
collectively posit that the motives behind the interventions in the region were convoluted. Not
significantly different from Furley and May's African Interventionist States, the authors in this
book also attribute interventions to strategic economic interests, hegemonic ambitions,
humanitarian concerns, ideological considerations and the geopolitical locations of the
respective states. All maintain that the international environment is significant in shaping the
nature of states' foreign policies. For example, they suggest that states intervene because the
international community is no longer focusing as much on African conflicts. In particular, they
assess the UN's performance in conflict management and argue that its failure has greatly
compromised its role in managing conflict, compelling states and regional organisations to take
over its role. The only differences between these two books lie in their ordering of the important
factors, but this does not have a significant impact on the information provided.
The articles in the book succinctly demonstrate that, if interventions in Africa are to be
understood, three theoretical explanations have to be used to explain the trend of interventions
that has emerged in the region. Firstly, they highlight regime  .'trinity as paramount in compelling
states to intervene in others, particularly in cases where states are threatened either by insurgents
based in neighbouring states or by domestic threats to their regimes." ° The second theory, called
the continental trend, is a salient explanation advanced by Crawford, which not only reflects on a
single factor but combines several factors to build a single broader explanation. He combines the
emergence of warlordism, economic interests in the natural resources of other states and lust for
power."'
The important role that leaders play in foreign policy decision-making and the individual
interests they have in other states form the third theory that the book advances. The theory of
foreign policy decision-making processes is not yet fully developed but Clark nonetheless
174 J. Clark used the term regime security to refer to leaders' interventions in other states' politics with the express
aim of preserving themselves in power. For a detailed discussiorr on regime security, see J. Clark, "Introduction:
Causes and Consequences of the Congo War". in Clark, J. (ed), The African Stakes of the Congo War, p. 5;
T. Turner, "Angola's Role in the Corrgo war, in Clark, J. (ed), The African Stakes of the Congo War, p. 76; and
T. Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo", in Clark, J. (ed), The African Stakes of
the Congo War, p. 130. Also see a related work by J. Clark, "Realism, Nee-realism and African International
Relatiorrs in the Post-Cold War Era, in Dunn, K. and Shaw, T. (eds), Africa's he International
Relations Theory, (New York: Palgrave , 20016), pp. 85-102.
275 Y. Crawford, "Contextualising Congo Conflicts: Order and Disorder in Postcolonial Africa", in Clark, J. (ed), The











provides a very good analysis of the decision-making character of the President of Uganda; he
argues for instance:
Undemanding Uganda's recent intervention  is largely a matter of understanding  the motives of the
person, President Yoweri Museveni, who ordered S UPDF [Uganda People's Defence
Force] into Congo... S decision to intervene cats made by the president himself; after consultation
with onlya few dose military advisers... . Unlik  in mote institutionalised settings,S zedl of the
president himself is  indisutably tlr key to .  poky decision making  M Uganda. However, one
am nea k completely confident about estimating Museveri's  motivations, and east the president
himself maynot hate been certain what they were.276
Although the focus is on Uganda's President Museveni as a single case, it does provide good
parameters in terms of which other leaders' foreign policy decision-making processes can be
analysed. In this study, Clark's theory is discussed under the heading of the poliheuristic theory,
as propounded by Mintz.' Drawing on Ayoob, Clark equates African leaders' foreign policy
designs with those of their European counterparts. He argues that the contemporary leaders of
the developing African states were emulating their European counterparts whose main goal in
the early modern period was to set up their states economically, administratively and militarily
with the motive of developing themselves; he points out that one way of ensuring development
was by fighting and intervening in neighbouring states.' This implies that African  states were
also embarking on interventions to develop themselves domestically. One disadvantage of this
perspective, though, is that it assumes that leaders of states act on behalf of or in the interest of
the state, yet literature on state building in Africa has also indicated that, when states intervene in
others, such intervention are often not entirely for the benefit of their states. The analogy
between the European leaders and the African leaders is good in theory, but it must also be
borne in mind that the early modem period did not have many laws and regulations prohibiting
intervention, whereas the modem state is faced with international laws and protocols that
regulate its capacity to intervene in other states.
With specific reference to the Ugandan intervention in the DRC, some articles in the book
underscore Uganda's desire for regime security' and the strategic economic motives that
276 J. Clark, "Museveni's Adverrture in the Congo Wan. Uganda's Vietrram?, in Clark, J. (ed), The African Stakes of
the Congo War, p. 147.
27 See the discussion of the Poliheurist theory in Chapter Two of this thesis.
278 J. Clark, 'Introduction: Canes and Consequences of the Congo War, in Clark, J. (ed) The African Stakes of the
Congo War, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002a) pp. 4-5.











compelled it to intervene. It does acknowledge, though, that Uganda had minimal security
concerns. This is a highly contentious position. If one looks at the period 1990 -1999, as the book
does, then many security matters are not taken into consideration, which is why Uganda's
security interests are ranked so much lower than other factors. The book also dismisses the
arguments that Uganda's interventions were motivated by the desire to spread democracy' -
which is a view shared by many other scholars."' Many scholars dismiss the claim that Uganda
was intending to spread democracy in its neighbouring countries. They highlight Museveni's
current trend of politics, which sidelines the opposition, does not seek legal mandates from its
legislature when making important decisions on both domestic and foreign policy matters,
violates international law, and does not obtain mandate from the UNSC to authorise its
interventions."' The issue that emerges very strongly from the literature discussed thus far is that
interventions in Africa are motivated by mixed interests and therefore it would be incorrect to
attribute an intervention to any one causal factor.
In addition to the books discussed above, a vast range of scholarly literature has focused on
specific aspects of African foreign policy and international relations. There has also been a
proliferation of a diverse literature on conflicts, wars, inter-state relations, insurgency, genocides,
aim of preserving themselves in power. For a detailed discussion on regime security, see, J. Clark, °Introduction:
Clines and Consequences of the Congo War", pp. 1-12, and J. Clark, "Realism, Neo-realism and African
International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 85-102. Similarly Shearer argues that Uganda wanted to
preserve its own regime, see D. Shearer, "Africa's Great War", in Survival, Vol 40, No 2 (1999), pp. 89-90.
29. Clark, "Museveni's Adverrture in the Congo War, p. 150.
281 M. Mamdani, "Rwarrda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo, in Mandaza , I (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, (SARIPS Series, 1999) pp. 33-34. See also M. Mamdani, "Preliminary Thought on
the Congo Crisis, Paper presented at the Workshop on Congo, (Harare : SAPES Trust, 1998); G. Dash, "The
Inevitable American Connection, in Central Africa Watch, 15th September (1998), and H. Campbell,
"Democratisation, Citizenship and Peace in the Congo, in M Baregu (eel), Crisis in the DRC, SARIPS Series 3:
(SAPES Trust: Harare, 1999), pp. 21-35; M. Kulumba, "Ethnocerrtrism arrd Movement Politics in Uganda: An
analysis of Ethnic Conflict in Kibaale Conflict, in Kabweru , M. A.,(ed), panda  Riding the Political Tiger: Security
and the Wars in the Great Lakes Region, (Makerere University Printery: Kampala, 2004), pp. 143-158; A. Mukwaya,
"Uganda's role in the conflict and security dilemma in the Great Horn of Africa under the Movementocracy", in K.
Mukwaya (ed), Uganda Ridirrg the Tiger  the WarsVan in the Great Lakes Region, pp. 131-142; and
S. Makara, "Making Sense of the `senseless' Armed Corrflict between Uganda and the DRC, in Mukwaya, K. A.
(ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger. Security and the Wars in the Great Lakes Regiorr, pp. 79-90; J. Clark,
"Explainirrg Uganda's Intervention in Congo: A Thick Descriptiorr", pp. 63-78; A. Mujaju, "How to make Sense of
the Events Taking Place in The Great Lakes Region, in Baregu, M. (ed) Crisis in the DRC, SARIPS Series 3:
(SAPES Trust: Harare, 1999), pp. 83-98; R.. Susan, "Statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Washington DC, presented on 12 March (1998); 0. Ogenga, "Uganda as a Regiorral Actor in
the Zarian War, p. 260.
282 B. Bruce., "Going to War Democratically: the Case of the Second Congo War 1998-2000, in Contemporary
Politics, Vol 6, No 3 (2000), pp. 263-282; J. Clark, "Explaining Uganda's Intervention in Congo: A Thick












and political history of the region, as well as dealing with intervention during the post-Cold War
era."' While some of the literature attributes interventions to political power struggles between
insurgents and ruling regimes, others emphasise economic interests as the primary causal
factor?' They also focus on domestic aspects that create insecurity internally, and that compel
neighbouring states to intervene because they pose security challenges for them. Drawing on the
domestic insecurity that is often a result of ethnic conflicts, intrastate power politics, and
regional power politics, they also argue that interventionist wars should be seen as a continuation
of the politics of survival on the part of the intervenors, both at domestic and regional level."'
Another view of interventions comes from Mamdani 286  who has produced a considerable
amount of literature on ethnicity (a few others with similar sentiments include Uvin 287 ,
Lemarchanr, Chretien 289 Pruner and Reyntjens291 . Mamdani has sought to demonstrate
283 A. Veale and A. Stavrou, "Violence, Reconstruction and Identity: The Reintegration of Lord's Resistance Army
Child Abductees in Northern Uganda, in ISS Monograph  mph, No 92, November (2003); W. Reno, "Uganda's Politics
of War and Debt Relief, in Review of International Political Economy,  Vol 9, No 3 (2002), pp. 415-435;
IL Lemarchand, "Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes Region, in Khadiagala, G. and Lyons, T. (eds), African
Foreign  Policies: Power and Process, (London: Lynne Renner, 2002), pp. 87-106; R. Lemarchand, "The Crisis in the
Great Lakes, in Harbeson, J. and Rothchild, D. (eds), Africa in World Politics: The African State Systems n Flux,
(Oxford: Knot View Press, 2000), pp. 324-352; P. Rich and R. Stubbs, "Introduction: The Counter Insurgent State"
in Rich, P. and Stubbs, R. (eds), The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerilla Warfare and State Buildinp in the Twentieth
Century (New York St Martins Press, 1997), pp. 1-25; and G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
24 S. Samkange , "African Perspectives on Intervention and State Sovereignty, (2002) p.73.
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/11NoliSamkange.html  accessed 26 August 2003; R. Kibasomba, "A Failing
State: The Democratic Republic of Congo", in Cawthra, G. and It Luckham, (eds), Governing Insecurity.
Democratic Control of Military  and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies,  (London: Zed Books,
2003), pp. 254-275; M Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAFES, 2001b), and M. Mamdani ., "Rwanda-
Uganda Intervention in the Congo", in Mandaza, I., (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, (SARIPS Series, 1999), pp. 33-34.
7"5 3. Cilliers , and M. Malan, "Peace Keeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUC and the Road to
Peace, ISS monograph series, No 66, October 2001; It Lemarchand, "Foreign Policy Making in the Great Lakes
Region, pp. 87-106; R. Lemarchand "The Crisis in the Great Lakes, pp. 324-352; and R.. Lemarchand, "The Fire in
the Great Lakes", in Current Affairs, (1999), pp. 195-201; M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001a); M. Mamdani,
Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, pp. 159-184; M. Mamdani, "Democratic Theory and Democracy Struggles in
Africa", in Okwudiba, N, (ed), Government and Politics in Africa: A Reader  (Harare: AAPs Books, 2000), pp. 220-
239; M. Mamdani, "Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo" in Mandaza, I, (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, (SARIPS  Series, 1999), pp. 33-34.
288 An exhaustive review of Mamdani's works on the GLR is impossible here this section focuses on four of his
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M. Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAFES, 2001b); M. Mamdani, "Democratic Theory and
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Books, 2000), pp. 220-239; M. Mamdani, "Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo, in Mandaza , I.(ed),
Reflections on the Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Conga, pp. 33-34; and M. Mamdani, "Preliminary Thoughts
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that ethnicity is the underlying cause of the insecurity in the region and that it thus accounts for
the fundamental cause of the GLR interventions. Mamdani introduced the concept of a "crisis in
citizenship" as something that has characterized since the collapse of the Tutsi rule in Rwanda
which was marked by the genocide of 1959. The 1959 genocide had had severe repercussions for
the Tutsi in Burundi and for those who had fled to the DRC, namely the Banyamulenge, who
suffered from state recrimination and discrimination, especially in Mobutu's postcolonial regime.
The accounts of the discrimination against the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda, in contrast
with Tutsi refugees in other African countries of refuge initiated the growth of "Tutsi
nationalism", which slowly grew into a strong force. The subsequent political and military
struggle by the Tutsi to return to Rwanda had sparked off hatred of the Tutsi in the region and
led to a grand plan by regional leaders to stop the growth of the Tutsi insurrection, which was
spreading not only throughout Rwanda but also through Zaire and Burundi. The central
argument of Mamdani in his collective works was that, to understand interventions in the region,
the question of citizenship has to be carefully analysed because it is so significant in the
contemporary crises in Eastern Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi .'
Given this background, it is doubtful that the thesis of Hima-Tutsi empire building advanced by
some scholars as a motive for Uganda's interventions in neighbouring states could be realized,
given the animosity that the Tutsi in Rwanda, for example, felt for Museveni. In general, though,
this literature provides a good background to the genesis of the ethnic conflicts in the region as
well as an understanding of the nexus between Uganda's political development and the entire
ethnic Tutsi question. Mamdani's works show how inextricably tied Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi
and the DRC are. It is implicit from the literature that Uganda's interventions have come to be
associated with President Museveni's ethnic class Hima' affinity for his close neighbours, the
Tuts?", but it is not necessarily applicable to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy.
Current Affairs, (1999) pp. 195-201; and R. Lemarchand, "Social Change and Political Modernization in Burundi",
in Journal of Modern African Studies,  Vol 4, No 4 (1966), pp. 401-433.
199 J. P. Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa : Two Thousand Years of History , p. 343.
299 G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, and G. Prunier, "The Geopolitical situation in the Great
Lakes Area in lift of the Kivu Crisis, in Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol 16, No 1 (1997), pp. 1-25.
291 F. Reyntjens, "Briefing The Second Congo War, more than a remake, African Affairs, Vol 98 No 391 (1999),
pp. 241 - 250; and F. Reyntjens, The New Geostrategic Situation in Central Africa", in Issue: Journal  of Opin ion,
Vol 26, No 1 (1998), pp. 10-13.
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It is evident therefore from the general literature on intervention in Africa and from specific case
studies that interventions have multiple causes. The motivations are similar, though; the most
common, according to all the scholars, is that leaders wish to ensure that they remain in power.
Other motives, which are of differing relevance in various cases are hegemonic ambitions,
interventions that are aimed at creating ideological spheres of influence, and situations where
successful revolutionary leaders have opted to help others in their struggles to overthrow
authoritarian regimes. In the next section, the literature on Ugandan's interventions is discussed
with a view to examining what factors and motivations are attributed to Uganda's interventions
in the region.
3.4 UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWED
Several scholars have produced a substantial amount of literature on Uganda's interventions in
the GLR region. There are innumerable journal articles, conference proceeding papers, media
articles and reports, as well as edited and unedited books that have focused on the subject of
Uganda's interventions. Its interventions have been criticised in the media and by organizations,
both international and non-governmental, which have produced enormous research. The aspects
of Uganda's foreign behaviour that has received the widest coverage have been its interventions
in the DRC, followed by Rwanda and lastly Burundi.'
Significant work located both within the realist and the liberal framework has attributed
Uganda's interventions to economic and national security interests. Uganda's intervention in the
DRC, for example, has been described as "a senseless war", or "Museveni's Vietnam". Such
negative perceptions of Uganda's interventions are prevalent, and it is difficult, if not impossible
to find studies that portray Uganda's military interventions in any better light. There is literature
that focuses on the economic interests of the county, backed by statistical figures of how much
income Uganda gained from the trade subsequent to / because of its interventions. Proponents
of this view argue that Uganda intervened for economic reasons. They further argue that,
294 J. Cilliers, and M. Malan "Peace Keeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: MONUC and the Road to
Peace, ISS monograph series , No 66, October 2001; R. Kibasomba, "A Failing State: The Democratic Republic of
Congo, pp. 254-255; J. Herbst and G. Mills, "The Future of Africa: A New Order in Flight, Adelphi Paper 361
(2003); A. Mujaju, "How to make Sense of the Events Taking Place in The Great Lakes Region, pp. 83-98;
Y. Tandon, "Globalisation  and the Great Lakes Regional Crisis, in Mandan, I. (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the
of Congo, (Harare: SAWS Trust, 1999), pp 9-15; J. Herbst, "Self Determination and the
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without such trade and considering that Uganda did not have the mineral resources to have
earned the amount that accrued from mineral trade during and after the intervention period,
Uganda would not have developed at the level it did. The most prominent of such literature are
Reno's analyses of the Ugandan geo-economic and domestic politics that, he argues, were central
to their interventions. Similarly, the UN Panel of Experts Report of 2001 and its Addendum of
2002 portray Uganda's intervention in the DRC as economically motivated!' Note, however,
that it may not necessarily be true. Lee argues, for instance, that that there was an overarching
effort from the 1990's onwards to develop, which forced African states into multiple regional
trade organisations. Uganda too joined all the regional trade organisations, except where the
geographic limitations could not be overcome!"
Interventions that were conducted to counter threats to national security, which the government
advanced as the predominant motive for intervening in its neighbouring states, have received the
heaviest criticism from scholars. Few scholars have argued in favour of viewing Uganda's
interventions as motivated by its strategic and defence considerations.'" In fact, this perspective
has been widely contested. It appears from some scholars' debates that they cannot comprehend
why the Ugandan government expected a neighbouring state like the DRC, whose government
had essentially collapsed, to secure its borders when it was evident that it did not have the
capacity to do so. Furthermore, it was clear that even Uganda itself had tried and failed!" Others
are critical of why Uganda had chosen to intervene in the DRC rather than in Sudan, which has
had a record of an overt policy of creating insurgency in Uganda since the inception of the NRM
regime in 1986.299 Some scholars were concerned with the depth of penetration of the Ugandan
295 W. Reno, "Uganda's Politics of War and Debt Relief" in Review of International Political Economy, Vol 9, No 3
(2002), pp. 415.435; W. Reno, "Stealing like a Bandit, Stealing like a State, Paper presented to the Department of
Political Science Makerere University, 14 April (2000); W. Reno, "Mines, Money and the Problem of State-Building
in Congo, in Issue: A Journal  of Opinion. Vol 26, No 1 (1998), pp. 14-17; UN Panel of Experts Ryon: 2001
together with its appendum of 2002; and N. M, Grignon and E. F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Con 
Economic Dimensions of War and Peace,  (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2006), and the
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Africa, 2000), pp. 29-30 and I. Mandaza, "Why Wamba Dia Wamba should be heard. , in Mancaz[, I. (ed),
Reflections on the Crisis in the DRC, (Harare: SAPES SARK'S Series, 2000), pp. 21-24.











UPDF into the DRC, and specifically with how it controlled a sizeable amount of the Eastern
Congo and particularly the mineral rich areas. 3©° Most interestingly, others argue that Uganda
"reaped what it sowed" in its exportation of revolutions (evident from its helping other
revolutionaries in Rwanda and Eritrea): the repercussions of doing so profoundly affected
Uganda too, because other states whose insurgents had been helped by Uganda reciprocated by
also sponsoring Uganda's insurgent groups?"
Various authors refer to the security concerns that were used by Uganda to justify its
interventions. For example, Kibasomba, Nzongolo-Ntalaja, Ginyera Pincywa and Mamdani all
argue very succinctly that Uganda's intervention were indeed motivated by some security
concerns, relating mainly to the DRC's lack of capability to neutralise dissidents or rebels."'
Sabiff303 compares Uganda's security dilemma to that of Israel. As is the case in Israel, the fact
that Uganda has large neighbours should be viewed as security vulnerability. Sabiti emphasises
how the rebels have exploited the porous nature of Uganda's borders to ease their movements
back and forth and to use the border areas as launch pads for military action. He enumerates the
rebel groups that attacked Uganda using the DRC, but does not include those that use Rwanda
and Burundi as operational grounds. Critiques of the proponents of the security argument
portray Uganda as an imperialist state that had an expansionist policy of controlling the entire
region using ethnic affinities such as the Hima-Tutsi 'nationalism' to build an empire for
Uganda's leaders?'
Republic Democratic  Congo  (Harare: SAPES TRUST, 1999) p. 24.
3°3 Y. Bangura, "Comments on Regional Security and the War in Congo", in Mwesiga, B. (ed), The Crisis in the
Democratic Republic  of Con (Harare: SAPES TRUST, 1999) pp. 10-17.
3°1 It Doom and K. Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: A new Koine? The LRA in Northern Uganda, in African
Affairs Vol 98, No 390 (1999), pp. 5-36.
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Tafelberg, 1999), pp. 72-73; A. A. P. Gingyera,"Uganda and Military Intervention in the Great Lakes Region:
Reflections on Two Historical Roles Since 1979, in K. Mukwaya (ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger. Security
and the Wars in the Great Lakes Region, (Maker= University Printery: Kampala, 2004), pp. 51-62.
3°3 Sabiti Mutengesa, then a UPDF officer, signalled the potential security areas of concern. See M. Sabiti, "Strategic
Dimensions of the National Security of Uganda: A Partial Agenda for Research, an unpublished paper presented to
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A huge amount of literature attributes interventions to the West's' failure to intervene in
conflicts at the critical time, and to its failure to support the UNSC in its bid to stop the
conflicts. The Western power that has received more than a fair share of the blame has been the
US. Its reluctance to engage directly in the conflicts as well as its half-hearted contributions to
the UNSC has been attributed to its experience in Somalia but mainly, to its change in policy,
shifting responsibility to the African states to find solutions to their problems."' The US
Disengagement Policy and its development of the African Crisis Response Initiative have been
projected as a shifting of responsibility to Africa?' France has followed closely behind the US in
being apportioned blame, particularly with regard to what happened in Rwanda. An example of
this is Linda Melvem's critique of France's decision to provide political and military support
when it was sure something bad was happening in Rwanda.' Furthermore France's decision to
delink from Africa is evidence of the change in France's foreign policy and, as Mitterrand is
quoted to have said, "the time has come for Africans themselves to resolve their conflicts and
organize their own security". This attitude from Mitterrand was a result of the realization that
French intervention simply aggravated the conflicts in the GLR and had come under continuous
attack from the international community for its role in the conflict in the region. In a quote that
ridicules the French in their role in catalyzing conflict in the GLR, Prunier is quoted as follows,
"France's role is like that of a person giving a bottle of brandy to an alcoholic. The drink does
not cause the man's death but it contributes"?'
The West is also blamed for several specific reasons: Firstly, it is blamed for having supported
the authoritarian regimes that abuse the rights of their citizens and engage in kleptocratic
behaviour, which provided the ingredients for insurgency and violent conflict that set in motion
spirals of conflict in Africa. Secondly, the West's role in supplying military equipment to these
African governments are blamed for leading to an escalation of warfare and violence, and
subsequently to the increase in interventionist wars?' Supplying small arms and light weapons to
30 The term the West' refers to the affluent states of the world, such as the US, Britain and European states.
3% A. Wallis, Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide, p. 204.
3° J. Fraser, and J. Herbst, °United States of America Investment in Security Operations in Africa" in Morrison, S.,
Cooke, J. and Crocker, C. (eds), Africa Policy in the Clinton Years: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration,
(Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), pp. 55-72 and D. Rothchild,  The Impact.
of US Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution, in Harbeson, J. and Rothchild, D. (eds), Africa in
World Politics: The African State System in Flux  (Colorado: West View Press, 2000), pp. 160-187.
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the region has had a profound and damaging impact on the region's security. The key scholars
on this issue are Alusala and Thusi, Hartung and Mott, Hartung and Montage, Hartung, Berman
and Batchelor. All of them have concluded that the insecurity in the region is the result of an
indirect reciprocal relationship between Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs)."1
The third issue for which the West has been blamed is its direct or at times indirect influence on
the UN, at the decision making and implementation level of its peace enforcement and
peacekeeping activities. The most prominent of this literature of blame has looked at the UN
role in Rwanda. Barnett and Miskel312 have demonstrated how the UNSC's habit of dragging its
feet, being indecisive and getting the wrong information has resulted in the genocide in Rwanda.
It can further be construed from their works that many other conflicts have received similar
treatment, and that they have thus escalated and claimed lives that would otherwise have been
saved, if the UN had acted promptly.
Others scholars have pointed out that the US has long condoned and even encouraged Uganda's
interventionist behaviour, by providing massive transfers of military hardware and even training
of its officers!' In this respect, these scholars argue, Uganda was being built as a new regional
"The Problem with Foreign Military Sales Reinvention, in World Affairs, Vol 164, No 1 (2001), pp. 26-47 and
P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, (Westford Kumarian Press, 1998), and worlts of
renowned institutions such as the World Policy Research Centre (US), the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(UK), Institute of Security Studies (South Africa), the Small Arms Survey (Geneva), and the African Centre for
Strategic Studies (ACSS) have provided statistical data on these weapons and arms transfers that are partly
responsible for the conflicts in Africa's specific regions.
311 N. Alusala and T. Thusi, °A Step towards Peace: Disarmament in Africa, in ISS Monograph , No 98, February
(2004); W. Hartung and B. Moix, "Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War, in World
Institute: Arms Control Reports,  (2000), http://wwwworldpolicy.org/projects/arrns/repons/congo.htm, accessed
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mini-power by the US to champion the Africa Force. The main reason why the US chose
Uganda was the nature of leadership of Museveni and because the US felt it could depend on
Uganda as a 'mini power' for geopolitical and ideological considerations?" The refusal of the
US to condemn Uganda's abuse of human rights as well as its undemocratic regime on the
pretext that Museveni was one of the models of the new kind of leadership that was needed in
Africa was a fundamental flaw in US foreign policy."' These scholars attribute the refusal of the
US to reprimand Uganda to Uganda's Cold War geo-strategic importance as a US base for
keeping a close eye on Sudan?' Shivji thus argues that the US would not let go of Africa and
would want to make sure that Africa does not subscribe to the "enemy" values propagated by
Sudan."'
The failure of the UN to act gave the African states a reason to intervene, and influenced the
timing of their interventions. For example, Ogenga-Otunu argues that the timing of Uganda's
intervention in the DRC (in fact, the same argument could apply to all the subsequent
interventions, even the recent case of Somalia) was the failure of the international community to
prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. This failure to act undermined the credibility of the
international community, and thus it suffered a profound deficit of legitimacy and moral
authority. This gave Uganda the opportunity to intervene before the international guilt could
erode."'
The analyses of Mamdani, Chretien, Clark, Ogenga-Otunu and Afoaku with regard to the
intervention process and its consequences also provided an analytical perspective that is critical
to foreign policy analysis. They have argued that the timings of the interventions, the nature of
the decisions made and the prevailing circumstances were instrumental to Uganda's
interventions. Uganda could have avoided the interventions but, given the nature of geo-politics
and regional ethnic violence in the GLR, it had little choice because it is inextricably tied to all
207.
314 M.  Ottaway , j Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?  (Washington: Carrregie Endowment for
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the other states by virtue of sharing ethnicities across borders. The only limitation with this
argument is that other states in the region, like Tanzania and Kenya, also share ethnicities with
their neighbours, but even though these neighbours have conflicts and are anarchic with violent
ethnic outbreaks, yet they refrain from intervening militarily.
Reviews of the literature discussed above show that there is still a need to study the motives of
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, because the existing studies have mainly focused on the
case of the DRC because this was the main 'military intervention'. Other studies that focus on
Uganda's role in Rwanda have dealt with the intervention in light of its historical relationship
with that country. Here Prunier, Gourveitch, Melvem, Wallis and Mamdani are the exception.
An intervention that has not been discussed adequately is the Burundi intervention: it is not clear
why, but two specific arguments can be made here. Firstly, the Burundi case has not received
much attention because Uganda did not intervene militarily, and secondly, because the events in
Burundi ran parallel to the violent and highly publicized DRC and Rwandan cases, Bunmdi was
easily ignored.
Literature on decision making in foreign policy is varied and covers decision making mainly in
the US and Britain, particularly because their foreign policy documents tend to be declassified,
which simplifies research. As Preston and De Rouen have demonstrated, it is thus easy to
conduct research into the actual decision making processes.' In Africa, however, where the
leaders, or elites, play a central role in foreign policy decision making, it is hard to obtain
information that reveal the leaders' motivations. This is because, as many studies have
established, leaders in Africa are at the centre of decision making in foreign policy, albeit not as
heads of governments but most often by making these decisions at an individual level or with the
help of their elite groups or family members in a very confidential way. This information is often
not recorded nor declassified making it impossible to access accurate information.
319 The ability for scholars to refer to decision makirrg events in the US has been ably demonstrated by T. Preston,
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In the chapter, it has been found that a significant amount of literature concentrates on African
interventions at different levels, namely at domestic, inter-state, regional and international level.
There is a consensus that African interventions are motivated by national security interests, as
well as by economic, hegemonic, ideological and geo-political considerations. However, the
personal interests of leaders and their bid to legitimise themselves and secure their regimes are
critical to understanding African interventionist foreign policies. While some scholars attribute
the increased African interventions in other states to the incapability of the UN, the international
community and the reluctance of powers like France and Britain to continue engaging in African
conflicts, others posit that it is the nature of conflicts and nature of political structures in the
region that have made intervention inevitable. Other scholars for example posits that domestic
weaknesses greatly influence the nature of foreign policies that states adopt. It is evident from
these views that African interventions need to be analysed because African states are increasingly
intervening in others. Uganda is good case to study considering that it has emerged as a
significant actor in regional politics. From the literature, it was evident that Uganda's multiple
interventions in the GLR have been under theorized and the focus has been mainly on
intervention in one state. While Uganda's security concerns have been underestimated and often
dismissed as negligible, emphasis has been put on "you reap what you sow" or the "sorcerers's
apprentices" type of explanation of the repercussions of conflict. There is need to examine the
best theory that explains the motivation of Uganda's interventions in the GLR in the period 1996
to 2006.
In this study, Uganda's interventions in its Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are analysed. Based
on fieldwork and on site visits to the conflict zones, the study examines the multiple
interventions and their uniqueness. The study takes cognizance of the fact that a single
framework approach cannot provide a comprehensive view of Uganda's interventionist foreign
policy and that therefore an eclectic approach is required. Originally, I felt that a single
framework approach would be sufficient and I focused on the Security Dilemma framework, but
the findings from both the fieldwork and desktop research revealed that much as the Security
Dilemma is the most parsimonious theory to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy,
there are aspects of interventions that it could not account for. This necessitated the application
of other theoretical considerations to be able to have a comprehensive view of Uganda's











If the International Relations theories on intervention are compared with the Africanist
Interventionist perspectives, it is evident that there is a common strand that runs along the two
bodies of literature. Some central tenets of specific International Relations theories are implicit
in the Africanist literature. The specific theory's depth of analysis of events surrounding an
intervention is what varies. If critically analyzed, the tenets of Constructivism espouse the
"Crisis in Citizenship" that Mahmood Mamdani advances. Furley and May who position
interventions in the economic war analysis highlight the Utilitarian Liberal position. Similarly
their Realist explanation of interventions as being motivated particularly by the "spill over" effect
and the "regime change" further strengthen the Security Dilemma theory that has been used in
explaining ethnic conflicts and inter-state conflicts else where other than Africa. The study uses
the Security Dilemma theory as an alternative interpretation of Africa's interventionist foreign
behaviour. Poliheurism is akin to Clark's perspective on foreign policy decision-making process
and as earlier noted in Africa, this theory of foreign policy decision-making processes is not yet
fully developed. It is against this background that the study seeks to examine the most
parsimonious theory that can be used to explain Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in the
following chapters.
In the next chapter, Uganda's security framework is contextualised. It covers aspects of
Uganda's security structure as it evolved in the different political regimes. The empirical
chapters that follow draw on the four theories i.e. Constructivism, Poliheurism, the Utilitarian













BACKGROUND: CONTEXTUALISING UGANDA'S SECURITY
FRAMEWORK
4.0 Introduction
In this chapter, a brief history of Uganda's political development is presented. It also discusses
Uganda's regional and international relations and demonstrates Uganda's geo-political
importance in the region. The chapter also discusses the security structural framework,
highlighting the defence structure, decision-making procedures and the financing of this
structure. In the last section Uganda's regional and international interests as well as its threats are
discussed, showing how these influence Uganda's foreign policy.
The purpose of the chapter is to discuss how Uganda's political, regional and international
relations in specific historical periods have fed into the foreign policy decision-making process,
that eventually provides a favourable background to understanding Uganda's security challenges
in the region. Uganda's regional vulnerability will become clear and provide grounding for the
subsequent discussion of Uganda's interventions in its neighbouring states of Burundi, Rwanda
and the DRC. The central argument of this chapter is that Uganda's political development and
strategic location, and its leaders' perception of its role in the geo-politics of the region, have
made it vulnerable and influenced the nature of its foreign policy.
4.1 A Brief History of Colonial Uganda
Uganda, it has been widely argued, was reluctantly occupied by the British, largely because it
lacked any obvious material advantage. Like many other regions, it was perceived as a white
man's burden.' Uganda was occupied because of its strategic location in what became the
British sphere of influence. Britain had colonized India because of its potential economic value.
If India's economic value was to be exploited, the British had to occupy and control the Suez
Canal in Egypt, which was a strategic part of the sea-route from Britain to India. To be able to
control Egypt, it was important to occupy Sudan through which the Nile passes, and Uganda
where the source of the Nile is. Uganda's landlocked position made it necessary for the British to
320 S. Karugire, Roots of Instab ility. (Kampala; Fountain Publishers, 1988), p.7 and R. Robinson, J. Gallagher and











occupy Kenya too, so that the British had access to the sea. This strategic location of Uganda
was to generate other territorial problems for it in the subsequent years (see Map 1). British
imperial policy thus regarded Uganda's occupation as a means to an end: it provided strategic
advantage for Britain's long-term economic interests in the region.
Uganda became a British colony in 1894 and Britain signed several agreements with various
kingdoms to consolidate its power, the main ones being Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro and Busoga.
Under colonial rule, the main administration was predominantly of British origin, while the
Ugandans were employed as clerks and in other subordinate positions. Following the earlier
resistance to colonial rule by some kingdoms, the British had established the indirect rule'
system, where Africans were responsible for the immediate administration of the territory as
clerks, chiefs and heads of regions, while the British oversaw their activities and supervised them.
The indirect rule system had its own limitation, however, because in areas where British rule was
resisted, they deployed administrators who were `Baganda', which was an ethnic group that
collaborated with Britain in its extension of British colonial rule to other regions in Uganda. This
led to ethnic misunderstanding between the Baganda  and the ethnic groups where they were
deployed as administrators, clerks and regional leaders, e.g. among the Bunyoro, Bugisu, Busoga.
The Nyangire Abaganda rebellion was thus aimed at the Baganda leaders who were perceived as
sub-imperialists. This set the precedent for the subsequent ethnic clashes between the Baganda
and other ethnic groups, particularly those that resisted them. The ethnic divisions subsequently
influenced the nature of the political struggle for independence. Political parties that were
formed to demand independence came to be organised along ethnic lines. While the Baganda
manned the administrative sector of the colonial administration, the British employed men from
the Northern region' to manage the security sector as policemen and soldiers. It is from this
321 Indirect rule was the British colonial method of administering its colonies by using the existing political
authorities to govern their vast African empire. The rationale for indirect rule was not to overhaul the indigenous
system but to continue with it, so that people would comply with new policies rather than having to be coerced. A
detailed examination of indirect rule is done by M. Crowder, "Indirect Rule-French-British Style" in African journal
of the International African Institute, Vol XXXIV no 3 (1994) pp, 198-199
322 Buganda collaborated during colonial intrusion and gave little resistance to colonial penetration. They had been
used in the subsequent resistance wars in the other parts of Uganda during the colonial process.
323 The ethnic groups from Northern Uganda were employed in the police, in the army and as security guards at big
plantations, in the industrial towns etc. The groups included the Kakwa, Acholi, Langis, Iteso, and some
Karamojongs. From the onset, the colonialists treated them as the martial groups, which the groups took very
seriously. From then onwards, they believed the security sector was their exclusive preserve. The second, third, fifth











time forward that the Northerners' regarded themselves as managers of the security sector and
transformed themselves into a military ethnocracy.3 25
The first political party in Uganda, the Uganda National Congress (UNC), was formed in 1952
by Ignatius Musazi. The patty demanded independence from the British. Like the Indian
National Congress (INC) and the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the UNC
pointed out that independence in Uganda was the only way to national development.
Considering that it was at a time when other African states were also experiencing a growth of
nationalism, the UNC drew its inspiration from and designed demands similar to those of
political parties in other African states. It preferred to use non-violent resistance, like the NC,
but this was met with stiff resistance from the British. The party nonetheless appealed to many
Ugandans because it was all-inclusive and non-ethnic based!'
The UNC was undermined from within with the support of the British, because it had drawn
some logistical support from the East (China and the Soviet Union).' The members who
dissociated themselves from it formed other political parties, for example, the Progressive Party
(PP) in 1955, the Democratic Party (DP) in 1956, and the Uganda National Movement (UNM)
in 1958. Just before independence, Uganda had seven political parties. Theirpolitical manifestos
were not that different from each other, but all were demanding political power. Alliances and
counter alliances were formed amongst some of them, while others became defunct due to
limited membership and lack of proper organization. By the time the British granted Uganda
independence, there were three dominant political parties: the Uganda People's Congress (UPC),
the DP and Kabaka Yekka  (KY).
The dominant position of Buganda within Uganda's politics was crucial and for independence to
be meaningful, it' had to be at the helm of political leadership. It had three main advantages.
Firstly, its ethnic category had had an upper hand in the political administration of many parts of
Uganda, so they were more experienced in administration and management of affairs of the
324 "Northerners" is the colloquial term for referring to the people who come from Northern Uganda.
323 A. Mazrui., Soldiers and Kinsmen Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy , (London: Sage Publications,
1975).
326 See L. Colin., An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda 1962-1965, (Nairobi: East African Publishing House,
1976), p. 17.
322 J. Mulira, "The Role of Soviet Bloc Countries in the Political, Economic and Serial Development of Uganda,
1945-1970", Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University (1975) p. 77.










state. Secondly, the British had trusted them more than other ethnic groups and so felt more
comfortable relinquishing their power to them. Thirdly, the colonial administrative capital
Entebbe' was in Buganda, which would reduce the costs of infrastructural development; after
all, it was adjacent to Kampala, another administrative town.' The implication of these political
and geographic advantages of Buganda led to its demand for political positions to head the newly
created Republic of Uganda. The first leader of the first postcolonial government came from
Buganda while the security sector remained controlled by the so-called "Northerners".
Postcolonial Uganda
The first leader President Sr Edward Mutesa (former president of KY) was a Muganda Kabaka
(king) of Buganda. The Prime Minister Milton Obote came from Lango."' The army
commander Shaban Opolot was from Teso332 and the deputy army commander Idi Amin also
from the (presumed) martial northern tribe of Kaluva.333 With the new political structure, the
independent state of Uganda started the task of rebuilding itself. The president was perceived by
many as an honorary president, and therefore power lay in the hands of the executive Prime
Minister. The new administration had inherited several problems from the colonial government,
the most outstanding of which were the conflicts between particular ethnic groups and the ir
overlords, the Baganda, who had been preferentially treated by the British during indirect rule.'
The ethnic groups administered by the Baganda on behalf of the British rebelled against them;
some wanted to secede while others wanted to be removed from the kingdom of Buganda,
where they had been put coopted into the colonial restructuring. One ethnic group that was
vehemently opposed to Baganda control was Bunyoro. The Banyoro insisted they neither wanted
the Baganda to rule nor administer their region. This forced the Prime Minister to call for a
referendum on the Bunyoro matter. When a referendum was held in 1964 to decide where the
329 Entebbe was the first administrative town because of its strategic location. It is located on Lake Victoria, which
facilitated travel and else of communication. Currently Uganda's only international airport is at Entebbe, and it
serves the UNSC operations in Rwanda and the DRC.
330 Kampala has been the capital of Uganda since 1962.
333 Tango is part of Northern Uganda where the core personnel of the security sector of the country came from.
332 Teso is in the East of Uganda but is often broadly included in the North category, because it too had been a
recruitment centre for the security sector that was predominantly "Northerner" based.
ill Amin had a doubtful parentage and so it was hard to tell whether he was a Kakwa or Anyanya. These ethnic
groups have their communities on both sides of the border, respectively on the northern side of Uganda and on the
southern side of Sudan.











Banyoro wanted to belong, they voted overwhelming to be part of Bunyoro and not Buganda, to
which the British had previously allocated them. This sparked off civil disobedience in other
areas. The fact that the Prime Minister was covertly involved in these demands for autonomy led
to a constitutional crisis. The President was opposed to the referendum, arguably because his
kingdom was going to lose a big region from which it received revenue. The President did not
expect a Prime Minister to act without his consent, and thus developed an indirect struggle for
power between the two; this became popularly known as the 1966 "Kabaka Crisis". The Prime
Minister with the help of the deputy army commander Colonel Idi Amin (hereafter referred to as
Amin overthrew the President, forcing him to flee to England."'
The Southerners perceived this coup as a shift of political power from the south to the north
because political power now lay in the hands of President Obote who was a Northerner. The
security sector continued to be manned by the Northerners. Since this crisis, politics has been
perceived in ethnic terms, as presidents increased their hold onto power using ethnic affiliations
and immediate family relations.
Postcolonial Regional and International Relations (1962 -1970)
Uganda's drive to independence coincided with the demands of other GLR states for
independence. The UN declaration that granted independence to Uganda in 1960 seemed to
create an advantage for the struggles and growth of nationalism in general. In Rwanda, the
struggle for independence had resulted in a massive ethnic clash between the Tutsi and Hutu,
which deteriorated into genocide in 1959. The Batutsi took refuge in neighbouring states and
Uganda become host to many of them. In Burundi, a similar ethnic clash between the Batutsi
and Bahutu occurred with many fleeing Burundi and some finding refuge in Uganda and
Tanzania. The Ugandan government did not have any influence inside the borders of Burundi
and Rwanda, though, and looked on helplessly while all the ethnic murders and expulsions took
place.
335 For a detailed account of the power struggle between the Prime Minister and the President, see Lwanga-Lunyigo ,
°The Colonial Roots of Internal Conflict", in Rupesinghe, K. (ed), Conflict Resolution in Um& (Oslo:
International Peace Research Institute, 1989), pp. 24-43; P. Mutibwa, Uganda since Independence: A Story of












In Zaire, the struggle for independence was extremely violent and because the Prime Minister
Obote was sympathetic to their cause, he engineered support for then key nationalist,
Christopher Gbenye in his struggle against the colonialists and Mobutu.' Uganda intervened to
assist the hard-pressed Congolese against Mobutu's troops in 1965.337 Obote sent Amin to Aru
where the Congolese revolutionaries had temporarily established their headquarters.' Amin was
tasked to act as liaison between the Congolese and Uganda, and was also supposed to procure
the necessary logistical requirements for the training of the rebels. Uganda did not only assist the
Congolese with logistics, however, but it became involved in the trade in gold and ivory. It is
recounted that Amin who had allegedly obtained ivory that he traded in at a customs post at
Vurra, had also brought seven bars of gold into Uganda.' Congolese revolutionaries contested
the purchase of vehicles and equipment by the Ugandan government and alleged that the money
raised for their revolutionary movement was being banked in Uganda at different banks. This
turned into a national scandal, and parliamentarians demanded that a full inquiry be held.
Although the inquiry exonerated the Prime Minister, the so-called "gold scandal" nevertheless
continued to embarrass the presidency.
Obote's decision to choose the East as his ideological partner created differences between him
and the British. He declared that all private enterprises be nationalized, and in his 'Common
Man's Charter' and subsequent Nakivubo settlement declared that the country was pro-East and
was going to adopt socialism.' The capitalist reaction to this ideological move was to secure
those parts of East Africa, for example Kenya, which had not been influenced by socialism.
Tanzania had already adopted socialism in their Arusha Declaration in 1967. The capitalist
reaction in the GLR was similar to how it had responded in other parts of the world that had
become socialist.' Uganda had followed suit. In 1971, in what Mamdani has termed an
336 K. Ingham, Obote: A Political Biography, (London: Routledge , 1994), pp. 103-105.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
899 Commission Report, 1966, p. 15.
94 See M. Obote, Move to the Left: The Common Man's Charter, (Document No. 1 Entebbe: Government Printer,
1970; M. Obote, The Common Man's Charter,  (Entebbe: Government Printer., 1986) and M. Doombos, "Changing
Perspectives on Conflict and Integration in Uganda", in Uzoigwe, G. (ed), Uganda: The Dilemma of Nationhood.
(London: Nok Publishers International, 1982) p. 322.
341 Those states that that were aligned to the East were often target by the capitalist powers. The US, for example,
using a low intensity conflict strategy, would sponsor dissidents against the socialist leader to be overthrown. Good
examples of this are the South and North Korean wars of 1950, the Vietnam war and in general the US foreign
policy towards Cuba. For details on US intervention in socialist states, see J. Schraeder (ed), Intervention into the











imperialist coup, Obote was overthrown by Amin with the help of Britain and Israel?'
Ironically, however, Amin's coming to power with pomp and ceremony was soon to end in years
of immense abuse of human rights and violence towards the country's citizens.
Three significant issues emerge from the political development of Uganda in the first and second
postcolonial governments. Firstly, political power shifted from the Southerners to the
Northerners while the security sector remained an exclusive preserve of Northerners. This
domination of power by the Northerners accounted for the political instability that followed:
Firstly, the Northerners had to use force against the Southerners in order to manage them more
easily. Doing so led to human rights abuses against anyone who was considered an opponent of
the state. Secondly, independence struggles in neighbouring states had generated a mass exodus
of refugees that were absorbed into Uganda, later to be integrated into the various structures of
the state?' Lastly, Uganda's involvement in Zaire's politics, even though it was covert, marked a
big shift in Uganda's foreign policy. Although these were not documented policies, it was
implicit that a tendency was emerging in which foreign policy decision making had become
exclusively the responsibility of the country's leaders?"
Uganda's Second Republic (1971-1979)
When Amin came to power after the coup, it is argued that Uganda had the best civil service in
the whole of East Africa and that it would have developed even further had Amin not failed to
manage the state. Amin's regime soon slipped into dictatorship, forcing many people to flee
Uganda for fear of being killed. He set up a very strong military presence in his regime and ruled
by decree, rather than making decisions after consultation. Whereas Obote's administration may
have had a foreign policy document that guided foreign affairs, the second republic had no
proper foreign policy document that described avenues through which decisions were to be
341 M. Mamdani, Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda,  (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1986).
343 Some of the Banyarwanda refugees (Tutsi) joined the military and manned the intelligence of the General Service
Unit during the regime of Obote I, Amin's State Research Bureau and in the general army. Others joined the civil
service while others remained as peasants in districts bordering Rwanda. For a detailed discussion of how the
independence struggle in the region influenced politics in Uganda, see M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers:
Colonialism Nativism Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), particularly
Chapter 6, and P. Mutibwa Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Ho ,  (London: Hurts and
Company, 1992),
144 During the Obote administration, the government's assistance to Gbenye of Zaire was never discussed in












taken. Amin's efforts to review the foreign affairs ministry were short lived, as his regime
slipped into dictatorship."'
On the regional and international front, his foreign relations were unpredictable.' In one of his
erratic moods, Amin declared that the banks of River Kagera belonged to Uganda and not
Tanzania and promised to return them to Uganda He thus attacked Tanzania. Tanzania
reciprocated by invading Uganda in 1978, and fighting Amin's regime until it was overthrown in
April 1979. Tanzania harboured a large number of Ugandan dissidents who had unsuccessfully
tried to overthrow Amin in 1972. In 1978, when Tanzania reacted against Amin's claim by
countering his occupation of parts of Kagera, many of Uganda's dissidents joined the Tanzania
People's Defence Force (TPDF). The leader of these dissidents at the time was Milton Obote
who had been overthrown by Amin in 1971. This invasion was the first in Africa to remove a
president from office and set the precedent of how governments would be changed in Uganda
and other parts of Africa."'
During his rule, it had been hoped that Amin would be pro-West to enhance the interests of the
capitalists after all they had put him in power. It turned out that he did not intend to be loyal to
the capitalists nor socialists instead he argued that he borrowed from both ideologies and did
what was good for Uganda Amin had a mixed foreign policy, ranging from dealing with the
Soviet Union (SU)348 in increasing his military capability to being an accomplice in the Palestinian
hijack of Israel nationals. Amin refused to collaborate with the Israelis to release the hostages,
which led to an Israeli attack on Uganda in 1976.349 He provoked Kenya by insisting that part of
Uganda's land had been taken by Kenya and that he would get it back. Kenya responded by
threatening to stop Uganda's export trade (particularly the transportation of fuel to Uganda).
345 Government of Uganda Statement, Achievements of the Government of Uganda During the Second Republic,
undated.
346 F. Bwengye, The Agony of Uganda  From Id; Anita, to Obote: An analysis of the 1980 Controversial Gener afl
Election and its Aftermath, (London: Regency Press Ltd, 1985); Y. Museveni, What is Africa's Problem? (Kampala:
NEVI Publications, 1992); and 0. Odongo, A Political History of Uganda Yoweri Museveni's Referendum 2000,
(London: WICU Publishing Press Ltd, 2000).
347 Detailed accounts of this invasion can be found in 0. Farley "Tanzania's Military Intervention in Uganda", in
Furley, 0. and May, R, African Interventionist States, pp. 69-92 and JP. Chretien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two
Thousand Years of History , (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 291-298.
Mg According to G. Okoth Uganda signed a new agreement with the Soviet Union in September 1976 for the
purchase of a wide range of military hardware and some long range military aircraft and commissioned two new
squadrons of Soviet supplied MIG-17 and MIG-21 fighter planes. See G. Okoth, "Intermittent tensions in Uganda-
Kenya relations: Historical  Perspectives", in Transafrican Journal of History , Vol 21 (1992), p.77.
344 1 Dugard provides a detailed legal examination of the justification of Israel's attacks on Uganda in 1976. See J.











This would severely affect Uganda, since Tanzania could not be an alternative route to use,
because Ant had bad relations with Nyerere. He also made a claim of land extending towards
Kagera that was Ugandan but that had been taken over by Tanzania. His military adventures in
Tanzania soon ended his dream of proving that he was a regional power, though, and in 1979, a
combined force of Ugandan rebels and the Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) overthrew
him. The Uganda army of the time was poorly trained and educated, particularly the non-
commissioned officers and enlisted personnel.' Previously, they had been highly disciplined,
although meagrely paid, but when Amin assumed power, the system broke down and there was
indiscipline in the army. The army became involved in looting, stealing and terrorising the
populace to give it money, watches etc. Besides providing security, the army had been used by
Obote and Amin to ensure that they remained in power, to hold in check any potential or
prevailing dissidents and to beat up the opposition if they posed a threat to the ruling regime."'
Obote II to Tito Okello Lutwa (1980 -1985)
When Amin was overthrown in 1979, Uganda went through a phase of turmoil and instability.
Within two years, there were four rulers. Professor YK Lule ruled for a record sixty-eight days,
backed by Tanzania. He was replaced by President Godfrey Binaisa, who ruled for eleven
months, and was overthrown by the army commander, Oyite Ojok in May 1980. The military set
up a Military Commission to rule Uganda, as it prepared for elections. These were held in
December 1980, on a multi-party basis, and Milton Obote became president for the second time.
During this period, however, it was hard to speak of a functional government. The civil service
had broken down, all the government departments were run down, and the countryside was
characterized by insurgency: in short, Uganda was a "failed state" . 332
The political parties that lost the election objected to Obote's UPC victory because they felt that
the elections had been rigged. Some formed protest groups and others formed rebel groups.
3511 5. Metz, "A Strategic Approach to African Security: Challenges and Prospects", in African Security Review, Vol
93 (2000), http://wwwiss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9No3/StratAppinmk accessed 30 April 2004.
351 S. Akiruinade, "Democracy and Security in Africa: Towards a Framework of Understanding', in Journal  of
Contemporary African Studies, Vol 17, No 2 (1999), p.224; G. Khadiagala , "State Collapse and Reconstruction in
Uganda", in Zartman, I. (ed), Collapsed  States: The Disintegrat ion and Restoration of Legitimate Authority,
(Boulder: Lynne Renner, 1995), p. 35.
352 P. Langeth and J. Mugaju., "Toward Reconstruction" in Langeth, P and Mugaju. J, (eds) Post Conflict U ganda:
Towards an  Service, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1996) pp 17-18. See also S. Karugire, Roots of
Instability, p. 32, and for a definition of a failed state see R. Dorff, "Responding to the Failed State: The Need for











Following Obote's ousting in 1971, a rift had developed between the Northern region and the
Southern region. When Obote came to power once more, he avenged his ousting by hunting
down Amin's clansmen and the Southerners (particularly the Baganda) for having celebrated his
downfall. These ethnic categories of the south (particularly the local leaders) were tortured and
killed on grounds that they harboured anti-government forces. The ethnic groups in the south
included the Banyankole, Batoro, Bakiga, Banyoro and Banyarwanda (Batutsi refugees).333
Throughout Obote's second period of rule, Uganda was plunged into serious guerrilla warfare.
Obote was preoccupied with keeping himself in power and was not willing to negotiate with the
dominant rebel group, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which was headed by Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni (a Munyakole) who used the South of Uganda as his operational base. In 1985,
following a disagreement on how the rebel groups should be handled by the government soldiers
and the persistent refusal to negotiate with the rebels who were exerting considerable military
pressure on the government, forced the army commander (then Tito Okello Lutwa) to
overthrow President Obote.354
On assuming power, President Tito Okello engaged in dialogue and peace talks with the
different rebel groups. The rebel groups included the National Resistance Army (NRA), the
Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), Federal Democratic Movement of Uganda
(FEDEMU), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), and
Former Ugandan National Aarmy (FUNA) with the aim of returned peace to Uganda In
December 1985, during the peace talks held in Nairobi between the then rebel leaders and Tito
Okello Lutwa's government, it was agreed that there would be a ceasefire and modes of power
sharing, which would be agreed upon between the rebels groups and the government'
However, in January of the next year, in contravention of the Nairobi peace agreement, the
NRM fought and took power from Tito Okello on the 26th January 1986. It is to the NRM rule
that this study now turns. The next section examines briefly how its leadership organised the
security sector to ensure national, regional and international security.
From the foregoing historical account of Uganda's political development it is evident that it was
characterised by ethnicized power struggles between the north and the south. The Northern and
353 The Banyarwanda (Batutsi refugees) had settled in Uganda following the 1959 genocide.
35' For a detailed account of the causes of the coup and what the leaders hoped to achieve, see M. Mwagiru ,
"Internal conflict and the Process of Mediation: The 1985 Uganda Peace Process", in East African Journal of Peace
and Human Rights, No 2 (1996), pp. 171-187.











Southern dichotomy was applied to all sectors of the state, and the ethnic categorizations became
even more pronounced. In addition, foreign affairs and foreign policy was exclusively the sphere
of the leader and, in fact, other than the Amin regime, the rest of the regime's foreign affairs
were not explicit as to what they were, what the state's priorities were or what exactly the
leadership planned. Other than Amin having been helped by the Libyans in his war, and the
Koreans being identified in Obote Ifs regime, the rest of the relations consisted only of the main
formal relations with international financial institutions, the common bilateral relations
characterised by exchanges of diplomats etc. The next section briefly discusses the NRM regime.
Subsequent chapters will discuss Uganda's interventions in the GLR region.
The National Resistance Movement government from 1986
The NRM led by Museveni came to power in 1986, following five years of protracted guerrilla
warfare. The war had been fought by dissidents that were living in Tanzania and other countries,
peasants within Uganda and refugee forces, particularly the Banyarwanda Tutsi. The NRM
inherited a state whose citizens were victims of guerrilla warfare, who lived in fear of the military
and who suffered in abject poverty. The onset of the NRM regime catalyzed the already deep
ethnic cleavage between the Northerners (leaders from ethnic groups from northern Uganda
who had held power prior to 1986) and the Southerners (who had engaged the previous
governments in guerrilla war and taken power from them). Ugandan political, social and
economic sectors came to be controlled by the Southerners. The Northerners fought back to
regain control and organised approximately six rebel groups, which fought to regain their lost
power. The more the Northerners fought, the more marginalised they became, and the more
dilapidated the region became. Many people were displaced within the country and moved into
camps where they hoped to be protected from the rebels. The plight of these people and the war
zone in the north became a concern to many, including the international community. The whole
situation in the north came to be termed the "Northern Question"?' The Northern Question
has dominated Uganda's politics since 1986.
356 The Northern Question is a term that was used to broadly describe the nature of the power struggle between the
North and the South. Note that the North is not a homogenous region: there are different ethnic groups within the











4.2 Uganda's Security Framework
Before President Museveni came to power in 1986, Uganda did not have a clear national security
policy. The two governments preceding Museveni's government were engrossed in "regime
security' and fighting rebel activity with limited time to design meaningful security policies.
Like all other armies in Africa, the Ugandan army was fragmented, characterised by ethnic
cleavages among its regular members, most of whom had had limited education.'
Uganda's security sector had been manned by the Northerners but with Museveni in power, the
army was manned by several ethnic categories, although the dominance of the Southerners was
evident. The first security policy embedded in the "Ten Point Program" set out to guard the
territory and sovereignty of Uganda, as well as to promote good neighbourliness and regional
cooperation in the GLR. In order to achieve these objectives, a new security framework was
conceived with the creation of the National Resistance Army Statute of 1992. The National
Resistance Army was established as the army of the state. The statute stipulated very clearly the
structure of the army and relegated decision making to the National Resistance Army Council
(NRAC), ideally the High Command. The statute was more concerned with the conduct of the
officers and the men of the army, than how it was to set out to guard the territory and
sovereignty of Uganda. It could be argued that the emphasis on the structure of the army, its
conduct and its decisions was more crucial at the time, because the government had no
immediate security concerns in 1992 when the statute was passed. Although there were
357 Regime security is a concept borrowed from E. Azar and Chung-in Moon in their "Legitimacy, Integration and
Policy Capacity: The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security", in E. Azar and Chung-in-Moon (eds),
National Securi in the Third World: The Man. • ement of Internal and External Threats (Aldershot: Edward Elgar,
1988), pp. 77-102. They use the term to refer to how the leadership of states try to legitimize their power. M.
Gasiorowski calls it "regime legitimacy", see M. Gasiorowski, "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case
of Pahlavi Iran", in Azar, E. and Chung-in-Moon (eds), National Security in the Third World: The Management  of
Internal and External Threats, (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988), pp. 227-250. Similarly in the GLR, J. Clark uses
'regime security' as a concept to refer to the way governments frame their national interests. When states intervene
in others, they argue that it is in the interest of their own state, when in actual fact they do it to ensure that they
remain in power. See J. Clark, "Realism, Neo Realism and Africa's International relations in the Post-Cold War
Era", in K. C, Dun and M. T. Shaw, Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory,  p.94.
358 See A. Seegers for an analysis of the nature of African armies, in A. Seegers, "Dimensions of Militarization:
Separating Development, State structures and the Rise of the Military in South Africa", Paper presented to the
Conference on Economic Development and Racial Domination, University of Western Cape, 8-10 Oaober (1984).
M. Sabiti., "Strategic Dimensions of the National Security of Uganda-. A Partial Agenda for Research", an
unpublished paper presented to the UPDF seminar on The Agenda for Peace (1996) provides a good background to











skirmishes on its border with Sudan and although the Rwandan Tutsi in the NRA had invaded
Rwanda,' these were security concerns that were being contained.
Following the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1995, the government devised a second
security policy. The Constitution clearly set out how the security sector was to be organised, and
this was operationalised with alternative ways of addressing situations that would arise outside
the agreed parliamentary requirements. In this new security framework, security affairs were the
exclusive preserve of the security sector. The security sector comprised the UPDF, which was
supposed to be in charge of the security of the state as a whole, to protect its borders and to
protect the lives and property of the populace. The police was to be in charge of law and order in
the state, while the prisons service was to be responsible for the safe custody of criminals, petty
lawbreakers and other persons. The paramilitary was to provide complementary services to the
UPDF in cases of high levels of insecurity. In Chapter 12 of the 1995 Constitution, Uganda's
security is dealt with exclusively as the responsibility of the UPDF. Article 208 (see excerpt
below) deals specifically with the character of the army.
Figure 1: Constitutional Excerpt on Defence and National Security
Source: The Constitution of Uganda, 1995
359 The invasion of Rwanda had been spearheaded by Rwandan Tutsi soldiers who had served in the different armies
in Uganda, mainly in the intelligence wings. In the first government they served in the General Service Unit (GSU)
of Obote I, the State Research Bureau (SRB) of Amin, the National Security Agency NASA) of Obote II and in the
NRA, they were in the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and the External Security Organisation (ESO) and other











Articles 209 and 210 of the Constitution explicitly deal with the structure through which security
decisions are made. Appointment, promotion and disciplining the forces are the responsibility of
parliament, although a parallel court can discipline the forces after careful analysis of breaches of
their duties or other behaviour that is not in consonance with the expectations of the army. As a
constitutional requirement, the special committees on Presidential and Foreign Affairs' and the
committee on Defence and Internal Affairs' debate key appointments to the Ministry of
Defence (MOD). It is not very clear if recommendations from these special committees are
considered or if only their opinions concerning key security matters such as potential invasions
or deployments of forces are sought (see below for excerpts of the Constitution that directly
refer to the functions of the UPDF and the role of parliament). For example, in all Uganda's
interventions that were undertaken by the state between 1993 and 1998, it is not clear if the
deployment of troops suggested  in Article 210(d) was exhaustively dealt with by the parliament.
The Constitution also contains an exclusive article on intervention, which allows the government
to address a security matter that would otherwise affect the security of the state in a short time
frame and then inform the parliament.
Figure 2: Functions of the Defence Force
360 This committee comprises twenty members with a favourable representation from all political parties.
361 This committee is comprised of sixteen members, four representatives from the UPDF senior officers, as well as
members of parliament from the ruling party and the opposition. Ironically, this committee is formed from
predominantly the Northern and Eastern ethnic groups (regions where the main security pressure points are), a few












The structure gives primacy to the Minister and State of Defence as the highest decision makers
of the MOD, although in reality it is the Commander-in-Chief (the President). The overall MOD
mandate, besides protecting the state from internal turmoil, external threats and ensuring total
peace in the country, is also to safeguard the lives of the people, to protect their property and to
foster harmony and understanding between the defence force and civilians. It is responsible for
designing and managing the sector The organogram below demonstrates the structure of
Uganda's security sector.










Decision Making in the Uganda People Defence Force
Although both the organogram and the White Paper on the Defence Transformation fail to state
how decisions are made within the component part of the MOD, i.e. the UPDF, and how the
security framework works up to the local government level, a provision in the UPDF's Military
Statute and the local government structure explains how the two operate. The Military Statute
creates a highly centralised leadership structure of decision making.'" The UPDF comprises two
important parts, viz. the Army Council and the High Command. The Army Council in turn
comprises the Directors and Battalion Commanders. The High Command, which is the
executive arm of the UPDF, comprises the UPDF (the chiefs) and the Division Commanders.
There are nine chiefs: the Chief of Personnel and Administration, the Chief of Political
Commissar, the Chief Controller of Finance, the Chief Signal Officer, the Chief of Military
Intelligence, the Chief of Operations and Training, the Chief of Medical Services, the Chief of
Engineering and Logistics and the Chief of Combat Operations!' The subsidiary ministries that
work with and provide services to the MOD include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Finance, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Local Government.
The President holds the prestigious title of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and
oversees the defence forces' operations and welfare. Decisions concerning the security of the
state and particularly the decision to commit soldiers in any security operation, be it domestic,
regional or international of any sort, is discussed at the Army Council level, which he presides
over as Commander-in-Chief. Once a decision has been reached, the High Command sits to
design the details of the intervention and its operationalisation. The dual roles of President and
Commander-in-chief put him in the line of inquiry as the first person to be responsible for
defence, as well as being answerable to the public and international community as to what
actions Uganda has taken in a given state. Critics of this dual role have argued that the President
is taking on too much work or responsibility, and that this compromises other sectors of
government that are equally crucial. For example, the International Crisis Group (ICG) points
out that Museveni sometimes becomes directly involved in combat, which they attribute to his
lack of confidence in his commanders and his unwillingness to acknowledge the distinction
362 One characteristic of this type of structure is the potential emergence of intra-organisational power struggles,
which is also true of the UPDF.











between strategic operational and tactical levels of command that enable effective political and
military synergy?" Ideally, they propose that presidents should remain at the levels of strategic
planning and not at the combat levels. This, of course, is an idea that fails to consider Museveni's
background as a soldier and his personality of being someone who prefers direct supervision of
the work of the soldiers.'"
In terms of Article 124 of the Ugandan Constitution, declaration of war is permitted subject to
the approval of parliament with a two-thirds vote. However, the Constitution also grants the
President the power to use his discretion to decide to declare war and to inform parliament
afterwards, though this must happen within seventy-two hours of declaring war. This is expressly
permitted on the understanding that emergencies that put state security at stake would require
prompt action, which would be delayed if the President had to wait for permission from the
parliament. It is, however, implicit from Article 124 that the President will make security
decisions in consultation with Parliament, and only if there is not enough time, is he provided
with an alternative article that empowers him to take action and inform Parliament later. In this
situation, it is not the Parliament, which determines the national security interests but rather the
President in consultation with the MOD.'" This partly explains why it has been common
practise that war is declared first and that Parliament is informed later: it is the President who
decides when a national interest warrants military action.
This dominant role of the President also applies to setting priorities for the security interests.
Until 2001, the President and UPDF had the exclusive power not only of determining security
interests but of also prioritising these interests for the state. Furthermore, the President and the
UPDF assessed the threats, formulated security strategies and implemented the security policy.
Furthermore, this extensive role of the President does not extend to the army alone, but also to
other policy issues in the economic, political and social sector. Akin to the Preston model of the
364 International Crisis Group, "Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict", No 77 (April 2004) p.
14.
365 The President's acceptance of responsibility for his actions and his willingness to fight alongside the army in war
not only boosts the confidence of the army but provides a better understanding of the army's operation than only
listening to military advisors and commanders. The President's willingness to fight in the army himself has helped
him to identify the main problems that have characterised the army, like corruption, ghost soldiers on pay rolls and
unscrupulous procurements.
366 The President has a dual role as head of state and as commander-in-chief of the armed forces to take charge of











head of state being a "Director" 367 the President, because of his strong need for power and
control, tends to control policy processes and prefers to become involved in all of these. He
makes decisions within a tight inner circle of advisers (mainly his proteges and relatives),
advocates his own preferences regarding specific policies and personally guides policy along a
path consistent with his own personal principles, views or experiences, irrespective of whether
they are good or will undermine the state." Examples of such decisions on policy are his recent
decision to degazette important ecosystem and give them to "foreign investors" for
development, even though the Environmental Impact Assessments have indicated that the
degazetting of these areas is going to have adverse effects on the climate of Uganda as a whole.
He has since rescinded this decision because of the public outcry. In one of the national strikes
against this decision, an Indian national was killed. This gave Uganad bad publicity yet it was
going to hold the Common Wealth Conference in 2007.
After the defence review in 2001, other stakeholders have been included in the formulation of
some of the security strategies and policies. The underlying motivation for this lies in the
interdependence of various sectors in achieving set security goals. It was realised that the MOD
could not design all policies and implement them without receiving input from other ministries
that are contingent in the development process. This does not mean, however, that other
ministries were not involved in the past: they were involved, but only as far as the MOD affected
their ministries' budgets. It could be argued that the inclusion of the other stakeholders was
mainly donor driven', to ensure that the MOD was accountable and efficient in its provision of
security to all the people irrespective of their location and ethnic composition.
Government may also have realised that there are stakeholders whose input was of immense
value if Uganda was to have a sound security framework. These stakeholders include the private
sector, key investors in regions of insecurity and opinion leaders who hail from various part of
367 
For a discussion on the types of presidents and their character see T. Preson, The President and His Inner Circle:
Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs,  pp. 15-19
368 T. Preston discusses the four dominant types of presidents and how they manage their presidency. In his
typology, presidents exhibit the characters of directors, magistrates, administrators and delegators. It is not possible
to discuss the typology here, but if closely analysed, the presidential system of Uganda since 1986 conforms to the
Director type of system. For a detailed discussion see T. Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership
Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Affairs, pp. 15-19 and pp. 22-23.
369 Uganda depends on multilateral agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB)
for part of its budget. These agencies have put conditionalities on the MOD like demobilization, limited expenditure
and the inclusion of other stakeholders on its planning committees to be able to access the aid. See Omitoogun,
Wuyi, on military expenditure in Military Expenditure Data in Africa: A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana,











the country. Whereas they are not included in the administrative structure of the national security
framework, they are nonetheless involved at the planning committee levels. The national defence
organogram indicates how the Ministry is organised, planned and linked to various components
of the organisation. It is instructive to analyse this defence structure with a view to understanding
the chains of command and how these were operationalized during the intervention period.
The National Security Council
The National Security Council (NSC) is another salient section of the security sector. Prior to the
2000, Articles 219 and 220 of the Constitution described and provided the composition and
functions of the NSC but how it was operationalised was not so clear. Despite the fact that the
NSC is an important part of the security framework, it is not represented on the structure
nevertheless it is the link between the military, the district security set up and the External
Security Organisations (ESO) and Internal Security Organisations (ISO) 3 70 The NSC advises the
President in security planning and is responsible for gathering intelligence information on which
much of the nation's security depends.
Functions of the National Security Council include:
• To inform and advise the President on matters relating to national security;
• To co-ordinate and advise on policy matters relating to intelligence and security;
• To review national security needs and goals;
• To receive and act on reports from the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC ) and
• To carry out any other functions as the parliament may oblige to the council."'
At the district level, members of staff seconded from the President's office are the link with the
NSC. These are responsible for security and development and have an established structure.
They include the district administrator attached to the President's Office; the Resident District
370 A. Seegers notes that when authoritarian states create National Security Agencies, state repression worsens, and
acts of political opposition are easily described as threats to national security. It is critical to establish the role that
ESOs and ISOs play in the internal politics within the state, particularly in the conflict between the former ISO boss
and government. See A. Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modem South Africa,  (London: Tauris Publishers,
1996) p. 304.
371 The National Security Council is still being re-organised to be able to serve its purpose optimally. Currently, the
link between the district and the central government is not so obvious and is characterised by unclear policies, which











Commissioner (RDC) who is charged with the security welfare of the district. Below the RDC
are the District Internal Security Officer (DISO), the District Police Commander (DPC), the
Central Investigations Department (CID), and the Local Council V, III, II and I chair persons
and the secretaries of defences at each of the Local Council levels. It is through this hierarchy
that citizens are sensitized about security at village local council meetings. They are told to be
alert to detect any strangers and questionable people settling amongst the population. As a result,
they are very active in identifying new people and questioning them on why they have moved to
a new area. As a result, the rebels who have infiltrated villages have been reported to the
authorities; those who succeed in camouflaging themselves as refugees are taken to the UNHCR
district units or to the Red Cross for onward transfer to the refugee camps managed by the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 3n
At the borders, the MOD deploys a UPDF liaison officer who works with the Border Police
post, the Immigration Unit and the Customs Department to ensure security at the border and
prevent the proliferation of illegal products or arms and ammunition entering Uganda. The
border administration is part of the Local Council security set up of the district. It is responsible
for precisely identifying those sections of the borders that are problematic or potential areas of
concern. They are also supposed to carry out investigations on where rebels are operating from
and to inform the district security officer, who in turn informs the RDC. Information is relayed
to the area's UPDF commander at the district who then decides on the best course of action.
This structure has been very vigilant in the Western border regions in identifying the areas of
potential threats to peace. The FGDs at the borders identified weaknesses in this information
flow system, which had resulted in a compromised security situation. They indicated three main
limitations in their work Firstly, there was slow response from the centre when a security issue
was raised. Secondly, the limited logistical resources and the delays in transmitting the resources
impeded their work Thirdly, the inadequate information about regions, and delayed
communication with their neighbouring security counterparts sometimes led to disastrous
consequences like the raiding of villages by a group of armed thugs, isolated attacks on
households and petty theft on market days?"
372 From here the refugees escape into the rest of the population to reorganise their clandestine movements.












On one occasion during fieldwork, I encountered a district that had been attacked by armed
thugs. The local people reported to security the intrusion of armed thugs (the thugs were well
known to the village for terrorising people, stealing their property and sometimes killing others).
On this occasion when information was relayed, the DISO took charge of the field operation of
arresting the armed thugs?" However, he was put out of action in the process because of the
delayed responses from their counterparts, namely, the police. It was evident that there had been
inappropriate reporting on what weapons the armed gang men had and how many they were.
Because of this missing detail, the DISO was killed.' Nevertheless, the case does indicate how
security is now a responsibility of all the people, irrespective of what position they hold at the
district. It also shows that the security sector faces serious challenges. There is often poor
communication or even a breakdown in communication between the different levels of the
security structure, which inhibits good planning and affects their operations. Another case is the
Barlonyo massacre in which civilians were massacred because information received was not
properly disseminated.' Overall, however, the UPDF has a better record of military
effectiveness and conduct under the current Museveni government than the armies Uganda has
had in the postcolonial era.'"
Paramilitary Groups in Uganda's Defence Sector
Another arm of the UPDF that is not included in the defence structure is the paramilitary.
Originally, these auxiliary forces were recruited from the local populace to complement the
UPDF in areas with severe rebel activity and in the cattle-rustling region of North East and
Eastern Uganda. They include home guards, vigilantes or local defence units. Examples of these
include the Arrow boys in Teso (Eastern Uganda), the Amuka group, the Rhino Group and the
La Becca group in Gulu, who are responsible for protecting roads and the camps where the
Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) live. In the earlier days, these forces were neither formally
374 The Ntungamo District Security Officer, Patrick Edmacu was killed on 28 August 2005 in a crossfire with
Rwandese armed thugs. Two of the thugs were killed and their live ammunition was recovered, but one thug ran
away.
375 Some people in the army have blamed his death on the tactical combat error of attacking a house without first
establishing the number of armed gangsters inside, instead of ambushing them and attacking them later. At the
logistical level, the police's delay in coming to his rescue was caused by a lack of fuel. What the incident
demonstrates is that district security structures should be provided with proper and sufficient logistical resources to
enable them work effectively. In addition, there is a laxity in information flow and a duplication of roles that need to
be streamlined if they are to be effective.
376 International Crisis Group, "A full account of the Barlonyo massacre", I. C. G Report, 2004, p. 15.











organised nor paid a salary but just a little token of appreciation. Following their deployment in
many operations in the insecure north, they have since been integrated into the army, given
military training, allotted numbers, and are now on the pay roll.
These groups operate alongside the UPDF. One example was "Operation Iron Fist", launched in
April 2004 to root out the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from Southern Sudan and Northern
Uganda.' In the DRC intervention, some of these Local Defence Units (LDUs) veterans of the
liberation struggle and demobilised soldiers were deployed to beef up the UPDF, which was
overstretched because of the multiple deployments in the DRC, in Western Uganda border
districts and in Northern Uganda at the border with Sudan to oversee the LRA pressure points.
Contrary to the Constitution, which spells out that recruitment of these soldiers should be based
on districts and must be overseen by the parliament; the recruitment of these paramilitary groups
is in fact done by the UPDF, thereby contravening the Constitution. Other paramilitary groups
that have not been visibly related to the state but have links to the ruling party are the Kalangala
Action Plan (KAP) and the Popular Intelligence Network (Nyekundire)." These are also
referred to as the "electioneering arms" of the ruling party, as they ensure that the ruling party is
voted back into power.' The KAP has been cited in many human rights violations against those
citizens who demonstrated their opposition to the ruling party.
The organisation of the security sector demonstrates an interesting set up, in that the legislature
is assigned roles to oversee recruitment, management and general organisation of the defense
and police security but that other than the police, the legislature does not seem to have adequate
control over the defence sector.
378 The governments of Uganda and the Sudan signed an agreement in terms of which the UPDF were allowed to
operate in Southern Sudan to root out the LRA. The area covered by the UPDF was limited, so the paramilitary
groups were supposed to fight alongside the UPDF to capture the Lubanga-Tek LRA base that was well equipped
with vehicles, radio communications and advanced weaponry - ironically all provided by the Khartoum government
to the LRA.
379 Okuku observes that KAP and Nyekundire recruitment, training and existence are not included in the UPDF bill,
although they were instrumental in the state's security operations. See J. Okuku, Beyond Third-Term Politics:
Constitutional amendments and Museven's quest for Life Presidency in Uganda, (Institute for Global Change,













Financing of the defence sector occurs mainly through the government, which receives its
money from revenue from the state, bilateral donor subsides, aid and grants from multilateral
donor agencies. In Article 11 of the Ugandan Constitution, parliament is responsible for
analysing programmes and policy issues that affect the national budget and economy and, where
necessary, for recommending alternative approaches that government can use to obtain
resources for the MOD (the UPDF in particular). The MOD is required to provide parliament
with its annual budget and defend it, if the need arises. The budget is divided into two parts, viz.
the recurrent budget and the capital budget. Often its display includes the recurrent and capital
development military expenditure as percentages of the central government expenditure and the
totals. When the budget is exceeded, parliament has the prerogative of permitting the MOD to
find supplementary funds with a limit of 3% from the state treasury. The committee on Finance,
Planning and Economic Development thereafter vets, adjusts and recommends the MOD
budget following the constitutional limits set on the defence spending. See Figure 4 below for an
excerpt of Article 12 of the Constitution, on defence spending and supplementary expenditure.
From the above article, the rules are clear, although the figures may be changed. However, in
unavoidable situations these rules are revisited depending on the security problem at stake and
provided the Ministry obtains permission to adjust them. For example, when the threats from











agencies suspended aid. In 2002, in contrast, the donors permitted the increment in
expenditure"' and although the rebel incursions remained only in the north, the defence
spending increased further because of the changes in the nature of guerrilla warfare.'" The
scorched earth policy and abductions the guerrillas were using changed to surprise attacks on
relief agencies, the local population, and displaced people's camps. This has continued to date.
The LRA rebels have also joined the regrouping Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and PRA in the
Eastern DRC, who are ready to attack Uganda. These immeasurable and unpredictable rebel
incursions require a matching readiness of the UPDF to address the impending insecurity
concerns, which in turn requires colossal sums of money to equip and run the daily surveillance
on the rebels. An abridged series of the military budget running from 1992 to 2005 is supplied in
Table 3 below.
Table 3: The Military Budget covering the period 1992-2005 in Uganda shillings
Source: Statistics generated from Ministry of Defence Policy Statement for selected Financial Years
From Table 2 above, the average MOD expenditure between 1992 and 2005 is on average
approximately 161.4 billion Ugandan shillings for the recurrent budget while capital development
only received 17.6 billion. From the budget, it is indicative that there has been an average
increment of up to about 0.23% per year, approximately 23 billion annually, except for the 1996-
1998 period when there was a slight decrease in expenditure. Although at this time there was a
381 For a detailed analysis of foreign aid to the military in Africa see case studies by W. Omitoogun, Military
Expenditure Data in Africa: A Survey of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, and W.
Omitoogun and H. Eboe (eds) Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of
Control, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).











marked increase in rebel insurgency, the multilateral agencies declined the government's request
to spend more money. A MOD official who has been closely involved in the budgeting stated
that IFIs were under pressure from the EU and the international community not to give Uganda
money for security. That IFIs felt that Uganda was engaged in a war that was no longer due to
its insecurity but one whose agenda was unclear, whose effects were gruesome and its end harder
to predict.' What can be drawn from the IFIs reluctance to give Uganda money is that; these
agencies were not convinced that Uganda had security concerns worth addressing by increment
in its funding.
To be able to control the MOD expenditure and systematise the irregular structure in decision
making regarding budgets and the fraudulent procurement processes in which the MOD was
losing colossal sums of money, a Budget Act was put in place. It was envisaged that this Act
would regulate the Budgetary Procedure and establish a systematic and efficient budgetary
Process and other matters connected thereto. The Act was to come in effect on 1 July 2001. This
followed the much decried over-spending in the military sector. The Budget Act was also aimed
at implementing an earlier legislation in the Constitution in which the parliament had been
mandated to vet the expenditure of the MOD. The legislation had not been adequately
implemented, which resulted in a demand for parliament to use its powers to vet the MOD
spending, as this was having a severely negative effect on the national budget. The Act was
somewhat related to a donor demand to ascertain how resources were being used to procure
inferior equipment, which cost the government large sums of money in three procurement scams
that were made public. These included the purchase of junk helicopters, expired food and
military fatigues that did not fit the officers and men of the defence forces, and lastly the arms
purchase scandal that extended to South Africa and the Ukraine and that involved shoddy arms
exporting firms in Britain.
What is peculiar about the financing of the army and the decision-making process is that the
army did not seem to have a well-established decision-making structure. Some UPDF members
recounted that orders of how money had to be dispensed or used were made erratically by the
respective departments, with lack of proper checks and balances. As a result, there was
inconsistency in what the budgets were and in what actually was spent. Priorities were never
harmonized, and money was disbursed depending on which chief wielded more power (meaning











who was closest to the President). In fact, the Commander-in-Chief often dictated what he
wanted once the budget had been passed, and his priorities often ranged from military
equipment to military combat. He would instruct that he wanted the following: "I want hangars,
armouries, and bankers, ... some of it should go to the Israel contractor and of course we need
some for classified use."' From interviewee UG/MOD 13's comments, it was evident that there
was no proper planning, budgeting or decision making in the UPDF: commands were sent via
phone, instructions were sometimes communicated by word of mouth or small chits of paper
were passed around from office to office, which made responsibility impossible to establish if
anything went wrong. The civilians who worked in the top positions in the army sometimes
made decisions blindly without consulting the technocrats on the matters. A specific example of
this was the army's then permanent secretary Dr Ben Mbonye (a medical doctor by profession).
He often made decisions on what he thought were the best interests of the state or the army
without considering or discussing issues with the respective chiefs of departments.'" Yet he
wielded considerable power and was a so-called "right hand man" of the president?' What made
the information flow more complex was what an army officer referred to as a "civilian army"
decision-making process!' An interviewee recounted a scenario that was a common example of
how the army dealt with transactions (see the excerpt below).
384 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town on 24 February 2006.
385 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town on 24 February 2006.
386 Dr Ben Mbonye is also a Rwandese Tutsi whose name often came up in all the arms purchase scandals.











This excerpt demonstrates three aspects of concern in the army: the level of illiteracy that
characterises the army, particularly at the higher ranks; the lack of accountability and finally, the
poor level of planning. It is little wonder, then, that the army has been characterised by so-called
ghost soldiers,'" inappropriate military expenditure and sometimes compromised combat
operations?" By 2006, the Court Martial was handling, among others, cases where 28 army
officers were on trial, allegedly for swindling money; one case involved approximately 379
million Ugandan shillings, meant for 650 soldiers in 2000. In his message, Museveni read out a
list of individuals who would be court-martialled. These included high ranking military officers,
such as Maj. Gen. James Kazini, Maj. Bakirana, Brig. Henry Tumukunde, Brig. Steven Kashaka,
Brig. Nakibus Lakara, Brig. Julius Oketta, Col. Poteli Kivuna, Col. John Mugume, Col. Fred
Tolit, Col. Mark Kodil, Col. Andrew Gutti, Lt. Col. Dura Mawa Muhindo, Col. Steven
Rwabantu, and Lt. Kenneth Ayebare. It was alleged that they had all been involved in the
misappropriation of military resources, and that they were implicated in the loss of huge amounts
of money that had been intended as salaries for soldiers or in general for financing the security
sector.' Brig. Tumukunde has since been acquitted of swindling and of subversive acts against
government: at the time when he was a 4 th Division Chief in Gulu, it had been alleged that he
had misappropriated up to 379 million Uganda shillings meant to pay the salaries of 650
soldiers?' He has since been acquitted of all charges. These issues not withstanding, financing of
the security sector still remains low, despite the many security challenges faced by the state.
It can be concluded that Uganda, like many other African states, has a weak defence budgeting
system, which is characteristic of many governments emerging out of liberation struggles. The
inability to account for defence resources is not peculiar to Uganda: in fact, as Rupiya and Henk
observe, African countries lack a transparent process based upon national consensus, for
defining security, forming coherent national security strategy policy, allocating resources
according to the strategy, and then overseeing its implementation?' The reason why Uganda
tends to exhaust its defence budget before the end of the financial year, is because it does not
388 Ghost soldiers is a term that has been used to describe the corruptive tendencies of the civil service that produce
fictitious employee names and records with the intention of drawing their salaries and other benefits for themselves.
This has been a common practice not only in the army but in other ministries.
389 See for example a story on the army "uncovering the ghosts in UPDF", published in The Monitor on
7 December 2003.
390 See K. Ogen Aliro, "Tinyefuza to lead new investigation" in The Monitor on 3 December 2003.
391 M. Okore, "Tumukunde acquitted" in The Monitor on 21 April 2006.
392 D. Henk and M. Rupiya, Funding Defence: Challenges of Buying Military Capability in Sub Saharan Africa,











seem to allocate its defence resources according to rigidly defined structures and because there is
misappropriation of resources as evidenced by the interviewees."'
With limited transparency with regard to the procurement of equipment and limited
accountability, if any, the potential of over-spending in the army is highly likely. The implication
of this in the search for genuine security of the state means that the latter is highly dependent
upon proper communication and dissemination of information and, above all, on the
coordination of resources that are required to address security. Uganda's over-expenditure in the
defence sector is not peculiar to the country; it is typical of countries with a history of militarized
liberation. Common to these countries is the allocatin of resources in areas of priorty that are not
necessarily based on ensuring the state's national security but are instead linked to "individual
interests", which are rationalized by those in control of the army as crudely linked to the nation's
security interests.
4.3 Uganda's Security Interests
Prior to Museveni coming to power in 1986, Uganda's security interests mainly involved the
protection of the state from external aggression, especially after the Tanzanian invasion of 1978
and the subsequent overthrow of Amin's regime in 1979. The successive governments after that
were embroiled in power struggles and initially depended on the Tanzanian soldiers and a limited
number of Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) soldiers for territorial protection. When
elections were held in 1980, the TPDF returned and left the UNLF in charge of Uganda's
security. The rejection of the election results by some political parties forced some leaders of
political parties to wage guerrilla warfare against the government of Obote II. Among these were
the Uganda People's Movement (UPM), which formed the National Resistance Movement, with
its military wing being the National Resistant Army. The DP in turn formed the UFM and the
FEDEMU. Increased incursions into the state by these rebel groups and the subsequent guerrilla
warfare of Museveni forced the ruling governments of neighbouring states to secure themselves
in power. Their core national interests became defined by how best their regimes could be
secured and not necessarily by taking into account the protection of the people per se.
393 Most of the interviewees in the Ministry of Defence echoed the view that there was misappropriation of











During Museveni's regime, new developments of GLR geopolitical conflicts like the Burundi
coup of 1986, the genocide of 1993, the Rwandan invasion of 1990 and the subsequent genocide
in that country during 1994, forced Uganda to redefine its national interests. By 1987, rebel
activity against the NRM government had commenced in Northern Uganda, and by 1994 there
were potential threats on the western flank that bordered Rwanda and the DRC. Uganda had to
develop a better security strategy to contain the conflicts in all these neighbouring states. At the
formal level, national security was prioritised and embedded in Chapter 12 of the new 1995
Ugandan Constitution. In this constitution, National security was defined in the traditional sense
as security from foreign attacks or infiltration from neighbouring states and encompassed
freedom from fear, intimidation and other pressures or threats, real or potential, from whatever
source that would undermine the basic rights, welfare and property of the people of Uganda.'"
Uganda's national security interests were categorised into national, regional and international
interests subsequent to the defence review in 2001. At the national (domestic level), Uganda's
security interests are contained in the White Paper on Defence Transformation (WPDT) and
cover a wide range of areas. Figure 6 below is a summary of the national security interests. These
security interests were arrived at after consultations and discussions, which led to the WPDT. In
Figure 6 below, the six specific threats to Uganda's national security are highlighted.
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According to the above figure, national security can be seen from two general perspectives. On
the one hand, it covers the traditional military and state centric view (parts e and f) while on the
other, it is defined rather rigidly to cover a wide range of perceived non-military issues."' This
study seeks to examine the last two national security interests mentioned in the figure (e and f). A
nation that has the capacity to defend itself against external threats and to maintain its national
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity ought to have both a clearly structured security
sector and communication channels. As noted earlier, though, the system is characterised by
inadequate information flow and disarticulated communication links. To be able to address these
problems, Uganda has initiated development programs within the MOD and particularly the
UPDF to build capacity and to professionalize the army in preparation for its multifaceted roles
at national, regional and international levels.
Regional and international interests
Museveni's coming to power in 1986, following a time of civil and guerrilla warfare, greatly
influenced the nature of regional relations. Firstly, the civil and guerrilla warfare had had severe
repercussions for the GLR as a whole because, as Chretien argues, the Museveni regime served
as a prelude to the general conflagration in the 1990s. Chretien describes Museveni as follows:
Musewni ultimately imposed his will on each of his neighbours; he was feared by the Kenyan and
Zairian dictators... ; he irritated the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere , whose protégé  vats
discreditedand he Tarried Rwanda'sJuvenalHabyar r ana,who symbolizedthe ethnicism that the
Ugandan leader despised .. 396
Given these kind of perceptions of Museveni, it is little wonder that all his efforts to establish
regional relations, regional cooperation or regional integration were always perceived by other
leaders as being motivated by ulterior motives. In fact, Chretien attributes the change in the
region's established order to Museveni's coming to power in 1986: this event convinced the
existing regional leaders, like Mobutu and Habyarimana. that it would spark off attempts to
395 See J. Erikson, "Introduction" in Erikson, J. (ed), Threat Politics: New Perspectives on Security Risk and Crisis
Management, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001) p.5; B. Buzan, 0. Waever and J. de Wilde (eds), Security: A New
framework for Analysis, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1998); J. Brian, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and
State Securities in the Third World" in Brian, J. L. (ed), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World
States, (London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 12. All of them explain these two general perspectives of security and
argue that national security can no longer be seen from the traditional military perspective but that it now also
includes issues of a non-military nature, like food security, health etc.












restore the rule of law and to initiate dangerous competition for political power.' In retrospect,
it is clear that Museveni's coming to power did truly spark off political power struggles in the
region. What emerges from this analysis is that Museveni's coming to power did not necessarily
result into the political struggles in other countries but rather that these moves to gain power by
competing groups was prevalent and became subtle after Museveni's ascension to power.
At the regional and international level, Uganda's commitment to peace and stability was
prioritized as its core interest, as was cooperation in all regional and international initiatives of
peace and development. This is evidenced by its undertaking of new military programs and
opening up of many bilateral relations with states in Africa and, in fact, with the rest of the
world. In its immediate neighbour of Sudan, Museveni's relations with Al Bashir were dependent
on how Museveni would relate with the SPLA. Museveni's choice to support the latter was to
have a negative impact on the relations between Museveni and Al Bashir. Museveni's relations
with the regional leaders were based on a tacit reciprocity arrangement in which they helped each
other to address each other's security concerns. The phrase "You watch my back while I watch
yours" characterised these regional relations. Museveni's relations with the RPF, AFDL and
SPLA compromised his relations with the Rwandan government, Mobutu government.
In other liberation struggles elsewhere in Africa, Uganda provided support to the Africa National
Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in their fight against South Africa's
apartheid regime. The ANC had a force of four thousand fighters who trained at Kaweweta in
Luweero district, while the PAC force of only forty-nine were trained at Kabamba. 398
At the diplomatic level, Uganda is a signatory to many regional and international conventions,
optional protocols and declarations that are aimed at preserving peace and solving the security
problems that affect the GLR region as well as the international system as a whole. The Kampala
Document (1991), the Summits on the Congo', the Conference on Security, Stability and
Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA, 2000), NEPAD (2001), Intergovernmental Authority
397 Ibid, p. 319.
398 These revelations were made by Amama Mbabazi (Former Minister of Defence) to the International Court of
Justice court session held on 18 April 2005 at the Hague.
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" Numerous summits were held in regard to the GLR conflicts, for example, the Victoria falls summit, the Lusaka
Peace Accord, the SADC-Non Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Durban and the summit in Mauritius to
mention but a few; however, a detailed account of these cannot be discussed here for purposes of brevity, but they











on Development (IGAD) (2003) and the Dar es Salaam Declaration (2004) all demonstrate
Uganda's core security interests. Uganda has undertaken joint security ventures to finding
solutions to security concerns in the GLR. It has participated in summits, made its position
known on the region's key security concerns, specifically on Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. For
example, it participated in the Summits at the Victoria Falls, at the Southern African
Development Community-Non Aligned Movement (SADC-NAM) (Durban) and in Mauritius,
when efforts were underway to end the war in the DRC. It has also been involved in joint
military commissions aimed at coming up with common standards on security issues. For
example, MEDFLAG a US-Kenya, Uganda and Tanzanian joint medical exercise that gave
medical care to the citizens of each of the member countries. Other projects are Exercise
Natural Fires, which commenced in 2004, Joint Range Exercise-range shooting for Marksmen,
and a Joint sports exercise initially scheduled for 2005 is underway.
Under the regional efforts towards peace and stability, Uganda supports the establishment of the
Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), which is a unit of the African Stand-by Force
responsible for addressing security problems and charged with security operations where
insecurity breaks out and threatens the lives and peace in general.' EASBRIG comprises a
regional division force stationed at the Gadaffi Barracks in Jinja (Uganda). The region is also
developing a continental early warning system to address conflicts at an early stage to avoid
instability. This international engagement has reiterated Uganda's commitment to regional
security. Similarly, the US in 1997 provided Uganda with a contingent of American troops to
train a battalion of the UPDF in peacekeeping in Africa!' The US also sent more troops to train
the UPDF in different types of training and provided equipment that was intended to enhance
Uganda's capability, with the aim of enhancing its capacity to serve as a bulwark against the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan and the region as a whole.' Russia, Israel, America
and China are also training the UPDF in different aspects of security management.
Whereas the GLR states have not signed any defence pacts, they do seem to have semblances of
quasi-regional alliance systems and bilateral defence pacts. An example of this is the joint military
intervention in the DRC and the diplomatic intervention in Burundi's intra-state conflict. These
400 See the detailed report of the Summit of Eastern African Heads of State and Government on the establishment
of the EASBRIG held in Addis Ababa, 2005.
401 A. Gakwandi, "Foreign Relations" in Mugaju, J. (ed), Uganda's Age of Reforms: A Critical Overview, (Kampala:
Fountain Publishers), pp. 80-88.











are all indications of generally agreed frameworks of operation. These quasi defence alliances are
not often sustained, though, firstly because of poor bilateral relations and secondly, because of
personal differences between leaders over specific aspects of security, like common strategies or
the best way to approach intrastate or inter-state conflicts.
Under the Nairobi Protocol and Declaration which became effective in 2004, Uganda has joined
the rest of the GLR states and the Horn of Africa as a member to curb the proliferation of Small
Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs).' Uganda has a National Focal Point Committee, which
established a National Action Plan in 2001 to collect and destroy illicit firearms. This has
supplemented its disarmament project in Eastern Uganda, although there are still many
challenges. Together with other states in the region, Uganda has established a national survey
and mapping strategy and an information gathering strategy through which information on illicit
weapons is gathered.
Currently, Uganda is considering sending troops (under the auspices of IGAD and the AU) to
war-ravaged Somalia' a proposition that is contested by some sections of the population
particularly the opposition. Those opposed to the intervention argue that Uganda's image in
intervention has been compromised by events in its intervention in the DRC. The negative
publicity regarding the proposed intervention in Somalia has been attributed to Uganda's loss of
the case to DRC at the International Court of Justice regarding its intervention in the DRC.
At the international level, the increase in transnational forces, particularly non-state actors like
terrorists, drug traffickers and people trafficking internationally, has compelled Uganda to review
its international interests and their influence on its national security. Uganda has thus joined the
rest of the world in fighting terrorism, particularly after it was subjected to terrorist attacks
between 1996 and 1999. It has ratified multiple international conventions and their respective
optional protocols. It has also participated in regional as well as international fights against
disease and arms proliferation and engaged in peace missions. For example, it sent peacekeepers
to Liberia in 1996. It provides operational strategic bases for UNSC peacekeeping programmes,
for example, by making available an air base for the United Nations Mission in the Democratic
403 Interview with UG/MIA 15 held in Kampala on 4 October 2004 at the conference on The Security Challenges of
Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation in Africa, held in Kampala, 2-10 October 2004.
404 Actually, Uganda has already deployed in Somalia, despite warnings from Eriteria and Ethiopia that it had done











Republic of Congo (MONUC) and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) peace
missions at Entebbe airport and other airstrips when the need arises.
Elsewhere, Uganda has established international relations with Asia, particularly with China. At a
meeting with a Chinese Deputy Director of Information General Li Zhongli, the UPDF
reiterated its interest in engaging in security locally and regionally because of its strategic role in
the region. The UPDF Commander-in-Chief stressed the UPDF's desire to upgrade the military
to match standards that were required to undertake international peace operations and to enable
the UPDF to be a stabilizing force in the region."'
From this discussion, it is evident that Uganda's commitment to regional peace and security has
been part of its broader regional peace program. Uganda's assumption that it has a strategic role
in the region and the military support it has received from the US and other states to its army
have bolstered its military ego and emphasised even further its perceived role in the region. This
perception of itself has greatly influenced its foreign policy behaviour. One feature of the
regional relations is the belief that signing protocols and agreements and setting up a regional
force and regional bodies would lead to successful mitigation of conflicts in the region, which
has proved impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, it demonstrates a willingness to employ peaceful
means to resolve conflicts and the willingness to cooperate in face of common threats to peace
in the region. Metz would argue that such willingness to cooperate is peculiar to the African
culture, which places much value on collective action through regional organisations and sharing
of problems as a region."6
Uganda's threat perceptions
At the official level, Uganda highlights nine internal and external threat categories. The three
most critical threats relate to external factors and include the threat of a "full scale invasion" by
the army of a neighbouring state or "cross-border raids" by smaller insurgency forces. Illegal
movements of people such as refugees or criminal elements that could disrupt security and
4°5 African Research Bulletin, "Uganda-China: Military Deals". in African Research Bulletin,  No 16875, November
(2006), pp 1-30.
406 For a detailed discussion on how African culture is leading towards regional security cooperation, see S. Metz,











hostile political and economic policies of other states are also included on the threat list."'
Among the potential internal threats acknowledged by government  poor governance and
political power competition, which seem more severe because they tend to disrupt the proper
function of government. Other potential threats are environmental disasters and resource
constraints that could easily affect the livelihood of the people and affect the informal and
formal economic base of the people.
Competition over natural resources at an intrastate level is highlighted too, but it manifests
mostly in ethnic conflicts over land and, more recently, in conflicts between government and the
people over exploitation of forests and other natural resources in the name of development. A
significant aspect of natural resource competition that was excluded from the threat list, although
it has already had serious consequences, is the slow but subtle conflict over water resources
(mainly with regard to the Nile), which is affecting the broader human as well as national security
of the state. Already the impact of the Nile on the generation of hydroelectric power (HEP) for
industries and domestic use is causing many disruptions. The discharge needed to produce the
HEP from the Owen Falls dam was initially regulated but has now greatly deteriorated, which
could lead to further reduction in industrial output. It has been argued that, given the current
reduction in the water levels, Uganda faces more severe threats than do any of the other Nile
riparian states, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi or even Rwanda for that matter.'
Government also highlights social polarization as a critical internal threat, which it attributes to
colonial legacy and neo-colonialism. Ironically, government does not consider common banditry,
political repression, armed insurgency and civil disobedience as critical. The White Paper does
not even include terrorism as a threat, even though this document was developed in an era when
terrorism was affecting the region. All of the above factors have in fact been disruptive and
continue to be a threat to the state as a whole, even though they are not included in the White
Paper.
These threats have been extremely problematic at both internal and external level because they
have resulted in a lack of trust between states and in the limited sharing of security information
between states. This has consequently limited interactions between states and, worst of all it has
4°7 A detailed breakdown of the threats is provided in the Uganda Government White Paper 2004.
408 R. Collins, The Nile (Virginia: Integrated Publishing Solutions, 2002), p. 158 and J. Waterbury, The Nile Basin:











compelled states to harbour each other's rebel groups as bargaining chips or security ransoms.
This issue will be discussed in the following chapters.' Because of the nature of the threats just
outlined, Uganda in its White Paper of 2004 developed a new comprehensive security policy and
strategy that addresses these threats at a regional diplomatic level, at a bilateral level, as well as at
a national level. To understand Uganda's interventionist foreign policy, it is imperative that its
interventionist episodes be examined. In the section below, Uganda's interventions in the GLR
have been summarised with a view to provide a favourable background to the discussions in the
subsequent chapters.
Uganda's interventionist episodes in the Great Lakes Region
It was discussed in the preceding section that Uganda's threat perceptions were mainly external.
These greatly determined his foreign policy formulations. In this section a brief overview of
Museveni's interventions into the neighbouring states is done. When Museveni came to power,
the interventionist foreign policy he adopted in the region was motivated by multiple factors.
From the time he came to power in 1986, those who had lost power to him challenged
Museveni's regime. While others formed rebel groups to fight his regime, others joined the
opposition with the hope that they could influence his policies. The Ugandan rebel groups that
formed used Sudan, DRC and later Rwanda as bases from which they launched their attacks on
Uganda. During this time the GLR was also characterised by dysfunctional states that had inter-
state and intra-state conflicts that put the region in a precarious situation. In reaction to this,
Uganda had to reconstruct itself and review its policies particularly the foreign policy to ensure
that it contained the situation so that it embarks on other development policies. One such
foreign policy was intervention. Uganda intervened in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC as a
means to address the GLR regional challenges.
Uganda intervened in Rwanda in October 1990 and continued through the regional initiatives to
support the peaceful resolution of the intra-ethnic conflict. Attempts at signing a power-sharing
agreement in 1993 between the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda followed suit. The rebels and
government all agreed to the establishment of a transitional government in which the two ethnic
409 In interviews with the RDC 1 and DISO 3 it was emphasised that there is a strong link between the internal and
external threats, particularly because the poor information flow between states regarding the movement of dissidents
and other non-state actors has affected the security of states, especially in neighbouring states. Similar views were












groups would share power despite the demographic imbalance. Unfortunately, the agreement
also known as the Convention of Government  did not hold. Instead, genocide broke out following
the plane crash in which President Habyarimana died in 1994. Uganda intervened again to stop
the genocide.
Ugandan's overt intervention in Burundi commenced in 1986 and became more pronounced in
1993 after the assassination of president Ndadaye. Museveni through the regional initiative
urged Barundi to stop fighting but the ethnic war ravaged on. Initiatives to resolve the conflict
in Burundi became internationalised and in 1995 the Cairo Conference co-sponsored by Jimmy
Carter was held with the express aim of establishing a regional group that would initiate the
peace process. The Arusha group was formed and entrusted with the responsibility of mediating
between the two dominate ethnic groups the Hutu and Tutsi. The Tunis Conference held in
Tunisia followed shortly and during this conference, Nyerere was appointed to head the
negotiations for the Burundi Peace process. Whilst the negotiations were on track, the former
president Pierre Buyoya of Burundi overthrew the Convention government forcing the regional
peace initiative to impose sanctions on Burundi. In 1997, the peace initiative made head way as
exemplified by the Pre-Ceasefire Agreement between Buyoya and Nyangoma the Hutu rebel. In
1998, Buyoya together with the National Assembly agreed to have an internal partnership for
peace. This marked the beginning of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha under the
auspices of Nyerere.
Uganda's intervention in the DRC started in 1996 when rebel leader then, Laurent Kabila
attacked Zaire. Uganda's intervention had been requested by Kabila when he was a rebel and
later when be became president. 41° Kabila needed military assistance to enable him bolster his
security in his vast state. Both presidents had mutually agreed that while Museveni used eastern
DRC as a base to fight Ugandan rebels that had positioned themselves in eastern DRC, Uganda
would also protect Kabila from Zairian rebels. This permission had been sealed with a Protocol
signed by both presidents in 1998. From November 1996, Uganda had suffered ADF attacks on
it its first attack from the ADF a rebel group allegedly supported by Sudan and Islamic
fundamentalists like Al Qaeda. The rebels attacked Western Uganda and continuously used the
DRC as a base from which they launched their attacks.
410 Documentary evidence puts Uganda's intervention in Zaire to 1993 when it promoted low intensity conflict at
the border areas with Zaire. In this study 1996 is the working date for the discussions but that archival materials has











In a series of attacks that followed ADF were able to abduct, kill and maim Ugandans. In
reaction, Uganda sent in its troops to control the DRC government installations, such as airports,
airfields and big towns in eastern DRC. The rationale for this was that Uganda had to ensure that
all the multiple supply lines were blocked, destroyed or under regulare survelliance. The
intervention in DRC in 1998 had been agreed upon between Kabila and Museveni as well as the
third president of Rwanda Kagame. However, following disagreements between presidents
Kabila and Museveni and Kagame, a full war broke out between Uganda and Rwanda on one
side against the DRC that had been an ally. This war that ravaged on for four years drew in many
other states either in support of the DRC or on the side of Uganda and Rwanda. In the next
chapter, an analysis of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy will done drawing on four main
theoretical frameworks, Constructivism, Poliheurism, Utilitarian Liberal policy and the Security
Dilemma. See Appendix A the chronicle for a detailed breakdown of the interventions and
attempts at resolving them in all the states where Uganda intervened.
4.4 Summary
The aim of the foregoing discussion was threefold. The first aim was to give a brief history of
Uganda's political development from colonial rule to the postcolonial era. The second aim was to
examine Uganda's security framework and its operation, and the last was to discuss Uganda's
security interests in the wider regional framework. What emerges from the history is Uganda's
regional division, which exacerbates the ethnic differences that have characterised Uganda's
political development. The power shifts between the Northerners and the Southerner have had a
serious impact on the security of the state and are to blame for the longest civil war in the region,
viz. the so-called "Northern Question". The chapter has also shown how Uganda's entire
security structural framework is characterised by strong presidential and high military personal
influence in decision-making on security related issues. Whilst the Constitution is explicit on
procedural matters concerning the army and decision-making on matters of national security, it is
evident that this legalistic approach is not often used in reality. Even when the Constitution
allows the UPDF not to follow the decisions of the presidency, the actual practise is that they do.
They believe the President is above the Constitution when it comes to the army's activities, and
furthermore believe that they are responsible only to the President. In fact, there is lack of a clear
policy on how communication flows from one section to the other, and many of the operations











set up in such a way as to encourage a concentration of power at the top. Uganda's success in
addressing the threats highlighted above would therefore depend greatly on a clear command
structure through all the ranks, and an explicit operational structure on the ground. The chapter
has described a security framework that is highly centralised, which is common to many
revolutionary governments. It has also demonstrated demonstrates how Uganda's high regard in
regional and international security matters has shaped its perceptions of itself. Uganda regards
itself as of strategic importance to the GLR region as a whole. It is evident from this chapter
that, much as Uganda has an important role to play in the region's geopolitics, it is equally
vulnerable because of the anarchic regional environment. The chapter has also provided an
overview of the interventions undertaken by Uganda in the GLR. In the next chapters, an
examination of Uganda's interventions will be done with a view to establishing a comprehensive
theoretical explanation of its interventionist foreign policy.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided the basis for drawing some general conclusions about Uganda's
security sector framework The security sector under the Museveni administration (compared to
all the leaders before him) demonstrates quite literally (from the organogram) a highly organised
and well structured security sector with an implicit smooth flow of information, vertical decision
making structures, and decisions that are made after proper consultation. In reality, though,
decision-making does not seem to be that systematic and in fact it is highly personalised. From
the views expressed by the interviewees, it is evident that procurement of military materials is
done in an adhoc manner, which would be representative of other policy decisions across the
board. Based on its declared foreign policy, however, Uganda under the Museveni administration
perceives itself as having a regional role to play and to be committed to cooperation with other












CONSTRUCTIVISM : NORMS AND TRENDS IN INTERVENTION
If the neighbour's house catches fire, the fire can spread also to your own house;
if there is fire  in the next house you get out and see what is happening... 411
[I] don't accept Western guarantees. The people of African  must guarantee their
owen future 412
5.0 Introduction
In this chapter, Uganda's motives for intervening in its neighbouring states are analysed.
Drawing on the constructivist framework the study aims at answering three critical questions.
Was Uganda's interventionist foreign policy part of an emerging trend of interventionism in
Africa? Did Uganda intervene in its western neighbouring states for altruistic reasons? To what
extent could we argue that Uganda's interventions were aimed at gaining a hegemonic position in
the GLR region? Constructivism is presented as an alternative approach to the dominant
traditional approaches of Liberalism and Realism in explaining international relations.
The chapter first discusses Constructivism and its application to intervention. In the following
section, specific interventions that conform to Constructivism are discussed to demonstrate the
relevance of the attributes of Constructivism in explaining intervention. This is followed by a
discussion of the relevance of Constructivism as an approach to studying intervention in the
Great Lakes Region (GLR). The central argument of this chapter is that leaders intervene in the
affairs of other states because this has emerged as an acceptable route: as was explained in the
previous chapters, norms and culture have emerged in the post-Cold War era, which have led to
intervention becoming a common feature of the international system. More specifically, it is
argued that, in the GLR, Uganda's intervention are part of the norm that has been set, firstly by
the challenges of the international system and secondly, by the demands of the region. it is
argued that Uganda's motives were part of a general trend emerging in Africa, in terms of which
states feel obliged to intervene to prevent humanitarian disaster and ensure that peace prevails in
the region as a whole. Of course, the focus on humanitarian considerations as motives of
411 Museveni's address to the Sixth Parliament on 16 September 1998, Hansard, p. 4907.
412 President Museveni's statement at the National Mourning Ceremony of Dr John Garang, the SPLA leader at











intervention is inconsistent with the dominant theories like Realism, which focus on the
centrality of national security in explaining interventions, or the Utilitarian Liberal view, which
interpret every intervention in economic terms.
5.1 Constructivism and Intervention
Constructivism advances norms, identity and culture as the three salient variables that influence
the foreign policy behaviour of states. Firstly, constructivists attribute state behaviour to the
social nature of international politics, which creates a normative understanding among state
actors that they should behave in a certain way, particularly when conditions such as genocide,
environmental disaster or violent conflict emerge to threaten humanity. In essence,
constructivists argue that what states do in international relations, the interests they hold and the
structure within which they operate are all defined by social norms and ideas rather than by
objective or material conditions!' In other words, states have a social role to play towards each
other; therefore, they are permitted to intervene in each other's affairs to address a precarious
situation. This kind of responsibility assigned to states translates into a norm that they adhere to
at given times and in specific conditions. The constructivist approach further posits that norms
operate within well-defined acceptable parameters; these state explicitly who the actors should be
(in this case, the state remains the key actor although constructivists also acknowledge that
international organisations and the "international community" are actors too) and what these
actors should and should not do under specific circumstances.
The second perspective advanced is the salience of identity and culture in international relations
rather than material considerations like power and economic considerations. It is argued that
states project themselves in ways that are distinct and assign themselves roles that become
identified with them. The states assume that their identity, particularly referring to the way they
carry out activities, is distinct and therefore presume they have special roles or responsibilities
that are uniquely assigned to them by the international system!' As earlier noted, states believe
that their actions (as prescribed by their identity) are publicly understood standards for action
that help address particular situations in a generally upon agreed way!' Lastly, they argue that,
413 S . J. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism", in International Studies Review,  Vol 5 (2003), p. 326.













actors attach meaning to their identities, practices and interactions' which emerge into a culture.
They try to adhere to this culture and behave in a way that is mutually acceptable to each other. 417
Constructivists' central thesis is that security of states should be understood from cultural and
institutional rather than material considerations like economic and power interests. When states
intervene in others, therefore, it is argued that they are motivated by considerations of national
security and because the culture and norm that is characteristic of their environment or peculiar
to them as individual actors compels them to. They argue that states will intervene in others
because they have assigned themselves roles to be custodians of security on behalf of others
implying that they can intervene in others' states with the intention of solving an outstanding
problem.
Whereas the constructivists like realists acknowledge the centrality of national security
considerations, their perspective is inconsistent with the realist claim that attributes motivations
of interventions to the anarchic nature of the world, which increases spirals of hostility among
states and result into war. On the contrary, they argue that states' behaviour that results in
insecurity of others or their own states is a result of those states' social practices that reproduce
egoistic and militaristic mind-sets. 418 In relation to intervention, therefore, states will intervene in
situations where social practices of states have produced precarious situations for humanity.
Therefore, they perceive themselves as having an obligation to intervene because the social
structure of the international system expects them to and the conditions of the target states
warrant intervention. In summary, the constructivist approach to interpreting interventionist
foreign policies of states is relevant to the African situation. The approach clearly demonstrates
how norms develop within regions or individual states and the identities these actors develop
over time. The trend of interventionism that has emerged in the region could be attributed to
these developments.
5.2 New African Philosophy
Uganda intervened in Rwanda from 1990 up to 1995 when municipal, parliamentary and
presidential elections were held in which President Kagame became the president. It intervened
416 K. Fierke, "Critical Methodology and Constructivism" p.122
417 R. L . Jepperson, A. Wendt and P. J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security" p. 41
418 For a detailed view on what the constructivists view as a realist's weakness, see D. Copeland, "The Constructivist











in Burundi starting in 1986 but more markedly in 1993 following the assassination of the first
democratically-elected Hutu President Ndadaye and 1996 when it called for sanctions against
President Buyoya. The intervention continued up to 2005 when the second democratically-
elected Hutu President Pierre Nkrunzinza took power. Similarly archival records indicate that
Uganda's intervention in the DRC and DRC incursions in Uganda started in 1993, but the
general literature has put the intervention as starting in 1996 and continuing through to 2003
when it officially withdrew from the areas it controlled in Eastern DRC. 419
In the three states -- Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC Uganda's motives for intervention were
similar in some aspects, while in others they were specific to the particular intervenee. One
common feature of all these interventions is the fact that they were motivated by the prevailing
norm in which states were intervening in others to addresses certain issues. A trend emerged in
the Post Cold War era in which Africa issues were no longer of primary importance to the
superpowers. The international community ignored the conflicts that had ensued between states
or within states. Because Africa was no longer on the priority list of the European powers, the
US or the international community in general, this resulted in an undertaking by African states to
address their own problems. This new undertaking, popularly referred as the "New African
Philosophy", marked the beginning of an African approach to their problems. This new
philosophy has translated into a culture and a norm that African states and regional groupings
have embraced to address their concerns in the region.
Uganda's interventions have been broadly attributed to its centrality in this new philosophy and
the identity it has constructed for itself within the region as a whole. Some interviewees argued
that Museveni's interventionist foreign policy must be seen from his commitment to the new
philosophy of African solutions to African problems. One respondent argued as follows,
Museveni's leadership  was visible in Africa and the GLR. He was wry crucial and extremely
positive about conflict resolution involving  Africans 'who best knew what was  best for them. He had
not only mediated in Burundi but had been instrumental  in Somalia and Sudan. Uganda's
interventions had a lot to do with Musereni's  personality because Uganda could haw had a
president who feels that it was not wise to invoke the state in conflicts in neighbouring states.
Museveni, on the other hang hadd been extremely positive about conflict resolution in the legion.'"
419 For a chronological review of key events in the GLR regional relations, see the chronicle appended as A.











The fact that Museveni was the "first guerrilla" to overthrow a sitting government and that he
brought "peace" to the country, was seen as one of the success stories of this new African
philosophy of African leaders solving African problems. Museveni also demonstrated, albeit
through protracted guerrilla warfare [which is not exactly a nice way of solving problems] that he
was capable of resolving Uganda's political crisis and stopping massive human rights violations.
In addition, he led Uganda to significant economic growth when it subscribed to the Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that were advocated by the IMF and World Bank for developing
nations. These achievements led to Uganda becoming a model against which other states were
measured to establish whether the SAPs were viable. It has been reported that Museveni's
Structural Adjustment Programs have performed remarkably well. Growth averaged 7% between
1986 and 1996, reaching as high as 11.2% in 1996. Inflation had been brought into the single
digits and, in 1996, it stood at 5 to 7%, having decreased from more than 200% in the pervious
years. The per capita gross domestic product had approached an all-time high at $290, regaining
ground lost during the 1970s. 421 Museveni had demonstrated a capacity to deal with crises and to
bring about peace. His achievements in restoring order in Uganda came to be associated with
what was referred to as the "New Breed" of African Leaders, and he was often regarded as the
new "beacon of hope" by the US. 422
Museveni's innumerable achievements in the political arena compelled him to intervene in other
states, ostensibly to share his experience with them and to assist other states to deal with civil
wars in their liberation struggles.'" His commitment to the new philosophy of "African solutions
to African problems" boosted his ego and, as his protege Kagame described him, Museveni was
overwhelmed by his importance in the region and felt that he had to be part of all geopolitical
events!' He was at the helm of finding viable strategies that would lead to stability in the GLR
421 M. 
Lofchie,
 "Structural Adjustment in Uganda", http://members.aol.com/apuuli/sapuga.htm,  accessed on 20
June 2006. See also, "Trade & Development Center, International Development Network 1997".
http://www.itd.org/ and "Uganda Investment Authority, 1997", http://www.uganda.co.ug/Invest.htm,  accessed
on 20 June 2006.
422 M. Ottaway, Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction,  (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1999). Y. Bangura has called them "master regional strategists and visionaries" in his
"Comments on Regional Security and the War in Congo", in M. Baregu (ed), Crisis in the DRC, (SARIPS Series 3:
SAPES Trust, Harare, 1999), p. 12.
423 Interview with Burundi embassy official 2 held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura. There was significant
unanimity among the interviewees that Museveni believed that he understood the problems of Africa better and was
convinced he knew how best to solve them.
424 Kagame believed that Museveni elevated himself too much and argued that, "Museveni assumed that he knows
everything about everything, every time... " See Appendix 8 for Kagame's position regarding Museveni's position in












region in particular and in Africa in general, especially through his contribution to the general
debate on peace and good governance in Africa."' His guerrilla warfare style and tactics were
copied by other African rebel leaders and neighbouring states dissidents with mixed results.
Leaders like Kagame, Zenawi and Kabila also used Museveni's methods to come to power. A
new perspective emerged amongst these leaders with regard to how Africa would solve its
problems. They all subscribed to the view that Africa had the capacity to solve its own problems
rather than having to rely on European states / on the West to solve them. In the next section,
Uganda's interventions in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are discussed.
In Burundi, Museveni engaged with Burundi as early as 1986 when he came to power. His overt
intervention in the ethnic conflict was in 1993 when the first democratically elected Hutu
President Ndadaye was assassinated. He premised his intervention on the basis that he
understood the ethnic conflict better than the existing political leadership and that he could use
his experience in dealing with both ethnic groups to arrive at an acceptable solution. Firstly, he
insisted that a diplomatic rather than military approach be used to resolve this conflict, as Kenya
had suggested. Diplomatic means would greatly reduce the possibility of continued violence in
the region.' Secondly, those involved in the negotiations were originally opposed to Buyoya's
participation in the process, but Museveni warned against his exclusion. He argued that Buyoya
was invaluable for the Burundi peace process and that he had to be included if peace had to
hold.' He further argued that Buyoya had been in control for such a long time, that he could
not easily be ignored without dire results.' Buyoya's supporters included many royalists and
those in charge of the army. Whereas Buyoya was feared and hated by the Hutu as well as by his
own ethnic tribe, the Tutsi, he nonetheless commandeered power and had a section of Hutu
who revered him.' It is against this background of Buyoya's strength and powerful influence in
the political system that Museveni insisted on the use of diplomacy to resolve the ethnic struggle
for power in order to prevent an impending genocide. This intervention eventually yielded
positive results.
425 He was chair to the Kampala Document, which says that peace is sustainable if democracy is practiced. The
forum convened in Kampala on the 19-22 May 1991. The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security,
Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was an initiative of the African Leadership Forum, which is
comprised of former heads of state and prominent Africans from many countries.
426 Interview with UG/FA 4 held on 18 December 2005 at Kampala, Ministry office.
427 In an explanation of Museveni's position on Burundi by a UG/FA 4, who argued that Museveni had carefully
outlined the issue of Buyoya to the members of the negotiation team during the proceedings of the negotiations.













In 1996, three years later however, when Buyoya overthrew the "Convention Government" that
had been put in place by the GLR states earlier negotiations, Museveni requested that the GLR
impose sanctions on Buyoya. Museveni's rationale for the sanctions was three-fold. Firstly,
Buyoya had contravened the principle of peace to which the GLR subscribed. Secondly, the
sanctions would prevent the genocide that had allegedly been planned by either ethnic group to
annihilate each other. Lastly, the sanctions would force the Buyoya government, the opposition
parties, and all insurgent groups to return to the negotiations that Buyoya's coup had interrupted.
The sanctions were accordingly instituted on 31 June 1996 by the rest of the GLR states.
This decision to impose sanctions on Burundi (referred to as a "tactic" by interviewees!) did not
only earn Museveni respect from the rebel groups and political parties, but also ensured that the
warring factions gained confidence in the peace process. This was because the Tutsi, who had
hoped that Museveni would favour them in the peace negotiations, were disappointed with his
impartiality and shocked that he would treat Buyoya (a Tutsi), with whom Museveni had ethnic
affmity, as if he were a "Hutu". 4" The sanctions forced Buyoya and Leonard Nyangoma, a Hutu
rebel leader, to return to the negotiations. Thereafter, a pre-cease-fire agreement was signed, in
which they agreed to an Internal Partnership for Peace.' Nyerere was chosen by the GLR
initiative to head the peace negotiations, which would be held in Arusha. The selection of
Nyerere was not acceptable to some Tutsi who feared that Nyerere would be partial and favour
the Hutu. Nevertheless, the negotiations commenced. Some Tutsi protagonists involved in the
negotiations insisted that Nyerere was biased and initially refused to participate in the talks. It
was fortunate for these groups, then, that Nyerere's illness required a new head to replace him.
At first, President Mandela of South Africa was his replacement, but he was in turn replaced by
South Africa's Vice-President Jacob Zuma, also for health reasons.
The success of the peace process marked by the completion of the Burundi Arusha Peace
Agreement in 2004, and the subsequent transition to democracy following the elections held in
430 The interviewees in Burundi were convinced that Museveni being a "Hima ", an ethnic category that is close to
the Tutsi, would side with the Tutsi, and even when the Tutsi held a wrong position he should have simply
supported them because they were Tutsi.
431Historical  facts to fill the gaps of the interviewees on Burundi were drawn from a first-hand report by Fabienne
Hara. See a detailed account of the role of non governmental organisations as third party mediators in F. Hara,
"Burundi: A Case for Parallel Diplomacy", in Crocker, C., Hampson, F. 0. and Aall, P., Herding Cats: Multiparty











2005 has been attributed to Museveni's role in the negotiations. Burundian respondents argued
that, without Museveni at the negotiation table, no one would have been able to convince the
Tutsi and Hutu to share political power and to sign the Arusha Peace Agreement.' Also,
because many of the Burundi rebel groups respected him, Museveni used this to get them to
accept the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement, which they had previously refused to endorse.
In the end, he succeeded in convincing nineteen rebel groups and political parties to sign the
peace agreement. These included National Council for the Defence of Democracy/ Front for
the Defence of Democracy (CNDD/FDD), which was the strongest opposition to the
Ndayizeyi government. Others included Rally for Democracy, Economic and Social
Development (RADESH), National Liberation Front (FROLINA), National Liberation Froces-
Icanzo (FNL-Icanzo), Palipe-Agakiza, Party of National Recovery (PARENA), Movement for
the Rehabilitation of Citizens (MRC), Union for National Congress (UPRONA), Front for
Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), and MSP-Inkinzo parties!" They signed the global peace
agreement in spite of their reservations.' Museveni was able to convince all the warring parties
to settle for an ethnic distribution in the army of 50% Tutsi/50%  Hutu in order to prevent
genocide and to ensure sustainable peace.' He also made them appreciate the fact that peace is
indivisible, in the sense that one ethnic group cannot obtain peace if another does not have it
He argued that it was thus incumbent upon them to embrace the peace process and develop
their state. Museveni's success was attributed to his diplomacy, cultural connections, and
transnational links. One political party leader argued that:
Museveni it was very big role because I cart tell you tun for that signature all big presidents  of this
area and the world like Clinton etc was there. It was wry hard to get the signatories of our political
groups. And I am tell you that; it's Museveni and Kagame who solved  the problem probably
because zee are ah ... Uganda even  zee do not have a border with Uganda something is there which
can be... eh... it's like that zee are brothers, zee are not eh... you know historically, I think, some
Burundi people Walt to Uganda and we  have many things together in terms of culture and behaviour
and then as zee are like Rwanda . Rwandans is in Uganda and Uganda cannot be happy getting
Rwanda stable and Burundi  in war. So in terms of sub-region Uganda has a wry big Aux and I
432 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 4 held on the 29 October 2005 at Bujumbura.
433 See Appendix 9 for the table of some of the political parties in Burundi that engaged in the peace negotiations.
Some had military wings, while others did not. This enabled an easier approach and negotiations because those that
did not have military wings had no force to fall back on and so were forced to accept the settlements.
434 Burundi Opposition respondents insist that the final Arusha Peace Agreement they signed was not the working
document that they had originally debated. They demanded that issues that had not been included in the final
document be addressed, and signed with that understanding. Apparently, these issues have not been included in the
implementation and have become a central point of concern.
433 Ibid.
436 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 1 held in Kampala on 29 July 2005 and 10 August 2005. Similar views were











think Museveni knows that and was obliged in teens of funds , in terms of cooperation because  in
this years you cannot be alone even you think you area big country ... 437
Some of the Tutsi interviewees were vehemently opposed to Museveni's 'handing over power to
the Hutu', as they referred to it. One interviewee had this to say:
Muserenisupported th  peace process but did not fulfilthe requirem nt of the peace process i.e. that
investigations be done to establish who killed Ndadaye and ensure that any person responsible for
genocide in 1993 and thereafter was  not given political poser. He favoured Hutu against the Tutsi,
because Hutu is majority and they call that democracy... democracy  is different from  ethnicity...
The person who made this statement was clearly oblivious of what Museveni had done, namely,
to insist on sanctions against Buyoya, a 'fellow Tutsi',439 and that this position was indicative of
his commitment to the peace process. The claim that Museveni's negotiation team had not set up
a full inquiry into Ndadaye's assassination, which would bring the culprits to book and prevent
them from gaining power in the new government, was equally baseless. Another interviewee
argued that those who assassinated President Ndadaye were Tutsi, and that the Tutsi's
conspiracy theory that was designed to convince the world that the radical Hutu had stage-
managed the assassination so that the Tutsi would be blamed for it, was not true.' The
interviewee further argued that denying the culprits (if they were identified) political power was
immaterial at the time, since both the Hutu and the Tutsi were implicated in the assassination.
An inquiry into the assassination would not only have stalled the peace process, but would also
have undercut any achievements that the peace initiative team had made."' Furthermore, the
claim that Museveni had supported the Hutu against the Tutsi was also unfounded because of
his fundamental argument that peace could not be achieved on divisive ethnic lines 
442
 Museveni
had insisted throughout that, if peace were to come to Burundi, it would only last if the two
437 Interview held in Bujumbura UG/FA/BU 4 on 27 and 28 October 2005 with a former political party leader
currently working for government. The interviewee's political party did not get any seat in the new Burundian
government, yet he still cherished the role that Museveni as an individual played. He was a little disgruntled that
Museveni had not helped them (Tutsi) parties in the negotiations but appreciated the position that Museveni was in.
438 Interview with UG/FA/BU 3 held on 27 October 2005, in Bujumbura.
439 
There is a general view in Uganda that Museveni is a tutsi and so is expected to support tutsi wherever they
are.
44° Interview with UG/FA 4 held on 18 December 2005, in Kampala.
441 Ibid.
442 Some Burundi Tutsi interviewed were convinced that Museveni had sided with the Hutu because of the falling
out of the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda with Museveni. He no longer trusted the Tutsi. However, Uganda officials
involved in the negotiations and Burundi's chief negotiator insisted that Museveni in Burundi was impartial and
believed that what was good for the Tutsi was good for the Hutu, so the Tutsi insistence to continue dominating











dominant ethnic groups accepted that they had to work together. This position has since yielded
positive results, although it is still too early to judge the success of the peace process and the
commitment to the new government. In steering the Burundi peace negotiations up to their
positive completion, Museveni was inadvertently assigning himself a role of arbiter, negotiator
and peacemaker in the region.' With regard to Uganda's role in ending the Burundi conflicht, it
should be noted, though, that other actors (i.e. regional leaders, non-governmental organisations
and faith-based organisations) were also part of the diplomatic negotiations. Their role was
crucial, although an analysis of their contribution is beyond the scope of this study.
In Rwanda, unlike in Burundi, Uganda's initial intervention was covert and in support of the
Rwandan Tutsi rebels who had invaded Rwanda in 1990 using Uganda as a military base.
Museveni feigned ignorance of the initial attack that the RPF had launched on Rwanda's Hutu
dominated government and insisted that he did not support the attack: in his address to
Parliament he argued as follows:
Earlier on, I was telling you that our involvement  with the problems of the Great Lakes Region
started with Rwanda. 4,000 young Rwandese  who had been part of our army, again contrary  to my
advice - because I tried to advice them not to go into Rwanda to fight - escaped and attacked the
Late Habyarimana's Government. They escaped  I repeat “-escaped"... 444
Of course, Museveni's claim has been contested and, in fact, it becomes more impossible to
believe because the defence structure is such an extremely closed system that it would be
implausible that such an invasion could have happened without his knowledge. And yet,
considering that the Rwandan Tutsi were in charge of the intelligence system, it is also entirely
plausible that they could have planned strategically to attack Rwanda on 1 October 1990, when
President Museveni was away on a visit to Norway.
This not withstanding, there are indications that Museveni engaged in diplomatic talks with
President Habyarimana negotiating the possible return of the Tutsi prior to this invasion of 1994.
443 Elsewhere in Africa, Uganda was involved in the peace negotiations of Sudan between Al Bashir's government
and the SPLA's Garang. He seems to have been critical to the signing of peace agreements because in his eulogy to
Garanga on 5 August 2005 he highlighted how he had been asked to persuade Garanga to sign the agreement. He
recounts that Danforth, the representative of President of the US George Bush to the negotiations, had called
Museveni to report Garanga's uncompromising position. Museveni recalled that he spoke to both Garanga and
Danforth and realised that Garanga was right in refusing to sign the agreement. Museveni states that he asked
President George Bush to instruct his group to stop pressuring Garang. A complete transcript of this eulogy is
available on request.











In the abovementioned address to Parliament, Museveni further indicated that the Ugandan
government had adopted a dual position. Firstly, Museveni negotiated for the return of the
Rwandan Tutsi to Rwanda and a political settlement in which the Tutsi would be allowed to hold
power. Secondly, the Ugandan government assisted the Tutsi materially so that they could defeat
the Rwandan government troops militarily. A military defeat of the Tutsi would have
necessitated their return to Uganda, which would in turn have caused problems for Uganda."'
Uganda took part in further negotiations initiated by the GLR leaders. These diplomatic
negotiations sought to resolve the citizenship issue in terms of which the Tutsi would be allowed
to return to Rwanda and to have their citizenship rights as Rwandans recognized. The
negotiations led to the 1992 agreement at N'Sele, in which it was agreed that the Rwanda
government would look into the return of the Rwandan Tutsi. Subsequent negotiations were
held in Dar es Salaam in August 1993 at which the Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed:
This aimed to restore the respect for human rights of the Tutsi within Rwanda, as well as to
address demands of political power sharing. It had also been agreed in principle in the Accord
that the RPF troops be integrated in the Rwandan army. However, this agreement was breached
by Habyarimana in 1993, and at a follow-up negotiation in which the GLR condemned
Habyarimana for violating the agreement, Habyarimana died in a plane crash on his way from
the meeting. Unlike the Burundi negotiations, the Rwandan diplomatic interventions did not
yield the desired goals. The conflict in Rwanda soon became intractable and deteriorated into
genocide. As a result, Uganda had to intervene to stop the genocide, which it did in 1994 in April
right up to 1995 when the UN presisidential, parliamentary and municipal elections were held.
The DRC case was even more problematic than the situations in Burundi and Rwanda discussed
above. Following the success of the RPF in taking power in Rwanda and the Interahamwe
fleeing to Zaire, where they opened bases in refugee camps, from which they attacked Rwanda,
Uganda had to intervene to protect the populace that was at the centre of the war between the
RPF and the Interahamwe genocidaires, who were being assisted by the Zairian forces. Whereas
Uganda's intervention was aimed at resolving the problems of the DRC, in this case, Uganda had
been part of the "problem", i.e. it had supported the ADFL attack on Mobutu's government as
argued by an OAU representative."' Its intervention thus could not be seen from a better
445 Ibid.











perspective. Uganda's efforts to bring warring factions in the DRC together did not yield positive
results. Nevertheless, by means of several summits and conferences, Uganda did try to engage
the various groups in negotiations.
Critics of this diplomatic ploy to resolve the conflict in the DRC have pointed to Museveni's
failure to do the same in his own state, particularly with his own rebel groups. The critics
underestimated Museveni's diplomatic initiative in the DRC because they argued that he had
ulterior motives of intervening in the first place. Regardless of this view, it should be noted that
the success of negotiations depends on many factors and Uganda's case illucidiates this best.
Firstly, the parties must agree to come to the table to negotiate. In the case of Uganda's rebels,
their willingness to engage in dialogue with government depended significantly on their ability to
survive. Those that were severely strained by the guerrilla warfare decided to give up fighting and
returned to negotiate. In fact, evidence from the field indicates that Museveni did engage the
rebels in talks and persuaded them to give up insurgency and return to Uganda. Some did and
have since settled. One ex-rebel had this to say,
Governmentsent a lett r to us saying that UNRF 2 come dozen and zee negotiate that is how zee
came down to negotiate but zee did not surrender. We were  called for a dialogue after realising that
there wets a mistake and the mistake has already been given that is why zee hawe come to settle. And
our settlement now is a permanent  resettle."'
This is evidence of government's initiative to dialogue with rebels. New developments since 2004
have demonstrated that Museveni is currently engaged in negotiations with the dominant rebel
group, the LRA. With the multiparty mediation, the LRA and the Museveni administration seem
to be heading for an end to the insurgency.
In addition to the above scenarios, the Museveni administration has not only engaged in
diplomatic interventions (e.g. in Burundi and Rwanda), but it has also engaged in humanitarian
interventions, as is discussed in the following section.
Congo", (DRC): "The Role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense
and Security", Paper presented to the Workshop on Congo, (Harare: SAPES TRUST, 1998).












The nature of international politics of the time 1990-2006 greatly influenced the nature of
Museveni's interventions. It is vital to examine the timings of Museveni's interventions at this
point. The first decade of the post-Cold War Africa, 1990-2000, was replete with unilateral and
multilateral interventions and counter-interventions in many Afriacn states. Intervention, as has
been pointed out in previous chapters of this thesis, was a kind of "norm ' that had emerged in
the post-Cold War era, permitting states to intervene in other states for reasons ranging from the
humanitarian to the political. The latter ranged from overthrowing sitting governments to
protecting authoritarian regimes that were on the verge of collapse or ousted by insurgent
groups. An updated version of Lewitt's intervention matrix is instructive here. The updated
version of the matrix can be found in Chapter Two (page 38).
African interventions reflected in the matrix are an indication of the increased interventions in
the decade of 1990-2000 and indicative of the fact that interventions are regarded as an
acceptable means of solving problems, even though some of them have obviously violated
international law. Interventions that did not violate international law were those spearheaded by
African regional organisations. These included: the Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau;
the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in
Central African Republic; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in
Lesotho and the DRC, following the UN Charter. The UN Charter Article 52(1) stipulates that
nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as are
appropriate for regional action if such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent
with the purposes of the UN. It is also stipulated in the UN Charter Article 52(3) that the
Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through
such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states
concerned or by reference from the Security Council. Also in Article 53(1), it is emphasised
448 The use of 'norm' here presupposes that states act out of their perception of what is expected of them when
grave danger, such as genocide, occurs. States intervene, for example, to prevent a death-threatening situation, and
are forced to deploy militarily in contravention of international law with the express aim of saving people's lives.
States also base their legitimacy in undertaking these kinds of interventions from "international customary law",
which recognises these interventions as driven by states values and respect for life.











further that the Security Council shall, "... where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements
or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. However, no enforcement action shall be
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state.... ”450
It could be argued, though, that Uganda's unilateral interventions that did not get an express
mandate from the UN, as in the Rwandan and DRC cases, obtained their legitimacy from the
customary international law. Uganda's mainstream argument when it defends itself in the
international community is that its interventions in the GLR neighbouring states were motivated
by humanitarian considerations, which were conditioned by the anarchic nature of the GLR. In
the decade 1990-2000, there were nineteen interventions in Africa, with Uganda having the
highest numbers of interventions and the biggest number of years of involvement with the
intervene states. It can be argued from this statistic, that Uganda has assigned itself a role of
"policeman in the region". The increased intervention of African states in each other's affairs
demonstrates that the concept of regional collective security in Africa has changed and that it is
continuing to evolve. Interventions are African states' attempts to solve the region's
humanitarian problems.
In this case, Uganda's interventionist foreign policy has much to do with the timing of the
intervention in relation to the international community's reaction to what was happening in the
GLR in general. This is what Smith and Hay' have called the Cable News Network (CNN)
effect. Uganda was compelled to intervene because of the genocide in Burundi and Rwanda, the
violent ethnic clashes between the Bahema and Balendu 452 in the Eastern DRC, and the intra-
ethnic clashes in the DRC, particularly among the Banyamulenge and indigenous communities
around them. Since Uganda was the nearest neighbour in all of these cases, it had to help rescue
450 The United Nations Charter.
451 In their analysis of the motivations that drive interventions, Smith and Hay argue that, in some cases, states do
not intervene because they are oblivious to international law or have ulterior motives, but because the media
projects the states experiencing conflict as being in a very grievous situation, which forces other states to intervene
to stop these situations. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the media in enhancing the likelihood of
intervention, see G. Smith and J. Hay, "Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire", in Crocker, C., Oster, H., Aall, P.
(eds), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, (United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C,
1999), pp. 102-
452 The Bahema and Balendu ethnic clashes have not been regarded as genocide even though over 300,000 people
were reportedly killed in one year. A detailed discussion of Uganda's intervention in the Bahema and Balendu ethnic
conflict is done by C. Karungi and D. Rupinyi, "Chauvinistic Ethnonationalism in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: A Regional Dimension" in Mukwaya, K. (ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger: Security and the Wars in











the local populations faced with genocide and ensure that the spill over effects of these mass
ethnic violent reactions were contained. Museveni has argued that, although he is aware that
international law prohibits states from interfering in each other's affairs, he is opposed to such a
law if governments evoke it as a means to annihilate a population. In his defence of his
intervention in Burundi, he said:
[I] would like however, , to clarify to the Ugandans that in my opinion, internal affairs should not he
interferedwith, I agree. Intern l affairs should he kfi to the people themselvesBut th se internal
affairs which cannot he interfered with cannot include genocide. You haw no right to commit
genocide and say, that this is internal affairs. This is not acceptable .
This is why zee have not accepted the regime  of Burundi. The regime of Burundi has been using this
argument that, "this is internal affairs. We can kill Hutus as zee like". No zany. We are not going
to allow it. If it is near here where I can walk, certainly, you are not going to do it. If it is far where
you need planes, I may not reach there. But here, zee shall he there-where  they are Dying to
exterminate people, zee shall he them... 453
My appeal to the NRM is that all sane human beings and NRM should support intervention ,
Stop genocide, g‘ necessary. That is why zee are intervening against Burundi; We are putting sanctions
on Burundi because of the threat of genocide... If the neighbour's  house catches fire, the fire can
spread also to your own house; if thew is fire in the next house, you get out and see what  is
happen* .454
Uganda's intervention should also be seen as part of the broader role that the UNSC has given to
regional groups to complement it in its peace initiatives."' Its willingness to intervene and the
timing of some of its interventions in the region have coincided with UNSC Resolution 1078456 .
This Resolution had called upon member states to prepare for a possible military intervention,
because the regime in charge of the genocide, which had escaped Rwanda, was returning to the
camps and invading Rwanda by using the DRC as a base. Uganda's intervention was furthermore
part of the tacit policy that the GLR followed, which was for African states to find their own
solutions to their problems. The underlying notion of the GLR initiative in Burundi was
premised on the grounds that Africans should champion conflict resolution because they are
453 Note the emphasis on the person.
454 In Museveni's address to the Sixth Parliament on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard,  p. 4907.
455 See Kofi Annan's "The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in
Africa", Secretary General's report to the UNSC, April 1998.
456 Security Council Resolution 1078 on the situation in the GLR called upon the OAU states of the region and
other international organisations to examine how they would contribute to and complement efforts undertaken by
the UN to defuse tenstion in the region, in particular in Eastern Zaire. This Resolution was adopted by the Security
Council at its 3710th meeting on 9 November 1996. See Security Council resolution 1078 (1996) on the situation in












more conversant with the problem. A Burundian's view of this approach supports this position.
He stated:
[W]ell there is an opinion or strong opinion in the African leadership of today that Africans must
be involved in conflict resolution in Africa. And this was said in Arusha by Ugandans, South
Africans, by Tanzanians, by everybody  and I think it's a new philosophy which is very good'
The strength of African involvement in the peace process lay in the fact that Africans would be
better able to understand their complex histories and, therefore, would be better brokers of any
peace deals. Evidence in earlier interventions had indicated that, when foreigners intervened, the
cases became more complex and conflicts became intractable. In the African Leadership Forum,
the African states realised that they had a significant role to play in resolving conflicts in Africa.
They thus resolved to set up a mechanism for mediation, conciliation, and arbitration in the
Security Calabash of the Kampala Document of 1991, which was urgently required to prevent
conflicts and disputes from escalating into armed hostilities. The Burundi conflict was the first
beneficiary of this enterprise.
In the absence of permission from the UNSC or a mandate to undertake an intervention, states
still have recourse to use customary international law. It could be argued that, whereas Uganda
did not work under any regional group, it intervened because it had an international obligation or
responsibility to stop genocide and address the humanitarian crisis that had emerged from the
genocide in Rwanda and the massacres amongst the Hema and Lendu of the DRC. Like
interventions elsewhere in Kosovo and Somalia, Uganda's intervention in its neighbouring states
was part of its regional contribution to contain disastrous consequences of inter-state and intra-
state political problems on the region. As Museveni stated above, it was part of African culture
to be respond to one's neighbour's problems: "If the neighbour's house catches fire, the fire can spread
also to your own  house; if there  is fire in the next house you get out and see what is happening... " As Bellamy
notes, and as has been pointed out in previous chapters, a new consensus has emerged among
liberal states, including African states, that there is a moral right to intervene even without UNSC
authorization in extreme cases, because states are sanctioned by their compelling moral purpose
to save lives."'
457 Interview with UG/FA/BU 3 held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura.
458 A. Bellamy, "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur", Humanitarian Intervention after











Another important aspect of Uganda's interventions that has to be noted is that, regardless of its
humanitarian considerations, its belief in humanity and its respect for the norms of the region in
respect to assisting neighbours that have problems, Uganda's interventions in Rwanda in 1990
and the DRC in 1997 and 1998 are considered illegitimate interventions. It did not adhere to its
1995 constitutional obligations to respect international law and obligation and to coexist
peacefully with its neighbours. The President is not oblivious to the law and he acknowledges it
in justifying the intervention in Burundi but that he did not evoke the relevant international law
to protect his actions makes his humanitarian concerns gain less appreciation. Actually, several
interviewees asked to rank the motives of Uganda's interventions in three states in order of
importance revealed an interesting picture of their perceptions of Uganda's foreign policy. See
figure 7 below.
Figure 7: People's perceptions of the  causes of Uganda ' s interventionist  foreign policy
Source: Data extracted from Interviews held on Uganda's interventionist foreign policy
The general picture created by Figure 7 above is that the potential of Uganda to be a regional
power is perceived to have had less of an influence than did its humanitarian concerns or











important than the threats to regional stability or Uganda's security concerns as a whole. A
general conclusion can be drawn from the figure that the interviewees felt that Uganda may have
had hegemonic ambitions, but that these did not influence its intervention as much as other
salient issues did, such as humanitarian concerns, security of the state and stability of the region.
Museveni's style of addressing and managing problems in conflict and post-conflict states, as
evidenced by his diplomatic intervention in Burundi and Rwanda, introduced a new dimension in
intervention, which demonstrated that whereas irredentist personal ambitions may be important
in motivating intervention, sometimes leaders are driven by altruistic reasons.
5.4 Summary
Uganda's interventions in the GLR are similar to many other interventions of the post-Cold War
era. It is evident from the updated intervention matrix of Lewitt' that Uganda's intervention
occurred at a time when similar diplomatic and humanitarian interventions were being
undertaken by other African states, using bilateral agreements and regional organisations
protocols.
The discussion has also shown that Uganda only intervened in other states if there was genocide
or a threat of genocide or an evident threat to regional peace. The country's geographic
proximity to conflict-ridden states increased the likelihood that Uganda would intervene, but it
did also offer to intervene militarily, diplomatically, or by contributing troops to UN peace
missions in states that were far way, such as Liberia. The current deployment in Somalia in 2007,
this time under the auspices of the AU is evidence enough of Uganda's commitment to regional
peace. Further, although many African states had promised to send troops to Somalia, it is only
Uganda that has lived up to its pledge (Though Ethiopia's effort to address the violent conflict in
Somalia is also noted).













This chapter has shown that the constructivist approach is useful as an alternative approach to
understanding the behaviour of states in the international system. Constructivism is also able to
account for why African states became more positive about intervention and more involved in
conflict resolution, which had previously been the exclusive preserve of the superpowers,
especially in the Cold War era. It also accounts for the numerous interventions and the timing of
those events, which it attributes to the general norms of the region at that specific time.
Constructivism exhibits similar tenets to Political Liberalism, which equally lays emphasis on the
intervention based on the inability of states to protect its citizens. Like Constructivists, the
Political Liberalist perspective attributes interventions to the desire to protect citizens of one
country from war, suffering and provision of humanitarian relief.' In general, constructivists
argue that states may only intervene in the business of other states if they are compelled by an
accepted norm of intervention, such as a humanitarian disaster, in which many lives would be
saved because of the intervention. Constructivists would thus argue that intervention was
acceptable because its aim was to save lives.
The constructivist approach is akin to the global liberal governance perspective. Both focuse on
the humanitarian disasters that make interventions obligatory, no matter what international law
stipulates. Similar to the European states which responded to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo,
African states have shown that, when genocide or mass murders occur, they do not need to wait
for the UN or regional bodies to grant them permission to intervene. Unfortunately, this makes
the legality of intervention a highly contentious issue, even if legitimacy is presumed in
humanitarian interventions. The constructivist approach shares with the poliheuristic approach
the idea of the "role of a leader", as what is expected of him or her by the international
community in situations of humanitarian disaster.
The only limitation of the constructivist theory is this: If, as the constructivists posit, a norm and
culture exist amongst states that makes them responsible to themselves and to others to ensure
peace in a region, then it is unclear clear why some states are unable to intervene even in glaring
emergencies, such as the genocide in Rwanda. Of course the constructivist could argue that,
because of their stature and position in the international system some states have more











responsibility towards other states, but this is not entirely correct. After all, a state like Tanzania,
which is at the centre of the diplomatic negotiations about conflict in the GLR and which, like
Uganda, is close to the conflict states, refuses to intervene militarily. For Constructivism to be
more effective in its interpretation of state behaviour, it should take cognizance of the structures
of states and their influence on intervention. A good place to start would be the constitutions
and the decision-making processes in the foreign policy sphere of states.
It is clearly necessary to review constructivist's generalisation of norms emerging in regions and
the expectation that states will automatically embrace these norms to engage in humanitarian
interventions. Eyre and Suchman point out in respect to norms and the proliferation of
weaponry, that "norms do not directly cause the acquisition of a particular weapon'''. Likewise,
we could argue that norms do not cause states to intervene but rather that norms become
relevant as states interact and see in themselves values or cultures that are peculiar to them.
These realisations and appreciation of their perceptions of themselves is what makes it more
likely that they will intervene. The second limitation, as noted earlier in the theoretical literature
review, concerns the definition of culture that the constructivists subscribe to, which is difficult
to study. The theory has methodological complications around the measurement of a culture or a
norm. Nonetheless, Constructivism provides a good orientating framework against which the
foreign policy behaviour of states can be analysed, especially considering that it pays attention to
important factors that are often neglected in international relations, such as identity, culture and
norms. However, other theories do overcome some of the theoretical and methodological
limitations of Constructivism. One such alternative theory, Poliheurism, is discussed in the
following chapter.
461 See D. P. Eyre and M. C. Suchman, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons", in
Katzenstein, P. (ed), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics,  (Columbia University












POLIHEURISM: LEADERS AND FOREIGN POLICY
6.0 Poliheurism
This chapter draws on the Poliheuristic theory to analyse the motives of Uganda's interventions
in its neighbouring states. The chapter seeks to answer two questions; first, did Museveni's
decision-making style influence the decisions he made to intervene in the neighbouring states?
Second, what were Museveni's domestic and foreign considerations in his foreign policy
formulation? The central argument of this chapter is that Museveni's presidential decision
making greatly influenced the foreign and security policy that Uganda adopted. It is argued
further that, whereas Ugandan interventions did reflect the leaders' interests, which constituted
critical national security interests, the motivation to build a foreign policy image could not be
ruled out either. The chapter first discusses the tenets of the Poliheurism that explain the
individual leader's role in shaping the foreign policy behaviour of his state. This is followed by an
examination of the interventions, to which Poliheurism is applied, and lastly the chapter
concludes with a theoretical evaluation of Poliheurism as an important framework for
understanding Ugandan's interventions in the GLR.
6.1 Poliheurism and Intervention
This study draws on the poliheuristic theory, which centres on the individual leader's style of
decision making in the foreign domain. Poliheurism firstly presupposes that leaders make
decisions to intervene in other states after carefully considering that these interventions will
translate into national interests. Secondly, the theory posits that, in choosing policy options,
leaders will evaluate different options available in two steps. The first step is to review the
options depending on their domestic pay-off, and to select the best policy option depending on
other important dimensions such as the foreign considerations!' As a second step, the two
dimensions, domestic and foreign, are compared and a decision is made as to which would offer
better pay-offs in terms of national interests, or individual considerations, or which would
462 Mintz A., "Integrating Cognitive and Rational Theories of Foreign Policy Decision Making: A Poliheuristic
Perspective" pp 6-7, K. De Rouen, "The Decision Not To Use Force at Dien Bien Phu: A Poliheuristic












minimise costs yet yield better results ." At the end of this two-step process, leaders then make
their decision to intervene or not to intervene. The two primary criteria are that the chosen
option must have a better pay-off than the other options, and that it must not hurt the leader
politically at the domestic level.
One variant of the Poliheurism argues that a leader's decision to intervene in other states
militarily is aimed at diverting the populace's attention from the leader's failure in some domestic
policies. Such a leader is hoping that the intervention will cause the populace to become
preoccupied with the events of the intervention and thus to condone government's failure to
deliver favourable polices or much needed services.' Poliheurism takes cognizance of the role
that groups or advisers play in the selection of choices, but argue that the leaders make the final
choice. Often this choice is based on consideration that do not compromise the benefits
expected from the intervention nor are they likely to affect the leader's political position. A key
assumption of Poliheurism is that leaders have the cognitive skills to make rational choices in
their foreign policy decision making. Cognitive skills include computational skills and the holistic
information processing capacity that is required to make rational decisions. Leaders are expected
to be selective in processing information rather than indulging in an exhaustive search and
comparison process when making foreign policy decisions.' Given this background on
Poliheurism, it is argued that the decisions of Uganda's leader to intervene were carefully thought
out and cautiously compared against the best domestic and foreign dimension pay-offs.
6.2 Decisions to intervene militarily in Rwanda and the DRC
Events in Rwanda and the DRC after Museveni came to power in Uganda started to take on a
different shape. As Chretien has argued, Museveni's leadership sparked off uncertainty amongst
his neighbours as to what his next move would be. 466 Because uncertainty causes decision-makers
to be fearful of others' intentions, every proposition Museveni made to his fellow regional
leaders was interpreted as malevolent. For example, the immediate request by Museveni to
Habyarimana to solve the citizenship question of the Rwandan Tutsi and the subsequent
463 K. De Rouen, "The Decision Not To Use Force at Dien Bien Phu: A Poliheuristic Perspective", pp. 16-17.
464 Jj Pickering, and E. F. Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type
and the Diversionary Hypothesis", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol 49 (2005), pp. 23-43.
465 L. Xinsheng, "Poliheuristic and Cybernetic Theory", pp. 146-147.











demands from him to Mobutu to consider the Congolese Tutsi as having Congolese nationality
were interpreted by both leaders as the beginning of Museveni's interference in the affairs of its
neighbours.
Following the Rwandan Tutsi attack on Rwanda in October 1990, and the subsequent genocide
that broke out, Mobutu construed this as a signal for him to review his domestic politics and
address the marginalization of ethnic communities, particularly the Banyamulenge. He was aware
that the Banyamulenge had been recruited in the RPF ranks, which compounded Mobutu's
political problems. His reaction was initially to assist Habyarimana's regime against the RPF
attack but also to try to target the Banyamulenge and use the law to marginalize them further.
The Banyamulenge had already joined forces with the ADFL to fight Mobutu. Museveni's
perception of all these developments greatly determined his reaction. Using the theory of
Poliheurism, it is clear from Museveni's address to Parliament in 1998 that he had weighed up
his options. His options were either to intervene in Rwanda and the DRC or not to intervene
and to let the two states handle their insurgency. At the level of foreign relations, he had weighed
up his options and made the best decision in the circumstances.
With regard to Uganda's foreign relations with its neighbouring countries, Museveni's decision to
intervene in Rwanda in support of the Rwandan Tutsi was motivated by the inaction of the
international community. He argued as follows;
Me decided tried to =vim the Late President Habyarimana  to reach a political settlement with
these young people (referring to the RPF) and the forte they we representing... These young boys
... had been in exile for 33 years... what had the international community done to solve  that
problem of Rwanda. What had the UN done to solve that problem? What had the European
Union done to solve that problem? So if the adults do not solve  the problem, then the children solve
it and they solve it in their own way 467
In the case of Burundi, he advanced a similar argument related to the failure of the Europeans to
intervene to assist the Barundi in their political crisis. He stated:
These Europeans have been coming here. They said  "we think them is going to be a genocide in
Burundi". I told them, "them will he no genocide in Burundi and I can tell you this again, there
will be no genocide in Burundi, because we are not going to permit it. The moment  they attempt












genocide, zee shall be there in form" I told these Europeans that there will k no genocide in
Burundi. This was two years ago. They thought I was joking. There was genocide in Rwanda
because we wer e waiting for the Europeans to be the ones to solve that problem-that was the
weakness .468
From the above statement we could argue that his decision to intervene in Rwanda and Burundi
was based on the failure of the "adults" (in other words, the Europeans or, more broadly, the
international community) to act. Museveni seems to have realised furthermore that Uganda's
intervention would most likely not be challenged by the international community, as it had after
all failed to intervene to protect the people of Rwanda or Burundi. Museveni's intervention did
however violate international law, which prohibits unilateral intervention by states. The law
specifically prohibits the use of force in other states. An analysis of the full legal implication of
this intervention cannot be done here. Nonetheless, in principle, Uganda's intervention could be
justified by using international customary law, which permits interventions to stop genocide.
What should be noted though is that the decision to intervene was made by the President and his
High Command. It is implicit from his use of persona "I told these Europeans that there will be no
genocide in Burundi.... They thought I was joking... .Interviews with interviewees engaged in these
wars also indicated that they got explicit instructions to intervene from the President. Similarly
the emphasis put on Museveni as mediator and his role in Burundi by a wide range of
interviewees in Burundi also spells out his saliency in the peace process in Burundi.'
In the DRC, the repercussions of the Rwandan genocide on neighbouring Zaire (later renamed
DRC) were severe. Most importantly, the Rwandan genocide sparked off demands from
Congolese marginalised groups to participate in the governance of the state. It also rejuvenated
old animosities between the Mobutu and anti-Mobutu forces that used the total decline of
Mobutu's rule to attack that country. The attacks by various rebel groups on Zaire from 1994 to
1997 weakened that country further and led to the collapse of Mobutu's rule. The decision of
Uganda's NRM government to intervene in the war in the Zaire/DRC initially seems to have
been carefully considered because, according to Museveni, President Kabila of the DRC had
requested Museveni's troops to help him with his insurrection against Mobutu. Museveni had
refused on the grounds that he could not give him troops and that Kabila needed to build his
468 Ibid .











own capacity rather than relie on foreign troops."' Museveni argued that he did not believe in
depending on foreigners to fight. Ironically, Museveni had depended greatly on foreigners
(Rwandan Tutsi) to fight his guerrilla warfare that brought him into power. It is not clear from
the President's address whether depending on any foreign troops was bad or rather depending
on Rwandan soldiers in particular was bad; nevertheless, according to Museveni, depending on
Rwandan soldiers was bad."'
Museveni's later decision to intervene militarily in 1997 was, so he argued, premised on his
analysis of the situation in the GLR and his realization that the Rwandans had continued to help
Kabila. He thus presented three reasons to justify the NRM government's decision to intervene
in the DRC, to which he had been so vehemently opposed initially:
• to stop the incursions of rebels that were using the DRC to attack Uganda;
• to stop the genocide against the Banyamuknge, and the ethnic violence between the Henna and the
Lend and
• to ensure that the mutiny and war in the DRC did not spill over  to Uganda. In Goma, vans
had beenfiled by the Ugandan consulate in Gana that eight Congolese battalions had mutinied
so Museveni had to intervene  to stop the Tzar because of the potential impact it would haw on
uganda.472
It emerges from Museveni's presentation to Parliament in 1998 that, in every undertaking, "the
NRM government" had made the final decision. By implication, the DRC intervention case
shows that when Rwanda intervened, it became obvious that Uganda would intervene too.
Ironically, not a single parliamentary session had sat to consider some of these decisions.
Similarly, no reports had been given to Parliament as required by the law until the intervention
had been internationally condemned. The excerpt below from the Constitution explicitly states
that declaration of war must be done within the framework of the law.
470 Ibid.
471 In his speech to Parliament, Museveni stated that he had warned Kabila against relying so much on the Rwandese
to fight for him. At one time he argued that he had almost convinced the Rwandese not to fight for Kabila, but that
Kabila insisted on using them. For further detail on his matter see Parliamentary Hansard, Museveni's parliamentary












Even the alternative clause 3, which allows the President to declare war and inform Parliament
later, was not adhered to. From the chronicle (Appendix 1) it is evident that Parliament was not
briefed until 182 hours after war had been declared on 13 August 1998 and subsequently ended
on 8 September. This was in direct contravention of the Ugandan Constitution.
It is important for this poliheuristic analysis that the phases of the decision-making process are
recognised. In the first phase, Museveni had used his cognitive abilities to select the best option
available from the two available options, i.e. to intervene or not to intervene. Initially, he had
chosen the latter. In a quick shift in his foreign policy, however, Museveni then decided to
intervene. His choice must have been made in consideration of the foreign affairs dimension
because at the domestic level, intervening or not intervening would not have hurt him politically.
If he intervened and the situation in either state improved, he would most likely gain further
repute in solving African problems. The intervention also reveals that, in accordance with the
central tenet of Poliheurism, leaders use their cognitive abilities to make choices or follow the
advice of their technocrats. In this regard, the intervention in the DRC had been properly
thought about because the security problem of Uganda would have been resolved by intervening,
or at most contained for a while. The decision to intervene would not have affected Museveni
politically either way. Nonetheless, much as the intervention was a high-risk option, it was still
chosen as a non-compensatory pay-off. The poliheurists would argue that sometimes choices do
not necessarily depend on a careful consideration of cause and effect. Before a state intervenes,











destroyed in the process, yet it will still intervene, as long as its national security would be
protected and its international and domestic political image is not hurt. In the next section, it is
argued that Museveni's decision to intervene must also be understood from his considerations at
the international level, particularly with regard to how other GLR states viewed Museveni.
6.3 The Role of Foreign Powers in Uganda's Interventions
In terms of Poliheurism, Museveni's foreign policy choices to intervene in the neighbouring
states of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are a reflection of a carefully drafted response to
regional crises. Uganda's perception of its role in the region as arbiter, mediator and intermediary
and the central positions it holds in regional geopolitics has been greatly bolstered by US and
British support towards its roles in the region. These powers have a high regard and probably
still do, for Museveni's leadership, and respect him as someone who can be given the
responsibility to help sort out geopolitical problems in Africa!" Some of the people interviewed
for this study regarded Museveni's central role in the regional politics and the support of the US
and Britain as indicative of him being a hired hand of British and American neo-colonialism. The
interviewees felt that the support for his interventions that he had received from Britain and US
was merely aimed at protecting those nations' political and economic interests in the region.' It
is not clear though if this view still holds, given the change in the US National Strategic
Framework in 1998 and subsequently following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US.'
Subsequent developments in Africa have marked a distinct shift in US foreign policy towards
Africa-. the US has been encouraging African nations and leaders to develop their own capacity,
to empower themselves to handle their own anarchic situations and to resolve their own
problems in a way that suits the African setting.
The disastrous US intervention in Somalia from 1991 until 1993 was the precursor to the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and later the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). Uganda
473 Interview with DP 1 opposition member of Parliament held on 20 October 2005 and UPC 1 opposition member
of Parliament interviewed on 14 November 2005 in Kampala respectively. The opposition argued that the visits of
President Clinton, his wife and his Secretary of State Albright to Uganda were the reason why Museveni perceived
himself as a hegemonic power, because he felt favoured and thus felt he should be key to every general development
of the GLR geopolitics.
474 This was the general view held by the opposition in Museveni's administration.
475 Steven Metz noted that, since 1996, Africa was no longer a top priority in the US 1998 National Security Strategy.
US security interests in Africa were very limited. For a detailed discussion of the New US National Security Strategy,











was a beneficiary of the ACRF and it could be argued, greatly influenced Museveni's behaviour
in the region. For Ugandan forces to be trained as ACRF was indirectly warranting Museveni to
assume a big role and undertaking foreign policy choices of intervening in its neighbouring states
of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. Uganda's perception of its role in the region as arbiter,
mediator and intermediary and the central positions it holds in regional geo-politics is greatly
bolstered by US and British support of its roles in the region. Following the Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) of 1994, which urged that US involvement in peace-keeping be
selective and more effective, the US preferred not to intervene in intra-state violent conflicts but
merely to provide the necessary framework for the peacekeeping initiatives of the African
states.' From what Rothchild has termed the "Stable Democratic States", the US selected a
well-equipped, deployable, inter-operable, and committed force, which would respond to peace-
keeping challenges on the African continent.'" Of the GLR beneficiaries of this ACRI strategy,
Uganda was the first state to receive ACRI training and equipment. It had the largest number of
recruits, followed by Rwanda. The US Department of Defence (DOD), the National Defence
University (NDU), and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) initiated three projects
for the ACRF's new role. The first project was military training under the International Military
Education Training (IMET) and Joint Combined Exchange Training (ICED. The second project
involved procurement of military equipment, arms and weapons under the Direct Military Sales
licensing (DMS). Lastly, through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements, the beneficiaries
of the program were able to access further military equipment.
They US provided Museveni's administration with the necessary training and logistics in
preparation for a regional role. With this perspective in mind, Museveni embraced a new role in
the region, that of 'regional policeman'. Subsequent significant events in the GLR conflicts came
to be dominated by Museveni and his protege Kagame. An analysis of the military aid and other
forms of support provided to the region in general and Uganda in particular illustrate the US
strategy to build a strong regional group that would intervene to assist in the region's
emergencies. Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is thus attributed to the US bilateral
476 See a detailed explanation of the Presidential Decision Directive on the US reform of its multilateral peace
operations on htt .://www.fas.org /irp ./offdocs/ dd25 brief.htm, and the Presidential Decision Directive 34,
which allows arms trading within a broad "circle of friends", with the aim of preserving the US's competitive
capability and national security through a strategy of engagement in arms, as well as a legitimate instrument of
foreign policy. See I. Wilson III, "The Problem with Foreign Military Sales Reinvention", in World Affairs, Vol 164,
No 1 (2001), p. 28.
477 See D. Rothchild, "The Impact of US Disengagement on African Intrastate Conflict Resolution", in J. Harbeson











relations and the support given by other powers to Uganda, which greatly bolstered Museveni's
perceptions of himself and his government as a major actor in the region's development. See
Tables 4 and 5 and figures 9 below on military aid illustrate the level of military help received by
Uganda from the US, which - it is argued herein -contributed significantly to its interventionist
foreign policy.478
Table 4: Military Assistance and Training to States that intervened in the DRC in US dollars 1000
Table 4 shows that Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 479 were
highest for Uganda in 1996, but dropped remarkably in the subsequent years. It is further clear
from the table that, whereas Uganda received the highest proportion of IMET resources in 1997
and 1998, it received the second highest assistance (after Rwanda) from the Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) in 1997 and 1998. This aid was instrumental in boosting Uganda's
military capacities and subsequent engagements in neighbouring states. Similarly, in Figure 9
overleaf a clearer image of the IMET program is depicted.
478 The figures are drawn from studies carried out on US-African projects by the Foreign Policy Institute of
Research. They are used in this study because of the dearth of readily  available case-to-case data on US military aid
to African states in Uganda's varied sources.
479 FMS is a government-to-government agreement negotiated by the Pentagon and the purchasing country. DCS is
an agreement negotiated between the manufacturing company and the purchasing country and then licensed by the











Figure 9 overleaf covers the period 1997-2005 of the IMET program. It demonstrates that
Uganda received substantial amounts of aid, even though Rwanda received the most military aid
during the time of what has come to be referred to as "the first African world war". Uganda
came second in this period, except in 2003, when it received slightly more aid than Rwanda, and
in 2005, when the program was phased out. When this figure is compared with the tables 3 and 4
in the subsequent sections, it can be argued that, after the regional war in the DRC in 1998
August, the US gave aid on a uniform basis during the second half of the decade.
Similarly, Table 5 overleaf shows that the ACSS had relatively uniform figures of expenditure,
although there were a few exceptions. Uganda received the biggest share compared to the other
states, while the DRC and Sudan got less than Chad, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Rwanda. Table 5
also provides details of the JCET and ACSS training for two years, 1998- 1999, when the war was
at its most intense in the GLR between Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi against the DRC and the
war between Uganda and Rwanda. It demonstrates that Uganda obtained the highest amount of
US military training in 1999 compared to the other GLR states and amongst those that were











From Table 5 overleaf, it is evident that Uganda continued to receive a substantial amount of
military training and military supplies even after the 1998 interventions in the neighbouring GLR
states. From 2003 to 2005, commercial and arms transfer sales to Uganda, too, were much higher
than in the other states. The exception was the DRC, which had obtained the highest arms
transfer foreign military sales between 1998 and 2005.
Table 5: Military Assistance and Training to Countries in the Congo civil war in $1000 units
It is on the basis that we could argue that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was greatly
influenced by US relations with Uganda, particularly through the development of Uganda's
military capability and massive arms sales and military training. The Arms Trade Insider
augmented this position in their report, which points that all the Ugandan graduates of the JCET
and IMET programmes were deployed in the DRC to fight alongside the Rwandan troops"' and
later to fight independently for Uganda's "national interests". It is important to emphasize here
that, whereas the US programs discussed (IMET, JCET, FMS, and DC) have always been part of
US foreign policy, what the recipient states of these programs do with the forces trained remains
the exclusive preserve of the recipient states. Decisions on deploying the same ACRI troops in
the regional conflicts or in the misadventures that these states were engaged in were entirely the
480 Hartung and Moix have argued that the Rwandan troops that attacked the DRC were graduates of the JCET
training. See W. Hartung and B. Moix, "Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War", World Policy
Institute: Arms Control Reports, (2000) available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm











responsibility of the leaders of these states, although the US does indirectly have an influence on
the recipients' decisions to intervene because it had created the ACRI in the first place.
Museveni in turn exploited his relations with the US and the British to build his regional power
status. He used his favoured position' to bolster Uganda's importance in the region and as a
foundation from which he would continue intervening in other states.' Uganda continued to
obtain massive transfers of military aid while it was intervening in other states because of its
assumed role as the region's police officer', even though it was clear that these interventions
violated international law and had caused enormous suffering to the people in the Eastern DRC.
Museveni's decisions to intervene militarily in the Rwanda and particularly in the DRC were
strongly condemned by the international community, and the US was called upon to reprimand
Uganda. The international condemnation of the US's implicit support for Uganda forced the US
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan Rice, to make a statement to the US House of
Representatives International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Africa. In her rebuttal of
the perceived role played by the US in enhancing Museveni's hegemonic designs of intervention,
Susan Rice' dismissed these claims. She said:[O]ur
 policy objectives  in the Congo haw been consistent and dear. We haw sought peace,
prosperity, democracy  and respect for  fundamental human rights. We haw worked  to counter those
who wouldperpetuate genocide in the legion. We haw encouraged the establishment of an inclusive
political transition that would  end the cycle of violence  and impurity, build respect for the rule of law
and human lights and ovate the conditions for a credible democratic transformation, economic
reformand the stability required forlasting developm ntR constructioA  a consequence,UV
hare been committed to a policy of engagement in support of the Congolese people, w1 sic fered so
481 Former American Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen, reemphasised Uganda's favoured
position when he stated that Uganda had legitimate reasons for intervening in the Congo because it was destabilising
Uganda and was a source of regional instability. See Cohen's statement cited in H. Campbell, "Democratization,
Citizenship and Peace in the Congo", in Baregu, M. (ed), The Crisis in the DRC (Harare: SAPES Trust, 1999), pp.
21-36.
482 Interview with UPC 1, an opposition party member, held on 23 July 2004.
483 Interviews with opposition members of parliament who echoed the same views as did W. Hartung and B. Moix,
"Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War", (World Policy Institute: Arms Control Reports, 2000).
Available: http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm, accessed on 23 April 2003. The term
`miniature police' here refers to Uganda as a small police post that was a branch of the main US regional police.
484 Susan Rice was the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Clinton Administration. In her
Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC she insisted
that the US policy was clear regarding Uganda's intervention in the DRC. The US did not in anyway condone












much under Mobutu Sese Seko's tyranny. We have sought to do this notwithstanding  the difficulties
=haw had in working with  the new government  in Congo. ... Mr Chairman , let me b e dear: the
US in noway supported encouraged or condoned  the interventions of Rwandan or Ugandan fortes in
the Congo, as some have suggested  This is a specious and ridiculous accusations  that I want to lay
to rest once and for all. We haw indicated to both Uganda and Rwanda that vee fully understand
their legitimate security interests in countering insurgent attacks from Congolese soldiers. We also
share regional and international frustration  with the Kinshasha government's  failure with respect  to
both the democratisation and human rights. Nevertheless, zee haw finny  expressed the United
States' conviction that foreign intervention to topple the Government  of the DRC is not
acceptable... .To mphasize our concern, zee withdrew a short-term training team and an assessment
team that were  in Rwanda at the time.485
Rice's address is very significant as a general explanation of US-Uganda relations in the history of
Uganda's interventions. It showed that the US was apprehensive about the interventions,
although it acknowledged Uganda's security concerns. It is not clear from Rice's presentation,
however, what type of government Uganda and its proteges toppled in the DRC. Did the US
consider the prevailing regime of Mobutu to be legitimate or illegitimate? If it is the former, then
there is inconsistency in the US policy: after all, the US had not come out openly to condemn
Uganda's involvement in the Rwandan invasion of the Habyarimana's regime in the 1990
invasion. Yet it now seemed to be concerned about Uganda's intervention in the DRC.
Echoing Rice's presentation discussed above, the US again defended its position regarding the
claims that it had supported Uganda's interventions. James Rubin, Assistant Secretary of State in
the Clinton administration, insisted that the US had raised its concern over the reports of military
preparations, including the movement of troops and material by forces on both sides of the
DRC by Uganda and other states like Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Chad. Rubin stated that
the US was concerned about these interventions because they undermined human rights and
violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Rubin reported further that, contrary
to the perception that the IMET program had enhanced the interventions, the US program had
been aimed at fostering close cooperation between the US and Uganda. It was also aimed at
serving the national interest of the US, as it sought to create stability in the region, advance closer
military-to-military relations, professionalize the UPDF, and promote human rights.















Critics of the US foreign policy in the GLR argued that the US should have done better."' The
withdrawal of the training team was not sufficient action. 488 It should also have suspended all
other forms of aid to all the states involved in the DRC, and it should have overtly condemned
the invasion. However, the US continued to provide aid, grants, and training to the countries
involved in varying degrees. It continued to provide training to the governments' officers and
men sent to US institutions, as well as to sell arms and ammunition to these states. Figures of
military assistance in form of aid, grants, and training quoted from the Foreign Policy Research
Institute indicate that the US has in fact given vast amounts of military aid to the Ugandan
government." 9 This, despite the fact that Museveni, Uganda's leader (who had been embraced as
the new brand of leader who had the potential to solve Africa's problems), was in fact spear-
heading the destabilisation of the region, ironically contrary to the US Clinton Administration's
expectations.
Further, the US's refusal to reprimand Uganda and demand its unconditional withdrawal from
the DRC must be seen in the context of broader US policy towards Africa following the
Rwandan Genocide and events in Burundi. The US had not assisted in either of the cases,
despite the expectations of the international community."' Therefore, it could be asked
legitimately, on what basis would the US have stopped the Ugandan interventions in the DRC, if
it had not done so in Rwanda and Burundi?
6.4 Domestic Motivations of Interventions
The central tenet of the poliheuristic school is that interventions are regarded as a strategy by
heads of state to divert public attention from their failing domestic policies in order to ensure
that they remain in power. In this section, we examine the domestic dimension of Uganda's
foreign policy.
487 W . Hartung and Montague, in their "Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo War"
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm  accessed on April 23 2003.
488 Respondents who pointed to this sentiment insisted that the US should have stopped any kind of aid or support
to the states involved in the Congo war, at least as per the expectations of the international community.
489 An analysis of US military assistance to Uganda for the period 1996-2004 is done later in this chapter. Figures are
drawn from Hartung and Montague's (2001) empirical reports, which indicate how US policy openly supported the
"undemocratic regimes" of Kagame and Museveni based on the grounds that they were the new kind of leadership
that Africa needed to, solve its problems.
49° In an interview with a UG/FA/US 1 held in Kampala on 10 December 2005, the official argued that the US's
treatment of Uganda should not be considered separately but as part of a general US policy towards states anywhere











Uganda's interventions were seen by some interviewees' as Museveni's way of bolstering his
image in the region following the unpopular Rwandan intervention of 1990 and the subsequent
genocide of 1994, which they (the interviewees) argue had broken out because of the initial
intervention of 1990. They also argued that, in view of the pending elections of 1996, Museveni
had campaigned for presidency on the ticket that he would strengthen Uganda's security. He was
constantly campaigning against the multi-party political system in favour of a system of
individual merit. The interviewees also argued that Museveni was able to win the 1996 elections
because he was in control of the army, which meant that he had better chances of providing
security against rebel attacks than the other presidential candidates. His overwhelming victory of
74%492 had been well earned, because Museveni at that time was still popular and Uganda was
still making huge strides in development.
Uganda's interventions have also been attributed to the domestic demands by interest groups to
access political power. As Museveni had been the President of Uganda for fifteen years, other
groups in the country started to demand that he relinquish power and allow other people to rule
Uganda. When Colonel Besigye, a retired army officer from Museveni's own party, emerged as a
popular competitor, it meant that Museveni had to work on his image to win the election. His
image had been marred by his attitude towards his competitors, particularly Besigye, with whom
he had had a very good relationship during his service in the army. Not only did the Museveni
government harass supporters of Besigye, but Museveni's party implemented the Kalangala
Action Plan' to coerce people to vote for Museveni as President, thereby violating the rights of
the opposition. A rebel group was formed by the disgruntled UPDF officers who had been
supporters of Besigye. During the presidential campaign of 2001, the PRA became the new rebel
group fighting the government. For the second time, Museveni gained power in the 2001
elections, with 65% because people believed that he would provide them with security despite
his inherent flaws as an individual and the flaws of his regime.
491 The members of the opposition alluded to this view.
492 Uganda Electoral Commission Report, 2001 released in May 2001.
493 The Kalangala Action Plan (KAP) was a paramilitary unit formed during the presidential campaigns of 2001. It
used violence against some people in areas where the President did not marshal up votes or in regions that were
clearly anti-Museveni. It has been one of the units that has been sued in front of the Uganda Human Rights











If the Poliheuristic theory of diversion is to find a place in the politics of Uganda, then the last
intervention in the GLR in 1998-2001 and the subsequent wars in the DRC need to be
examined. Following the general populace's demand for a change in political leadership, it is
revealing that a well-calculated move occurred to change the Constitution to change the number
of terms that presidents can remain in office, in order to enable the ruling party and Museveni to
continue in power. When the Constitution had been drafted in 1995, it had been very carefully
specified that the President's term of office was five years, which could only be extended twice.
As the interventions in 1996-2000 in the neighbouring states fell within the first term of office, it
is unlikely that the President was motivated by interests to stay in power. After all, he did have a
constitutional mandate at the time.
Similarly, in the subsequent interventions in the DRC that ended in 2002, he had won a second
term in office. If other interventions had taken place at that time, though, it would have been
possible to interpret them as deliberate attempts to remain in power. In that regard, during the
2001 Presidential Elections campaigns, the Government of Uganda established a Constitutional
Review Commission to review the Constitution of Uganda. The Commission submitted a report
of its findings and recommendations in December 2003. The Uganda Cabinet, after studying the
report, prepared a Government White Paper in September 2004. The Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs Committee of the Ugandan Parliament considered the Government White Paper and
submitted its report in December 2004. Parliament subsequently passed the Constitution
(Amendment) Act, in August 2005. Among the various amendments made to the Constitution of
Uganda was one that eliminated the restrictions on presidential terms of office. Previously, the
Constitution had limited the President to two five-year terms in office. This provision was
contained in Article 105(2), which stated: "A person shall not be elected under this Constitution
to hold office as President for more than two terms as prescribed by this article." This position
was changed by replacing Article 105(2) with the following provision: "A person may be elected  under
this Constitution to hold office of the President for one or more terms as prescribed by this article." The above
amendment thus allowed an incumbent to hold office for more than two terms. This cleared the
way for Museveni to run for president again in 2006.
In light of this, the timing of the interventions in the DRC was perfect; throughout 2005 and
early 2006, the LRA had moved back and forth from southern Sudan and the Garamba forest in
the DRC, making fresh attacks on tourists, foreigners, and aid workers. The ADF was











preparing incursions into Uganda. Arrests and counter attacks of rebels showed the population
that Museveni needed to be re-elected so that the development so far attained in the last twenty
years would not be lost and security guarranteed.' The election results of 2006 indicated that the
domestic pressure on the political power distribution was even higher though Museveni was still
1, riding ahead of the rest of his competitors.
Another domestic dimension that is critical to Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is the
internal military politics and power struggle in the High Command and amongst the regular
members of the UPDF.
495
 The interviewee argued that there were squabbles in the UPDF
between the top military cadres regarding who had more power and an intense debate on who
was to succeed Museveni in power. There was a rift between the elite in the UPDF and the semi-
literate soldiers in UPDF: the elite, though better placed to be in charge of the army were not
given powers to man specific posts. Instead, some of the semi-literate officers who were also
related to the President were appointed to the high command. The latter had greater military
power and wanted to suppress the former. Museveni's solution to defuse the power struggles in
the military was to give responsibility to some of the semi-literate officers to take charge of the
DRC intervention. This tactic of engaging them in such inexhaustible "lucrative ventures"'
solved the power struggles in the short run, but had dire consequences for the DRC. The UPDF
officers who led a contingent of soldiers to the DRC engaged in trade and exploited the
resources in areas they controlled. The President's delay in stopping the exploitation of the DRC
and the subsequent delay in bringing to justice these officers implicated in these activities"' have
also been attributed to his covert plan to undercut a potential coup, which would have resulted
from the rift in the UPDF 49g
494 This analysis does not negate the fact that the rebel groups, like ADF, LRA and PRA, existed but points out that
they were used to justify why the ruling party should remain in power.
495 Interview with UG/MOD 13 held in Cape Town, February 2006.
496 Lucrative ventures refer to the business that the UPDF officers carried out in the areas of Isiro, Bunia, Beni,
Bumba, Bondo and Buta, all of which were under their control. For details of the business enterprise see the Porter
Report, p. 89 and the UNSC report S/2002/1146 by the Panel of Experts Report, p. 22.
497 The Panel of Experts report recommended that the governments of the countries where the individuals were
from should prosecute them for the illegal exploitation of the resources in the DRC. For detailed recommendations,
see Report, p. 31, in International Crisis Group, "Rwanda/Uganda: A Dangerous War of Nerves", Africa Briefing
(Nairobi/Brussels, December 2001), p. 12. Similarily the UN Panel of Experts Report, 2001 and its Addendum
Report, 2002 upheld its position with regard to those found guilty of exploiting DRC's resources.
498 In an interview with UG/MOD 13 held on 23 February 2006 in Cape Town, the interviewee indicated that
Kazini, the Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF in the DRC was weary of his position in the army and demanded
that he be put in better command position. He was opposed to all "literate" UPDF and tried to subjugate them. For
fear that he could easily institute a coup against the President, he was made commander in the DRC. This was done











6.5 Regional Hegemony or Warmonger
Uganda's interventions in the neighbouring states have been associated with, on the one hand,
Museveni's intention to create a regional hegemony', and on the other,they have been
interpreted as being part of his personality as a warmonger.' The interventions in Rwanda,
Burundi and, later, in the DRC in support of the Banyamulenge (a Tutsi generation that had
settled in the DRC) has been construed as motivated by Museveni's imperialist design of creating
a Tutsi empire in the region.' The proposed Hima-Tutsi imperial design was reported on by
many media houses. In 2004, for example, a media house in Kenya wrote:
For more than six years, Museveni actively plotted to overthrow  the Moi government  while Moi
acutely engaged in counter-insurgence  sending his intelligence officers  on cattle raids into Eastern
Uganda... According to Museveni's  plan, pieced together by the Sunday Standard after intensive
in  &rya was supposed to be the first government  to fall in a domino-like chain of
military takeovers in the region covering  Rwanda, Zaire and Sudan. The Kenyan troops would  then
be used in the operations in Rwanda, then Zaire and then Sudan... but these imperial designs were
checked by a lack of credible Kenyayn  leaders willing to lead the assault on Nairobi ... .502
This media report highlighted the empire-building design and the domino-like chain of coups
that were to start in Kenya, then Rwanda and finally Zaire. Although Kenya did not fall, there
were two coup attempts orchestrated by the Mwa Kenya, a Kenyan dissident group, possibly
supported by Uganda. In Rwanda and Zaire, however, the regimes were overthrown in 1994 and
4
" R. Keohane and J. Nye define hegemony as a system when one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential
rules governing inter-state relations and willing to do so. See R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence,
3rd Ed) (New York Longman, 2001), p. 38.
5°0 This position is shared by interviewees who were in the opposition of Uganda's seventh parliament. Some
scholars have also pointed to this view of the hegemonic dominance by a Hima-Tutsi empire. See Melvern , for
example, who argues that, in Paris, Uganda's intervention in Rwanda was considered to be part of a Ugandan plot to
create Tutsi-land. It was taken for granted that Museveni wanted a Tutsi empire. Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed:
The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide,  p. 30.
501 The alleged Tutsi Empire was supposed to stretch from Mombasa to the Western Banks of the Congo River, and
up North, perhaps to the Nuba Mountains in Sudan. This area covered the pre-colonial interlacustrine kingdoms
that extended as far as Madi and Bukidi in the north, Kavirono in the east, Kiziba, Karagwe, and Rwanda to the
west, and the periphery Buzinza and Burundi in the south. For a detailed account of Museveni's imperial design see:
M. Kulumba"Ethno-centralism and Movement Politics in Uganda: An analysis of ethnic conflict in Kibaale
Conflict" in Kabweru Mukwaya (ed), Uganda Riding the Political Tiger: Security and the Wars in the Great Lakes
Region, (Makerere University Printery: Kampala, 2004) pp 143-158, 0. Onyango, "Museveni: Foreign Policy
Schemer Or just Getting By?", in The East African, April 28-May 4, 1997,; and 0. Furley and R. May,
"Introduction" in Furley, 0. and May, R. (eds), African Interventionist States, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 1-13.
For a pre-colonial history of the interlacustrine region, see R. Lemarchand, "Social Change and Political
Modernization in Burundi", in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 4, No 4 (1966), pp. 401-433; G. Sutton, "The
Antecedents of the Interlacustrine Kingdoms", in Journal of African History, Vol 34 (1993), pp. 33-64; and D.
Newbury, "Pre-colonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Loyalties", in Journal of African Historical
Studies, Vol 30, No 2 (2001), p. 255-314.











1997 respectively.' Although these events mean that the argument is feasible, particularly given
Museveni's statement in 1966 (see the epigraph at the start of this chapter), a few questions
remain: Firstly, was it feasible to create such a transnational empire based on one ethnic category
in such a large region and given the international system of the time? Secondly, did Uganda have
the prerequisites for creating such a hegemonic power during the period of these interventions?
Lastly, is it not likely, that there would have been a clash of interests with other leaders who had
similar designs of becoming the dominant power in the region?
Some interviewees in Rwanda and Burundi have dismissed the hegemonic design of a Hima-
Tutsi empire as speculation and even as Francophone propaganda to discredit Museveni's role in
the region, because the French were losing their grip on the region as their proteges were being
overthrown 504 The respondents also argued that it was Rwandan Tutsi who had put Museveni in
power and therefore doubted his ability to extend his rule in Post-genocide Rwanda?'" Even if
the debate around the regional hegemony were plausible, Museveni lacked the capacity to assert
himself over Rwanda'', which had not entirely adopted the policies he had recommended for
that country. In the DRC, similar attempts to influence the political development of Kabila's
regime were obstructed by Rwanda, which had similar interests. The clash of interests between
Rwanda and Uganda further alienated both states from Kabila and their influence became greatly
reduced. Instead, Uganda settled for relations with the rebel groups in order to give it the
opportunity to further its interests in the region.
Burundi and Rwanda were experiencing similar political upheavals. Considering that Museveni's
intervention in Burundi was diplomatic, but perceived as favouring the Hutu, the possibility that
503 Interview with a UG/FA/BR 1 held in Kampala on 8 December 2005.
5°4 Interview with a UG/FA/BU 4 (also the leader of a political party) held on 27 October 2005 in Bujumbura. He
argued that the French were affected by the loss of political power by Francophone leaders to Anglophone-
supported leaders in the GLR. As a result, the French fabricated the Hima-Tutsi claim to discredit Museveni who
was seen as the main architect of this loss of power of the Francophone leaders. Similar views were expressed by 0.
Ogenga, "Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zairian War" p. 50, who also pointed to Uganda's interventions in the
region as a Tutsi-ethnic expansionist nationalism supported by the US and Britain.
505 Interview with UG/FA/RW 3 held on 30 October 2005 in Kigali.
5°6 Museveni's attempt to have a say in Rwanda's issues was ridiculed outright by Kagame, who argued that Rwanda
was not obliged to listen to Museveni or to anybody else. In a highly heated defence of Rwanda, Kagame insisted
that Museveni referred to them as "... these young boys. These Rwandese don't listen to me. These boys I trained
personally... ", which was not warranted and therefore Rwanda had no obligation to listen to him. For a full text of
this expose, see Appendix 6. In contrast, some DRC rebels perceived Uganda to be a hegemonic power that had the
capacity to do much for the DRC but that it was not doing enough to end the DRC conflict because Museveni was
being confused by Rwanda. A former Congolese rebel leader insisted that if Uganda was to help the region, it had to











he would rely on Burundi to be part of his empire was extremely slim. Given such an
atmosphere, it was highly unlikely that Museveni could pursue hegemonic interests in a region
where his fellow leaders were challenging his influence. Museveni himself dismisses the Hima-
Tutsi Empire claim as rubbish, arguing as follows:
Then the misperceptions  which are being peddled by those against NRM, they say that Museveniwants
 to build a Hima Tutsi Empire. This is colonial trash... I think this is colonial trash, it is
absolute rubbish. In the first place, there has never ken a Hima-Tutsi empire because these twn
groups have near ken rulers, Himas have never been rulers... Hima and Tutsi are cattle keepers,
they are always looking after cows  in the bush. You cannot build an empire in the bush when  you
are looking after cows, you must be in the palace because that is where they build empires. 507
The other aspect of the regional hegemony design that makes the claim weak is the nature of
Uganda's capabilities at that time. Did Uganda have all the prerequisites of a regional power?
There are four prerequisites that a state must have to hold a regionally hegemonic position.
Firstly, the state must have a good geographical position. Secondly, it must have natural
resources and technological endowments. Thirdly, it must have immense industrial and military
capabilities compared to other states in the same region. Lastly, it must have intangible resources,
such as a national morale, and a high quality of government and diplomacy .508" To this, we could
add a fifth prerequisite: it must be internationally accepted as having a central position in a
specific region.
Uganda fulfilled only one of the requirements, which helps to explain why its bid to hold a
regional hegemony cannot be convincingly defended. Geographically, Uganda is a landlocked
country that depends on Tanzania and Kenya for most of its trade. This makes it vulnerable and
unable to extend its power even if it wanted to. Secondly, although it is endowed with natural
resources, it lacks the technological capacity to exploit them optimally. Resources, like copper,
that were once profitably exploited are nearly exhausted and its exports of other resources, like
hydro-electric power, are also lagging. Whereas it could be argued that Uganda has a high quality
of government by World Bank standards, these have not translated into better public welfare for
its citizens. The last prerequisite, a military capability, could indeed be claimed by Uganda claim.
However, events in the GLR have also demonstrated otherwise, particularly given the economic
strain the GLR wars have placed on Uganda and the successive defeats it has suffered in the
507 Y. Museveni in his address to Parliament during the Special session of 16 September 1998, Hansard, p. 4914.
508 See H. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to Intervene", in Foreign Affairs, (1967), pp. 426, and S. Strange,











three wars of Kisangani. A further analysis of the military capacity of the states in the region puts
Uganda second to Sudan. See Table 6, which compares the military capability of selected regional
states.
Table 6: Military Structure of Five GLR States
The security structure above can be used to compare the military capacities. If Uganda did
indeed have designs of becoming a hegemonic power, it would have required a high calibre of
soldiers, a maximally equipped military, a strong military capability and colossal sums of money
to address the security problems of the region.'" Yet from the above table, it is clear that
Uganda's military expenditures" is far lower than that of Sudan. Considering that Uganda
received training from the US, particularly for the ACM, we could argue that it used this as a
premise for its interventions, although military-style interventions were not the sole interventions
undertaken by Uganda. We could argue that it was more the role that the US gave Uganda
through the ACM rather than the President's own hegemonic ambitions that motivated it to
intervene in the neighbouring states.
509 There are no figures in the DRC column because data could not be collected due to the wars and the political
transition of the state.
510 In the Ministry of Defence Report of 1996 to 1997, the Minister of Defence requested a bigger budget to equip
the army with more troop carriers, station wagons for commanders, and staff vehicles for military intelligence and
military police. The army still needed uniforms, helicopter repairs, and maintenance of its motor vehicles to improve
operations in Northern Uganda. See Policy statement for Ministry of Defence for the financial year 1996/1997, p. 7.
511 The actual figures of the Ministry of Defence expenditures are far greater than this source quotes. The Ministry
often negotiates for more money using the justification that it is addressing the security situation in Uganda and that











Museveni's interventions in Rwanda in 1990 and the later intervention in the DRC have aso been
attributed to his nature as a kingmaker5 ' and as a warmonger.513 Some think that Museveni
intervened in other states because he believed these lacked the capacity to manage their own
affairs. Ironically, his patronizing behaviour and belief that he was a regional policeman had
involved Museveni in every conflict in the GLR. 514 Museveni disputed claims that he was
patronizing, however, and argued that these reasons were too simplistic to explain Uganda's
interventions. He pointed out that regional leaders, like Kabila, had approached him during their
earlier struggle to request military support, which he initially objected to giving.' He argued that
he was not a warmonger and dismissed the hearsay that Uganda had fought Rwanda in 1999 and
later in 2000 over trivial issues, such as the trading of insults. In his own words, President
Museveni said:
I have, however, been told that the differences between  Uganda and Rwanda are caused by
Ugandans looking dozen upon Rwandese. I was told by one of the senior leaders of Rwanda  that
somebodyhad said that the RPA vas part of UPDF• that Rwandais a district of Uganda; nd
that Brigadier Kayumba, the RPA Chief of staff; was a Sergeant in Uganda... [therefore, if
somebody can really believe that those are the kinds of issues that can cause people to shoot at each
other, there must be something wrong with our ideas! I told the leaders of Rwanda that some
Rwandese are always abusing me, even in the newspaper, but I cannot take that as a national
policy. Even if somebody  abuses me, so what? That is his problem, not mine Gm I pick a gun and
shoot people just because somebody has said that Museveni is senile, as they have keen saying.. ?5 16
Irrespective of his position that he was not a warmonger, there was a consensus among the
opposition and some embassy officials that Uganda had not intervened in other states until
Museveni came to power. They thus mentioned Museveni's support to the SPLA of Sudan, and
his interventions in Rwanda in 1990 and 1994 to support their view that Museveni was a
warmonger. Museveni's insistence that Ugandan leaders before him had intervened in
512 Onyango Obbo remarked that, "We (implying Uganda) perceived ourselves as the Great Lakes King makers, best
illustrated by the private views many people held (and some still hold) of Rwanda as Uganda's outback... Haruna
Kanabi, editor of the Shariat (a local newspaper), expressed this view publicly regarding Uganda's expansion into
Rwanda describing it as Uganda's 40th district where Pasteur Bizimungu was the "Resident District Commissioner".
This joke landed him in prison, but it reflected the kind of views some people held of Uganda". See 0. Onyango,
"Museveni: Foreign Policy Schemer Or just Getting By?" The East African, April 28-May 4 (1997)
513 Museveni used this term to express his annoyance at how people (particularly the opposition) referred to him.
See Museveni's address to Parliament in September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4906.
514 Kagame, in his interview with a Monitor scribe, argued that Museveni's interventions were motivated by
Museveni's conviction that no one knew better than he did and that he perceived himself as best suited to solve the
problems of Africa. See the full interview that appeared in the Monitor publication in Appendix 8.
515 Museveni reported to Parliament, presented on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p.4909.
516 Museveni's address to Parliament, held on 28 May 2000, "Uganda's Involvement in the Great Lakes Region," p.
25. (On some occasions, when President Museveni addresses the Uganda Parliament the address is published into a











Zaire/Congo was meant to justify his intervention in the DRC. It should be understood though
that, whereas the Congo was the only state that Uganda had intervened in throughout the entire
Cold War era (i.e. from 1963-1965). Museveni in the space of twenty years (i.e. from 1986 to
2006) had intervened eleven times in neighbouring states, both unilaterally and through the
collective regional arrangements.
Further support for the argument that Museveni is a warmonger has been drawn from the
decision to intervene in Rwanda in 1990: the Rwandan Tutsi, who were formerly in his army,
attacked Rwanda and over-ran the Eastern part of Rwanda for a couple of days. It is claimed that
Uganda facilitated the return of the Tutsi emigres to Rwanda, using Ruhama as the base in the
Mirama hills. The Tutsi obtained logistical as well as financial support from Uganda to wage a
war on Rwanda's Hutu-dominated regime of Habyarimana. Uganda's support has been ably
demonstrated by an interviewee as follows:
[N]tungamow sthe tactical and signal base and communicationspoint th t the e RPF used
Ntungcanowas wry strategic becauseit was proximate to Rwanda and from Mirama hills
propellers or large artillery guns could easily fire into Rwanda,. Kizingo in Ngoma sub-county was
another tactical base and front that the RPF used in entering Rwanda . They entered through
Nyakatare (local as Nyagatare in kinyarwanda). Secondly from a sociological point of view,
the sub-counties of Ntungamo, Ruhama, Rwechiniro  and Ruhama were  dominated by Ruandese  of
Tutsi origin who had fled  in the 1959 and 1972 annihilation attempts by the Hutu government
This provided the RPF with social support as well as fall bade bases in case of hot pursuit.
Another entry point was Kamwezi in Kabale. This was the main route of the RPF recruits...
Ntungamo was the drawback centre following the initial defeat of the RPF until they regrouped to
attack Rwanda again.'"
What emerges from this account of the 1990 attack on Rwanda is that it was a well co-ordinated
war, which must have been aided by Uganda as a state. The President denied complicity in this
attack, although critics insist that such an attack could not have been orchestrated without his
full knowledge. It is clear from his address to Parliament that plans to invade Rwanda were
known to him and that, as he states, he advised them [my emphasis] at the preparatory stages. 518
He confirms his complicity in the subsequent narration of events preceding the invasion as
follows:
517 Interview held with a Rwandese Tutsi former combatant of the 1990 Rwandan invasion, held in Kabale, on 19
October 2005.
518 The timing of the attack could have been without his knowledge and that explains one respondents confession of











[T]heNRM governmentadopted a dual position. First of allwe tri  yhard o convince he late
President Habyarimana to reach a political settlement with these young people and the fora they
were representing At the same time,we  derided also to support these young people materially so that
they would not he defeated militarily. In which  case, they would be forced to come back to Uganda
and that could cause us a lot of problems . So [zee] adopted a dual strategy. On the one hag give
them material support; so that would not be defeated but on the other hand negotiate so that we get
overwith this problem. ... [blames the international community for not doing anything to ensure
that the Rwandese of Tutsi origin return to their country . What had the UN done to solve  that
problem?... We supported Rwanda materially. Again we gave them materials to defend themselves
against these barbaric groups supported by Mobutu. But we refused to involve our own troops for the
reasons I have mentioned above... 519
This claim that he refused to involve Ugandan troops has been highly contested, and many
scholars' have argued that Uganda did intervene directly by providing military troops as well as
covertly aiding the invasion logistically. Logistical support to a group of dissidents to overthrow
a seated government is often motivated by many factors but, in the case of Uganda, it has been
attributed to Museveni's character as a warmonger. Some interviewees pointed to a reciprocal
arrangement between Museveni and the Rwandan Tutsi to put him in power in return for
support to put them (the Rwandan Tutsi) in power.
6.6 Summary
The general view presented in this chapter is that interventions are a result of leaders' individual
decisions. In other words, the leader will choose policy options depending on what he perceives
as important to the state, or to his regime. The decision to intervene, for example, is arrived at
after the leader weighs the available options depending on the factors that matter most to him.
The decisions arrived at may not be entirely the best, but are chosen based on their pay-off and
the fact that they are unlikely to hurt the leader politically. It is argued that Museveni's decisions
to intervene in the neighbouring states was mainly a result of what he perceived as the best
option in his view and based on his claimed experience in the geo-politics of the region.
Museveni's perceptions of himself as an important leader in the region and the implicit role that
the US, Britain and other European states gave him as a police officer of the GLR greatly
influenced his decisions. It also influenced his belief that his interventionist foreign policy was
519 Museveni's address to Parliament on the 16th September 1998
520 See G. Prunier , The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide,  (New York Columbia University Press 1995), pp 93-












merely a benevolent attempt to fill the gap that the failure of the "adults" (in other words, the
West and the international community) had left in their overt decisions not to intervene in
African conflicts.
This chapter has shown that, whereas interventionist foreign policies may be motivated by
attempts to divert attention away from domestic demands for power re-distribution and pressure
for internal reform in political organisations, these were not significant in influencing Museveni's
decisions to intervene. This is because Museveni has a powerful control over the government of
the country, he has a loyal army despite the squabbles among its officers, and he has the majority
seats in Parliament, which he uses to retain power. He thus did not need to divert attention away
from any domestic problems of inequitable power sharing. Note that power sharing in Uganda is
non-existent, after all. Opposition, and political opponents are actively discouraged, if not
threatened. Thus it can be argued that Museveni is so powerful internally, that he embarks on
interventions in his neighbouring countries, because he knows that as long as the country is
fighting wars externally, the population will want to keep him in power - knowing that if he is
voted out or deposed, then they will be even worse off.
6.7 Theoretical Assessment
The poliheuristic theory used in this analysis of interventionist foreign policy is an appropriate
approach because it emphasises the centrality of the individual leader, highlighting how his
decision-making procedure informs his decisions. The focus on the decision-making processes
is also vital because, as drawn from the experience with which these interventions were taken, it
is evident that they were chosen cautiously with a view to minimise the negative effects they
would have on the leader's geopolitical position at home, regionally and internationally. They
were undertaken with the intention to solve what the leader argued were obvious security
concerns. Other ambitions cannot be ruled out entirely though. The strength of Poliheurism lies
in its ability to explain why Uganda intervened in Burundi, which at the time had no immediate
or direct impact on Uganda's security. The poliheuristic theory implies that leaders have
calculated their options and chosen the option that most favours their political position. It may
be correct to insist that leaders play a central role in determining foreign policy but, at the same
time, both the nature of regional politics and the timing of major regional events and that
leaders' foreign relations are equally influential in the ways the leaders project their foreign











interventions, but also other forms of interventions, as well as explaining why states may decide
not to intervene in others.
Whereas Poliheurism provides a viable interpretation of states' interventionist foreign policies
especially in as far as leaders use their cognitive abilities to make decision, it is not nearly
comprehensive enough to cover all perspectives of these interventions because of its
methodological limitations. There is a dearth of documentary evidence with regard to decision-
making processes, particularly in Africa where decisions are made 'behind closed doors' / in
secret. This makes it impossible to review whether leaders made choices using their cognitive
abilities given specific in the foreign policy arena. For example, in studying a leader's decision-
making process it does not help us understand why interventions result in wars, which were
initially supposed to be avoided. A good case here are the Kisangani wars between Uganda and
Rwanda in the DRC, it was evident that these clashes would negatively affect the local
population and would lead to military losses, and yet the military commanders went ahead with
fighting.
When Poliheurism articulates how leaders make their decisions, it does not take cognisance of
the other role-players, like military commanders who often take power into their own hands or
advisors who give the wrong advice, which often makes interventions disastrous mistakes. As De
Rouen has noted, "the methodology of theory-orientated case studies of foreign policy derision making is still in
its infancy... [and]much  'work needs to be done before the method becomes a reliable  intellectual tool 
u521 Inspite
of this limitation, Poliheurism remains a good approach. The methodological limitation is
possible to control by triangulating sources. These sources could include mass media reports,
investigative reports by organisations outside the state and presidential speeches. In this study,
these sources were invaluable. Other theories can also bridge the gap that Poliheurism leaves
unfilled. In the next chapter, one such theory is discussed.












LIBERALISM: UGANDA'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION
In some cases, to get the economy going, you need some wars to change the situation, otherwise
the situation does not change the economy will never grow522
[al intern. tons invoke the exercise of power, all involve, in one way  or another taking sides in
local political conflicts, and the motives for all interventions are mixed'
7.0 Introduction
This chapter analyses the major interpretation that has characterised the debate on Uganda's
motives for intervening in neighbouring states. Uganda's interventions have been interpreted as
being driven by imperialist designs to occupy and control the natural wealth of collapsing
states.' Its intervention in the DRC in particular has been criticised as being Museveni's
`rational plan' to build Uganda's economic and military prowess in the region by using the DRC's
wealth as the main base for this project, which would subsequently lead Uganda to become a
regional hegemonic power.' Secondly, Oxfam described the DRC intervention as a collective
scramble of unscrupulous neighbouring states for the wealth and spoils left unclaimed."' These
interpretations contrast sharply with Uganda's emphasis on its geo-security being the main
motivation of intervention.
522 Yoweri Museveni's address to the Special Session of Parliament, held on 16 September 1998, Hansard p. 4916.
523 Chris Brown, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Political Theory", in Moseley, A. and Richard, N.
(eds), Human Rights and Military Intervention, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p. 155.
524 For in-depth views on economic motives of intervention, see for example J. Clark, "Introduction: Causes and
Consequences of the Congo War", p.5; J. Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War: Uganda's Vietnam?",
PP. 152-153; J. Clark, "Explaining Uganda's Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Explanation", in Journal of
Modern African Studies, Vol 39, No 2 (2001), pp. 261-287; C. Kabemba, "The Democratic Republic of Congo: The
Quest for Sustainable Peace", in Kadima, D. and Kabemba, C. (eds), Wither Regional Peace and Security? The
Democratic Republic of Congo after the War,  (Pretoria: African Institute of Southern Africa, 2000), p. 105; Otunnu,
0., "Uganda as a Regional Actor in the Zairian War", p. 48; W. Reno, "Uganda's Politics of War and Debt Relief",
pp. 415-435; W. Reno, Warlord Politics in the Congo, p. 174; W. Makonero, "Background to the Conflict and
Instability in the African Great Lakes Region". in Kadima, D. and Kabemba, C. (eds), Wither Regional Peace and
Security? The Democratic Republic of Congo after the War,  (Pretoria: African Institute of Southern Africa, 2000), p.
73; C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 62-63 and A.
Boaz, "When good fences make bad neighbours: Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict", in
International Security, Vol 31, No 3 (Winter 2006/07), p. 170.
525 Oxfam characterises the intervention as "military commercialism" in which natural resource exploitation is the
key factor in determining military deployment and power in the region. See Oxfam, Briefing, Poverty in the Midst of












The chapter draws on the utilitarian liberal theory, which presupposes that interventions are wars
over resources, regardless of the intensity of the humanitarian situation in these states. Gilpin
and Gibbs' theory further posits that states will intervene in others to ensure that their own
economic interests are served.' Gilpin argued, for example that, "a state will seek to change the
international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal
costs of further changes are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits". Ideally, when states
gain more power in a region, they will seek to extend their territorial control by influencing the
political and economic arena of the region. States thus endeavour to expand with the motive of
becoming regional economic powers, until they realise that the cost of further expansion exceeds
or is equal to the benefits of such expansionist policies.' Political power is synonymous with
economic power, and superior economic competitiveness is accompanied by superior military
power.' In short, Giplin argues that states intervene in others to enhance and protect their
economic interests.
The central argument of the chapter is thus, that, whereas the economic motives of Uganda's
intervention cannot be completely ignored"°, the complex nature of the conflicts that occurred
in the states proximate to Uganda, had a greater influence in forcing Uganda to intervene than
did the economic motives. It is further argued that the illicit trade, which was most likely /
probably started by Uganda's military officers at the border, was in fact part of the already
existing nature of cross-border trade, and that this was merely amplified by the involvement of
Uganda's military actors who occupied the region. The third argument advanced in this chapter,
based on primary research and investigative reports of the intervention period, is that Uganda's
improved economic performance during this time was due to its intrastate economic policies,
partnership with key economic organisations and inter-state trade relations, and that economic
exploitation of the DRC had contributed minimally to its economic growth.
527 R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 50-51;
R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 85. He
later expounds it in his Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order,  (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 44; and D. Gibbs, The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines,
Money and U.S Policy in the Congo Crisis, pp. 28-33.
528 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations,  p. 87.
529 Ibid, p. 53.
530 The fact that both Rwanda and Uganda fought each other in the DRC, and that Kisangani is a diamond trade
centre is implicit of economic motives. C. Gray has described the Kisangani wars as the first time since the World
War II that foreign regular armies engaged themselves in the territory of the a third state arguably with a view to











7.1 Uganda's Economic and Security Nexus
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Uganda faced two main challenges in the region. Firstly, the
insecurity caused by conflicts in the neighbouring states affected Uganda's economy, and
particularly people's livelihood and trade in the border districts. Secondly, Uganda had drawn up
an economic strategy, which would require it to enhance its regional economic relations, yet the
geopolitical character of the region inhibited this strategy. If the region was to develop
economically, the insecurity being caused by insurgent groups thus had to be addressed.
Ironically, some of the areas occupied by the insurgent groups were the same areas that were
richly endowed with natural and mineral resources. 531 This gave rise to a dilemma for Uganda.
Was Uganda going to secure Uganda's borders without exploiting the economic opportunity this
region offered?"'
The findings of the study indicate that there was a deliberate decision among the leaders of the
GLR states of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC to secure the region against the many insurgent
groups in return for economic control of some parts of the DRC.' The interviewees believed
that Uganda had a general desire to see the region develop and especially to engage in mutually
viable economic relations, although there was an undercurrent of scepticism, as to whether
Uganda genuinely had such noble interests?' Interviewees argued that Uganda's intervention
531 In an interview with UG/FA/SA 1 held on 25 July 2005, he pointed out that, whereas Uganda wanted to
safeguard its borders, to intervene for commercial reasons was also on its agenda. The UPDF supported rebels in
the DRC who thrived and survived because of the illegal commercial trade in the DRC. The interviewee further
stated "Bembe (referring to Pierre Bembe the rebel leader of MLC group in the DRC) one of the rebel leaders and
former war lords made a lot of money from the trade and was able to have a big armed group because of the
benefits of the trade. Bosco (referring to Bosco Taganda) another rebel who made money and supported war is
being sought by the UN. The UN would like to see him arrested but all these people move around in Kampala and
we see them", the official emphasised. The latest Security Council Group of Experts on the DRC Report of 18 July
2006, S/2006/525highlighted that Bosco had been put on financial sanctions and travel bans but that none of the
GLR states and complied with upholding these sanctions by taking any action against Bosco, although he was
reportedly seen trading back and forth between Uganda and the DRC. See report p. 44.
532 Uganda's strategic location near DRC's rich Ituri region particularly near the Okimo pit mines, Sezere mine and
Mongbalu environs, were a significant attraction. See detailed geographic explanation by Casoliva, J. and Carrero, J.
"The African Great Lakes: Ten years of suffering, destruction and death", in Cristianisme i Justicia, Roger de Lluira
13, 08010 Barcelona (Spain), http://www.fespinal.com/espinal/llib/en93.rtf,  accessed on 12 June 2004.
533 In interviews with UG/MOD 1, interviewed on 30 July 2005, Kampala, UG/MOD 8, interviewed on 8 August
2005, Kampala and UG/MOD 2, interviewed on 5 October 2005, Kanungu/Ntungamo, all argued that Museveni,
Kagame and Kabila had agreed on some form of economic cooperation in which Uganda and Rwanda would
exploit certain areas' resources.
534 From many of the interviewees particularly those from MOFA and MOF, Uganda had an insatiable economic
drive to develop itself and the region in general. They quoted Uganda's regional trade initiative in trade organisations
set up in the region for example, Preferential Trade Area (PTA), Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and the East African Community (EAC). Uganda's African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) bid,
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was partly economically motivated and that this was consistent with the President's desire for
mutual trade with the regional states. A highly placed interviewee revealed:
[After  Kabila became President; Museveni selected us, a group of ten cabinet ministers; in 1997,
we metKabila. We discussed a wide range of issues Uganda was to b e in charge of commerce/trade
with the purpose to haw economic "dominance " of the Eastern Congo and he had proposed a road
from Mombasa to Kisangani so that trade and commerce %mid flourish but under Uganda's
dominance. Museveni was pushing for Uganda's businessmen to harness the wealth  of the... aah
Eastern Congo. This did not happen because Rwanda tried to control the Kinshasha government . It
tried to colonise the Kinshasha government  Kinshasa government resisted Rwanda's dominance
and of course Uganda opposed Rwanda's policy in the DRC. This was the beginning  of the
differencesbetw enUganda and Rwanda,'
The control of Eastern Congo that had been agreed upon by the Ugandan ministerial visitors
and Kabila did not take place, as had originally been planned because Kabila repudiated the tacit
agreement. Instead, Uganda's UPDF ended up controlling parts of Bunya and Kisangani, in
which the ADF and PRA operated, but which were also a lucrative business areas. Other areas
controlled by Uganda where trade was carried out on a large scale, included Buta and Isilo, all the
way up to Mahagi and Am."' Uganda also occupied and exploited North-Eastern Congo's gold-
rich Orientale Province areas of Haut uU'ele' district, and the Watsa territory, covering the gold
mines of Gorumbwa, Durba and Agbarabo.'
That said, though, the trade that emerged from this acclaimed ministerial visit did not turn out to
be what the President envisaged. Instead, the trade was carried out contrary to the operational
orders of Museveni; the people Museveni warned not to indulge in trade ironically became the
key players in exploiting the resources of the DRC.' One of the interviewees continued to argue
that:
From the joint military operations agreed upon', it was envisaged that Uganda would control the
Eastern part and ensure that trade was  carried out by Ugandan businessmen and that there zees to
direct investment and attracting foreign investors were further examples of its economic bids.
535 Interview with UG/FA 1 held on 16 November 2004 in Kampala at the Ministry office. In a corresponding
report by the Human Rights Watch, they argue that because of the business arrangements between the two
presidents, Uganda occupied North Eastern Congo from 1998 to 2003 its soldiers took direct control of the gold
rich areas and coerced gold miners to extract the gold for their benefit.
536 Interview with UG/MOD 7 held on 17 October 2004 at Kimaka, Jinja.
537 Ibid, the places the UG/MOD 7 referred to were also contained in subsequent reports by Human Rights Watch,
Democratic Republic Of Congo: The Curse Of Gold, (HRW, New York: 2005) p. 15.
538 Ibid, p. 15.
539 This joint military operations protocol is referred to in many encounters with interviewees involved in the DRC-











be mutual benefit for all the parties... unfortunately, when commanders Muzoora, Kazini, Colonel
Sonko, Colonel Otafire and a few others when they gott there, they got excited Saleh and Jovia
found a state "raped" economically and forgot the mandate (operational order we call it in thee army)
from the president They looked at the Colton, tinter, money, women, they were diverted This they
did as individuals, those were not orders or objectives or policies that g0 "L 077177071 had given them in
the operational order in the DRC. So ifthey exploited they were doing it on individual capacity.'
Museveni's response to the Judicial Commission's inquiry' explicitly details the kind of trade
that the President had in mind. An excerpt from the full transcript of the Justice Porter inquiry
below attests to Museveni's position.
Figure 9: Excerpt from the Porter Report
Source: Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report, Legal Notice NO. /2001, p.29
It emerges from President Museveni's submission to the Porter commission that, even though
President Kabila had revoked the arrangements made earlier, permitting Uganda to control and
exploit parts of the DRC, some Ugandans had followed through on the earlier arrangement.
protocol was signed on 27 April in 1998 and it provided for the joint action by Uganda and Congolese armed forces
in the DRC to stop armed irregulars in the border region.
54° Interview with UG/FA 1 held on 16 November 2004 in Kampala Ministry Office.
541 The Judicial Commission of Inquiry (here after referred to as Porter Commission) was set up by Uganda to
investigate the DRC allegations that Uganda had illegally exploited DRC mineral and natural resource wealth. While
appearing in front of the Porter Commission, Museveni in his defence of Uganda and himself in regard to the












Additionally, the President knew that trade was being carried out by the UPDF officers contrary
to his orders.
President Museveni's insistence that trade could be carried out by businessmen to take supplies
to the population was in itself not carefully thought out. This is because, in a bid to take supplies
to the ordinary population, the "politicians, soldiers and their families" who became traders,
could easily hide their identities - and that is what they did.
542
 In fact, the soldiers used military
aeroplanes to carry out trade in these areas for three years, despite the fact that the President had
prohibited this explicitly':
Figure 10: Excerpt from the Porter Report
Justice Porter. Yes. What was worrying us is that nearly four thousand businessmen
travelled back from the Congo, over the three years that we are talking about, on military
aeroplanes; and we did not think that your radio message authorised that....H-E
 the President; No no, No, that is a separate matter; I was not talking about that.
Justice Porter Right. Because those who authorise actually rely on this radio message....
RE The President: But what I was saying was that: soldiers, politicians or their families
should not do any business in Congo, because if they do, first, they would be diverted.
(This one, of course, I did not have to say all this in the message). They would be diverted
from their work and they may be involved - you know, because business always involve
conflict and so on and rivalries and they would be involved in all that. But business people
- Ugandan business people - should, if necessary, be assisted to do business; with security
because of the insecurity there because, I mean, there was also insecurity there....Because
here, we had ... I was bearing in mind that a town like Kisangani is a town of half-a-millon
people. If they go on without supplies for two weeks, three weeks, you can have a
humanitarian disaster....
Source: Judicial Commission of Inquiry Report, Legal Notice NO. /2001, p31
President Museveni's statement elucidates the situation on the ground and confirms that he was
aware that business was good and that he had encouraged it. His insistence, though, that the
military, politicians and their families should not engage in trade or business implies that there
were already reports about their involvement. Regardless of whether or not the UPDF engaging
in trade overlooked his commands or were in fact defiant of the President, it is clear from the
542 Salim Saleh's wife Jovia Akandanaho had shares in diamond smuggling companies in the DRC, and had
commercial dealings with key business actors named in the exploitation of the region, for example, Khalil Nazeem
Ibrahim a Lebanese, see The Panel of Experts Report, S/2002/1146, pp. 21-22 and Porter Report, p. 88.











Porter report that the President did not have control over the Eastern Congo or over his army. It
can be confirmed, however, that he supported an intervention in the region with a view to
establish trade between Uganda and the DRC.
In Burundi, the diplomatic intervention may have been aimed at improving the economy of the
area. Whereas Burundi had no obvious natural or mineral resources that Uganda would exploit, it
nonetheless offered potential economic partnerships, which required a stable environment for
mutual economic relations to be realised.' As the political situation in Burundi was not
conducive to trade, Uganda intervened to address the instability. Museveni was thus also pushing
the East African Community (EAC) council quickly to consider the inclusion of Burundi in the
EAC in order to consolidate the regional economic organisation as well as to stabilise trade.'"
Rwanda's economic attractions (or lack thereof) were similar to those of Burundi. Uganda's
intervention in Rwanda was primarily aimed at restoring peace following the genocide. Those
who had supported the intervention logistically, particularly the "Rwandan Tutsi", however,
expected to benefit from Rwanda's new government in the end. They planned to expand their
Ugandan businesses into Rwanda and to establish new branches of their companies in lucrative
business areas."'
It should be noted that, unlike the case in the DRC, Rwandan refugees who were successful
business people in Uganda predominantly supported the Ugandan intervention in Rwanda.
During the final intervention in 1994, the first batches of Ugandan-based Tutsi who went and
settled in Rwanda were Rwandan businesspersons who had operated in Uganda."' One
interviewee referred to well-known people like, Mugabe', Mugisha549 Emma Kato550, and many
544 Confidential interviews with IO/UNHCR held on 7 September 2005, in Hoima, Uganda.
545 Interview with UG/FA/BU 1 held in Kampala, 29 July 2005. He further argued that, "Being part of the Great
Lakes region, a neighbour of the DRC, Rwanda and Tanzania, Burundi shares in the trade it is a member of
COMESA so if one of the countries gets insecure it affects the trade in the region as a whole. Burundi and Rwanda
joined the East African Community in November 2006."
546 Interview with UG/FA/RW 1 held on 24 October 2005 in Kigali.
547 Ibid.
548 Mugabe is a name that features in the Panel of Expert's Report Addendum as having been involved in the illicit
trade in the DRC.
549 Joseph Mugisha is in-charge of a lot of Rwanda's reconstruction tenders in the new Rwandese government.
550 An arms dealer involved in Rwanda and Uganda's military procurement scams, see for example President
Museveni's probe into an arms deal. Vision Reporter, "Museveni begins probe into tank purchase", The New











others. The other Ugandans who returned to Rwanda were described as "economic refugees"
who sought jobs and other minor engagements in Rwanda.'
Uganda's economic interests in the region are also further supported by the graphic
representation of people's perceptions of Uganda's intervention in the three states. The results of
interviewees' perceptions regarding the question which of the three countries was of more
economic value for Uganda varied significantly, as can be seen from the pie chart below.
Figure 11: People's perceptions of Uganda's economic interests in selected GLR states
Source: Census Results explaining Interviewees' Perceptions of Uganda's Economic Interests in the GLR.
The DRC's economic attraction for Uganda's intervention ranked highest, as compared to
Rwanda and Burundi. What is puzzling about the results is why the interviewees thought that
Uganda had higher interests in maintaining economic relations with Burundi than Rwanda when
Burundi is located further away from Uganda.
During in-depth interviews, policy makers, the military and ministry official interviewees were
asked whether Uganda had intervened because of its economic interests or because it had other
551 Interview with UG/FA/RW 3 held on 30 October 2005. It should be noted, however, that the Ugandans
referred to here are mainly the Rwandese who had been in Uganda initially as refugees, but after gaining an












interests (these other interests were also outlined in the schedule, see Appendix 2). The response
was that, compared to other interests, the economic interest was ranked highest', when tabled
against the other factors included in the schedule. See the chart below.
Figure 12: Chart showing causes of Uganda's Intervention in the GLR States
Source: Census Results from In-depth Interviews comparing the various Motivations of Intervention
The general perception of Uganda's intervention was that economic interests had been more
important than its interest in the ruling parties of the neighbouring states or the fact that it it had
an opportunity to intervene. The claims that Uganda intervened because it had interest in the
parties that ruled in either state were rated less important than geographical proximity, except for
Burundi. For Rwanda, interviewees thought its proximity and economic interests that Uganda
had in it drove Ugandan's intervention.
552 Note that security was not included in this calculation because it was worked out separately in the overall











Although the President on numerous occasions reluctantly refused to acknowledge that
economic motives were also a factor in Uganda's interventions,' it was evident from his
addresses that he perceived economic intervention as an exclusively Ugandan characteristic of
international relations. He often drew on the 1965 Uganda intervention in the Congo to augment
his argument that Ugandan governments had always had interventionist foreign policies.'"
Drawing from Ugandan history, he cited an incident in which Uganda had been involved in a
Gold Scandal in the Congo in 1965555: the implication was that there was a pattern of
intervention by Ugandan governments in the past, and that they frequently became involved in
regional issues of other states. It is clear from the findings that Museveni's interventionist
foreign policy is premised on the hope that bilateral trade would flourish and that regional trade
would develop and be better organised.' He did not anticipate that trade in the GLR states
would lead to negative inter-state relations, which happened in the case of the DRC. The
interventions were aimed at ensuring that Uganda's strategy to develop economically was not
hindered by poor bilateral relations, which were creating insurgency in the region. Museveni's
support of the defunct Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and its subsequent replacement Common
Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and EAC trade partnership is clear
testimony of this interest. Uganda continued to trade with all three neighbours despite being
criticized for intervening in these states. The DRC continued to import more merchandise from
Uganda in the intervention period, while Rwanda and Burundi had varied performance from year
to year as can be seen in tables 9, 10 and 11.
553 President Museveni often boasted that Uganda had phosphates in Tororo, iron ore in Muko and oil in the
Western Rift Valley that it had not yet exploited because of financial limitations. He argued that it was more
reasonable to exploit Uganda's natural resources than the much harped-about minerals in the DRC and that he was
persuading Americans based in South Africa to come and invest in Uganda. See for example his address to
Parliament on 28 May 2000 in Kampala, "Speech on Uganda's Involvement in the Great Lakes Region", pp. 6-7.
55a See Museveni's address to parliament on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4906.
555 In 1965, Uganda intervened in the Congo in support of Patrice Lumumba and provided military equipment and
training to Lumumba's men. In exchange, the military commander then "Idi Amin" (later to become president of
Uganda in 1971 following a military coup against Obote) was allegedly given some gold bars that he appropriated
for his own personal use. When the Parliament moved for a vote of no confidence in Obote because of his covert
operations in the Congo, it is alleged that he instructed Amin to raid the King's Palace and what ensued was the
Kabaka Crisis of 1966, in which the gold scandal was highly implicated.
556 From the time Museveni assumed power, he argued that the African states' problem was their failure to
transform the economic base and to have access to large markets so that the African producers would sell
sustainably into the international and regional markets. See his Key Note Address at a Symposium on the Great
Lakes Region commemorating President Mwalim Nyerere, delivered on 8 April 2002, International Conference











7.2 Reflections on Uganda's Economic Relations
Uganda, like many other African states, has been increasingly marginalised from the world
economy, with their total share of global trade and capital falling from 7 percent in the 1950s to
6 percent in the 1960s, down to 1 percent today. 557 The Economic Sustainability Index (EST) that
was created by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) shows that of all the states that
intervened in the DRC, Uganda was among the ten worst performers, together with Chad,
Burundi, Ethiopia and the DRC.558 Uganda's strategic location next to Sudan and the DRC, both
of which are big countries, has not improved its economic relations with these two states. As
Herbst and Mill observe, Sudan and the DRC in fact pose a continual threat to their neighbours
since their bad economic record has had a dampening effect on the dynamism of the region.'"
In fact, the conflicts in these two countries have spilt over in multiple ways, such as causing
increased refugee populations, increased crime rates and enormous Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALWs) proliferation. These outcomes have aggravated insecurity in the region and,
in turn, have affected the economic development of the region as a whole.' In spite of this,
Uganda continues to trade with its neighbours at bilateral level through local trade at border
crossings and at regional level with other trade zones like the COMESA and EAC.
Local Trade
At local level, trade across borders often occurs on established market days that are held in
gazetted places, except for the small retail shops that are dotted around the communities. At this
level, trade between communities is often managed and overseen by district personnel.
Rwandans and Congolese bring in specific merchandise, such as fuel, cloth, food stuffs and other
household commodities. Sometimes it involves expensive sales in livestock, cars, and land 561
Ugandan communities also trade in more or less similar merchandise, such as second hand
clothes, new Chinese fabrics (often much cheaper than the new clothes from other countries),
557 J. Herbst and G. Mills., The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?  (International Institute of Strategic Studies:
Oxford University Press, 2003), Adelphi papers 361, p. 7.
558 Ibid, p. 19.
559 Ibid.
560 Ibid, p. 20.
561 Focus group interviews held with border staff at Uganda Revenue Authority and local council leaders. See details
of these interview dates (focus group discussions held on 15 August 2005 in Bunagana, Kisoro border with the DRC
and another at Kyanika (Chanika) Kisoro, border with Rwanda held on 16 August 2005). This information is











match boxes, paraffin, food stuffs and other household commodities. Sometimes, if the
Congolese or Rwandan have relatives in Uganda, they may even buy land from Ugandans
neighbouring their relations to enable them carry out agriculture or set up small businesses.'"
The common currencies used in the trade between Uganda and the DRC are Ugandan shillings
and US dollars. The latter are used in local transactions and exchanged at gazetted places by
mobile personal handling forex bureaus (i.e. money changers) on the Uganda-DRC border. On
the Rwanda563-Uganda border and in Uganda-Burundi trade, either Ugandan money or Rwandan
or Burundi francs are used In all the local currencies, the Uganda shilling is by far the weakest at
a ratio of Rwanda: Burundi: Uganda, 3:2:1.'
562 Interview with UG/MOLG 25 of Ntungamo held on 5 October 2005.
563 Rwanda's francs are also called mafaranga Kinyarwanda, while those of Burundi are called mafaranga Kirundi.
%4 The ratio of the exchange rate presented here is calculated from my experience as a researcher. I had to purchase











Source: Compiled from Interviews held in the Ugandan Districts bordering Rwanda and the DRC
Figure 13 shows that there was and continues to be active trade between border districts, mainly
in food and livestock. Trade of minerals and timber was highest in Kabale and Bundibugyo
respectively.'" The trade in guns and ammunition was very limited, although, considering that it
was done in a clandestine manner, it was not possible to establish accurate figures or the contact
points of the traders.'" Further, the mineral trade was not recorded at the border points because
these items were transported using air carriers, which took the minerals directly to the buyers. 567 "
When the traders used road transport, the minerals transited through the border checks as
classified goods.'" The respondents also mentioned that trade in items like arms and
ammunition usually involved security and military personnel who conducted the trade in an
illegal manner. This meant that such trade was not recorded because it had been carried out in a
covert manner. This contrasted with the situation at the Northern Uganda border with Sudan
and the eastern border with Kenya, where, although no records were kept of trade in guns and
ammunition, these items were sold in open markets in small piles. A gun cost the same as a
chicken in Uganda (approximately $3)
569
 at such open market places.
The respondents from the border communities regarded the existing GLR trade relations as
cordial. Their only complaints about the local trade were the exorbitant taxes that traders were
being charged at both country borders and the confiscation of smuggled goods by border
customs revenue posts.' There were also petty thefts and smu I t: ling of goods on both Rwanda
and DRC borders with Uganda, which sometimes created some minor insecurity for the border
communities.
565 There were no corresponding indications that these transactions in minerals or timber were recorded by the
Uganda Revenue Authority. The other merchandise particularly from Uganda into Rwanda, Burundi and DRC was
taxed and clearance provided to the traders. The entries were mainly of large consignments of merchandise,
excluding the bicycle traders and head pottage traders.
566 The reasons why minerals and arms were least projected in the table as interviewees' responses were because the
trade involved high security personnel or well protected illegal networks that eluded the police and border
administrators.
567 The respondents at the border posts speculated about this possible mode of transport but it was reflected in the
UN Panel of Experts Report on trade in the DRC.
568 Confidential interviews with UG/MOLG 36 in charge of customs at the borders of Kabale, Kanugu and
Bundibugyo.
569 In a confidential interview with UG/MOLG 12 held in Ntungamo on 3 October 2005 he argued that the guns
and ammunition trade was not recorded but was overtly done with the full knowledge of the security operatives in
the region.











Regional and International Trade
At the regional level, Uganda has legitimate trade relations with the GLR states and more
specifically with its western neighbours of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. Regional trade is
controlled at the official level by the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry through the
various boards of trade. The nature of the goods that Uganda and her western neighbours trade
in do not vary greatly. Considering that they are all raw material exporters, Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda compete for more or less the same international market for coffee and other raw
materials.' The only advantage that Uganda has over Burundi and Rwanda is its proximity to
the main trade port of Mombasa, despite its land-locked nature. The DRC has a comparative
advantage over the trio because it has an unrivalled access to the international markets of
extremely highly priced metals, stones and other resources, including gold, diamonds and other
special yet crucial minerals like coltan, copper, uranium and others. At the regional trade level,
Burundi depends heavily on Uganda and Rwanda's commodities exports. Uganda imports far
less from Rwanda and Burundi than what it exports to these states.
The GLR trade occurs within an established framework of COMESA and now EAC. 572 The
inter-state trade relies on controls established and operated by each member state at the border
trade points where the imports or exports leave the territory of one state and enter the territory
of another. Achievements of this interdependence require a high degree of mutual confidence
and trust between the states', factors that are greatly compromised by the current geo-political
conflicts.
Uganda trades with many other states and regions. The European Union', for example, has
remained the major trading partner throughout 1996-2005. With a total market share of 26.3% in
2003, it is second to COMESA, which has a market share of 27.7 percent of trade. COMESA
member states altogether contribute 79% of Uganda's market share.' The other trade partners
571 Interview with a UG/TTI 1 held in Kampala on 23 November 2005.
572 By the end of 2006, Rwanda and Burundi had joined the East African Community, which was followed by the
ratification on 18 June 2007.
573 There is great mistrust in the region amongst the leaders, as each leader accuses the other of harbouring
dissidents and providing bases from which these dissidents carry out subversive activities against their regimes.
574 The EU trade partners in order of market share are Netherlands, United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium. See
UBOS Report of 2003.











are North America, which has 2.7 percent' of the market share and the Asian continent' with
a 9.3 percent market share. Uganda exports, among others, coffee, vanilla, roses, cut flowers, fish
and fish products. In the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region, Uganda trades with
South Africa (currently, a key investor) and Swaziland. Egypt contributes to Uganda's market
share too.'
7.3 Uganda's Trade and Economic Performance in the Intervention Period
The findings of the study demonstrate that Uganda's interventions did not necessarily lead to
tremendous economic development during its interventionist era of 1996-2002579, as the figures
reported by the United Nations Panel of Experts and other critics have claimed. It is argued that
Uganda's economic performance improved during that period, and that Uganda's strategy of
improving its trade and developing its economy were therefore achieved as a result of its
interventions and with the emergence of illegal trade and illegal exploitation of the resources of
its neighbouring states.' Uganda's regional trade contributed greatly to Uganda's economy and
trade figures indicated that there was no overwhelming difference in these figures during the
period of intervention compared to when Uganda was not intervening. Furthermore, the
economic exploitation of the region that Uganda's critics allude to ignores the fact that such
exploitation and second economy' existed even before the intervention period. What the
interventions did was to expose this illicit trade and enlist new players. In order to establish
Uganda's economic performance during the intervention period of 1996-2005, it is thus
necessary to first examine Uganda's economic interests and relations in the region and then
analyse its trade performance.
576 Trade with the United States of America has increased with the establishment of AGOA, see Uganda Bureau of
Statistics Report of 2003.
57 In Asia, Uganda's trade partners are Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong; for more detail see the Uganda Bureau of
Statistics Report of 2005.
578 No figures were available for the trade between Uganda and Egypt.
579 See Panel of Experts Report Addendum of 2002. The Panel of Experts was a selected UNSC investigative group
assigned to establish that the states that intervened in the DRC had illegally exploited the DRC and intervened for
economic exploitation purposes. See also Reno's analysis of Uganda's hard pressed rulers who used theft from
neighbouring states to consolidate domestic political gains, in "Uganda's Politics of War and Debt Relief", in Review
of International Political Economy, pp. 415-416 and pp. 421 -222.
580 Ibid.
581 The term "second economy" is borrowed from MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga. It is used to refer to
activities people carry out to survive the hardships of poor states. These activities are unmeasured, unrecorded and
are carried out outside or on the margins of the law and deprive the state of revenue, see J. MacGaffey and R.
Bazenguissa-Ganga, African Issues: Congo-Paris Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law, (Oxford: James











Uganda's Trade Performance 1996-2005
Uganda's interventions in the GLR states were aimed at improving its economy and reports from
the Panel of Experts indicate that Uganda's trade and exploits from the DRC not only improved
its economy but helped it ease the burden of its growing current account deficits in 1997. This
was because gold and gold compounds were Uganda's second largest export earnings after
cooper during 1997-2001. 582 Uganda's trade in the region had greatly improved its revenue and
the general economic performance between 1997 and 1998. What the available figures' do not
tell us with any degree of accuracy is whether trade between Uganda and other states like
Rwanda and Burundi was affected. Specific focus on these states does not provide sufficient
proof of how their trade led to an improved economic performance. An examination of the
revenue from all these states is crucial to show which country's trade has brought more revenue
and in which year. Data on Uganda's mineral exports between 1994 and 2000 indicate that the










Source: Uganda Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 2000 (Data covers January to October)
According to the table, Uganda exported more gold than it produced between 1999 and 2000
despite the marginal drop. This has been explained by the fact that huge amounts of gold exited
Uganda's trade customs points so it was recorded as re-exports from Uganda even though the
states of origin of the gold were not Uganda. Similarly, Uganda exported Coltan between 1997
and 1999 even it did not produce it. These exports have been used to explain Uganda's economic
intervention in the regional (more specifically the DRC) with a view to exploit the region to its
economic advantage. Diamond sales have also been used to bolster the argument that Uganda
benefited economically from the exploitation of the DRC, see Table 8 below.
Table 8: Uganda: Rough diamond exports, 1997-October 2000
Year Volume(carats) Value
(United States dollars)
1997 1 511.34 198 302
1998 11 303.86 1 440 000
1999 11 024.46 1 813 500
2000 9 387.51 1 263 385
Source: Diamond High Council
The graph below illustrates this even more clearly:










It is indisputable that Uganda does not have diamonds yet records from the world trade
indicated that it exported diamonds. Interviewees explained that the trade in diamond was not
necessarily carried out by Ugandan's perse. The diamond trade revenue that accrued was
obtained from the foreign companies traders at Uganda's ports of entry and exit. Further, other
companies that belonged to other states and did not necessarily belong to Uganda registered the
diamonds that exited Uganda.' It was clear that Uganda was a conduit through which diamond
was traded in but there were interviewees who pointed out that the government was aware that
this trade was being carried out. Another mineral from the DRC that increased Uganda's
revenue was niobium. The Panel of Experts argued that Uganda exported great quantities of
niobium between 1997 and 1999, but that it did not export any niobium prior to 1997 (see
figures below) 585







Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data)
The graph overleaf portrays a clearer picture of this.
584 Interview with UG/TTI 2, held at Ministry office on 23 November 2005. The Ministry official also commented
that the Ministry had no concrete figures on diamonds as an export of Uganda so it was not possible to explain the
figures.
585 In all the trade figures discussed in this section, no follow-up figures were provided by the Panel of Experts
report that explained Uganda's economic exploitation of the DRC, therefore, it was impossible to examine the
trends to be able to arrive at a conclusion that would verify that in fact Uganda did not continue to export as much











From the tables and graphs' above, Uganda's export of gold'', diamonds and niobium mineral
in the late 1990s exceeded its exports of the early 1990s by far. The tables also show that these
increases in exports were higher than production and coincided with Uganda's occupation of the
Eastern DRC. The findings of the study indicate that, although the increase in exports coincided
with Uganda's occupation of Eastern DRC, Uganda's economic performance during this period
can be partly attributed to internal economic adjustments and policies.' Uganda established a
new trade liberalization policy in 1996, which gave more opportunity to conduct export trade by
removing restrictions.' Proof of the impact of the trade reform on increasing market access was
not only limited to the non-traditional exports for example gold, diamonds or other minerals but
also to the traditional exports for example coffee, tea and other agricultural products.."'
586 These graphs and tables are extracted from the Panel of Experts Report to the UNSC regarding the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. Corresponding figures were also obtained from the Panel and from
the Ugandan-DRC customs border posts records for 1998, 1999 and 2000.
587 The Panel of Experts reported that the Central Bank of Uganda officials reportedly acknowledged to IMF
officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports did not reflect Uganda's gold production levels but rather that
some gold exports might have been "leaking over the borders" from the DRC. The central bank reported that, by
September 1997, Uganda had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared with $60 million in 1996 and $23
million in 1995. The difference in the exports has been accounted for by Uganda's re-exports, i.e. goods that entered
Uganda and exited Uganda as if they were Uganda products/goods.
588 For a detailed explanation of this economic policy, see 0. Morrissey, N. Rudaheranwa and L. Moller, Trade
Policies, Performance and Poverty in Uganda, (ODI, EPRC, and Nottingham Report, 2003), p. 3. They argue that in
the early 1990s Uganda had a strong protectionist and highly distorted trade regime, with taxes on coffee (the major
export) and high tariffs and restrictions on imports.
589 Interview with UG/MOF 3, held on 12 November in Kampala, Ministry offices.











Trade figures from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) explain performance in the period
1990-2001 more clearly. Table 9 provides a comparison of the export trade of both traditional
and non-traditional goods. Whereas the table indicates that gold, gold compounds and other
precious compounds performed very well, there were variations from year to year. (There are
also contradictor), figures: for example, in 1999, the government reported that it had exported
7.0 percent whereas the Panel of the Experts Report indicated that it exported 11.45 percent as
can be seen in Table 10 overleaf) 591 Despite the discrepancy in the percentages, Table 10 does
provide an overall picture of Uganda's trade performance. Traditional exports, such as coffee,
cotton, tobacco and tea, and non-traditional exports contributed enormously to this
performance.
argument that by the end of the 1990s, a more liberal trade regime was in place, with duty and tax exemptions and
concessions as incentives to increase the volume and diversity of exports.











Table 10: Composition of Exports (% shares), 1990-2001 Selected
Source: Morrissey, Rudaheranwa and Moller, 2003: Computations from various years from the Background
to the Budget (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and Uganda Bureau of
Statistics)
In Table 10, minerals are generally referred to as precious; this conceals much information
regarding particular minerals, but nevertheless serves the purpose of comparison. Gold, gold
compounds and other so-called 'precious' compounds brought in as much as other products.
The benefits in terms of taxes received by Uganda were marginal, but this is because the minerals
usually transited through different points where the revenue collection could easily be
corrupted.592 Therefore, no proper records were kept.' All these factors notwithstanding, the
592 One limitation to the effective recording keeping at the revenue collection points cited by interviewees at border











UN continued to argue that the lure of natural resources became the primary motive why
Uganda stayed in many areas of the Eastern DRC.594
The regional trade results give a far clearer picture regarding the revenue Uganda obtained and
spent. See the tables and figures below to establish the recorded revenue.
Table 11: Uganda's Exports Value to the GLR states in US $m for the years of 1996-2004
Countries Years
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Burundi
887,165 338,845 1,211,089 703,856 2,543,401 2,135,008 6,624,016 11,726,797
DRC
35,313,975 2,746,121 276,969 881,055 1,161,311 615,315 1,250,050 1,565,722 2,573,742
Rwanda
39,872,818 18,521,698 10,517,817 4,505,859 1,551,056 4,525,092 1,568,910 2,871,656 3,153,823
Source: Extracted from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2005
From Table 10 it is evident that, during the intervention period, Uganda's exports to the GLR
region were predominantly in Rwanda, rather than in the DRC and Burundi. A comparison of
Uganda's exports and imports in the region are important for creating a true picture of Uganda's
economic motives of intervention. Table 11 below shows Uganda's imports from the region.
Table 12: Uganda's Imports from the Great Lakes Region - selected states in US $m for the years 1996-2004
Countries Years
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Burundi
249,612 69,257 9,827 249,612 47,927 1,361.47 47,927 25,544 71,430
Congo
82,198 369,785 1,473,086 82,198 108,167 38,25.84 108,167 301,280 2,274,355
Rwanda
301,628 806,741 1,372,825 301,628 693,622.46 351,836.93 693,622.46 535,656.00 636,975
Source: Extracted from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics Report, 2005
593 Note should be taken that it was the military officers who engaged in this trade, so the minerals could have been
declared as "classified products". If done so, the customs officials were not permitted to question nor see them.











If only the figures of 1997-2000 are examined,' it is evident that Uganda received far more
revenue in its trade with Burundi, DRC and Rwanda in those years than in other years. It also
received more revenue from exports to Rwanda than to Burundi and the DRC. Similarly, it
imported more from Rwanda than it did from Burundi and the DRC combined. What we can
conclude from these figures is, firstly, that Uganda's trade with the GLR enabled it to obtain a
significant amount of revenue as compared to the revenue it earned from the sale of minerals
mined in the DRC and the re-exports respectively. Secondly, contrary to the view that Uganda's
motives to intervene were economic and that Uganda benefited greatly from the interventions,
the subsequent trade figures show a trend that negates the claim that Uganda's economic
development was mainly a result of the exploitation of resources in the DRC between 1997 and
2000. The subsequent figures in Tables 10 and 11] are an indication that even when Uganda was
not intervening in its neighbouring states, it continued to generate considerable revenue from its
GLR trade.
Trade and Insecurity
Whereas all the districts indicated that trade was carried out amicably, there were massive
interruptions at certain times. This compelled Uganda to stop the incursions that were
detrimental to the general welfare and economic development of these districts. Statements from
the Local Council and the DISO operating in the Western districts of Kasese, Ntoroko and the
Bundibugyo region dismissed the notion that Uganda benefited economically in the Congo."
They argued that their districts were severely ravaged by the eight years of war and that
opportunities for trade were minimal if not impossible. A Ugandan security officer' (also
involved in the combat with the ADF and West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels) argued that
there was no business in the DRC for Uganda in the districts of Bundibugyo and Kasese, for
example. The war had affected farmers who depended on the sale of their produce in urban
markets, but they abandoned their crops and stopped trading when the war started. This
interrupted food supplies to the towns. The disruption of trade between urban and rural areas,
together with the disruption of commercial circuits on a local and regional scale, contributed to
595 The selected years are comparable to the ones that have been used in the analysis of the revenue that the Panel of
Expert Reports to confirm the importance of the illegal trade on Uganda's economy.
596 Focus group discussion with the Local Council officials of the districts.of Ntoroko, Bundibugyo and Kasese.











the emergence of food shortages, not only in the districts directly affected by the war, but in the
country as a whole. In fact, they argued, it was the DRC that depended on Uganda. For example,
the Congolese depended on Uganda for their livelihood', because of the war in the area.
However, since the ADF had disrupted trade, blocked trade routes, massacred people, and
robbed them of their property, trade had been greatly curtailed."'
Another problem that traders faced in the region was the stringent trade regulations of states like
Rwanda. These regulations included the prohibition of selling alcohol, particularly Wa ragi”600
and any merchandise that was not thoroughly checked by the border trade posts. In this regard,
the interviews conducted amongst the communities at the borders revealed that Uganda traders
were more interested in trading with the DRC than with Rwanda because of the stringent
conditions of entry at the customs posts and greater flexibility at the DRC customs posts. Also,
the bargaining power of the Congolese was far better than that of the Rwandan because the
former transacted in dollars, which the Ugandans preferred to Rwandan francs.
The third problem was the bad treatment from trade officials at some border posts, particularly
because it was preventing smuggling. Because the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) interfered
with these so-called "second economy' activities", traders sought state intervention. One
newspaper reported:
Sir I wish to pretest at the ?my the URA officials at the Congo-Bwera  border handle business
people. Ifyou are caught with smuggled goods from Congo, he or she is beaten thoroughly and all his
goods taken away  firm him. If he follows  them, he is charged a fine 'which is more than what he
bought them. So most people decide not to follow their goods  once they are impounded.. Let the
governmentssa e our peopleas it did when it stopped the smuggling of Coffeeinto Congo.602
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Rwanda prohibited the importation of Waragi, a potent brew that often makes people who take it addicted to it
and prevents them from carrying out their work. Whereas Rwanda prohibited its sale or importation into Rwanda,
they allow those who wanted it to cross over and drink it. They could "Carry as much as they wanted in their
Stomachs" (said a Rwandan officer), provided it was not in a bottle. The prevention of the sale of Waragi was a key
issue in cross border meetings between Rwanda, represented by the Province of Ruhengeri and Uganda, represented
by Kisoro District. This was revealed in an inter-state security meeting.
601 "Second economy" is a term borrowed from J. MacGaffey and R. Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris
Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law, (Africa Issues Bloomington: Oxford and Indiana University
Press, 2000) who use it to characterise the illegal economy (trade) that people depended on as a coping mechanism
of a bad regime in which their social and economic security were not guaranteed.











The fourth problem was the clash of interests between states. Museveni and Kagame temporarily
severed relations following the clash over Kisangani, an area of intense economic activity, which
resulted in military engagements between the two armies in 1999 and 2000. The military clash
between the two states has been attributed to economic interest in controlling this mineral-rich
zone.' Contrary to this interpretation, findings demonstrate that the clashes of the two armies
were actually caused by indiscipline rather than economic interests. They were not fighting to
protect the vulnerable Congolese populace, but to control the air bases and areas of
"occupation", which is akin to the imperialist's "spheres of influence in the early colonial days".
This underscores the salience of the economic motives of intervention. Related to this, an
interviewee's account of Uganda's economic involvement in the DRC leads to the conclusion
that Uganda may not have sanctioned the illicit trade carried out by its military officers, but that
it was nonetheless responsible for failing to stop them from engaging in such economic activities.
As a result, Uganda bore the brunt of having intervened for economic reasons, particularly in the
DRC.
Three conclusions may be drawn from Uganda's economic relations in the region. Firstly,
Uganda intervened to ensure that it created an atmosphere conducive for trade, especially in
those areas in the neighbouring states affected by conflicts and insurgency. Secondly, Uganda
intervened to stop conflicts and wars because it thought that once these were removed, then
amicable trade would commence between and among states. Thirdly, the "illicit trade" that the
UPDF carried out, had already existed before and simply became more exposed. The prevalence
of many smugglers other than soldiers, who demanded protection from the state, reveals much
about what the state was expected to do or what it was in fact doing.'
7.4 Summary
The findings of the study do not establish facts very different from the earlier arguments cited in
the first part of this chapter that Uganda's motives of intervention were economic. This study,
however, has provided clearer information on how Uganda's intention to prevent insecurity and
genocide in the GLR states was mixed up with the economic activities and political designs of
the major actors on the ground. The chapter has also shown that Uganda's economic relations
603 Kisangani has the greatest number of gold deposits in the Eastern DRC.
604Considering that the state was protecting the UPDF officers in their illicit trade, the other local smugglers saw no











with the GLR states provided it with revenue at both the official level and the informal level.
The only difference is that the official trade reports declared financial benefits that indicated
economic development, while the unofficial trade lacked records that could have been used to
argue that Uganda's economy improved greatly because of the intervention.
The DRC case was given more prominence throughout this analysis of Uganda's economically
motivated interventions. Limited reference was made to Rwanda and Burundi because their trade
with Uganda was not as volatile as that between Uganda and the DRC, and because it did not
require an official inquiry like that between Uganda and the DRC. The DRC trade was
"characterised as illicit and illegal" and thus necessitated an inquiry in both state and non-state
actors to establish whether Uganda was responsible for the illegal mass exploitation of natural
resources and the illicit trade that DRC had reported to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Because of the many actors in the DRC trade, including the UPDF officers, and in other states
like Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola, and its anarchic nature during this period, the DRC
received more coverage than Burundi and Rwanda combined.
While the Judicial Commission's report that acquitted Uganda of the charge of systemic and
systematic exploitation of resources in the DRC 605 (see Judicial Commission of Inquiry Legal
Notice no. 5/2001 p.85). The ICJ found it guilty of illegal exploitation of resources, mass abuse
of human rights and a range of other crimes committed against the state.' The judgements in
both cases disregarded the fact that the exploitation of these materials and their exports could
not have occurred without the assistance or acquiescence of the local Congolese rebel leaders
who depended on these raw materials for their logistical weaponry supply and the cooperation of
Western corporations, which needed these raw materials to supply their high-tech industries,
space exploration and sophisticated defence projects.' Although this does not legitimate
605 In paragraph 85 of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, Legal Notice no. 5/2001, p. 85, the Ugandan government
was acquitted of the charge of Systemic and Systematic exploitation by government, and the blame was put on to
individuals, mainly top army commanders. In spite of this, the judge condemned Uganda's complicity because there
was evidence that the political establishment knew what was going on, especially considering the amount of trade
and the level of use of MOD airplanes and private airplanes on the military air bases and yet did nothing to stop it.
606 The International Court of Justice rule on Monday 19 December 2005 that Uganda had violated the sovereignty
of the DRC during the War of 1998-2003, that it had violated the principles of non-use of force and non-
intervention in international relations, and that it violated its obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law and other obligations owed to the Congo.
607 See W. Hartung and D. Montague, "Deadly Legacy: US Arms and Training Programs in Africa", in Arms Trade
Resource Centre, (World Policy Institute, 2001) 22 March
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/update032201.htm,  accessed on 22 June 2003 and also see W.











Uganda's engagement in the DRC trade, it helps to explain Uganda's engagement in this illicit
trade as part of a broader exploitation process that characterises the global economic system.
The support system encourages the economic exploitation of states by other states. The UN
does little to reprimand states that conduct such actions (e.g. sanctions were never imposed on
Uganda because of its trade with the DRC). The international financial institutions too did not
condemn Uganda for plundering other states. States like Uganda often got away with such acts.
In this chapter, Uganda's economic motives of intervention in the GLR states are not contested
per se. Three salient issues of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy emerge from this chapter.
Firstly, Uganda's motivations for intervention were mixed. It intervened to ensure that its
national security was guaranteed, and it occupied areas of the DRC to ensure that the security
pressure points were controlled. However, Uganda also conducted trade and exploited the
resources of the DRC because the insecure region of the Eastern DRC had plentiful natural
resources. So, while Uganda fought to secure its territory, it became embroiled with the
exploitation of the resources in the regions under its control.'
Secondly, the findings demonstrate that the volume of Uganda's trade in the region increased
with the interventions, although its official revenue collection was marginal. Therefore, it cannot
be concluded that Uganda's exploitation of the DRC improved Uganda's deficit budget as
claimed by critics earlier. The increase in the volume of trade that Uganda experienced during the
intervention period was not only a result of Uganda's interventions but also a result of the intra-
regional trade reforms it established and the general good economic relations it had in the GLR,
as indicated by the on-going economic integration efforts in the COMESA and EAC. The
"illicit" trade, which is supposed to have been established by Uganda and is alluded to as being
responsible for solving part of Uganda's deficit budget, already existed before. It was merely
amplified by the involvement of Uganda's military actors who were in charge of the occupied
regions.
Control Reports (2000), http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm,  accessed on 23 April
2003.
608 Whereas it is Ugandan individuals who were responsible for the exploitation of the resources in the DRC, the












Thirdly, underlying Uganda's intervention was the notion that stability and peace in the GLR
component states would lead to better economic relations and subsequent economic
development for Uganda and the entire region combined. The regional instability that
characterised the GLR for the decade of 1996-2006 greatly affected the welfare of states. It
increased the number of refugees, depleted resources of the states, and severely disrupted the
livelihood of the populace in each GLR state.
The study also reveals that the level of intervention varied from state to state. It was sheer
coincidence that the DRC not only posed an enormous security threat but that it was also
endowed with natural resources. Efforts to control the rebel groups necessitated the occupation
of the bases that were sustaining the rebel groups' wars. This occupation provided Uganda with
two advantages: (1) it was able to control the rebel incursions into western Uganda and parts of
northern Uganda, and (2) Uganda's military officers at the High Command deployed were able
to exploit the local resources. In comparison, Rwanda and Burundi, which have similar trade
patterns but fewer exploitable natural resources, experienced limited interventions. Furthermore,
irrespective of the prevalence of natural resources to exploit, the inability of states to solve their
inherent political problems often made them more vulnerable to intervention by other states.
Rwanda and Burundi were more organised than the DRC, especially during the second
intervention of 1998. Uganda and other states that intervened in the DRC had more opportunity
to exploit the insurgency in it and insist on occupying parts of its territory to protect their own
countries. Uganda did just that.
The final point to be derived from this study is that there was no conspiracy by Uganda to
exploit the natural resources of the DRC: it was individuals in the army who were principally
involved in such exploitation. There was a strong local base of Congolese who were in political
positions and who provided the Uganda army with the necessary network that allowed them to
carry out the exploitation and illicit trade. This does not seem to come out clearly in the Panel of
Experts reports or in the final judgements of the ICJ in the Ugandan case. "The fish stinks from
the head", is a Ugandan ethnic group saying, which means that the President as head of state
bears the brunt of what went wrong in the DRC. Whereas the state can be exonerated from its
officers' activities of greed and wealth-amassing, the legal framework that allows intervention
would still find the state culpable because of Article 8 of the International Law Commission
2001 on (Attribution to the State of the Conduct of persons acting in fact on behalf of the state)











state under international law if the persons or group of persons in fact act on the instruction of
or under the direction or control of the state in carrying out the conduct."'
7.5 Theoretical Implications
In this study, we have seen that the Utilitarian Liberal theory is helpful in explaining Uganda's
economic intervention in the GLR states. The strength of the theory is the quality of facts that it
demonstrates both statistically as well as in form of policy, which gives it a methodological
strength that is greater than that of the other theories discussed in the previous chapters. The
advantage of quantitative data is that it is possible to calculate if the figures substantiate claims
that the economic performance of states has been improved by interventions. The only weakness
of the theory is its inability to explain interventions like those of Rwanda and Burundi that had
no outright economic benefits. The trade income accruing from trade with Rwanda and Burundi,
which was allegedly responsible for Uganda's economic development, was pre-existing trade that
had already existed between the three states before the internventions. In fact it does not take
cognizance of the domestic economic polices that were responsible for much of the economic
development. It also does not account for Uganda's economic development outside the
intervention period to show that, when Uganda did not intervene, its economy declined. The
advanced utilitarian position of Gibbs, namely the Business Conflict Model, accounts for the role
of non-state actors in the economic motivations of intervention. Special attention is paid to the
multinational corporations of the industrialized states and to other non-state actors that are
highlighted in many of the UN reports on the DRC conflict. The evidence demonstrates that the
individuals' use of the state as an avenue to intervene and then to exploit the intervene for
personal aggrandisement is prominent in this form of economic imperialism, particularly in the
case of the DRC. The utilitarian liberal perspective is a good theory but can be improved if
complemented with another approach. In the next chapter, the Security Dilemma as an
alternative framework is discussed.
























THE SECURITY DILEMMA: UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST
FOREIGN POLICY
Interests are often not obvious, and much of politics is a struggle to define them. States and the
people in them spend a great deal of time and energy arguing about what their national interests are
They also spend a great deal of time and energy trying to persuade other people in other states whit
their national interests are Much of international politics is about defining, rather than defending,
national e.610
8.0 Introduction
This chapter examines the motives behind Uganda's interventionist foreign policy by drawing on
the Security Dilemma theory. The chapter examines three central questions. First, what threats
did Uganda's western neighbouring states pose for Uganda to warrant intervention? Second,
what role did Uganda play in creating instability in the region that in turn contributed to its
precarious situation? Lastly, discuss the view that Uganda's interventions have been attributed to
regime security interests of president Museveni and not necessarily to his continue claim of
ensuring regional security. The chapter examines these questions drawing on the different types
of intervention that Uganda undertook. In the first part, the tenets of the Security Dilemma are
discussed, followed by an analysis of the interventions in the second part. The last part concludes
with an evaluation of the Security Dilemma theory in explaining states' foreign interventionist
behaviour.
8.1 A Brief Review of the Security Dilemma Theory
The theory has three central tenets. Firstly, states are unable to distinguish offensive and
defensive actions of each other's military postures and military capabilities. The inability to
distinguish offence from defence presupposes that the military preparations of one state create
an irresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether the preparations are for











defensive purposes only (to enhance its security) or whether they are for offensive purposes."'
Suspicion is created because states are incapable of drawing accurate inferences about why other
states exhibit specific military postures and particular military capabilities, and states are then
drawn into competitive acquisition and development of better military capability to offset each
other's intentions. This creates a spiral of competition between states to improve their respecitive
military capabilities.'" The spiral of arms race that emerges from states and the increase in their
capabilities intensifies which in turn leading into a dilemma. This dilemma escalates and could
deteriorate into war, particularly if the drive for security produces aggressive actions or is
interpreted by other states as compromising their security.' The ability to distinguish offence
from defence may be hampered by either misinformation regarding a state's military capabilities
or inaccurate evaluations or misperceptions of states' actions by others. Irrespective of the
source of the misperception, the main issue that characterises the Security Dilemma theory is
that states seek to build their military capability, which compromises their inter-state relations, as
each is cautious of the other.'" In a bid to offset any attack, states are thus compelled to
intervene in other states, which they are sure are intent on attacking them.
The second tenet posits the superiority of offence over defence as a key character of inter-state
relations.'" States that perceive themselves as strong tend to become aggressive towards weaker
states and are likely to engage in pre-emptive wars against them." The weaker states in turn
resist the advance or the control of the stronger states, thereby creating intense security
dilemmas in their relations, which could result in war, or in interventions into each other's
territories."' As each state tries to increase its own national security, it acquires weapons. This
causes an arms race, as states signal that they are prepared to fight, which further intensifies the
security dilemma.' The animosity between such adversaries reduces the chances of amicably
settling disputes because neither state is interested in negotiating. The possibility of states
forming alliances in a situation of a security dilemma is more feasible, and these alliances tend to
611 N. Wheeler and K. Booth, "The Security Dilemma", p. 30.
612 R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics,  p. 64 and N. Wheeler and K. Booth, "The
Security Dilemma", pp. 30-31.
613 Ibid, p. 63.
614 C. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence
Models", p. 515.
615 B. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", pp. 103-124.
616 Ibid .
617 S. van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the Causes of War", p. 10.











be characterised by secrecy. The states become extremely secretive about their security plans,
their alliance intension and above all, their foreign policy actions. Offence may have the
advantage over defence because of two salient factors, i.e. geography and technology. Whilst
geography plays a central role in determining a state's capacity to attack (offence) or in favouring
another state to deter the advance of its attackers (defence), technology may favour offence over
defence or vice-versa. Technology includes the military hardware and the nature of military training
that troops undergo; Krause argues that these are important in shaping the perceptions states
have of each other.
619
The third tenet of the security dilemma is the window of vulnerability and opportunity. Posen
argues that, when states are in a security dilemma, they take advantage of a defendant's
indefensibility to attack.' He argues further that, when states realise that an opportunity has
availed itself and may not be there later, they will take advantage to gain as much from their
attack as they can. 6" They take the advantage to strike while the opponent is weak and cannot
access resources or military aid from allies, or they may attack at a time when the international
community or international organizations are too busy and preoccupied to attend to them.'
When this happens, the offensive position gains an advantage over the defensive one, which
most often results in war.
In the study it is discussed that leaders' perception and misperceptions of each other's actions
and intentions towards political developments in each other's states may cause a security
dilemma. Leaders may carry out foreign policy actions that signal war or intentions to engage
each other. They may form tacit alliances breaking older alliances, which intensifies their
individual insecurity as well as that of their regimes. The consequence of this on the inter-
personal relations of these leaders is a security dilemma. Leaders will therefore intervene in each
other's states to either pre-empt any actions against them as individuals or against their states or
to ensure that they displace the other before the adversary organises to wage war on them. It is
against this background that Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its westerly neighbouring
states is discussed at three levels. At the first level the Security Dilemma theory is used to
619 Ibid.
620 B. Posen's "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict", pp. 105 - 111.












explain how the inter-state relations and conflicts resulted into Uganda's interventions. At the
second level, the security dilemma that resulted from inter-ethnic violent conflicts and wars are
discussed to demonstrate that these inter-ethnic conflicts greatly contributed to Ugandan's
interventionist foreign policy in the region. At the third level, the impact of the states' security
dilemma on the inter-personal relations of leaders of the states is done with a view to show that
misperceptions between actors was not at the state level alone but equally influenced the inter-
personal relations between the leaders. These inter-personal relations in turn created a security
dilemma amongst their states.
In the study, security dilemma has been used to explain Uganda's precarious situation that
compromised its national security.' National security is used to refer to the total capacity of the
state to protect the state and its citizens and provide a secure environment from external threats
that are real and imaginary. The study demonstrates how Uganda's national security was
challenged by various state and non state actors and how its lack of preclusive defence compelled
it to intervene to stop the external attacks and spill overs of its western neighbours conflicts
from affecting it.
8.2 Ugandan's Geo-political Position in the Great Lakes Region
Uganda lies astride the Equator, between latitudes 4° 12' N and 1° 29' S and longitudes 29° 34'
W, and 35° 0' E. More than two-thirds of the country is a plateau, lying between 1 000 - 2 500
metres above sea level. Uganda has a total land area of 241 548 km2 .
To the North, Uganda borders on Sudan, with the boundary between the two countries
stretching about 438.16 km, from geographical coordinates 30 ° 51" E and 3° 29" N to 33 ° 59" E
and 4° 14" N. To the East, Uganda borders on the Republic of Kenya, with the boundary
between the two countries stretching about 711.67 km from geographical coordinates 33° 59" E
and 40 14" N to 33° 55"S and 10° 03" S. To the South, Uganda borders on Tanzania and
Rwanda and the boundary stretches 1082.11 km, between from geographical coordinates 29 ° 35"
E and 1 ° 23" S and 33° 55"S and 10° 30" S. To the North, Uganda borders on the Democratic












Republic of Congo, with the boundary between the two countries stretching about 710.46 km
from geographical coordinates 30 0.51" E and 30 29" N to 29° 35" E and 1
°
 23" S. (Overleaf is a
Map of Uganda showing its location in relations to the GLR. The purpose of the map in this text











Uganda's western border security concerns
Uganda's narrow geo-strategic depth' and lack of preclusive defence"' aggravated its insecurity
because it was easy to over-run once attacked. The rebels were able to leave forests in the DRC,
attack Uganda's western districts, destroy lives, property and loot and return to DRC before they
could be pursued. The ADF,630 were able to occupy parts of Kasese district (for a short time
though) near Rwenzori Mountain, using it as a base to consecutively carry out terrorist attacks
and wage guerrilla warfare in the districts of Kasese, Fort Portal, Hoima, Bundibugyo  and
Ntoroko in Western Uganda. In the DRC, the Butalinga district,' which is virtually an overhang
of Uganda's Bundibugyo district is only approximately 250 miles from Kampala, this provided
the rebels with an offensive advantage over the UPDF. This situation was worsened by Uganda's
porous borders. The forests, as indicated earlier, inhibit easy patrol of the borders. Where there
are no forests, there are few gazetted points that are patrolled by Uganda. Border points like
Chanika (Uganda-Rwanda) and Bunagana (DRC-Uganda) are controlled in Kisoro district, which
leaves large expanses of land underpatrolled and unprotected. For example, Busanza is currently
used as an entry point that Ugandan rebels with the help of the Interahamwe use to attack the
region. In Ntungamo and Kabale districts, there are many entry points that are not gazetted,
which provided safe corridors for the rebels to penetrate Uganda. In Kanungu (Butogota area),
the rebels penetrated Uganda through the Bwindi forest. 632 The rebels had a strong strategic
advantage because they ailed easily with other rebel groups to fight the target government; they
lent each other forces and sometimes even provided hiding places for the other. This partly
explains the precariousness of the security situation of the region. It turned out that Uganda, for
example, was not fighting particular rebel groups at certain times but a whole coalition of rebels.
This is what made the region a theatre of war, as it has been described (see Table 13 overleaf
showing some of the rebel groups that fought against and within the borders of Uganda).
628 "Narrow strategic depth" refers to when the area a state has to prevent attacks from other states is geographically
narrow, making it susceptible and vulnerable to attack.
629 "Preclusive defence" refers to the ability of the state to defend its borders from external attacks. In this case
Uganda lacked the ability to defend its borders from foreign attacks.
630 The ADF was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, which commenced its
activities in the 1990s and continued them until 2003.
631 Butalinga district, which is covered by large tracts of forest and a game reserve, was one of the areas where the
Ugandan rebels camped, which were highlighted as a pressure point in an interview with UG/MOD 11 held in
Kampala, 28 July 2005.
632 One of the terrorist attacks which claimed eight European tourists was orchestrated using this Bwindi forest











Map 3: Uganda's Geographical Location within the Great Lakes Region
Source: Makerere University Institute of Environment and Natural Resource, 2007
Uganda is a landlocked state that depends on its eastern and southern neighbours Tanzania and
Kenya for most of its export and import trade. It neighbours the resource-endowed but anarchic
DRC to the west and north-west. In the south, it borders Rwanda which is ridden with intense
ethnic dissensions and while it does not share a common border with Burundi, it provides
Burundi with an access route to the ocean. It shares ethnic communities with Burundi, Rwanda
and the DRC. The colonial powers had drawn boundary demarcations in 1894 that divided
these ethnic communities with some settling in one state directly oppoisite from their nexts of











geographic features that are critical to each state. The Mugahinga forest, an extremely vital
forest, extends into Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC but with the biggest share of the forest on
the DRC side. Ituri forest which is equally critical extends to Aril near Uganda's border.
Virunga Mountain which is covered by dense forests, also extends across all three countries. All
these ecosystems are critical to the security of the region.
This geographic character of the region gave the rebels a strategic offensive advantage over
Uganda's UPDF and other states' armies. Large numbers of rebels from different states were
able to inhabit and depend on Mugahinga forest and the forests surrounding Virunga because of
their vast resources and space. The Ugandan rebels in particular used these bases in the forests to
attack the western districts of Uganda and return to their safe havens, which hid them from the
UPDF, the Rwandan People's Army (RPA) and the Congolese army. Out of the nine rebel
groups that attacked Uganda between 1987 and 2000, six had their bases in the DRC (see a
detailed table 13 of the rebel groups on page 218. Rebels such as the ADF and PRA operated
between Rucuru, Kiwanja, Namusengera and Vichumbi. Other rebels that did not directly attack
Uganda but provided military back-up to Uganda's rebels, also used the DRC as their military
base. These included the Interahamwe and RCD renegades who occupied Mt Nyamurangira-
North of Goma and Rucuru road. The rebels that had their bases in Sudan used the DRC as an
alternative route from which they accessed and attacked Uganda once they were repelled by the
UPDF in the Northern section.
The rebels benefited from the terrain because the forests, mountainous areas and expansive
Virunga national park from Bukavu up to Kisangani, from which they operated, were dense and
impenetrable. This delayed the Ugandan forces' advance when they pursued the rebels. This
provided the rebels with a strategic advantage over the Ugandan UPDF. The region also
provided the rebels with an economic advantage because they were able to replenish their
supplies and use the resources from the areas they occupied to purchase arms and other logistical
supplies. The rebels engaged in lucrative business and, because the area was also populated with
many foreigners, the rebels were able to exploit the advantage of communication from the
foreigners to whom they provided security. Lack of proper management of these forests meant
that the rebels were able to establish firm bases without being stopped. In the DRC, for example,
there were no proper policies and laws in place to regulate access and use of the forests by rebels.











settling there. Apart from that, it was preoccupied with civil disobedience, intrastate ethnic wars
and power struggles, so it could not police this region well. To describe it well, an interviewee
said that, rebel groups could have even set up their own states within these forests without the
government in Kinshasa knowing that there was another " state".6 24 All these limitations enabled
the rebels to entrench themselves in these areas.
The ungazetted border points like Busanza in Kisoro and Kisanza in Ntungamo were used by
the Ugandan rebels and rebels of its neighbours to enter Uganda. Whilst Uganda was
disadvantaged by the physical and geographical features that concealed these rebels, it was
simultaneously able to provide military aid to rebels of the neighbouring states that would
provide them with the required information regarding its rebels' troop formation, deployments
and areas of operation. The groups Uganda allied with in the interior of the DRC include RCD-
Kisagani based in Rucururu, initially led by Wamba dia Wamba, and later by Mbusi Nyamwisi,
and RCD-Goma now led by Banyamulenge.' These provided Uganda with the necessary
intelligence regarding the position of the ADF and other rebel groups operating in the DRC and
Sudan, in return for Uganda's reciprocal management of these allies' inadequacies.
The districts that suffered rebel incursions were Kitugum (borders with Sudan), Kanugu,
Bundibugyo, and Kasese on the border with the DRC. They have been susceptible to attacks
from RCD-Goma and other mercenary groups from the DRC. Other areas of Uganda that have
suffered most, have been Botogota, Kihembe and Ishasha, where the rebels of RCD-Goma loot
drugs, phones and money from health centres (Kanugu district) and Ntoroko, Rwebisengo and
Karugutu in Bundibugyo District, where rebels carried out terrorist acts, massacres and banditry.
Other than Kabale and Ntungamo where there are minor rebel incursions from Rwanda, the
districts bordering Rwanda have been a little more secure, save for the few incidents with armed
thugs and massive inflow of illegal migrants, which is likely to affect the welfare of Uganda's
indigenous population. (See map 4 of Uganda overleaf page 211 showing the districts that the
rebel groups targeted. They are marked with arrows).
624 In an interview with UG/MOD 11 held on 28th July 2005 held in Kampala.
625 Byamulenge RCD-Goma is also supported by Rwanda. Following the differences between President Kagame and











Uganda intervened in the DRC in hot pursuit 626 of the rebels to ensure that they were unable to
create a favourable base from which to operate in the DRC and in Rwanda. Uganda thus
occupied Kisangani to ensure that the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory
being protected did not offer any strategic advantage to the rebels who were attacking Uganda.627
However, because of the infrastructural underdevelopment of the Eastern DRC, it was also
necessary to ensure that the rebel bases were watched and controlled, and that the supply lines
for arms and resources were cut, an issue that could not be achieved if Uganda had simply
stopped at the DRC-Uganda border. Arms and other logistical supplies were being airlifted from
Khartoum to Juba and from Khartoum to the airfields and airport of Kapalata, Bangoka and
Kisangani. In principle, the control of the DRC airports of Bangoka and Kisangani by Rwanda
and Uganda were aimed at denying the rebels bases from which to receive the military assistance
that could be used to attack these countries. Uganda furthermore occupied areas overlooking the
rebel strongholds of the Forces Armées Zairoises  (FAZ), Mai Mai, People's Redemption Army
(PRA), Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and Rally for a Democratic Congo based in Goma
(RCD-Goma). These areas included the Mai Mai controlled areas like Rucuru, Lubelo, Goma,
Benza sub-county and Kibirizi, a prominent location in the Virunga mountain region (see Map
of the DRC on page 207) where the arrows indicate the UPDF military bases and areas of
operation).
626 "Hot pursuit" is a military term used to refer to a situation where troops of one country pursue their enemies and
ensure that the distance between the enemy pursued and the territory being protected does not offer any strategic
advantage to the enemy for future threat.
627 In interviews with Major 1 held on UG/MOD 11 on 27 and 28 July 2005 in Kampala, and UG/MOD 13 held on
24 February 2006 in Cape Town, they argued that the occupation of Kisangani was warranted because of the
effectiveness of 'hot pursuit'. The occupation of Kisangani has been highly contentious because it is highly



























































As the Security Dilemma theory posits, aggressive states seek to conquer less aggressive states,
which in turn resist the advance of the aggressive or stronger states. Superiority of offence over
defence is enhanced by the character of the geographical area in which the states are located and
their level of technology. It is possible to extrapolate this into the GLR region, where the
prevailing circumstances were evidence of a security dilemma. The fact that militarily strong
Sudan neighboured Uganda meant that Sudan was its main adversary, with an opportunity to
attack it easily using rebels and other insurgent groups. Uganda suffered incursions from the
rebels who were supported by and using Sudan as a base and as a source of military hardware.'
Sudan also provided support to other rebels that did not necessarily use it as a base but that used
the country as a conduit to reach Uganda.
Terrorism has been defined by Schmid as an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action,
employed by semi-clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or
political reasons.' Terrorism in Uganda has been traced back to Sudan and the DRC, with the
latter acting as a conduit through which the terrorists sponsored by Sudan operated. It is argued
that the rebels inhabiting the DRC forests took advantage of Uganda's permeable borders and
the forest terrain to launch terror attacks on Uganda. By 1998 alone, ADF terrorists had
exploded a total of 38 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) bombs in Kampala and Jinja, killing
82 and wounding 236 others. A total of 184 ADF rebels were arrested and 125 were charged
with terrorism.637 The ADF (Tabliques)638 who were responsible for the wave of terrorism in
Uganda attacked urban centres of Kampala and Jinja. In these urban centres, the terrorists placed
grenades and bombs in drinking places with the claim that the drinking of alcohol was not an
Islamic practice.639 See Appendix 1 for a detailed chronology of the terrorist attacks on Uganda.
635 "Military hardware" refers to the military capability of a state or an insurgent group that includes both the
tangible i.e. weaponry, force structure, and intangible characters like military doctrine and values the military holds
dear.
636 There are many definitions of terrorism but in this study, Schmid's definition of terrorism is used. See A.P.
Schmid, Report to UN Crime Branch, 1992.
637 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala, 28 July 2005. Similar views were expressed by UG/MOD 3 in
this interview in Ntungamo on 4 and 5 October 2005.
638 Tabliques belonged to an Islamic sect that was engaged in a religious war with other Islamic groups in Uganda
such as those that belonged to the Muslim Supreme Council.
639 It is not possible that the Tabliques were motivated by Islamic law as they claimed to attack Uganda so the











Uganda's attacks were carried out before the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania on
7 August 1998. However, following the embassy bombings, the terror attacks increased in the
districts of Kasese, Bundibugyo and Hoima and in the North and North-western parts of the
country. The ADF and LRA attacked and burnt up houses, killed and maimed people, abducted
children in large numbers and took others hostage. For example, the first attack on Buseruka and
the second major one at Mpondwe in Kasese claimed over one hundred lives. In areas where the
LRA operated, the death toll was equally high and abductions of women and girls very common.
All the rebel groups that carried out terrorist attacks were funded by multiple agencies. It was not
established with documentary proof whether Al Quaeda was funding the ADF. 640 Highly placed
interviewees in charge of intelligence however insisted that ADF's terrorist actions were part of
the wider terrorist acts that the Al Quaeda had unleashed in the region."'
Terrorism elsewhere has been attributed to repressive governments with unfair economic and
political policies."' In Uganda, the government attributed terrorism to three main factors. Firstly,
it was sponsored by Sudan to create instability as a reaction against Uganda's support for the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Sudan's intention was to create another security
threat that would keep the Ugandan government engaged on different fronts, in the hope that
this would undercut Uganda's assistance to the SPLA. Secondly, they argued that terrorism was
launched to establish bases from which the ADF could operate easily, because the war in the
DRC was obstructing the ADF operations. Lastly, the rise of terrorism in Uganda, particularly by
the ADF that claimed to be funded by the Islamic fundamentalists, was contemporaneous with
the increased terrorist actions at an international level. The ADF terrorists were part of the
bigger Al Quaeda network operating in the world. Evidence unearthed (from the rebel bases in
Rwenzori Mountain) by the UPDF revealed that ADF had links with Al Quaeda. The Al Quaeda
wired money to their links in Kenya, where the East African base was, and provided ADF
military training and training in assembling bombs. Of the Al Quaeda group operating from
640 Note that the UPDF interviewees argued that they had evidence but insisted that this was classified information
that could not be given to the researcher. Similar evidence the UPDF alluded to is referred to as an exhibit in the
International Court of Justice Court sessions of the Uganda-DRC case.
641 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala, on 27 July 2005 and a follow-up interview on 28 July 2005 and
UG/MOD 1 was interviewed on 30 July 2005 in Kampala.











Africa, at least eight Ugandan names came up (see summary of record below from the Central
Military Intelligence).
The ADF was an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist organisation led by Sheikh Jamil Mukulu,
Commenced their terrorist campaign in 1990 in Kampala
It was nurtured by the National Islamic Flynt (NIF) in Sudan (closely linked to Al Quaeda).
1996-1997 Six ADF operatives were trained in Khartoum in Sudan in bomb assembling. While
others trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
1,Abdul Kassim Mulumba
2,Mohammed Bossa
3, Hussein Muhammad Senkisa
4,Abdul Majid Tiger
5, Yassin
6, Twahir Zubair Sebiryo
In November 2000, Abdulla Kasujja together with Jamil Mukulu acquired a safe house in
Pangani area in Nairobi, Kenya in which a group of 26 Ugandans were trained in assembling
explosives (IED)
The gimp later detonated twelve (12) IEDs in Kampala and Jinja between  January and July
2001.
In February 2001, a suspected Al Qaeda  operative in Saudi Arabia called Omran A Alomrani
wired funds to an ADF terrorist cell in Kampala, on bhdf  Sheikh Jamil Mukulu.
Source: ADF fact file sheet, courtesy of Central Military Intelligence
From this information, the UPDF argued that Al Quaeda's assistance to the ADF was part of a
strategy used by Al Quaeda to create more terrorists and spread them out to create terrorist
networks. East Africa did not yet have an established network, and so the ADF would be the
link together with the prevailing link in the Sudan that would mint out terror attacks on the
region."'
Terrorism in Uganda was intended to punish the Museveni administration for being
sympathisers of the US and to create an international picture that Uganda was after all not as safe
as it portrayed itself to be in the international community. An analysis of Museveni's reaction to
the US embassy bombings and his condemnation of Sudan shortly after the US secretary of State
Madeline Albright's condemnation of Sudan during her visit to Uganda could have influenced
Sudan's further support of terrorism in Uganda. We could argue that Uganda's relations with
Sudan became strained because of Uganda's attack on Sudan, yet the two had just endorsed an











agreement in terms of which Sudan permitted Uganda to operate inside Sudan to weed out the
rebels of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) under the "Operation Iron Fist".
Contrary to all these explanations, critiques of the Museveni administration and tentative
academic discourse in general point to the fact that terrorism is a result of poor governance; they
also attribute it to the nature of Uganda's political structure, which excluded other political
parties from taking part in active politics.' The interviewees argued that the terrorists wanted to
take part in politics and that Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) preveented this.
These "terrorists", who were predominantly from the radical Moslems called "Tabliques",
eventually joined the ADF.645 Terrorism in Uganda was also linked to the dissatisfaction of the
leadership in the Moslem Supreme Council and was neither related to the "nature of leadership"
in the country nor any influence from outside, as other views claim. Furthermore, there were
intra-faith leadership squabbles amongst the Muslims. The illiterate and radical Moslems wanted
to control the mosques and head the Islamic faith. 646" Fighting ensued and when government
intervened, it sent the radical Tabliques to prison. When these got amnesty, they camped at what
is popularly referred to as the "container village". They became involved in business; it is not
clear from the accounts of some of the remaining Tabliques how they came to be in the
Rwenzori Mountains and joined the ADF, but it is apparent that the Islamic fundamentalists of
Sudan who armed them and provided them with logistical support to terrorise Uganda identified
them.' The terrorism that broke out in different parts of the country was of serious concern to
government. Attempts to address it required that the ADF responsible for the terror attacks be
rooted out from their bases in the DRC. Intervention in the DRC to root out the terrorists was
thus one approach Uganda adopted.
644 For detailed discussions on terrorism in Africa, see M. Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism", Kegley, C. (ed),
The New Global Terrorism, (tipper Saddle Riven Prentice Hall, 2003), S. Ellis and D. Killingray, "Africa After 11
September 2001", in African Affairs, (2002), pp. 5-8, and G. M Khadiagala, "Legal Human and Accountability
Challenges to Combating Terrorism in Africa", African Centre for Strategic Studies Commissioned Paper Series,
Leaders Seminar, Gaborone: Botswana, on 19 June 2005.
645 Interview with opposition UPC 1 held in Kampala on 14 November 2004, UPC 2 in Dar es Salaam on 18
November 2004, and opposition DP held in Kampala on 20 October 2005.












8.2 Proximity to a volatile neighbourhood
Uganda's insecurity was aggravated by its geographic proximity to the anarchic states of the
DRC, Burundi and Rwanda. In all these states, there were citizenship crises', which had
resulted in violent ethnic conflicts and political power struggles that caused wars and a mass
exodus of refugees into Uganda.
As Posen and Roe have argued, when ethnic groups develop misunderstandings and the state
that held them together breaks down, a security dilemma emerges. As each ethnic group
misperceives each other's intentions, inter-ethnic conflict ensues. Ethnic groups that are strong
threaten the weaker ones, and often this leads to war; sometimes, it even deteriorates into
genocide, as the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo have shown. Sometimes the weaker ethnic group
pre-empts the attack from the demographically stronger ethnic group, leading to a further
security dilemma. The impact of these ethnic conflicts on regional stability is immense,
particularly in a region like the GLR, where they destabilise the entire region and cause security
concerns for the individual states. The Hutu-Tutsi ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi, and in
the DRC the Banyamulenge versus other ethnic groups and the Hema-Lendu ethnic conflict spilt
over into Uganda, causing further insecurity. On the one hand, the Ugandan rebels exploited the
ethnic conflicts in these states to attack Uganda on the pretext that the ethnic groups were
fighting each other. On the other, the failure of these states to address their own ethnic conflicts
and control their territories also provided Ugandan rebels with the required bases from which to
carry out terrorist and military attacks on Uganda.'
In each of these states, Uganda intervened to address the ethnic conflicts that were of grave
humanitarian and epidemiological concern in the region, and to prevent Ugandan rebels that
648 "Citizenship crisis" is borrowed from M. Mamdani, who uses the term to refer to the intricate nature of the
ethnic conflicts in the GLR and how these shaped the security systems of the region. See two of his invaluable
works, M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001a) and M. Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu, (SAPES, 2001b).
649 A detailed review of the causes of these ethnic conflicts and their manifestations in the region cannot be
adequately covered here; however, a summary has been provided for purposes of the discussion. Detailed coverage
of these ethnic conflicts has been done by many scholars who include but are not limited to P. Gourevitch, We wish
to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda;  G. Prunier, The Rwanda
Crisis: History of a Genocide,; P. Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda,  ; M. Mamdani,
When Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda;  and M. Mamdani,











were using the ethnic conflicts in these states as a pretext to attack Uganda. Below is a summary
of the refugee population in Uganda covering a decade of its manifest interventions in the
region. It was estimated that Uganda from 1993 to 1998 hosted approximately one million
refugees from the neighbouring states."' Table 14 below shows the refugee population in
Uganda from 1996 to 2005. The figures do not necessarily paint the entire picture of the refugee
crisis, nor do they indicate the deaths that occur in the camps; but international organisations
operating in the region provide supplementary statistics that can be drawn on to complete the
picture of the security situation of the region as a whole.
Table 14: Refugee Population in Uganda from Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
From Table 13 above it is evident that Sudan produced the greatest number of refugees at
anyone time. Sudan was followed by the DRC and Rwanda, all of which produced a large
number of refugees. There was also a marked increase of refugees from Somalia from 1996 to
1998. Although Burundi had few refugees in general, the numbers increased from 2002 to 2005.
On average, Uganda received approximately 230,000 refugees a year. It should be noted that
these are the documented refugees; others who settled outside camps and those who eluded the
immigration departments by using the ungazetted border posts of entry are not included in these
statistics.
650 Uganda has ten refugee camps managed by the UNHCR, each with an average of 100,000 refugees from Burundi,











Uganda intervenes in the Great Lakes Region states
In Burundi, the Museveni administration was convinced that the ethnic violence that erupted
following the assassination of Hutu President Ndadaye put the Hutu in Burundi in danger
because the Tutsi were determined to annihilate them. The Tutsi were far stronger economically
and politically, so they wielded more power. The political parties that had military wings thus
engaged each other; for example, troops loyal to the National Council for the Defence of
Democracy/ Front for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD/FDD), National Liberation Front
(FNL) and Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU), National Liberation Front
(FROLINA) and National Liberation Forces-Icanzo (FNL-Icanzo), Palipe-Agakiza, fought each
other. Political parties that did not necessarily have military wings were equally drawn into the
civil war; for example, Rally for Democracy and Eonomic, Social Development (RADESH),
Party of National Recovery (PARENA), Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens (MRC),
Union for National Progress (UPRONA) and MSP-Inkinzo (a detailed list of these political
parties is provided as Appendix 9).
Museveni as Chairman of the Great Lakes Initiative on Burundi together with the negotiating
team intervened diplomatically to address the violent ethnic struggle for power and contain a
situation that was deteriorating into genocide. Museveni was cautious not to elevate the Tutsi
against the Hutu, as he believed that the two ethnic communities had to realise that they had to
co-exist and that this delicate balance could only be achieved if they all shared power equally. Of
course, neither party appreciated this option, but the most crucial issue was that their ethnic
dissensions had led to genocide and had jeopardized the security of the entire region. Museveni
argued that if a problem broke out in Burundi or Rwanda, this affected Uganda and other
countries of the region.
In Rwanda, the 1995 genocide and subsequent war between the Rwanda Patriotic Army and the
Habyarimana regime had also led to massive involuntary migrations into Uganda. Uganda's
porous borders allowed former genocidaires, the Interahamwe, to penetrate and occasionally kill
a few Ugandans, loot food and medicine and return to their forest bases. Initially the RPA had
used Uganda as a base to fight the Hum-dominated Rwandan government of Habyarimana. This
had led to spill-over effects in Uganda. Even when the RPF broke into the factions of Kagame











Uganda and secondly, because Rwanda alleged that there were troops disloyal to RPF that were
hiding in Uganda. Uganda also accused Rwanda of aiding its rebels of the People's Redemption
Army (PRA). The mistrust that Kagame and Museveni had for each other and the potential
threat they posed for each other put each state in a precarious situation. For Uganda, it meant
ensuring that no attack occurred from Rwanda's side, while Rwanda's RPF ensured that no
attack occurred from Uganda's side. They both occasionally deployed troops at their borders as
signals of war but were quick to retreat, following internal negotiations and external diplomatic
third party mediation of their conflict by Britain and the US.
The inter-ethnic clashes in the DRC, particularly in the fight by the Banyamulenge for citizenship
rights, the Bahema-Balendu ethnic conflict over resources, and the overall declining control of
Mobutu over the entire state had led to war in that country. The advance of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and the subsequent taking of power
from Mobutu by the ADFL ultimately affected Uganda. Firstly, Laurent Kabila's government
was too preoccupied with the inter-rebel wars to have enough time to focus on Uganda's security
needs. The widely argued agreement that the three leaders (Kabila, Museveni and Kagame) had
tacitly agreed to a security plan to ensure the security of Uganda and Rwanda had not been
fulfilled; consequently, the rebels continued to operate from within the DRC in attacking Uganda
and Rwanda. The vastness of the DRC (discussed in detail under the geopolitical implications in
the first part of this chapter) provided Ugandan rebels with a base to attack Uganda.
Consequently, Uganda intervened, initially diplomatically and later militarily with the aim of
overrunning the rebel bases in the DRC.
Uganda directly intervened to fight its rebels that were using the DRC forests as bases from
which to attack it. The main reason for this was that the sitting government in the DRC (if there
was any to speak of at this time) was not in a position to control the Eastern DRC. This was a
vast region with a habitat that clearly favoured terrorist groups. To be able to check the advance
of the rebel groups and counter their insurgency, Uganda had to block potential logistical supply
routes that the rebels were using. This was not a feasible undertaking because of the geographical
character of the region. The DRC's Eastern regions of Beni, Butembo and Ituri
651 were
impenetrable and had a very poor infrastructure. The alternative was for Uganda to occupy parts











of Eastern Congo, particularly those with air bases, which were used as conduits by the Sudanese
government to deliver food, arms and ammunition as well as other logistical supplies to the
Ugandan rebels. Sudan airlifted supplies from Khartoum to Juba and from Khartoum to the
airfields and airports of Bangoka and Simi Simi in the Eastern DRC. For Uganda to control the
airports effectively, particularly in North Kivu, Kisangani had to be occupied. There has been
much debate regarding the depth of Uganda's penetration into the DRC particularly the
occupation that extended up to Kisangani. What should be clear at this point is that the
geographical region between Uganda and Kisangani offered the rebels better hide-outs and good
vantage points of offence as well as defence against Uganda. Uganda would need a firm base that
was equally accessible and operable to be able to hunt down the rebels in between Kisangani and
Bundibugyo and Hoima and access to the airfields that were being used to deliver logistics to the
rebel groups.'"
As the DRC war continued, Uganda extended its security bases further into the interior to be
able to focus on potential security pressure points being used by the rebels.'" The UPDF's hot
pursuit of these rebels and over-running of their bases forced them to find alternative bases from
which to wage a guerrilla war on Uganda, including Buhira, Ngoma, Bugoye, Kahinda ngoma
and Kidedeya in the DRC. These too were blocked by Uganda. This not only delayed supplies to
these rebels but also undermined the rebels support among the communities that they sought
refuge from. The communities were wary of keeping the rebels because they bore the brunt of
the UPDF attacks. Consequently, the rebels carried out isolated attacks on UPDF bases to
obtain arms and ammunition and looted village retail shops and drug shops for supplies. In his
speech, President Museveni defended Uganda's intervention in the DRC as follows:
... as I said when I last addressed you on the issue, the following were the reasons why Uganda
Free militarily involved in the Congo:
1. To maintain forces in A Congo in order to secure Uganda's security  interests by denying the
Sudanese government  an opportunity to destabilize Uganda through Eastern Conga We haw done
this and that is why the ADF is no longer able to getting (sic) supplies.
2. To deny habitation to Uganda dissidents such as the ADF;
3. To ensure that the political and administrative instability arising firm rebel and government
dashes in Eastern Congo do not destabilize Uganda;
652 Interview with UG/MOD 11 held on 28 July 2005 in Kampala.
653 Ibid. Similar views were expressed by other Interviewees, UG/MOD 7 held on 17 October 2004 at Kimaka,
UG/MOD 1 held on 30 July 2005 in Kampala, UG/MOD 4 held on 19 September 2005 in Kampala and












4. To demobilize elements of the interahamwe and ex-FAR and pram: them fare terrorizing
Uganda and Rwanda;
5. To pi= Uganda's territorial integrity from invasion by Kabila's forces654
Museveni's position regarding the DRC's role in creating insecurity in Uganda is augmented by a
statement by a Congolese DRC transitional government party leader as follows:
"We all know that what brought Ugandans to Congo 'teas the issue of Ugandan rebels here (in
Congo) 71 se rebels are still in Ituri. Unless we face reality, a problem  still lies ahead Kisembo
told a meeting organized last week  by the MONUC... Hema and Lendu (at this Bunia) meeting
agreed on the cantonment of their forces Kiser& said ADF, RPA and Taban Amin had bases
in Ituri. PRA were supported by Rwanda but mixed among fighters of Union of Patriotic
Congolese UPC of Thomas Lubanga and that PRA are now based near Nyachucbu, south of
Bunia town but closer to Ugandan border. The ADF were regrouping in the areas of Kamango and
Eringeti. Congolese were holding Ugandan rebels (especially the Lendu)... 655
This summarises the nature of the security concerns that Uganda had in the DRC. The security
concerns with Rwanda were more in fear of a coalition between Rwanda and the DRC against
Uganda. Although this never materialised, it is still looming. In Burundi, security concerns were
more about the spillover effects of refugees and concerns of a potential genocide by either ethnic
group, given that they were being forced to share power. The diplomatic intervention went on
for a very long time and was primarily aimed at stopping an impending genocide and returning
the country to democracy and the equitable distribution of political power between the two
ethnic communities.
The Sudan Factor
To understand Uganda's security challenges in the GLR states, it is important to understand the
Sudanese factor in the geo-politics of the region and in Uganda's regional relations. Uganda's
security challenges are inextricably tied up with Sudanese domestic conflicts and wars between
Southern Sudan and the Arabised or Islamised dominated north that controls political power.
President Museveni provides a brief historical account of Uganda's security challenges as follows:
Uganda's security trouble dates as far back as 1986 .... At one time you remember we had some
problems.... With Sudan, we had been in Government  for only six months and on August 22nd
654 President's address to Parliament on 28 May 2000.












1986, the Sudan army attacked us with rebels at Bibia. We haze been having problems with
Sudan all that time We had problems with Rwanda under the late Habyarzinana , and we had
problemswith Congo under Mobutu. We always handle all these problems by ourselves. We never
call foreign troops to come  and help us deal with our problems. therefore,  the propensity for the
foreigners to be involved in Congo is directly proportional  to the internal weaknesses-both
organizational and ideological (and in a later part of his presentation he reemphasized  that) ...
Uganda's security interest in the Congo has always been the problem of Sudan using Congo  to
deliver terrorists into the country... Security problems  of neighbours  should be handled correctly and
on a durable basis. Otherwise, they will invite interventions from these regional states, or there will
alwaysbe tensions with them
Uganda's initially covert support and later overt intervention in Sudan's affairs in support of the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army has been attributed to Uganda's attempt to reciprocate
Sudan's assistance to Ugandan rebels. Sudan government reportedly provided military training
and logistics to Ugandan rebels and alternative bases from which to attack Uganda. Ugandan
rebels were trained in areas like Ikotosh, and Magwii, 657 which bordered Southern Sudan, and
records indicate that Sudan provided military equipment and other help to all the rebels groups
except those in central Uganda and Eastern Uganda as a trade-off for Uganda's support to the
SPLA.
Sudan supported various rebel groups in Uganda from 1986 to 2001. These included; Uganda
People's Army (UPA), Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF I), Uganda National Liberation
Army (UNLA), Ugandan National Rescue Front (UNRF II), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF),
Former Uganda National Army (FUNA), National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU),
the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM), Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic
Front (ADF). See Table 12 on page 213-216 that provides a summary of their interests and
sources of logistical and financial support. Sudan extended support to Uganda's rebels even in
their rebel bases in the DRC and provided military equipment to them. In his address to
Parliament, Museveni reported that the UPDF had captured from the rebels multiple weapons
which included, 82 mm recoilless cannons; Self Propelled Guns (SPG-9), anti armour guns;
SAM-7 (Surface to air missiles) and Igla surface to air-missles (hand held); 12.7 mm (anti-air-craft
machine guns); land mines (anti-Vehicle; anti personnel mines (for chopping off people's feet);
60mm and 82mm mortars, multiple grenade launchers; and machine guns known as G-2s (which
656 Y. Museveni's parliamentary address on 16 September 1998, see Parliamentary Hansard, Special Session, p. 4907
and 4910.











were fired against the President in Gulu Barracks). Thirteen sub-machine guns an Rocket
propelled grenades (RPGs) optic sight, one medium Machine gun, fifteen fully-loaded SMG
magazines and eight empty ones had been recovered from West Nile. Five RPG bombs with one
fuse, 14 anti-personnel landmines with ten fuses, seven tortoise grenades and an anti-tank
landmine were recovered in Yumbe; it is alleged that these had been provided by Sudan. The
security matrix on page 213-216 details the weapons that each rebel group fighting Uganda had
and the possible sources of these weapons. 6"
8.3 Uganda's role in destabilising the region
Museveni's position regarding the security of the GLR had always favoured peaceful resolution
of conflicts through dialogue: in short, a diplomatic approach to issues. As Mamdani points out,
when Rwanda decided to provide foot soldiers to spearhead the anti-Mobutu rebellion in 1996,
the main objection to this move came from President Museveni.659 Why then did President
Museveni shift his policy from his cherished diplomatic approaches to military intervention in
the DRC? In examining this change in policy, two issues emerge. Firstly, each state in the GLR
played a role in destabilizing the region in one way or the other. Secondly, Uganda's change of
policy was driven by its national security concerns and the potential impact this DRC
intervention would have. The main character of the GLR in the post-Cold War era was that
states provided bases for each other's rebel groups through some kind of reciprocal revenge-
based arrangement of "An eye for an eye". Uganda's role in contributing to the insecurity in the
region should not be underestimated. In pursuit of its security interests, it affected others along
the way. Uganda covertly provided logistical and financial assistance to the rebels of other states,
thus creating its own precarious position because other states retaliated by assisting Ugandan
rebels. Although covert interventions are more subtle and yield better results, as Howe argues,
they lead to more insecurity and distort relations between leaders, a result that Van Evera argues
is characteristic of a security dilemma."'
658 See Museveni's Parliamentary Address of 22 November 2002 in Parliamentary Hansard, 2002. Similar inventories
of weapons were provided by the following scholars, and implicitly point to similar arms in the region. See R. Doom
and K. Vlassenroot, "Kony's message: A new Koine? The LRA in Northern Uganda", in African Affairs, Vol 98,
No 390 (1999), pp 5-36
659 M. Mamdani, "Rwanda-Uganda Intervention in the Congo", in Mandaza, I., (ed), Reflections on the Crisis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo,  (SARIPS Series, 1999), pp. 33-50.











Evidence from districts bordering the DRC indicates that Uganda had thus destabilised the
GLR, and thereby made its own position more precarious. As early as 1994, reports indicated
that the Museveni administration had adopted military postures signalling war, which sent
warning messages to the DRC. Uganda pointed to the incident on 4 October 1994, in which the
FAZ had conducted a military exercise at Kyeshero/Butogota near the Ugandan border, an act
that caused great panic among the local communities. A mortar shell was fired into Uganda by
FAZ at Kabuiyiri near the Mpondwe border post and suspected Zairean intelligence agents were
arrested on Uganda's border at Butogota. In May 1995, a regional border meeting held from 28
to 31 May in Mbarara (Uganda) revealed that both Uganda and the DRC carried out activities
that compromised each other's security. In their reports, each state detailed the magnitude of
insecurity caused by the other. Uganda had deployed troops at Rukungiri in Kanyatorogo on
Bugiri hill, in Kasese facing Kasindi and in Bundibugyo facing the DRC to reduce the insecurity
at the borders of Bundibugyo, Bushenyi, Kasese and Rukungiri. On 13 June 1995, a Zairean
captain from the Kasindi army unit crossed into Uganda and threatened the western brigade by
saying that he would launch an attack against Uganda. Uganda also noted that Zaire had
continued with acts of aggression, such as the mobilization of training and arming of Ugandan
rebels.
The DRC was concerned with the insecurity at Goma, Ituri and North Kivu. Zaire in its report
indicated that it was aware that Uganda and Rwanda were jointly training rebels to overthrow
Mobutu. They were also inciting ethnic cleavages in the region of Kivu. particularly among the
Banyamulenge who were related to the Tutsi of Rwanda. Uganda had deployed at the border,
which covertly assisted Zairean outlaws. The Zairean report argued that the deployments were
heavy and threatened the state, because they were interpreted as preparations for an invasion.
The DRC alleged that intelligence reports it had obtained revealed a grand plan by Uganda,
Sudan (Zaire must have meant the SPLA because Uganda had relations with SPLA and not the
Sudanese government) and Rwanda to overthrow Mobutu, during a secret meeting in












Kampala.' Secondly, Uganda had constructed airfields in Lamia (Bundibugyo) and in Kinyonzo
(Rukungiri) to assist the rebel groups it was supporting. Uganda was using the existing Zaire=
rebels (supported by Uganda) to carry out intelligence. These were arrested in Kivu and Goma.
The failure of the two states to address these problems even after the diplomatic cross-border
meetings resulted in more animosity on both sides. As evidence unfolded on how each state was
preparing for war on the other, the possibility of any meaningful diplomatic decision was further
reduced. By 1996, the ADFL rebel war commenced and was later joined by the Rwandans and
Ugandans. This war took the ADF by surprise, and forced them to make a premature attack on
Uganda with a plan to obtain a base to operate from since the ADFL was now sweeping towards
their hideouts. The events that followed have been covered in much of the literature, but what is
important at this point is to establish why Uganda decided to intervene militarily in the DRC.
The preceding report' on Uganda's actions at the border of the DRC is the underlying reason
for Uganda's insecurity. Whereas Uganda's subsequent intervention in the DRC has been
attributed to the fact that the DRC was providing the rebels with a base from which to attack
Uganda, it could also be argued that Uganda had created its own instability by instigating war in
the DRC through its proxies (the rebel groups in the DRC). Irrespective of who started it all,
whether it was Museveni or Mobutu, they are all responsible for the insecurity in their own
states. Uganda intervened in the DRC-occupied parts of Eastern Congo and the air bases that
were the main conduits for the rebel logistical supplies that were being airlifted from Khartoum
through Juba and brought to Eastern Congo for the rebels. To secure itself, Uganda extended its
security bases further into the interior to be able to focus on potential security pressure spots
(rebel areas)." It also cultivated good relations with the local populace in Eastern Congo. These
acted as whistle blowers and informed the UPDF of the movement of the Ugandan rebels. To
be able to sustain this supply of information, Uganda allied with Congolese rebels, particularly
661 The report indicating Zaire's security concerns is available on request. Zaire's fear of a coup came true just a year
after this report was released.
662 This report is available on request.
663 The depth of Uganda's penetration into the DRC has been strongly contested, particularly regarding the
occupation that extended up to Kisangani. What should be clear at this point is that the geographical region between
Uganda and Kisangani offered the rebels better hide-outs and good vantage points of offence as well as defence
against Uganda. Uganda would need a firm base that was equally accessible and operable to be able to hunt down












RCD-Kisangani, Lendu Militias led by Foribert Njabu of the Integrationist Front (FNI), Forces
of Armed Congolese (FAPC) of Commander Jerome Kakwava and the Party for the Safeguard
and Integrity of the Congo of Chief Kahwa and the Rally for a Democratic Congo -Liberation
Movement (RCD-ML). It also supported Rally for a Democratic Congo-Kisangani new leader
Mbusa Nyamwisi664 who was interested in controlling Beni and North Kivu. He did not want the
UPDF to leave the DRC because he benefited from Uganda and would use them to fight his
own battles.
It has been discussed from the foregoing that Uganda played a role in creating its instability, but
it should also be noted that military interventions were not the only mode of intervention
undertaken by Uganda. Efforts to resolve conflicts and misunderstandings diplomatically
preceded the use of military force. Joint communiqués were endorsed as a means of addressing
the insecurity in the region. One common feature in all these communiqués was the willingness
of the states to use mutually agreed strategies to address security problems that pervaded the
GLR. Whereas the implementation of these agreements is questionable, it serves to show that
although military options were taken, they were preceded by diplomatic efforts. For example, in
the Joint Communiqué of 1997, the DRC and Uganda agreed to address the NALU, Forces
Armées Zaire (EX-FAZ), Forces Armées Rwandaises (EX-FAR) and the Interahamwe groups in
the Rwenzori mountains, which were creating insecurity for both states.
These bilateral relations were continuously dogged by failures of both states to uphold
resolutions and recommendations made in many of the security meetings. In July 1997, for
example, attempts were made to harmonize and consolidate the good neighbourly relations
between North-Kivu Province and Uganda's Western districts of Kisoro, Kasese, Rukungiri and
Bundibugyo. Central to this meeting were concerns over the activism and provocations from the
NALU dissidents, the repeated incursions of Uganda's regular army into the DRC, and the
violation of territorial borders and death-threats towards traditional and local authorities.
Included were police harassments and bad treatment of the Congolese in Uganda and Congolese
torture of Ugandan businessmen. All these were discussed, but the two states did not live up to
stopping them. We could argue that the failure to cooperate was because either state did not
664 Another interviewee pointed to the fact that Mbusa Nyamwisi was actually a Mukonjo and that he was thus able











have control over their soldiers on the ground, or because communication between those at the
top and those actually in the war zones was non-existent. A summary of the communiqués
below demonstrates the diplomatic effort undertaken by the GLR states.
One salient factor emerges from these diplomatic efforts to address insecurity. 'Whilst it is true
that border administration met to agree on a few security arrangements, it was not clear from the
field studies whether the leaders were advised about these communiqués and the obligations
expected of them. Of course, records indicate that the governments were represented from the
highest security offices, and that other than these communiques cited, there were many more
(see chronicle Appendix 1) but it is unclear what then caused these communiqués to fail to
achieve their goals. The failture of these communiques and attempts to cooperate in security
matters has been attributed to the character of the leaders in the region and their competition for
power, authority and economic interests. The competition of these leaders is at two levels. At
the first level, the military commanders of Rwanda and Uganda who were in charge of the troops
in the DRC were opposed to each other and engaged in war out of their own differences. At the
second level (this is dealt with in detail in the subsequent section) the Presidents of the three
states Rwanda, DRC and Uganda were all competing for regional power. Most prominently
were the leaders of Rwanda and Uganda who indirectly engaged each other through their proxies











is evident in Appendix 8 which illustrates President Kagame's interview with a journalist on the
Kisangani clashes and President Museveni's address to the Ugandan Parliament of May 2000 the
two must be read together to appreciate the tension that existed between the two leaders. At a
more subtle level, the leaders in the region, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC engaged in arms
acquisition as a means to prepare themselves for any eventuality. These are discussed in the next
section.
Regional Competitive Arms Acquisition in the GLR
One consequence of the security dilemma created by ethnic conflicts and political power
squabbles in the region, is the arms build-up, not only by the states, but also by the rebels and
ethnic groups as a means to secure themselves. The increase in competitive arms acquisition"' or
armament of the region and states enormous procurements of weapons during this period
aggravated the security dilemma in the region. As Posen, Jervis, Roe, Van Evera and Glaser
point out, increases in resources by states in order to defend themselves result in states getting
both too much and too little: too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression, and
too little because those being threatened will increase their own arms and so reduce the first
state's security.
666
 In this way, the arms build-up expands into an arms race, as states compete for
better and more advanced military hardware, which may deteriorate into a standoff between the
competing states. Tables overleaf showing the massive flow of arms through purchases and
military expenditure in the region, demonstrate the magnitude of the military build-ups that were
responsible for the security dilemma.
In Uganda, the increase in its military capability has been attributed to three factors.667 Firstly, the
security challenges that resulted from the rapid incursions of Uganda's borders by the Ugandan
insurgent groups and the discovery that the rebels had advanced weaponry compared to the
UPDF forced it to increase its military strength with the rationale that they would counter the
665 Competitive arms acquisition has been used in place of the arms race which is one of the characters of a security
dilemma. The time series of the conflict in the region can not warrant an analysis of an arms race because it is so
short a time.
666 R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, p. 64. Other scholars express similar views to
that of Jervis with regard to the arms increment amongst states.
667 Evidence of Uganda's arms build-up was inadvertently revealed by some highly publicized hitches in the











insurgents' military capabilities."' Secondly, because of the increased insurgency regionally,
Uganda felt that it had a salient role to play in restoring stability in the region. This necessitated
that Uganda acquire more military hardware. Lastly, the military build-up and arms procurement
were a direct result of inappropriate behaviour on the part of the officers who sought to gain
from the procurement procedure for personal aggrandizement."'
Reports revealed other military purchases in 1999: Uganda bought T-55 tanks at US $30,000
each, which was the cost of a car."' Whereas previous researches have attempted to link the
increased expenditure on arms to the regional wars that broke out between 1994 and 2000, it is
apparent that Uganda's procurement of weapons continued to increase, particularly between
2003 and 2005, even when rebel activity had subsided. In 2005 alone, Uganda planned to acquire
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) from Russia's Arzamas Engineering plant, which had put
up a weapons show at the IDEX 2005 in Abu Dhabi. Uganda planned to buy 14 BTR-80 APCs;
Sudan retaliated by ordering thirty APCs for its own army.' The table of military expenditure
explains this clearly. The statistics used in this study were obtained from documentary evidence
from the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), the Small Arms Survey (Geneva)
and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (Washington DC) these are reputable research
institutions.
The impact of Uganda's military build-up on the neighbouring states sparked off similar attempts
by these to procure even more weapons, setting in motion a rapid arms acquisition between
states. Another factor that greatly contributed to the military build-ups but that has not been
given sufficient treatment is the US role in the region. Whereas it was obvious that the US did
668 In his Address to Parliament Museveni said that weapons captured from the rebels were far better than what
Uganda had. He used similar arguments to justify the increase in the budget of the Ministry of Defence. See
Museveni's Parliamentary Address of 22 November 2002 in Parliamentary Hansard,  2002.
669 The New Vision, "Museveni begins probe into tank purchase", Kampala 2 January 1999 and P. Harris, "Uganda
pays over the odds for tanks that will not work", in Jane's Intelligence Review (1999). Through the connivance of
top military officials and civilian business middle men, the Ugandan government procured weapons and helicopters
of substandard quality, which cost the government colossal sums of money. A highly publicised case in which Lt
General Salim Salem, Kampala businessmen Kwame Ruyondo and Emmanuel Kato revealed that bribery and
corruption had been a common character of the UPDF involving sums of bribery as high as 1.4 billion Uganda
shillings. Evidence elsewhere suggested that the supplier of the arms in Uganda had also sold similar junk
helicopters to Rwanda.
670 S. Metz ,"A Strategic Approach to African Security: Challenges and Prospects", in African Security Review, Vol
93 (2000), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/9No3/StratApp.html,  accessed 30 April 2004.











not support a regional war, its earlier and continued military sales to the GLR states nonetheless
provided them with the opportunity to equip themselves for war. The more arms one state
purchased, the more the rest acquired. In Africa, the US continued to sell even more weapons
through its two main programs - the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales
(DCS).672 In Chapter Six, it was discussed in detail how the US sold large amounts of military
equipment and trained many soldiers. The aid and training inadvertently led to an increased arms
acquisition and a willingness among the states to engage in war, because they believed they had
sufficient military capability to sustain it. Uganda thus became strong enough to intervene in
other states because the training and the military procurements had improved its military
capability.
Other avenues through which the region was militarized included the direct aiming of rebels by
neighbouring states. Arms trafficking continued to be a common feature of the militarization of
the region, and Uganda became a hub of weapon transmission in the region. Corresponding
research indicates that the majority of weapons purchased by the DRC militia were organised
through Uganda's secondary trade arrangements. Uganda provided the intermediary points of
arms trafficking, and is continues to supply arms and ammunition to other states through its
arms factory in Nakasongola.673 Arms were sold to the rebel groups with which Uganda
sympathised, for example, Bembe's group in North Eastern Congo, while the rest were sold in
Kinshasha for about US $200 dollars each." More evidence of the arms acquisition is provided
on states like Rwanda', although it is not the central focus here.
This competitive acquisition of arms depicts a security dilemma. As Jervis points out, a security
dilemma is caused by the military preparations of one state, which creates two situations. On the
672 W. Hartung in his report on exposing the US arms export lobby, provides a detailed overview of how US politics
greatly influences the US arms export policy. He argues that many of the top leaders of the US are able to take office
because they include in their election campaigns policies that favour the big military technology industries in the US.
See W. Hartung, Peddling Arms, Peddling Influence: Exposing the Arms Export Lobby, Report of the Arms Trade
Source Centre. (1996-1997). See also W. Hartung, and B. Moix, "Deadly Legacy: US Arms to Africa and the Congo
War", World Policy Institute: Arms Control Reports, (2000)
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm, accessed on 23 April 2003.
673 See African Analysis, "Uganda's Arms Bazaar", on 3 October 2003, and Report by the All Parliamentary Group
on the GLR, Arms Flows in Eastern DRC: A report pursuant to Security Council Resolution no. 1533 paragraph 12,
http://www.appgreatlakes.org, accessed on 15 July 2005.
674 Small Arms Survey, Special Report, April, 2002, pp. 33-34.











one hand, the arms race creates an unreasonable uncertainty in the mind of another state as to
whether the arms build-up is for defensive or offensive purposes.' Van Evera argues that when
such an arms race occurs and states increase their military capabilities to their advantage, they
encourage styles of diplomacy that increase the probability of war because states negotiate less
and are more likely to use fait accompli tactics.' This is precisely what happened in the GLR: the
increased amounts of armaments in the region led to wars between allies, like the Kisangani wars
between Uganda and Rwanda, and regional wars such as the DRC war between Angola,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad in support of the DRC and Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda's
coalition forces in 1998 and 1999. The competitive acquisition of led to increased military
spending and further instability in Uganda. In a critique by a Small Arms Survey Specialist,
Uganda's acquisition of arms was not necessarily because of only the security challenges
particulary counter-insurgency it had but rather simply amassed weaponry with an underlying
motive of projecting its military as top of the range. The specialist had this to say,
Think about the material procured by Uganda. Was it suitable for a
counterinsurgency operation against the LRA? ... the answer  is, for the most
part, no. And this is very  important; the LRA at no time outgunned the
UPDF. There was nothing sophisticated about the weapons that they had'
From this communication it is evident that not all the weapons acquired were necessarily for
immediate security use (here equipment such as night vision and radio sets for small unit bush
operations are the exception) but rather for military preparedness as well as for projection of
power in the region. Overleaf is Uganda's defence budget over six years.
676 R. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics, pp. 63-64.
677 S. van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the causes of War", pp. 10-12.











It could be argued from the defence budgets for these six financial years that, whilst the budget
was increasing, the security of Uganda was not necessarily improving. The figure also indicates
that, in 1998, in spite of increased external threats, wars and local insurgenciesm the defence
expenditure was progressively reduced, from about 40% of recurrent expenditure to 19%
(Minister of Defence: 1997/1998 Policy statement) 679 but this changed into a drastic expenditure
increase, which was most likely a result of the precarious situation in the subsequent years. In his
address to Parliament, President Museveni explained the common question that was being raised
by the opposition and other citizens.
IS UGANDA WASTING MONEY IN CONGO?
I am always hearing false arguments by some people to the effect that we are wasting money in
Congo. Of course we are spending money, but we were spending money anyway  be  we were
fighting banditry hem in Uganda, only that We did not have a chance to soh this problem
conclusively. We would operate on the Uganda side but the bandits 'wmid be on the Congo side and
679 Efforts had been made to increase the budget but the International Financial Institutions had refused and had
forced Uganda to stick to its previous budget. Critiques of this expenditure pattern showing a decrease in
expenditure argued that, whereas the Ministry had declared that it the budget was as required by the donors, there











we wouldnot be freeto do anything about it. Nowar pera ing on both sides. Therefore,T e
spending money, but we are now doing so profitably. That is how we have been able to capture the
bandits in Congo. Therefore, the argument of spending money does not hold miter because even
you do not operate outside your borders, if you haze security problems, which are part of the old
security problems of our country, you will spend money within your country. However , you will have
fewer chances of resolving the problem if the people on the other side do not co-operate.
680
From the graph, it can also be seen that there was an increment in the budget every year even
though there was a very marginal increase in the capital development. It should be noted that
whilst the increment in the budget can be justifiably defended, as mainly a result of insecurity,
there were incidents when some of the resources were used for personal aggrandisement through
shoddy military expenditures that were never accounted for. The earlier reference to the
purchase of substandard military hardware is but one of the many examples of misappropriation
of military resources that has characterised the Museveni administration.
The increments in the defence budgets were not peculiar to Uganda; other GLR states also
increased their military spending, indicating that there was indeed a security dilemma. Below are
two detailed breakdowns of military procurements and expenditure in the Great Lakes Region of
Africa in the period of intense insecurity from 1995 1999. The tables provide comparative views
of the defence spending in the region. The purpose of Table 15 is to demonstrate that the
increment in military expenditure was not confined to Uganda but also relevant to the other
states in the region, most probably because of the security dilemma in the region. The table
demonstrated that there was deliberate acquisition of arms and weapons not only for counter-
insurgency but also for conventional warfare which is akin to one main characteristic of the
security dilemma arms race.

























































8.4 Perceptions and misperceptions of Uganda's regional actions
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy was a product of shifting alliances and diplomatic
oversights that characterised the leaders' relations in the GLR states. Right from the time that
Museveni came to power with the help of Ugandans opposed to the ergimes of Amin and Obote
II and with the help of ethnic Tutsi of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC refugees, his neighbours
were afraid that he would help their ethnic minorities to struggle for their return, a fear that
indeed came true.
Initially, Museveni's relations with the leaders of the neighbouring states were cordial, though,
and it is recounted that the presidents shared each other's problems and consulted on central
issues that concerned the region. They attended each other's ceremonies, such as swearing in
ceremonies, and met often to discuss issues of mutual interest. However, these relations broke
down when the Rwandan Tutsi refugees in the National Resistance Army (NRM) of Uganda
attacked Rwanda in 1990. This Museveni argues was the beginning of Uganda's problems in the
GLR region. 681 It sparked off mistrust for Museveni in the region and strained his relations with
other regional leaders, particularly Habyarimana and Mobutu. The consequences of the RPF
invasion of Rwanda using Uganda as a base were many. The leaders in the neighbouring states
perceived this invasion as a precursor to their own invasions.
Museveni's insistence that Habyarimana and Mobutu address the citizenship questions of their
refugee minority ethnic groups, which had been caused by the colonial legacy, caused animosity
between Museveni and his counterparts. The differing view on how this crisis in citizenship"'
had to be addressed was partly what brought out the differences between Museveni and other
leaders in the region. Museveni's approach was to let the ethnic communities return to their
states of origin and share political power with the ruling ethnic groups, but this option was
rejected. The second option was to naturalize them in Uganda and the DRC, an option the
ethnic groups (refugees) vehemently opposed and one that the Habyarimana and Mobutu
681 President Museveni in his Parliamentary Address on 16 September 1998, Parliamentary Hansard, p. 4907.
682 M. Mamdani used the term "crisis in citizenship" to demonstrate the intricate nature of the ethnic conflicts in the
GLR and how these shaped the security systems of the region. See two of his invaluable works, M. Mamdani, When
Victims Become Killers, Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,  and M. Mamdani, Understanding the











governments supported. As covert diplomatic negotiations to solve the problem stalled, the
Rwandan Tutsi who were in Uganda's army attacked Rwanda in 1990 with the intention of
overthrowing the sitting government.
In Burundi the assassination of the first elected Hutu president by Tutsi and the taking over of
Burundi by a Tutsi was viewed as a follow-up of the Rwandan ethnic conflict in which the Tutsi
were fighting to dominate the Hutu. In the DRC, ethnic dissensions commenced on the Uganda-
DRC border and on the Rwanda-DRC border with the Tutsi there demanding recognition by the
DRC government. These circumstances created animosity in the region, which deteriorated into
regional wars in all the three states. Museveni on several occasions admits that he covertly helped
the liberation struggles in the neighbouring states. In one instance, Museveni reported that
Kabila asked him for troops to help him in his war against Mobutu but that he had declined and
instead gave him materials because he preferred Kabila to build his own capacity. Similarly, rebel
leaders in the DRC and in Burundi all acknowledge that Museveni was the point of reference in
their struggle to overthrow their leaders. In the DRC the renowned rebel Ondekane, then
Commander and Deputy President of the mainstream Congolese rebel faction RCD-Goma, had
this to say:
At the beginning of our struggle I met President Yoweri Museveni in Gulu. He had his generals.
We went to see whether he could help us, we Congolese. The way the war began was very good
Uganda provided us with logistical support to liberate ourselves.... We did not know that
meanwhileMusezeni wasbuyi g t me to build Bemba's movementWhen we ent back to him,
Museveniset conditions that; I Ondekane, should take charge of all troopsweere tra ning but
that I give Bemba a place with the RCD, so he I  one of the leaders.... Museveni  then agreed
to provide me with guns and food for soldiers for two months. For that, and because he is an elder,
we are really gra* to him even ifthings have turned sour .. ."3
Museveni's relations with leaders of the neighbouring states were shrouded in mistrust.
Museveni's was perceived as the "king-maker state"' responsible for the attempted changes in
leadership in the neighbouring states through use of military force. In the subsequent years that
followed the completion of the liberation wars in Rwanda and the DRC and of the diplomatic
negotiations in Burundi, saw the formation of an alliance amongst the new leaders of Rwanda,
683 An excerpt of a transcript of Ondekane's Interview with Kevin Aliro, "UPDF Like Mobutu's Army-Ondekane",
in The Monitor, 20 June (2000), p. 10.












the DRC, Burundi and Uganda. Initially they allied to fight rebels in the region and help
themselves secure their regimes."' This alliance developed cracks, following initial
misunderstandings between Rwanda's Kagame and the DRC's Kabila. 6" Kabila's decision to
stop the Rwandans from providing him with security and his demand that all foreign troops
return to their respective states created animosity between him and Rwanda. The allies of
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda became suspicious of Kabila's moves. For example, when the
seven presidents met in Harare to discuss the Congo crisis, it became apparent that Kabila was
covertly seeking new alliances and had had a meeting prior to the one in Harare with the Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Defence of South Africa, the results of which meeting Kabila never
revealed at the Harare meeting. The subsequent meeting in which only four countries met to
discuss the DRC chaired by Mugabe became even more suspect to the former allies of Kabila.
A counter-meeting to discuss this new Kabila strategy to seek new allies was called in Kigali with
the main agenda of discussing Kabila's alleged plan to expel the Banyamulenge from
government. The decision to expel the Banyamulenge would have severe consequences for
Uganda because their expulsion would further intensify Uganda's insecurity on the Eastern
border. The Banyamulenge acted as a bulwark against the rebel-infested region in the Eastern
Congo and were helping Uganda comb out the ADF from the region. Kabila's hurried expulsion
of the Banyamulenge and other Rwandans guarding him, and the Kabila's supporters attack on
Uganda's Congo embassy in mid-August of 1998 coincided to change the alliance system in the
region. It became apparent to Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda that Kabila had severed relations
with his former allies.
Another source of mistrust was Kabila's style of diplomacy. Rather than raising his concerns
with Rwanda and Uganda over what he did not agree with in their relations, he openly choose to
carry out plans that were inherently a threat and problematic to the alliance. For example, his
initiative to persuade the SADC countries to give him soldiers to fight what he termed the
685 The concept of the "new leaders" was used by Ottaway to describe the leaders who had come to power after
coups and guerrilla warfare and professed democracy etc. In the GLR region these included Museveni and Kagame.
Kabila was never included among the new leaders given his discredited background. For a detailed discussion on the
new leaders see M. Ottaway, Africa's New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction?, (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
686 Kabila was scared that Rwanda would overthrow him because Rwandese were in charge of his security, despite











"foreign aggression of Rwanda and Uganda", angered his former allies. Secondly, the situation
was aggravated when he secretly visited Sudan en route to Zimbabwe and later Tripoli in mid-
September 1998. It was revealed (no sources of this revelation were confirmed) that during
Kabila's visit to Bashir, they had agreed to cooperate in ending the rebellion in the DRC 6H 7
Bashir's decision to help Kabila was premised on the fact that Israel and the US were helping
Uganda and Rwanda, so he would retaliate by helping Kabila
688
. Note that according to Van
Evera, when states are in conflict with each other, then a security dilemma will emerge, because
these states will mistrust each other and shroud their policies in secrecy to prevent their
adversaries from knowing what they are planning.'" This is what happened in the GLR, and it
undermined the already fragile peace in the region. Van Evera argues further that states will
reach fewer agreements and that diplomatic initiatives to resolve conflict will not yield any
positive results.
Reflections in the daily reports69 on the deteriorating situation that eventually led to war indicate
that agreements between Kabila and his former allies were impossible to arrive at and in fact,
Kabila had carefully played his former allies into a trap, in that his new allies of Angola, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, Chad, Libya691 and Sudan enabled him win his war against his original allies. An
advance party to understand the conflict between Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC
commissioned by SADC following the Mauritius summit had not yielded anything. 692 Following
the declaration by nine French speaking African countries that Uganda and Rwanda were
aggressors 693 and their demand that peacekeeping troops be deployed, led to a further breakdown
687 Interview with UG/MOD 12 held in Kampala on 27 July 2005.
688 Ibid.
689 S. Van Evera, "Offense, Defense and the causes of War", in International Security, Vol 22 no. 4 (1998) p. 10.
690 A chronology of the events covered by a Ugandan daily newspaper was developed in this study. The information
in this discussion is derived from these chronologies.
691 Libya was not only arming Chad but was arming and bankrolling Kabila and his allies. See A. Mwenda, "M7 in
Libya", in The Monitor, 30 September 1998. There were speculations that Libya's support to Kabila through Chad
was aimed at protecting Libya's economic interest in the Congo. For details on the Chad-Libyan relations, see a full
report, "Chad sends 1000 Troops to Congo" in The Monitor, 27 September 1998. Note that in the geopolitical
relations of the GLR, Uganda was known to have very good relations with Libya and that Muammar Gadaffi had
visited Uganda twice in a space of six years (1995-2001). So a shift in relations, even though Libya was doing it
through a proxy state, was to influence how Uganda approached the entire problem at hand.
692 Monitor Reporter, "Summit disappoints Kabila", in The Monitor, 16 September 1998. At this meeting President
Chiluba of Zambia had been mandated by the Mauritius SADC summit to visit Uganda and Rwanda and to establish
the cause of the misunderstanding between the former allies.
693 These French speaking African states that condemned Uganda and Rwanda had had a summit at Libreville in
Gabon on 25 September 1998. They included Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Congo-Brazaville , Chad, CAR,











in Kabila's relations with Museveni and Kabila694  A war thus broke out, which attracted eight of
the DRC's neighbours, both immediate and in Southern Africa. The war had severe
repercussions for the region because about 11,000 Hutu crossed from Congo Brazzaville and
joined Kabila's forces to fight Rwanda.' Sudan opened up attacks on the SPLA and
simultaneously provided more military aid to the Ugandan rebels to enable them to fight Uganda.
Sudan believed that this would undercut Uganda's assistance to the SPLA, since it was already
engaged in a war with the DRC. The neighbouring states' leaders' reciprocated by arming
Uganda's rebels.
It can be concluded from the shifts in alliances and how these led up to the war that
misperceptions of leaders' actions and strategic plans by each other greatly hinder the
cooperation between states. The magnitude of such misperceptions provided the window of
opportunity that states exploited to intervene and fight each other. It is also evident from the
events in the GLR that intervention was an intricate undertaking. As Finnemore correctly points
out, interests are often not obvious, and much of politics is a struggle to define them. The same
could be said of Ugandan's motivations to intervene in the GLR. Uganda's actions, both covert
and overt, and its bilateral relations created mistrust between states and leaders, and ultimately
destabilised that country. Consequently, Uganda in its efforts to contribute to the liberation of
other states created its own instability.
Summary
From the foregoing discussions on Uganda's interventions in its Western neighbours, it is
evident that Uganda's security challenges were inextricably tied to the geo-politics of the region
and intrastate ethnic conflicts of the region as a whole. It was also discussed that Uganda's
interventionist foreign policy can be attributed to its proximity to anarchic states, particularly
where ethnic conflict and violence was intense, and to the nature of inter-personal relations
between the leaders in the region. It is argued that the security dilemmas that characterised this
1998.
694 Ibid.











region account for Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in all the three states in which it
intervened. Uganda's security challenges may be a result of external state and non-state actors,
but it was also discovered that Uganda had a significant role to play in creating its own insecurity
in the region as a whole.
Theoretical implication
Whereas the Security Dilemma theory focuses on state actors in its traditional form, the links
between state actors and non-state actors becomes important in accounting for state actions.
Non-state actors emerge as a salient conduit through which states carry out their foreign policy
towards each other. It demonstrates that these non-state actors seek support from the official
leadership of the states and that they exploit the poor inter-personal relations between such
leaders to carry out their subversive activities against them with little or no reproach from the
states in which they operate. Misperception of states of each other's actions extends to the
leaders' misperceptions of each other's intentions, which creates a security dilemma at two levels,
at the level of the state and at the level of the leaders. The strength of the theory lies in its
capacity to account for the ethnic conflicts that characterised the region and that compelled
Uganda to intervene in the affairs of its Western neighbours. The theory posits that when a state
that held together diverse ethnic groups collapses, ethnic conflicts ensue and these deteriorate
into violence and genocide, which demands interventionst action by the neighbouring states.
The Security Dilemma theory provides a convincing explanation of Uganda's interventionist
foreign policy between 1986 and 2006, and provides important insights into how Uganda has
developed its national security policies during Museveni's administration. The theory has been
able to explain an array of important issues of Uganda's interventions in an interesting new way.
For example, it acknowledges that geography plays a central role in creating insecurity and that
permeable and defenceless borders are likely to intensify the security dilemma of landlocked
states. It acknowledges economic motivations too, although it argues that these motivations are
peculiar to greedy states that project themselves as security seekers, which Uganda cannot claim












The greatest weakness of the Security Dilemma theory is its failure to account for the role of
morals, norms, culture or identity as critical to state behaviour. These ideas and values as
motivations are generally consistent with other theories though, for example, the poliheuristic
and constructivist theories that complement the Security Dilemma theory in explaining the
foreign policy behaviour of states. This not withstanding, the Security Dilemma has better
predictive power for the region as a whole. States are more likely to intervene in states that
compromise their security but also if their own internal conflicts affect their neighbouring states,
the propensity to intervene is high. The conclusion of this chapter is that Uganda's security
concerns continues to be an essential ingredient of its interventionist foreign policy, be they
caused by state actors or non-state actors and that a comprehensive theory that explains
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy can be derived from using multiple theories namely, the
Security Dilemma, Constructivism, Poliheurism, and Utilitarian Liberal theory. The study argues
further that, of the four theories, the Security Dilemma theory provides the most parsimonious












CONCLUSION: UGANDA'S INTERVENTIONIST FOREIGN POLICY
9.0 The Study
When should states intervene in others and for what reasons has remained a challenging debate,
especially in Africa where intervention has become a common phenomenon in the post-Cold
War era. Intervention is also contentious because of the legal challenges of international law and
because of the repercussions of interventions on the intervenee states and regions as a whole.
Thus, it is against this background, that the study sought to examine the most parsimonious
theoretical explanation of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in its Western neighbours of
Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. The study covered the Museveni administration from 1986 to
2006, when Uganda lost its first case at the ICJ for intervening in the DRC. Uganda was studied
because of all the countries in Africa; it has conducted the greatest number of unilateral
interventions696 than any other African state in the period 1990-2006 which makes it a good case
study. The study examined Uganda's interventions based on five intervention models, military
intervention (when Uganda directly engaged its soldiers in neighbouring states), humanitarian
and diplomatic intervention, covert intervention and paramilitary intervention (which were used
alongside military intervention). These models were selected because Uganda employed multiple
interventions in states at different times.
The decision to study intervention using comparative theory was based on the fact that,
Uganda's interventions were under theorized. Literature on Uganda's intervention focuses mainly
on the intervention in the DRC. Against this background, studying Uganda's interventionist
foreign policy was premised on the fact that its interventions in its neighbouring states were
contemporaneous with the anarchic nature of the geopolitics of the GLR region. Like many
696 This study of course excludes the intervention in Somalia during late 2006 -March 2007 and the intervention in
Liberia in 1996 because Uganda intervened under the auspices of the African Union (AU) and followed the required











other unilateral interventions and regional group interventions in Africa, Uganda's intervention
played a key role in shaping the geopolitics of the region and the nature of inter-state relations
amongst the GLR states.
9.1 Uganda's Interventions: An Audit
As indicated above, this study was guided by four dominant theories, Security Dilemma,
Constructivism, Liberalism and Poliheurism. The use of these theories was premised on the
realization that just one of these theories on its own would not be able to address the research
question fully. The theories were thus weighed against and compared with each other with the
aim of establishing the most parsimonious theory that explains Uganda's multiple interventions.
The study established that, attempting to disaggregate the dependent variable ie Uganda's
interventionist foreign policy into specific interventions in the GLR, paused theoretical
limitations because no single theory was sufficient to account for all the interventions. It was
evident that specific interventions conform to specific interventions and others do not. The
study showed that all the theories are mutually reinforcing, where one theory can not explicitly
account for an intervention, the other theories can.
Constructivism for example that centers on the role ideas and culture play in determining
whether states should intervene or not gained more relevance in the intervention in Burundi as
well as in Rwanda in 1994 when the genocide broke out more than the interventions in the DRC.
Constructivism demonstrated a close relationship with Political Liberalism; they both attributed
intervention to states failure to protect citizens and in some extreme cases to states committing
genocide on sections of their population. This compelled neighbouring states to intervene to
protect and to provide citizens with humanitarian relief.
It was also evident from the findings that, the Utilitarian Liberal theory was helpful in explaining
Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. The statistical data on trade activities flow of trade and
expenditure on the economic sector demonstrated that the economic interests could not be ruled
out in the interventions that Uganda undertook. The findings of the study were also able to
disconfirm a widely held notion that Uganda's leader Museveni had a "rational plan" designed to
build Uganda's economic and military prowess in the region by using the DRC's wealth as the











resources to build his hegemonic power in the region. Furthermore, it was suggested that
Uganda had benefited greatly from the exploitation of the DRC, in particular from the diamond
and gold trade, which supposedly alleviated Uganda's financial crisis and funded its economic
development programs. On the contrary, the findings demonstrated that Uganda's economic
development was not influenced by its exploitation of the DRC but rather by macro-economic
policies that the state undertook. Further, if any economic accruals from the exploitation were
indicated, they had benefited non-state actors like big regional trade cartels to which Ugandan
soldiers belonged and other big renowned corporations. Details of these beneficiaries are widely
publicized. It was found that Uganda's improved economic performance during the intervention
period was due to its intrastate economic policies, partnerships with key economic organizations
and inter-state trade relations, which Uganda and other GLR states, particularly those in the East
African Community had sought to develop further in their regional economic relations.
In the study, the findings demonstrated that Poliheurism provided a good perspective to
Uganda's interventions in the region particularly because it proved that Museveni's decisions to
intervene were driven by his own whims and that of his privy. His decisions to deploy Ugandan
troops in foreign territories was traceable to him in the absence of a clear communication
protocol in the military structure of Uganda's security framework and lack of legislative clearance
of such critical diplomatic undertaking. Evidence of the study demonstrated that Museveni
wielded a lot of power in Uganda and in the region in the period of study such that his
involvement in conflict states' conflict mitigation or peace negotiations was interpreted to mean
that, it was his commitment to regional peace and security. Burundi provides the most
outstanding success story of his mediation role in conflict resolution that saw the coming to
power of a Hutu and of equitable distribution of political positions between the two warring
intra-ethnic communities, although this still awaits the test of time.
Whereas Poliheurism provided a viable interpretation of states' interventionist foreign policies
especially in as far as leaders use their cognitive abilities to make decisions, and consider
domestic payoffs in the long run, it was evident that Museveni reflected more on the
international payoffs in his interventions in Burundi in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994 and 1995.
The exceptions were the DRC intervention and Rwandan intervention in 1990, where it has been











positions compelled Museveni to avert an "impending coup" by ensuring that he supports the
Rwandese military in his army to return to Rwanda and in the case of the DRC deploying
military officials in DRC conflict to occupy them as well as appease them.
Unlike in other states where intervention is aimed at diverting the attention of the populace over
a failing social or economic policy, in Uganda Museveni did not attempt to divert the attention of
his populace in an impending election because he was sure that there were other processes
through which obtaining a lead in a political contest did not require intervention in another state.
Already he had made an imprint in the minds of the Ugandan citizens that he was indispensable
since he was the only one who knew how to "protect" Ugandans from terrorists, rebel incursions
etc. There were isolated incidences when decisions to intervene had been made close to an
election but these too were not conclusive because they selectively refer to the intervention in
the DRC. It is also implicit that Museveni's interventionist policy was calculated more on the
foreign diplomatic pay off such as gaining a better image in the region and internationally than
for any outright domestic pay off. He drew a lot of strength for his interventionist policy from
the support from U.S.A and United Kingdom and through his bilateral and multilateral
diplomacy he intervened because of the status Uganda had at the international front. As was
noted by De Rouen, referring to poliheurism, the methodology of theory-oriented case studies in
foreign policy decision making is still in its infancy particularly when abstracted to explain
interventions by dysfunctional states that have no clear communication protocol. Nonetheless, it
provides a useful framework for understanding Uganda's interventions foreign policy in the
region.
Based on the foregoing, it is concluded in this study that the Security Dilemma is the most
parsimonious theory for explaining Uganda's interventionist foreign policy. Uganda intervened in
the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi to guarantee its security, particularly because of its geo-political
location in a region that is riddled by conflict. It intervened to prevent anarchy from having
severe repercussions on Uganda and other neighbours. Uganda's security dilemma at her
Western flank, Northern flank and minimally at the Eastern flank played an instrumental role in
compelling it to intervene. Uganda's lack of preclusive defense, in the face of adversaries that
were taking defense postures, increasing their military capabilities and adversaries that were
providing Ugandan dissidents with opportunities to launch attacks on Uganda greatly compelled











Uganda, its proximity to these conflict states made intervention inevitable because the "Crisis in
Citizenship" that had caused genocide, massive unrest and an exodus of refugees had
repercussions on Uganda. Similarly, in the case where Uganda does not share a border (e.g. in
the case of Burundi), it had to intervene to protect itself from the spillover effects of intrastate
violent conflicts particularly in Burundi.
It is the final conclusion of this study that, no single theory is sufficient to account for all the
interventions that Uganda carried out. To understand Uganda's interventionist foreign policy,
multiple theories have to be utilized because they reinforce each other. In some interventions the
constructivist explanation is most plausible in other interventions realist or poliheurist
interpretations are more explicable. This said though, the most parsimonious theory to explain
Uganda's interventionist foreign policy is the Security Dilemma theory. From the discussions in
these chapters, it is evident that to arrive at a theory that can comprehensively explain Uganda's
interventionist foreign policy, the central theory, viz. the Security Dilemma theory, has to be
complemented with the constructivist, utilitarian liberal position and poliheuristic theories.
9.2 Future Research Prospects
Interventions and the question why they take place have been analyzed in disciplines such as law,
politics and international relations; this study explored African states' interventions using
comparative theory. This study thus contributed to the literature on theoretical perspectives of
intervention in African international relations. Secondly, this study's general objective was to
contribute to a better understanding of Uganda's intervention in the GLR states. Uganda has
been named as a major actor in the GLR conflicts and its interventionist foreign policy has come
under attack from its neighbours, the international community and the citizens themselves. The
focus of Uganda's interventionist foreign policy in available academic discourse has been mainly
on the DRC and Rwanda, with limited coverage of its role in Burundi. It is envisaged that the
findings of this research will contribute to the general understanding of Uganda's foreign policy
in the region as a whole, which would in turn place Uganda's interventions within an African
international relations perspective. There are mainly three areas that would benefit from further
research. Firstly, at the theoretical level, the poliheuristic and constructivist theories require
further development because in the study they provided interesting perspectives that would











lead to intervention and how norms and a culture had emerged in the region, which accounted
for many of the interventions.
Secondly, outliers that emerged from the study suggested that there were potential conflict and
insecurity areas that needed attention because they would once again result in war in the region if
no attention were paid to them. They were raised during the fieldwork by communities and
border administrators on the Ugandan side. An emerging and extremely disturbing trend that
had characterised the region was the increases in the refugee population. Uganda's permeable
borders were being used by fleeing Hutu and other ethnic communities from the DRC, who
entered Uganda at illegal border crossings. The average number of fleeing Hutu and other
communities totaled to approximately 500 a month. Crudely calculated, since 2004 when this
study commenced, Uganda has harboured approximately 25,000 undocumented and illegal
immigrants from the GLR region alone. This calculation is based on only two borders where the
researcher encountered the buses that the Hutu were using to flee Rwanda and the DRC.
However, all border districts visited raised their concerns over the issue of Hutu entering Uganda
and settling amongst Ugandan communities. A particular region was highlighted: the Kiboga
district where the Hutu are settling because of the vast land available there. This is a very salient
issue and an emerging threat. Uganda's insecurity may soon be aggravated because neighbouring
states are suspicious of why it harbours all these ethnic groups that may not necessarily be
responsible for the Rwandan genocide but who if not monitored carefully could be a source of
another genocide. Planning genocides cannot be put past communities that are large and are
given space from which to plan effectively.
These immigrants or fleeing communities have the potential of causing ethnic strife for the
already marginal land resources. Uganda already has violent ethnic conflict over land in the
districts of Kibaale, Teso and Kumi, and by allowing immigrants from other states to take over
such land, it is likely to break out into further mass ethnic violence, which could easily be
avoided if the immigrations were checked. Currently, this is mainly speculative; however, further
research is needed into these issues, which are increasing regional insecurity. The issues of
natural resource use and population growth are also fundamental if Uganda's security challenges
are going to be resolved. During the study, it was evident that the population in general was
concerned that there was a conspiracy by the leaders to let Hutu genocidiares and Hutu fleeing











not central to the study, it emerged as a critical factor that could seriously affect regional relations
and result in other interventions.
Thirdly, a natural resource conflict area that needed further research was the claim that Rwanda
and the DRC were domesticating mountain gorillas so that they could tap more revenue for their
tourist industry. This was compromising other states' tourist industries: tourists preferred to visit
the mountain gorillas in accessible areas, rather than tracking them in wild bushes for a long
time. Although discussions with border communities showed that this matter seemed trivial, the
key administrators argued that it was subtle and needed quick state intervention. Prior research
into these areas of potential insecurity would pre-empt ethnic violence and conflict identified in
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Appendix 1: Chronicle of Events
1986
26 Jan 1986 President Museveni comes to power in Uganda.
Mar 1986 Former Ugandan army soldiers enter Sudan with 6 helicopters and approximately 11,000
weapons. Sudan returns the helicopters but the weapons are not returned.
Aug 1986 A Sudanese army officer lieutenant Colonel Clement returns all arms to the former Uganda
National Liberation Army (UNLA) soldiers who had taken refuge in Sudan; it is an indication to
Uganda that if they support the SPLAY , the Sudanese army will in turn support the UNLA against
the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.
UNLA soldiers with Sudan army attack Uganda with the rebels at Bibia, with intention of taking
Gulu and onwards to Kampala to overthrow the NRM government. The soldiers are overrun and
the attack is quelled.
Insurgency commences in Northern Uganda with ambushes in all northern towns of Gulu,
Chwero, Opit, Kitgum, Puranga, Patong, Lira, Pajule and Pajimu, all in Northern Uganda.
1987
18 Jan 1987 First major military engagement of National Resistance Army (NRA) with rebels in Northern
Uganda at Corner Kilak in Gulu.
The Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) of Alice Lakwena follows suit in their attack against the NRA,
as the Ugandan army was known, then engages the HSM at Soroti, Kanyum, Mukongoro, Kariti,
Iyolwa, Muterere, Magamaga, all in Eastern Uganda.
1990
01 Oct 1990 Rwandan Tutsi rebel force of 4,000 attacks Rwanda, using Uganda as a base.
1991
29 Mar 1991 Cease-fire signed at N'Sele between Rwanda's government and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF);
Uganda and other regional states oversee the ceasefire agreement.
Apr 1991 RPF and Rwanda government talks continue in Dar es Salaam.
Aug 1991 Regional efforts to resolve conflict continue with a regional summit in Dar es Salaam.
1992
July 1992 Ceasefire agreement between the Rwandan People's Army (PA ) and the Rwandan government
is reached with the help of OAU.
1993
Aug 1993 Rwandan government and the RPA sign a comprehensive Peace Accord in Arusha, Tanzania.
21 Oct 1993 In Burundi, the first democratically elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi is
assassinated, allegedly by a Tutsi faction in the Burundi Army. Civil War breaks out in Burundi
and approximately 200,000 to 300,000 lives are claimed. This is interpreted as genocide against












Sep 1993 In Rwanda a power-sharing agreement between the Tutsi and Hutu is signed, in which a
transitional government is set up with a Hutu President and a Tutsi Prime Minister. This
agreement is also known as the "Convention of Government".
Oct 1993 United Nations approves UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR ) mission to, among
others, watch Uganda's border.
Nov 1993 Habyarimana indicates that the Rwandan government is not committed to the agreement by
arguing that it was, after all, just a piece of paper. This is followed by preparations for ethnic
divisions and hatred, as radios start to indicate that the Tutsi have to be wiped out.
1994
06 Apr 1994 President Habyarimana and President Ntibantunganya of Burundi are killed in a plane crash on
their way home from a summit in Tanzania.
11 Apr 1994 Rwandan genocide commences, approximately 800,000 die in the genocide. The RPF wage a full
war against the Rwandan government.
1995
1995 UN prepares for municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections in Rwanda.
Nov 1995 Cairo Conference on Burundi co-sponsored by Jimmy Carter leads to the creation of the Arusha
Group.
1996
Mar 1996 Tunis (Tunisia) Conference on Burundi is attended by the regional heads of state; Julius Nyerere
is appointed to lead the negotiation for the Burundi peace process.
25 Jul 1996 Pierre Buyoya leads coup against the Convention Government; the regional states of the GLR
impose sanctions on Burundi for Buyoya's action, because it violated the principle of peace to
which the GLR subscribed.
31 Jul 1996 GLR states impose sanctions on Burundi for Buyoya  coup against the Convention Government.
13 Nov 1996 Allied Democratic Front (ADF) attack Mpondwe by a group prepared by the Sudanese at Kaya.
They use Zaire as a base with the full knowledge of President Mobutu.698
1997
May 1997 Pierre Buyoya and Leonard Nyangoma, a Hutu rebel leader, sign a pre -cease -fire agreement.
1998
27 Apr 1998 President Kabila invites Uganda to station its forces in eastern Congo to pursue and subdue the
rebel bands that attacked Uganda from Congolese bases. This invitation was reconfirmed in the
written Protocol of 27 April 1998, signed by Uganda and the DRC.
Jun 1998 Buyoya government and the National Assembly agree to an Internal Partnership for Peace, which
marks the beginning of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha under the auspices of Nyerere.












08 Jun 1998 Attack on Kichwamba Technical School (Uganda) by an alliance between Congo, Sudan and the
ADF, and a Uganda army detachment at Kanyamura was attacked. The rebels abducted
200 civilians and set ablaze a locked dormitory with an estimated eight students who were fleeing
the rebels.
10 Jun 1998 Kichwamba attacked again and five Ugandans killed by the ADF.
26 Jun 1998 ADF attacks Banyangule village in Bundibugyo district, killing ten and wounding others.
05 Jul 1998 ADF attack Kiburara in Kasese district abducts 19 seminarians from the St. John's Seminary.
27 Jul 1998 President Kabila's decree of 27 July 1998 formally expels Rwandan soldiers (this is later
overturned by Kabila to say that it included the Ugandan soldiers).
The Russian T-55 tanks allegedly belonging to Uganda are found near Kitona; note, however, that
each state in the region owned the same Russian T-55 model tank.
Sudan deploys several thousand of its own troops, along with thousands more Chadian troops, in
eastern Congo. Isolated aerial attacks on Western and Northern Uganda commence.
Jul 1998 Sudan assists the anti-Uganda groups to merge with the Congolese armed forces. Taban Amin,
son of Idi Amin and a leader of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), a Ugandan rebel group, is
made Major General in the Congolese army and appointed to head the resident division of
Kabila's government in Kinshasa. The Sudan airlifts its own troops into several locations in
Eastern and Northern Congo, and begins to take control of all airfields in those parts of the
country, at the invitation of President Kabila.
Aug 1998 Uganda embassy in Kinshasha is attacked by the Congolese forces. Uganda launches a major
diplomatic effort to end the conflict in the Congo. Uganda's diplomatic initiative resulted in a
series of summit meetings.
01 Aug 1998 ADF attack Kasese town, burning shops and houses, and killing three people.
02 Aug 1998 Diplomatic initiative to end DRC conflict commences with the Pretoria Summit.
06 Aug 1998 ADF attack the town of Kyarumba near Kasese, killing 33 people.
07 Aug 1998 Uganda is attacked by ADF and some Congolese army elements at Beni.
The ADF attack and burn up houses, kill and maim people, and take others hostage. The attacks
in Buseruka and the second major one at Mpondwe in Kasese claim over 100 lives.
In North and North West part, the LRA also burns houses, maim people, and abduct children,
men and women in large numbers. All the rebel groups that carried out terrorist attacks are
funded by multiple agencies.
07 Aug 1998 United States of American Embassies are bombed in Tanzania and Kenya.
07-08 Aug 1998 Summit meetings at Victoria Falls I, Harare (Zimbabwe) to discuss the deteriorating situation. A
Joint Communique on the security concerns of the neighbouring states and the need to address
them is part of an effective settlement.
13 Aug 1998 Uganda retaliates by pursuing the rebels and occupies Bunia Airport.
14 Aug 1998 Uganda deploys in Watsa (border area north of Bunia).
15 Aug 1998 Uganda deploys substantial troops into Eastern Congo in self-defence against the attacks of the











23 Aug 1998 Kabila while in Khartoum reaffirms his military alliance with Sudan and arranges for more
Sudanese brigade to take up positions hostile to Uganda in Eastern Congo.
24 Aug 1998 President Museveni declares that, "if unilateral action intensifies, Uganda may be forced to take its
own independent action to protect its own security interests" because of the threat that
interventions of other states into the ARC posed for Uganda and the opportunity such
interventions would give the dissident groups to attack Uganda.
26 Aug 1998 Sudanese Antonov aircraft bombs positions of the Ugandan army at Bunia, just across the border
with Congo.
02 Sep 1998 Sudanese Colonel Ibrahim Ismail Habiballah delivers a planeload of weapons to the Congolese
army in Gbadolite for use by UNRE  II units that had been incorporated into the Congolese
armed forces.
11 Sep 1998 The High Command (Uganda) decides to intervene in the ARC.
14 Sep 1998 A Sudanese army brigade of approximately 2,500 troops, under the command of Sudanese
Lieutenant General Abdul Rahman Sir Khatim arrives in Gbadolite; the brigade deploys in the
Businga area, and prepares to engage with the Ugandan forces in Eastern Congo. President
Kabila's aide announces that the ARC and Sudan jointly agree to reinforce their deployment
along the Congo's borders with Uganda and Rwanda.
16 Sep 1998 President Museveni addresses the Sixth Parliament of Uganda on Uganda's intervention in the
ARC. Parliament's special sitting was aimed at briefing the members about the security situation
of Uganda.
18 Sep 1998 President Kabila again goes to Khartoum, where he receives pledges of additional Sudanese
troops and military equipment; he also meets there with leaders of the AAE, WNBE, UNRE II
and LRA.
20 Sep 1998 Uganda's occupies Isiro as a counter measure to prevent attacks from the ARC, Sudanese and
armed groups coalition forces and to prevent their occupation of strategic positions from which
they would continue their attacks on Uganda.
03 Oct 1998 Uganda occupies Buta.
17 Oct 1998 Uganda occupies Bumba.
12 Dec 1998 Uganda occupies Lisala and airfields of Eastern Congo to prevent the ARC and Congo coalition
forces being reinforced and providing logistical support to the Ugandan rebel groups based in the
ARC.
1999
18 Apr 1999 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopts its first resolution on the War in the ARC; the
Sire Agreement (signed in Libya), brokered by Murammar Gaddafi between Kabila and
Museveni and calling for a ceasefire, is signed.
28 May 1999 Rwanda declares a unilateral cessation of hostilities, which the US uses as an example to press
others to stop the military engagements. Two days later, however, it is alleged that Rwanda had
fired at the rebel posts in the ARC.
03 Jul 1999 Uganda's forces take control of the airfield at Gbadolite, and expel Sudanese and Chadian forces.
Uganda's military intervention in the ARC ends and preparations begin for disengagement.
10 Jul 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement (LPA) is endorsed and takes shape a few months later. LPA promises
Uganda and other foreign forces in the Congo to disarm, demobilise, resettle and reintegrate the











Kampala Aisengagement Plan is released, laying out the plan to manage the Ugandan rebels to be
handled by Uganda and the ARC Kabila government.
04 Aug 1999 Sudanese planes bomb Makanza and Bogbanga, rebel-held villages north-east of Kinshasha, and
killing approximately 500 civilians.
06-17 Aug 1999 Uganda and Rwanda clash in Kisangani ARC. Multiple causes but mainly because the RPA wants
to block the verification exercise that had been agreed upon by the Summit of the Heads of State
that has signed the Lusaka Accord.
Museveni and Kagame meet at Mweya and sign a ceasefire agreement that includes the
demarcation of Kisangani into two zones. The North-East to be under Uganda's control, while
the South and West are put under Rwanda's control.
2000
14 Apr 2000 Lusaka Peace Accord to be operationalised. It is agreed by the Joint Military Commission and the
United Nations Mission in the Aemocratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) that 30 kilometres be
the disengagement zone along the agreed confrontation line.
05 May 2000 Another clash between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani over strategic territorial control.
Uganda's interest to control Kapalata and the Lubutu-Bafwasende Road is in contravention of the
Rwakitura and Mweya agreements.
Another non-military cause of the war that is advanced is the fight between the military
commanders of both states over a beautiful "Munyamulenge" woman whom both wanted to
court. The decision by the woman to honour a visit requested by the Ugandan commander was
construed by the Rwandan commander as rejection and following some "unverified rumours" to
the Commander-in-Chief that Uganda wanted to attack Rwandan outposts. In a quick way to
justify his story, the Rwandan commander commences attacks on the Ugandan posts in Kisangani
and war ensues. Like Helen of Sparta, the states fight over two military officials' love wrangles,
which may also be part of national security.
08 May 2000 Museveni calls a meeting at Rwakitura between UNSC and Kagame (consultation on phone), and
both agree to demilitarize Kisangani.
14 May 2000 Benjamin Mkapa, President of Tanzania, holds a meeting between Uganda and Rwanda, during
which it is agreed that Kisangani be demilitarized.
21 May 2000 Military commanders of Uganda and Rwanda sign an implementation order for the withdrawal
and redeployment of their forces - all forces, including the rebel forces from Kisangani. MONUC
is to deploy its forces to exercise neutral control of the region, particularly the airports in
replacement of the Ugandan and Rwandan forces.
28 May 2000 President Museveni addresses parliament on the new developments surrounding the second
Kisangani war of 5 May 2000.
16 Jun 2000 UNSC Resolution 1304 orders both Uganda and Rwanda to desist from military engagements in
the region.
19 Jun 2000 ARC makes a request to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that provisional measures be put
in place to prevent Uganda from fighting in the ARC
01 Jul 2000 The ICJ makes an order that contains the provisional measures in the case concerning Uganda
and the ARC.
28 Aug 2000 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi is signed. The implementation












2001 The London meeting (2001) is the fourth in the year to resolve the conflict between Uganda and
Rwanda. A verification committee is established with the participation of the UK as a third party.
27-28 Oct 2001 A joint military verification committee, agreed on in Durban, is established. Colonel Charles
Kayonga for Rwanda and Major James Mugira for Uganda head it.
29 Oct 2001 Amama Mbabazi of Uganda and Colonel Emmanuel Habyarimana of Rwanda meet for six hours
in Kabale. Their official communique announces that both countries will relocate the dissident
RPA; they call for transparency and prior notification of any new troop deployments in their own
countries and in the ARC.
01 Nov 2001 Transitional government is set up in Burundi with the setting up of the TransnationalAssembly
and the Transitional Senate in January 2002.
2002 
06 Sep 2002 Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the ARC is endorsed. The agreement takes cognisance
of the growing threat to Uganda of armed groups attack. The ARC permits Uganda to stay and
protect its territory, while the ARC increases its military and police patrols in the border region.
The withdrawal timetable of Ugandan troops is agreed upon but subject to revision, if the ARC is
not satisfied with its preparations for securing the Eastern part from the Ugandan armed groups.
So a battalion is authorized by the ARC to remain at the slopes of Mt. Ruwenzori. A joint
pacification committee is established for the troubled region of Ituri in the Northern ARC.
Sep 2002 Kony, using Southern Sudan as base, attacks Eastern Uganda and loots drugs worth Shs 400,000
from the Awach Health Unit, disarming 16 Karamojong warriors and castrating others.
Oct 2002 Sudan permits Uganda to launch Operation Iron Fist in Southern Sudan to root out the IRA.
2002 The Sun City Agreement is endorsed, commencing the formation of the transitional government.
Oct 2002 Inter Congolese Aialogue (ICAO ) protocols are signed, while Mai Mai mercenaries occupy Uvira
and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) occupies Bunia.
21 Nov 2002 President Museveni addresses Parliament on the security situation of Uganda.
17 Aec 2002 Pretoria Agreement between the five parties of the ICAO  with the help of the South African
government, the ICD UN special envoy Moustapha Nyasse (former Senegalese Prime Minister)
and the five parties of the ICED . Principle objective: to share power during the transition period.
2003
03 Jun 2003 Constitution of transition and a protocol on the reform of the security services (the security
structure of the envisaged national army) are agreed upon.
02 Apr 2003 Sun City: Ratification of the Constitution of transition and the protocol on the reform of the
security services.
May 2003 Uganda starts withdrawing troops from the ARC with the supervision of the Joint Military
Commission ((MC).
02 Jun 2003 The last contingent of Uganda leaves the ARC.
16 Nov 2003 Transitional government of President Aomitien Ndayizeye and the National Council for the













18 Apr 2004 President Museveni has a meeting in Dar es Salaam with the Ugandan delegation to the
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. He highlights issues of "citizenship" as
being responsible for insecurity in the region.
Oct 2004 A Tripartite Joint Commission composed of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda commences
operation.
Nov 2004 The Dar es Salaam Declaration, drawn up between the GLR states, agrees on the security
measures between states. The Declaration is overseen by the International Community.
2005
03 Eeb 2005 US President mediates ARC talks between the three countries on the ARC.
25 Mar 2005 An Antonov 28 plane from Kyrgystan is impounded at Kanombe International Airport in
Rwanda. The crew (six Russians and two Congolese) are jailed in Kigali.
18 Apr 2005 The DRC case against Uganda continues at The Hague in The Netherlands. The ARC claims that
Uganda failed to take the necessary steps to prevent that plunder the natural resources of the
ARC, including by its own military officers, as it was required to do under the general principles
of international law.
Aug 2005 The new government is led by a Hutu President Pierre Nkurunzinza, who is sworn in in Burundi.
In terms of agreement, Hutu and Tutsi agree to share power and the army equitably.
2007
26 Mar 2007 The UPDE kills 34 ADF rebels and captures five in a battle in Bundibugyo. The fighting is along
River Sempaya in Semliki Game Reserve in Bundibugyo, 15 to 20 km from the Congolese border.











Appendix 2: Detailed List of the Informants




UGIMOD 1 Captains Kampala 30th July 2005
UGIMOD 2 Captain Kanungu/Ntungamo 5th October 2005
UGIMOD 3 Captains Ntungamo 4th -5th October 2005
UGIMOD 4 Lieutenants Kampala 19th September 2005
UGIMOD 5 Lieutenants Kampala 29th July 2005
UGIMOD 6 Lieutenants Kimaka 30th July 2005
UGIMOD 7 Lieutenants Colonel Kimaka 17th October 2004
UGIMOD 8 Lieutenants Colonel Kampala 8th August 2005
UGIMOD 9 Lieutenants Colonel Kampala 19th September 2005
UGIMOD 10 Colonel Kampala 17th October 2004
UGIMOD 11 Major (Eormer Sector Kampala 27th and 28th July 2005
Commander)
UGIMOD 12 Acting head CHI Kampala 27th July 2005
UGIMOD 13 Major Cape Town 24th Eebruary 2006
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
UG/FA 1 Minister Kampala 16th November 2005
UG/FA 2 Commissioner Kampala 18th July 2005
UG/FA 3 Commissioner Kampala 18th July 2005
UG/FA 4 GLR affairs Kampala 18th December 2005
UG/FA 5 Regional relations desk Kampala full consultation 1 .
UG/FA 6 Protocol section Kampala Regular discussions 2
UG/FA/RW 1 Rwanda Katuna 24th October 2005
UG/FA/RW 2 Kigali 24th October 2005
UG/FA/RW 3 Katuna 30th October 2005
UG/FA/BU 1 Ambassador Kampala 29th July 2005
UG/FA/BU 2 Minister of Peace Process Bujumbura 26th October 2005
UG/FA/BU 3 Vice-President de la Commission Bujumbura 27th October 2005
UG/FA/BU 4 Leader Political Party (IMC) Bujumbura 26th-29th October 2005 699
UG/FA/BU 5 Leader of Political Party Bujumbura 28th October 2005




UG/FA/DR 5 Bwindi Uganda/DRC border 7th October 2005
(Butogota
699 I am greatly indebted to interviewee UG/FA/BU 4 who hosted me and shared with me his views during my












UG/FA/SA 1 In-charge Political Affairs Kampala 25th July 2005
UG/EA/BR 1 British Kampala 8th December, 2005
UG/EA/US 1 US 10th December 2005
Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Police)
UG/MIA 1 District Police Commanders (DPC)
UG/MIA 2 DPC Kisoro
UGIMIA 3 DPC Ntungamo Ntungamo District
Offices 6th October 2005
UGIMIA 4 DPC Kanugu Kanungu Town Council 5th October 2005
UGA4IA 5 DPC Kabale Kabale 23rd October 2005
UGA4IA 6 DPC Hoima Hoima 8th September 2005
UGIMIA 7 DPC Kasese Kasese 10th August
UGIMIA 8 DPC Bundibugyo Bundibugyo 8th September 2005
UGA4IA 9 Criminal Investigations Department
(C.I.D) Kisoro Kisoro 16th August 2005
UGIMIA 10 CID Ntungamo Ntungamo District
Offices 6th October 2005
UGIMIA 11 C.I.D Kanugu Kanungu Town Council 7th October 2005
UGA4IA 12 C.I.D Kasese Kasese 11th August 2005
UGIMIA 13 C.I.D Ntoroko Ntoroko West 2nd September 2005
UGA4IA 14 C.ID Bundibugyo Nyankonda
(Bundibugyo) 7th September 2005
UGIMIA 15 Chairman Eocal Point (SALWs) Kampala 4th October 2004
UGIMIA 16 ISO Kampala 1st December 2004
Ministry of Local Government
UGA4OLG 1 Resident District Commissioners Kasese 10th August 2005
UGA4OLG 2 Resident District Commissioners Kisoro 16th August 2005
UGA4OLG 3 Resident District Commissioners Ntoroko 1st September 2005
UGA4OLG 4 Resident District Commissioners Bundibugyo 6th September 2005
UGA4OLG 5 Resident District Commissioners Hoima 8th September 2005
UGA4OLG 6 Resident District Commissioners Ntungamo 6th October 2005
UGA4OLG 7 Resident District Commissioners Runkungiri 7th October 2005
UGA4OLG 8 Local Council V Kasese 11th August 2005
UGA4OLG 9 Local Council V Kisoro 16th August 2005
UGA4OLG 10 Local Council V Bundibugyo 6th September 2005
UGA4OLG 11 Local Council V Hoima 8th September 2005
UGA4OLG 12 Local Council V Ntungamo 3rd October 2005
UGA4OLG 13 Local Council V Kanugu 6th October 2005
UGA4OLG 14 Local Council V Runkungiri (deputy
RDC) 7th October 2005
UGA4OLG 15 District Security Officer Kasese 10th August 2005
UGA4OLG 16 District Security Officer Kisoro 16-18th August 2005











UGA4OLG 18 District Security Officer Bundibugyo 1 	7th September 2005
UP/MOLG 19 District Security Officer Hoima 8th September 2005
UGA4OLG 20 District Security Officer Ntungamo 3rd and 5th October 2005
UG/MOLG 21 District Security Officer Kanugu 6th October 2005
UG/MOLG 22 District Security Officer Runkungiri 7th October 2005
UGA4OLG 23 Border Administrators Kasese 10th August 2005
UP/MOLG 24 Border Administrators Kisoro 16th August 2005
UP/MOLG 25 Border Administrators Ntungamo 5th October 2005
UP/MOLG 26 Border Administrators Kanugnu 6th October 2005
UG/MOLG 27 Border Administrators Kanungu 6th October 2005
UG/MOLG 28 UPDE Liaison Officers Kisoro 16th August 2005
UGA4OLG 29 UPDE Liaison Officers Kabale 23rd October 2005
UP/MOLG 30 UPDE Liaison Officers Ntungamo 3rd October 2005
UP/MOLG 31 In-Charge Immigration Kasese 11th August 2005
UP/MOLG 32 In-Charge Immigration Kisoro 16th August 2005
UG/MOLG 33 In-Charge Immigration Kisoro 16th August 2005
UG/MOLG 34 In-charge Customs Kisoro 16th August 2005
UP/MOLG 35 In-charge Customs Ntungamo 3rd October 2005
UG/MOLG 36 In-charge Customs Kanungu 6th October 2005
Ministry of Finance
UG/MOF 1 Assissant Commissioner Kampala
UP/MOF 2 Permanent Secretaries office Kampala 10th November 2005
UP/MOF 3 Officer (Auditor's office) Kampala 12th November 2005
UG/MOF 4 Budget drawer Kampala 18th December 2005
Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Industry
UG/ITI 1 Ass. Commissioner Level Kampala 23rd November 2005
UG/TTI 2 Ass. Commissioner Level Kampala 23rd November 2005
UG/ITI 3 Permanent Secretaries office Kampala 23rd November 2005
International Organisations
IO/AU 1 UN Kampala
IO/AU AU Tanzania 20th November 2004
IO/UNHR UNHGR Hoima 7th September 2005
IO/AFRIKAKTION AERIKAKTION Hoima 8th September 2005
JO/RED CROSS RED CROSS Kampala 15th December 2005
IO/MONUC MONUC Kampala 21st September 2005
Legislature (Political Parties Representatives)
UPC 1 Kampala 23rd July 2004
UPC 2 Kampala 14th November 2004
UPC 3 Tanzania 18th November 2004
DP 1 Kampala 20th October 2005
DP 2 Kampala 20th October 2005






















Appendix 3: Questionnaire with a mark-up sheet at the end








Section A: National Security Strategy
• What is Uganda's national security strategy?
• What is Uganda's security concern in the Western border and how does this change over time?
• What is Uganda's regional security concern (East African region, Great Lakes Region, and Africa as
a whole?
• What is the mandate of the military in border security and how does this influence their action in a
conflict situation? Focus on the Western border?
Section B: Non-State Actors in Western Uganda
• What were the main groups on the western border that were involved in destabilizing Uganda?
• How old were their operations?




• About how many were they and how were they spread?
• What were their main arms of combat?
• What were their main areas of operation?
• What problem did they pose for the region in. which they operated?











Section C: Arms and Weaponry
• What were the main arms that these non-state actors use? SALWs or Heavy military weapons?
• What do you think was the main source of these weapons?
• What were the main transfer centres of these arms or areas of exchange?
• What other transfer centres were used by these groups to access arms?
• Is there any observation you made during this period that you find important to the fact of the
weapons on Uganda's security interests.
Question guide: Mark up sheet
What would you argue in order of preference is the main factor that explains Uganda's foreign policy in
the following countries?
Factors Burundi DRC Rwanda
Uganda's proximity to the intervenee
Uganda is a potential regional power
Uganda had hegemonic ambitions
Uganda viewed the conflicts as threatening regional stability
Uganda was concerned with the humanitarian concerns
Uganda had interest in the parties and issues involved in the
conflict
Uganda's size in comparison to the conflict states
Uganda had trans national economic, military, educational,
social and political linkages
It was because of the end of the cold war.
Uganda was upholding human rights
Uganda's security concerns/threat crisis
Uganda simply wanted an opportunity to intervene
Country specific discussion: Burundi/Rwanda/DRC











• What are the events in Burundi that Uganda has responded to and how?
• Why did Uganda respond the way it did and how?
• How would you describe the relations between Uganda and Burundi currently?
• What was Uganda and Burundi's relation in the events in Rwanda and the DRC?
• What was Uganda and Rwanda's relation in the events in Burundi and the DRC
• What were Uganda's relations with the Zaire/DRC in the events in Burundi and Rwanda?
• What is the Great Lakes alliance and who comprises this alliance? What are key alliance
components or structures?
• Why in your opinion do you think Uganda goes to other states? A) Burundi B) Rwanda C) DRC











Appendix 4: Questionnaire for the Communities
Uganda's foreign Policy in the Western Neighbouring States
1 Name of organisation
2 Position held in district/organisation
3 Do you know of any cross border conflicts? List them
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4 What kind of conflicts do you normally handle?
(ii)
5 How often do these conflicts occur?
6 What are the main causes of these cross border conflicts in this area?
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7 How does your district handle cross border conflicts?
#1) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
8 Are there any rebel groups operating in your neighbourhood)











(iv) - - - - - - - - - - -
(v) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(vi) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10 Have rebels ever attacked villages in your district? Which specific places?
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(v) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(vi) 	
11 Where did the people take refugee when the rebels attacke
12 How did the administration deal with the situation?
--------------------
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
13 Are there ethnic conflicts at the border?
14 What ethnic groups fought each other at this border and why?
15 Briefly explain the impact of this fight on the village.
16 What was done to resolve the conflicts between these ethnic groups?
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 












18 Give the strengths of your administration in dealing with the problems in the region?
(it) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(v) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
19 Who keeps records of the main conflicts and their effects on the region/people and property?
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
20 Is there any trade conducted between your district and the neighbouring countries?
21 What are the main trade items in which your district interacts with neighbouring countries?
(iv) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(v) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(vi)
(vii) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
(ix) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -











Appendix 5: Contact Summary Sheet
Contact Code:  Contact Date:
Name: Interview Venue:
Title: Organisation:
Phone No: Time of interview:
Main issues raised:











Appendix 6: Interview Schedule
• What were the main problems your country faced that led up to the civil war between the Hutu and
the Tutsi?
• What were the main problems between the warring parties?
• What in your opinion is the comment that Museveni's intervention in your struggle was calculated
to expand his power in the region?
• Did Museveni favour the Tutsi,  since it is claimed he had links to the Tutsi?
• What, on the whole, was Uganda's role in your conflict?
• Why do you think your country allied with Uganda in its war in the DRC?
• What would you argue is the status of the relations of Museveni's administration with your
country?
• What are your views on the peace agreement that you endorsed?
• Do you think the new regime will observe democracy?
• What would you like the new regime to do?
305
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
